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ABSTRACT 
This research aims to propose a Risk Management (RM) framework and develop a 
generic risk-based model for dealing with potential hazards and risk factors associated 
with offshore terminals' and marine ports' operations and management. Hazard 
identification was conducted through an appropriate literature review of major risk 
factors of these logistic infrastructures. As a result in the first phase of this research a 
Fuzzy Analytical Hierarchal Process (F AHP) method was used for determining the 
relative weights of the risk factors identified via the literature review. This has led to the 
development of a generic risk -based model which can help related industrial 
professionals and risk managers assess the risk factors and develop appropriate 
strategies to take preventive/corrective actions for mitigation purposes, with a view of 
maintaining efficient offshore terminals' and marine ports' operations and management. 
In the second phase of the research the developed risk-based model incorporating Fuzzy 
Set Theory (FST), an Evidential Reasoning (ER) approach and the IDS software were 
used to evaluate the risk levels of different ports in real situations using a case study. 
The IDS software based on an ER approach was used to aggregate the previously 
determined relative weights of the risk factors with the new evaluation results of risk 
levels for the real ports. The third phase of the research made use of the Cause and 
Consequence Analysis (CCA) including the Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and Event Tree 
Analysis (ETA) under a fuzzy environment, to analyse in detail the most significant risk 
factors determined from the first phase of the research, using appropriate case-studies. 
In the fourth phase of the research an individual RM strategy was tailored and 
implemented on the most significant risk factor identified previously. In the last phase 
of the research and in order to complete the RM cycle, the best mitigation strategies 
were introduced and evaluated in the form of ideal solutions for mitigating the identified 
risk factors. All methods used in this research have quantitative and qualitative nature. 
Expert judgements carried out for gathering the required information accounted for the 
majority of data collected. The proposed RM framework can be a useful method for 
managers and auditors when conducting their RM programmes in the offshore and 
marine industries. The novelty of this research can help the Quality, Health, Safety, 
Environment and Security (QHSES) managers, insurers and risk managers in the 
offshore and marine industries investigate the potential hazards more appropriately if 
there is uncertainty of data sources. In this research with considering strategic 
management approaches to RM development the proposed RM framework and risk-
based model contribute to knowledge by developing and evaluating an effective 
methodology for future use of the RM professionals. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1. AN OVERVIEW OF THE RISK MANAGEMENT 
The principle of Risk Management (RM) may be traced to 2250 BC when the 
Babylonians established a principle called Bottomry as a method of handling the risks 
associated with international trade (Trenerry, 1926). One of the earliest records of RM 
is the marine insurance arrangements that were drawn up by Phoenician traders more 
than 3000 years ago (Brown, 1998). Indeed both individuals and firms have been 
infonnally dealing with risk for thousands of years. Yet, regardless of the occurrence of 
risk in society, academic interest in the area of RM has only begun quite recently. In 
fact the "birth" of the discipline can largely be traced back to only the late 1950s and 
early 1960s, since it was not until this time that a-formal definition of "corporate RM" 
was developed or indeed widely accepted (Snider, 1991; Williams et ai, 1995). 
In earlier defmitions the main purpose of the RM was its insurance buying function in 
order to avoid the "pure risk" e.g. piracy, theft, storms etc. Pure risk exists when there is 
uncertainty as to whether loss will occur. No possibility of gain is presented by pure risk 
- only the potential for loss. Other examples of pure risk include the uncertainty of 
damage to property by fire, flood or the probability of premature death caused by 
accident or illness (Trieschmann et a/, 2001). Furthermore, pure risks were typically 
seen as being non-business risks in that they were more an unfortunate by-product of a 
finn's manufacture of goods and services rather than an integral part of the production 
process (Carter and Crockford, 1974; Mehr and Hedges, 1974). In contrast to pure risk, 
"speculative risk" exists when there is uncertainty about an event that could produce 
either a profit or loss. Business ventures and investment decisions are examples of 
situations involving speculative risk (Trieschmann et ai, 2001). In other words it is 
mostly involved with business related risks and decision making processes. 
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However, during the end of 20th century and at the beginning of the 21th century 
research into corporate RM started to move along away from emphasising the 
importance of the insurance buying and pure risk avoidance. There are new emergent 
reviews of the development in both practical interest and academic research into the 
field of RM which have been carried out by the era researchers. However they have 
introduced two key insights to facilitate the RM development The first one is the 
achievement of integrated RM as "when RM is integrated (or embedded) into all of the 
functions and processes within the organisation" (AIRMIC. 1999). This addresses not 
just insurable pure risks but also all other types of related risks (i.e. speculative risks) 
that a firm, corporation or organisation can face e.g. country risks, business risks, 
organisational risks, operational risks, etc. The second one is "taking a strategic 
management approach to RM development" (Johnson and Scholes, 2002; CFO research 
Service, 2002). In this respect Williarns et aI, (1995) define RM as: "a general function 
that seeks to identify, assess, and address the causes and effects of uncertainty and risk 
on an organisation". They then go on to say that "the purpose of RM is to enable an 
organisation to progress toward its goals and objectives in the most direct, efficient, and 
effective path". 
Eventually as per AIRMIC, ALARM and IRM (2002) RM "is a central part of any 
organisation's strategic management. It is the process whereby organisations 
methodically address the risks attaching to their activities with the goal of achieving 
sustained benefit within each activity and across the portfolio of all activities. The focus 
of good RM is the estimation and treatment of these risks". They explain RM should be 
a nonstop and developing practice which runs all through the organisation's strategy 
and the implementation of that strategy. It should address systematically all the risks 
surrounding the organisation's activities at earlier periods, in present and particularly in 
the future. Moreover, RM must be integrated into the culture of the organisation with an 
effective policy and a programme led by the most senior management. As per IRM 
(2002) "RM must translate the strategy into tactical and operational objectives, 
assigning responsibility throughout the organisation with each manager and employee 
responsible for the management of risk as part of their job description. It supports 
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accountability, perfonnance measurement and reward, thus promoting operational 
efficiency at all levels". 
1.2. RESEARCH BACKGROUND 
1.2.1. Earlier concepts 
As Bureau of Transport Economics (2000) explains infrastructures (i.e. marine ports 
and tenninals) are essential elements for the operation of every country's economy that 
can affect their cost structures, industry competitiveness and living standards. They then 
express the fact that still the importance of marine ports does not tend to be 
acknowledged by general public. Following the aforementioned statement, Helmick 
(2001) explains that the general public in USA are unappreciative of the key role of 
marine ports and tenninals as conduits enabling products to be available for their 
consumption. In addition Young (200 I) discusses that "sea ports affect almost 
everything that people come into contact with on a daily basis, yet marine ports do not 
have the same recognition with the general public as airports". 
While the general public and government in many countries are in fact unaware of the 
economIC contribution and the regional impact of their ports and terminals, as is 
discussed previously by Helmick (2001) and Young (2001), research and the 
subsequent improvements in four related areas (operational, organisational, economical 
and business) of sea ports and marine tenninals have been occurring for many years. 
Although in respect of the mentioned areas many efforts have been carried out by 
different researchers over the recent years, leading international organisations and 
bodies such as United Nations Conferences on Trade and Development (UNCT AD), 
World Bank, European Commissions and Asian Development Bank which are the main 
places where there have been strong tendencies to carry out research concerning marine 
ports and terminals for many years. 
In respect of the operational improvements perspectives of the marine ports and 
terminals UNCTAD (1976), World Bank (2001) and Marlo and Casaca (2003) express 
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that performance indicators are important factors in determining the efficiency of the 
sea ports and marine terminals. For the purpose of the safety and pollution prevention 
improvements of ports in 1993, UK Marine Safety Agency (MSA) proposed to the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) that Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) could 
be applied to ensure a strategic oversight of safety and pollution prevention (Trbojevic 
and Carr, 2000). In another attempt UNCTAD (2006) discusses factors which influence 
the improvement of the security related issues within marine ports. In respect of the port 
safety and container revolution Fabiano et ai, (2009) explain the factors that can affect 
occupational accident frequency in ports and terminals. Regarding offshore terminals 
the UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE) has focused comprehensively on health, 
safety and environmental related matters particularly from the time when the Piper 
Alpha disaster took place in 1988. 
Relating to the organisational improvements perspectives, for ports and terminals 
Thomas (200 I) for example, has researched organisational and institutional 
relationShips within container terminals and others have examined the port privatisation, 
ports operational/management structure and the industrial relationships with employees, 
including stevedores (UNCTAD, 1996; World Bank, 2001). As sea ports become more 
concerned with performing a linking role in the international trade and transportation 
chain, research emerging on how this relationship should be managed and facilitated by 
new information technologies has been conducted (Lee et ai, 2000). Frankel (200 1) for 
instance, in reviewing technological opportunities for container terminals, explains how 
new technology enables sea ports to integrate cargo transfer into individual customer 
logistical requirements. 
In respect of the economic (macro and micro) related issues and perspectives for ports 
and terminals, UNCT AD (1996) and World Bank (200 1) have examined the macro-
economic purposes and contributions of the ports and terminals, their value for the trade, 
and how competitiveness among ports and terminals can impact the economies of the 
different countries. For example Goss (1990a) explains how having efficient sea ports 
can raise the gross domestic product of a nation. On the other hand at the micro-
economical level, PaImer (1999) concentrates on the efficiency of the port facilities and 
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operations ID order to improve their competitive positioning. In respect of port 
productivity and efficiency which will influence and improve the competitiveness of the 
ports and terminals, others such as World Bank (2001), Wang et al (2007) and Huang et 
al (2008) have carried out different investigations. 
With reference to the business related perspectives of the ports and terminals, Malchow 
and Kanafani (200 I) have discussed the factors that influence marine port selection by 
shipping lines and other customers by applying a generic multinational modeL Other 
business related studies about marine ports and terminals include reviews of the 
development of sea ports via case studies, with respect to the individual port and 
terminal bases, as well as regional and national levels (e.g. UNCTAD, 1985; Xiaobin 
and Sum, 1995; Mak and Tai, 2001; Beresford, 2004) 
In the past, the above areas of the research may have been sufficient, but now, dynamic 
and enforced changes occur in marine ports' and offshore terminals' economical, 
business, operational and organisational related environments. The prompt is refocusing 
on the marine ports and offshore terminals studies, in order to include the recently 
emergent RM-related issues taking into consideration both externally and internally 
driven elements e.g. pure and speculative risks. This view has been steadily increasing 
and evidenced, for example, in the changes to the UNCT AD from 1996 to 2006. 
UNCTAD (2006) is used to describe the initial development of a security risk 
assessment and management framework which is capable of reflecting the logistics 
scope of transport networks. But before 2006 the focus was mostly on the development, 
management, commercial, operational and organisational issues of the ports and 
terminals. Another example is GAO's case which recently has focused on the ports' RM 
topic. GAO (2006) has stressed "further refinements needed to assess risks and 
prioritise protective measures at marine ports and other critical infrastructures". In UK 
also, DETR (2000) has required all marine ports to perform risk assessment of their 
marine operations in order to put into practice the safety management system. 
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1.2.2. Recent researches and their contribution to RM 
Currently RM related studies such as ISPS Code (2003) represent a very small 
proportion of the investigations corresponding to the offshore terminals' and marine 
ports' operations and management issues. Issues contained within the four major areas 
mentioned in the previous section still tend to dominate the offshore terminals and 
marine ports research as is evident in the most major maritime related academic journals 
such as Journals of: Marine Science and Technology, Offshore Engineering, Offshore 
Technology, Marine Policy, Maritime Policy and Management, Maritime Economic, 
Maritime Economic and Logistics, Marine pollution Bulletin, Transport Management, 
Transportation Research, Research in Transportation Economics and Environmental 
Impact Assessment Review. Moreover they can be evident in many non-maritime 
related academic journals such as Journal of: Hazardous Materials, Economics and 
Business, Production Economics, Operational Research, World Development, Cleaner 
Production, Commerce on Line, Productivity Analysis, Industrial Economics, 
Computers, Industrial Engineering, Fuzzy Sets and Systems, Expert Systems with 
Applications, Applied Soft Computing, Reliability Engineering and System Safety and 
International Journal of Business Continuity and Risk Management. UNCT AD, EUC, 
World Bank, ADB, HSE, DNV, ABS etc also conduct research on the same mentioned 
backgrounds. 
Currently ports' ancherminals' RM related studies are evident only in a few journals 
such as Journal of Hazardous Materials. Trbojevic and Carr (2000) show an established 
risk based methodology which can be used for safety improvements in marine ports. 
Tsai and Su (2005) in the Journal of Marine Policy have explained about a new risk 
assessment method used for assessing five East Asian ports situated in different 
countries. In another attempt, and in Journal of Maritime Policy and Management, 
Banomyong (2005) explains about the impact of port and trade security initiatives on 
maritime supply chain management. 
In respect of nations and governments for the purpose of the RM-related subjects, 
countries such as USA, UK, .canada, Norway, Australia and New Zealand are pioneers 
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in RM issues by developing their own specific RM guidelines and standards. Most of 
the produced RM standards by these governments are used in areas such as: Norwegian 
Petroleum Directorate, US Offshore Oil Production Industry, US Coast Guard, US 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, US Department of Defence, US Department of 
Energy, US GAD, UK HSE, UK Ministry of Defence, UK Dff (i.e. DETR superseded 
by Department for Transport in 2002), UK Marine Coastguard Agency and 
International Maritime Organization (lMO) in London (ABS, 2003 and HSE, 2010). 
However in respect of the offshore terminals and marine ports RM-related topics-except 
the work reported in the journals mentioned earlier, appears to have been little interest 
until recently. As the DETR (2000), World Bank (2001), UNCTAD (2006), GAO (2007) 
and, HSE (2010) claim, there exist risks in ports and terminals, all of which require 
attention in respect of their hazards identification, assessment and management if they 
are going to remain responsive to the strategic needs and future challenges. 
In this regard recently GAO (2007) regarding managing risks in ports explains that US 
ports and waterways handle more than 2 billion tons of domestic and import/export 
cargo annually, and more than 95 percent of US international trade moves by water. As 
such, ports are a global gateway to world markets and significant engines in the US 
economy. However, as significant as they are, almost every main US port faces one or 
more types of natural catastrophe with potentially devastating effects. Ports located in 
the Eastern seaboard and the Gulf Coast encounter-the prospect of hurricanes, and ports 
on the West Coast are in locations that are extremely vulnerable to earthquakes. Losing 
a main port, even for a short duration e.g. a number of weeks, could have a national 
economic impact, making successful improvement a worry not only for the local area 
but also for the central government. Therefore it is important to have disaster planning 
and recovery programme in ports and ultimately to conduct the RM for ports. 
Similar sentiments are expressed by UNCTAD (2006) in respect of the 11th September 
attack on the US in 2001 as well as about International Ship and Port facility Security 
(ISPS) Code which came into force in 2004 by the IMO. In their conclusions they 
introduced an "initial security risk assessment and management framework capable of 
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reflecting the logistics scope of the transport networks. The document also reviewed 
existing approaches to measuring transport security compliance costs and funding 
schemes adopted by industry and governments in order to finance the costs of security 
regulations". 
The World Bank in 2001 presented an analytical framework for assessing the risks 
confronting port operators and with the goal of identifying principles for the equitable 
sharing of each risk between the public and private sector parties involved. 
Moreover in the UK as a consequence of the Sea Empress disaster in Milford Haven in 
1996, the Port Marine Safety Code (PMSC) was introduced in the UK in March 2000, 
necessitating all ports to perform risk assessment of marine operations in order to 
execute the safety management system (DETR, 2000). Following this regulatory 
requirement in the US, UK and New Zealand many ports in the same year carried out 
the risk assessment processes in order to meet the PMSC's requirement. 
In the offshore industry, safety and risk-based subjects mainly relate to the legislation 
and safety acts principally in response to disasters involving significant loss of life. 
These can include the destruction of a fixed offshore gas production platform (e.g. Piper 
Alpha installation in the UK waters in 1988) or the destruction of an offshore oil and 
gas production tenninal (e.g. Bombay High North Platform in 2005). Mather (2004) 
stated that the Piper Alpha incident has caused a fundamental change in the way the 
industry was both certified and regulated. Regulatory bodies and legislators such as 
HSE and Department for Transport (Off) in UK require all offshore companies 
(operators, contractors etc) involved in offshore operations, logistics and engineering 
must carry out and have valid documents called SafetylHSE Cases and Reports prior to 
starting any task. This demonstrates that a comprehensive Quantitative Risk Assessment 
(QRA) methodology involving use of different techniques has been utilised prior to 
carrying out any offshore activities. The mentioned document confirms that all the 
potential hazards for the intended operations are identified. assessed and mitigation 
measures along with an appropriate emergency response plan in place for immediate use 
and/or formal investigations. These documents must be approved by legislators before 
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any operation starts and finally they can be used as evidence or will be checked in court 
as a testimony in a court case. They will be used in courts to prove and show that an 
ultimate safety related due diligence has been exercised for the intended operations in 
order to protect operators' or contactors' liabilities against potential raised claims. 
In another case, ports and terminals have received exceptional attention by GAO' s 
report in 2006 as marine ports are broadly viewed as indicating attractive terrorist 
targets, in part because of their importance to the economy. As GAO expressed more 
than 95 percent of US's overseas trade (and 100 percent of certain products, such as 
foreign oil) is transported in vessels. The estimated economic effects of a successful 
attack and resulting shutdown of this system could cost billions of dollars. Ports in 
addition symbolize attractive targets since they contain countless vulnerability. In total, 
the US's 300 plus ports have more than 3,700 cargo and passenger terminals. Chemical 
factories, oil refineries, power plants, and other facilities are often located in port areas 
and add another set of possible targets. Roads cross many ports, allowing access by land 
as well as by water, and the number of people working in or travelling through ports is 
significant. 
Nevertheless it seems that there are some moves by governments and international 
bodies towards RM for managing mostly the pure risks that offshore terminals and 
marine ports may encounter. Presently for the purpose of dealing with speculative risks 
(i.e. business related ones) arguments and efforts are generally rare. 
By viewing the above facts and arguments the discipline of RM (especially those 
relating to speculative and business related risks) is still developing. 
1.3. JUSTIFICATION FOR THE RESEARCH 
As mentioned in the previous section, there have been some moves toward RM to avoid 
the pure risks but at the moment the moves toward managing the speculative risks are 
very slow (i.e. risks which are linked directly to the business function and decision 
making processes within the offshore terminals and marine ports). This trend reveals the 
fact that in the offshore and port industry there is a lack of a coherent framework with 
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which to understand the RM decisions in offshore tenninals and marine ports especially 
for the purpose of their operations and management. 
On the other hand, the problem facing port RM professionals is a lack of research upon 
which to base their activities, a general lack of a model that .approximates the RM 
realities of the field and confusion over terminology, approaches and methods in the 
discipline. There is a distinct need for some form. of a generic model which can 
highlight the issues facing RM professionals such as risk managers, emergency 
managers, QHSES managers, Human Resource (HR) managers, production managers, 
site control managers, Safety officers, port facility security officers, port state control 
officers etc. 
Adesola and Baines (2005) state that business environments are complex. Logistics 
related activities (e.g. offshore terminals and ports' operations) are undergoing swift and 
major changes motivated by such pressures as customer expectations, new technologies, 
and increasing global rivalry. As a result, many business processes within firms which 
are mainly logistics providers are dynamic and constantly changing. In order to carry on 
in such environments, logistics practitioners are forced to frequently modify and 
improve their business processes to react quickly to changes. 
Figure 1.1 depicts major pressures that are being exerted on offshore tenninals and 
marine ports (Ward, 2005). Uncertainty, for example, may be caused by complexity in 
marine transport business along with its regulatory regimes, rapid change of 
technologies, increasing and changing demand of customers, increasing pressures from 
other competitors (neighbouring ports and terminals), and scarcity of resources (e.g. 
financial incentives for port development and cheap labour etc). The uncertain 
environment may contribute to bad experiences and increasing demands for better 
performance. It is shown in Figure 1.1 that much of the pressure for RM in sea ports and 
offshore terminals originates from bad experiences: heavy commercial losses, major 
accidents, terrorist attacks, natural disasters, and so on. Bad experiences are also a key 
driver of developments in the marine related regulatory environment (i.e. portlharbour 
or offshore authority regulations, health and safety legislations etc). Eventually these 
developments can lead to increased demand for insurance. Bad experiences also can 
stimulate demand for insurance and reduce the profitability of insurers. Together, these 
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factors encourage ports' and terminals' managers as well as insurers to become more 
proactive in enhancing their own RM practices ultimately leading to the development of 
the best RM practices. 
Figure 1.1: Pressures toward RM in offshore terminals and marine ports 
Source: Modified from Ward (2005) 
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In fact in both theoretical and empirical research on offshore terminals' and marine 
ports' RM is only beginning to emerge and the important contribution ofRM on these 
facilities appears yet to be appreciated. 
Therefore, at the substantive level, there exists a gap in knowledge about the usage of 
RM during the offshore tenninals' and marine ports' operations and management. 
Similarly, at the academic level there is a need for more-practical research to find out 
the justification for existence of the RM and different methods for its (i.e. RM) proper 
implementation on these logistics infrastructures particularly with due regard to the 
potential requirements in the near future. 
1.4. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In order to ensure that the research objectives are met and for the purpose of providing a 
base for activities in this research, the following questions have been generated: 
-e What are the hazards or sources of risks and uncertainties associated with 
offshore terminals and marine ports and how can they be identified? 
Based on the definition of the hazard (i.e. anything to cause harm to people, the 
environment, property, plant. products, reputation etc.) there are different types 
and categories of hazards or risk factors that can put any offshore terminal 
and/or marine port in danger. Furthermore while there are different methods and 
techniques for hazard identification there are a number of common features of 
importance. 
• How can the identified hazards or risk factors be prioritised and ranked? 
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The prioritisation of hazards or risk factors is fundamental to analysis of them. 
There are a number of ways in which this can be done and these will vary 
depending upon the risk factors under consideration and the particular 
methodology being employed 
• What are the most appropriate and useful tools for evaluating the risk factors in 
real situations (e.g. port-ta-port comparisons) and how can they be used? 
For application of any specific risk-based model (identified and ranked risk 
factors) on offshore tenninals or marine ports (e.g. for the purpose of their audit, 
port-to-port or offshore terminal-to-offshore terminal risk evaluation etc due to 
the characteristics of RM) there will be a need of using human judgements and 
to use knowledge based decision support systems. Previously. the risk 
evaluations were all based on the knowledge of managers. Now there are 
numerous techniques and software.tools for decision support systems that can be 
used in this regard. 
• What are the most appropriate and useful tools to analyse the causes and 
consequences of the most significant identified risk factors and how can they be 
used? 
There is a need to carry out cause and consequence analysis on any individual 
risk factor. It must be investigated for potential causes. The investigation should 
not be limited only to identify the causes already known. The investigation must 
be carried out for potential causes which may lead to loss in future but has not 
happened yet. Additionally it must be ensured that all the effects are identified. 
taking into consideration the ones which have previously occurred. Therefore 
careful analysis is needed to ensure that all the known/unknown causes and 
effects for each individual risk factor are high-lighted. There are different tools 
and techniques to do this. 
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• Individually for any of the most significant risk factors, how can a separate RM 
methodology and strategy be mapped and implemented? 
Different RM methodologies and approaches can be implemented on any 
organization such as offshore terminals and marine ports. On a detailed level the 
same is applicable on any individual risk factor. This is possible provided that 
the identified risk factor is properly investigated by a competent person or 
authority and furthermore an appropriate RM strategy and methodology is 
mapped and implemented on the individual risk factor in question. 
• How can the identified hazards or risk factors be mitigated and controlled? 
After risk factors were identified and assessed in order to complete the RM cycle 
it is appropriate by using a proper decision making tool or technique to select the 
best available strategies in order to manage and control the hazards. 
1.5. RESEARCH AIM AND OBJECTIVES 
1.5.1. Research aim 
This research aims to propose a RM framework and develop a generic risk -based model 
for dealing with potential hazards and risk factors associated with offshore terminals' 
and marine ports' operations and management in order to choose the best proposed 
alternatives (control options) to mitigate risk factors. 
1.5.2. Research objectives 
Having defined the aim of the research. a number of objectives were developed in order 
to meet the described aim. These objectives were as follows: 
• To conduct an intensive literature search in order to identify sources of risks 
and uncertainties associated within offshore terminals and marine ports. 
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• To propose a risk-based framework and research methodology for identification, 
assessment and management of the potential risk factors. 
• To propose a novel risk prioritisation, evaluation and analysis approach to 
evaluate the levels of the identified risk factors. 
• To propose an appropriate decision making tool for evaluating the proposed 
alternatives (control options) in order to mitigate the previously identified and 
assessed risk factors. 
• To examine the proposed model by the use of various test cases and case studies 
in different stages of the model. 
1.6. ACHIEVEMENT OF THE RESEARCH 
The achievement of the research is the development of an advanced generic RM model 
enabling industrial professionals to identify, assess and mitigate the risk factors and 
sources of uncertainties existing in offshore terminals and marine ports. 
Another research deliverable is to demonstrate the theory of the strategic management 
approach to the RM development and to reveal the implementation of the principle of 
the RM integration into all of the functions and processes in offshore terminals and 
marine ports. The proposed RM model is intended to provide a practical tool for RM 
professionals in the application and study of the RM processes in offshore and marine 
industries. 
1.7. RM FRAMEWORK OF THE RESEARCH 
RM framework like strategic management is an ongoing process that identifies, assesses 
and mitigates hazards and risk factors in which any company or industry is involved and 
sets goals and strategies to mitigate all existing and potential sources of uncertainties 
and then even can reassess each mitigation strategy regularly to determine how they 
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have been implemented and whether they have succeeded or need replacement by a new 
set of strategies to meet changed circumstances or new environment. Figure 1.2 in this 
research depicts a RM framework designed for managing hazards and risk factors 
associated within offshore terminals' and marine ports' operations and management. 
In fIrst section of RM framework hazard identifIcation was conducted through an 
appropriate literature review of major risk factors of these logistic infrastructures. 
As a result in the frrst phase of the risk assessment (i.e. second section of RM 
framework) a Fuzzy Analytical Hierarchal Process (FAHP) method was used for 
determining the relative weights of the risk factors identifIed via the literature review. 
This has led to the development of a generic risk-based model which can help related 
industrial professionals and risk managers assess the risk factors and develop 
appropriate strategies to take preventive/corrective actions for mitigation purposes, with 
a view of maintaining efficient offshore terminals' and marine ports' operations and 
management. In the second phase of the risk assessment section the developed risk-
based model incorporating Fuzzy Set Theory (FST), an Evidential Reasoning (ER) 
approach and the IDS software were used to evaluate the risk levels of different ports in 
real situations using a case study. The IDS software based on an ER approach was used 
to aggregate the previously determined relative weights of the risk factors with the new 
evaluation results of risk levels for the real ports. The third phase of the risk assessment 
section made use of the Cause and Consequence Analysis (CCA) including the Fault 
Tree Analysis (FTA) and Event Tree Analysis (ETA) under a fuzzy environment, to 
analyse in detail the most significant risk factors determined from the first phase, using 
appropriate case studies. In the fourth phase of the risk assessment section an individual 
RM strategy was tailored and implemented on the most significant risk factor identified 
previously. 
In the last section of the RM framework and in order to complete the RM cycle, the best 
mitigation strategies were introduced and evaluated in the form of ideal solutions for 
mitigating the identified risk factors. 
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Risk Management Framework (or Offshore Terminals and Marine Ports 
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Figure 1.2: RM framework for offshore terminals and marine ports 
1.S. THESIS STRUCTURE 
This thesis has followed a common research and reporting structure as follows: 
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Chapter 1 corresponds to research background and explains the earlier concepts and 
recent researches and their contribution to RM. Justification for the research was 
explained and then research questions were generated to ensure that the research 
objectives are met. At the end RM framework and structure of the thesis were explained. 
Chapter 2 is literature review and used to identify major externally and internally driven 
sources of uncertainties. Hazard identification was carried out using the documents and 
references from the different offshore, marine and logistics related sources. 
Chapter 3 is methodology chapter. In order to cope with the identified risk factors an 
appropriate research methodology was defined. The proposed research methodology 
was used to analyse and handle each phase of the defined RM framework. 
Chapter 4 is fIrSt phase of the risk assessment section of the RM framework. An F AHP 
method is used for determining the relative weights of the risk factors identified via the 
literature review. This will led to the development of a generic risk-based model. 
Chapter 5 in second phase of the risk assessment including the developed risk-based 
model incorporating FST, has used an ER approach and the IDS software to evaluate 
the risk levels of different ports in real situations using a case study. 
Chapter 6 in third phase of the risk assessment has used the CCA including the FT A and 
ETA under a fuzzy environment, to analyse in detail the most significant risk factors 
determined from first phase of the risk assessment. 
Chapter 7 in the fourth phase of the risk assessment has tailored and implemented an 
individual RM strat~gy on the most significant risk factor identified from first phase of 
the risk assessment. 
Chapter 8 is the last section of the RM framework and in order to complete the RM 
cycle, the best mitigation strategies were introduced and evaluated in the form of ideal 
solutions for mitigating the identified risk factors. 
Chapter 9 explains conclusions and contribution to knowledge in RM of offshore and 
marine industries. Additional suggestions for the further research were recommended. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
Managing risk is one of the main intentions of finns working internationally (Ghoshal, 
1987). However, the present forms of the handling of risk and uncertainty in the 
international management literature differ in their use. Miller (1991) defines the most 
important uses of the term "risk" are in reference to unforeseen variation or negative 
variation (i.e. "downside risk") in business outcome variables e.g. revenues, costs, profit, 
market share etc. Managers generally relate risk with negative results (March and 
Shapira, 1987). The perception of risk as performance variance is broadly utilized in 
finance, economics, and strategic management. With either the variance or negative 
variation accepting, "risk" refers to variation in business outcomes or performance that 
cannot be predicted in advance (Miller, 1991). 
Taking a corporate strategy perspective of RM engages the maximum challenge for 
uncertainty identification, not least because the factors capable of influencing 
performance are so many. To conduct any analysis of sources of uncertainty tractable at 
a business level needs sources to be broken down into broad categories or areas which 
taken together, entirely cover the range of uncertainties facing the organisation. These 
categories then serve as prompt lists for identifying sources of uncertainty in more detail 
(Ward,2005). 
The simplest kind of framework may be just a list of major categories such as the 
examples shown in Table 2.1. 
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Table 2.1: Simple frameworks for categorizing sources of risks. 
Example 1 (OGC, 2002) 
Strategic / commercial risks 
Economic I financial! market risks 
Legal, contractual and regulatory risks 
Organisational management I human-factors 
Political / societal factors 
Environmental factors I Act of God ( force majeure) 
Technical I operational I infrastructure risks 
Example 2 (pricewaterhouseCoopers, 2004) 
External factors: economic and business; natural environment; political; social; 
technological. 
Internal factors: infrastructure; personnel; process; technology. 
As Miller (1991) -explains again, the brand "risk" has also frequently been assigned to 
factors either external or internal to the finn that impact on the risk experienced by the 
finn. In this sense, "risk" essentially refers to a source of risk. Some general examples 
of risk referring to risk sources are terms such as "political risk" and "competitive risk". 
Such terms link irregularity in firm performance to specific vague environmental 
components. 
In some form of enhanced models business perception frameworks present an 
illustrative structure to add supporting sense for the categories of uncertainties identified 
A diagrammatic framework provides a richer perspective of sources of uncertainty both 
in terms of the construction and scope of sources included (Ward, 2005). An example of 
this kind of framework is shown in Figure 2.1. 
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Figure 2.1: A corporate framework of areas of uncertainty 
Source: Adapted from Ward, (200S) and AIRMIC, ALARM, IRM Standards, (2002) 
Ward (2005) expresses the other business perspective frameworks classify sources of 
risk in hierarchical structures. For example, Arthur Andersons Business Model 
(reproduced in full in ICAEW, 1999) assigns business risks into three main types of 
environment, process and information for decision-making. Process uncertainties are 
divided into operations, empowennent, infonnation processing technology, integrity 
and financial. These classes are then further divided to help a more detailed analysis. 
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Another example is Emst and Young's Risk Universe based on four first level 
categories of: operations, financial, strategic and knowledge, followed by more detailed 
second and third level divisions of these categories into narrower (but still broad) areas 
of uncertainty (Mottershead and Godfrey, 2001). 
Such hierarchical structures can differ considerably in the categories adopted at each 
level, and it can be difficult to make a convincing case for one structure over another. In 
practice companies might choose to develop their own hierarchical structures, knowing 
particular features of their line of business (Ward, 2005). An example of a hierarchy 
structure for different sources of risks and uncertainties for an organization or a firm 
within the industry i.e. offshore terminals and marine ports are fully explained and 
illustrated for the purpose of this thesis in Chapter 4. 
As the focus in this thesis will only be on RM in offshore terminals and marine ports it 
is therefore necessary first to review and argue the existing risk-based literature in the 
marine industry as a whole and then narrow it down and concentrate merely on the RM 
of offshore terminals and marine ports. 
2.2. A BRIEF LITERATURE REVIEW ON MARINE INDUSTRY 
In order to review the risk-based issues in the marine industry it is useful to discuss 
them according to the existing sectors. Obviously these sectors can extend from inland 
terminals or dry ports inside coastal or land locked states up to the other locations 
beyond the oceans. Figure 2.2 simply illustrates these sectors in the marine industry. 
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Figure 2.2: Segments in the marine industry 
Source: Khan et al (2002), Maclachlan (2004) and les (2007) 
In the process industry shown in Figure 2.2, process operations are the most hazardous 
activities next to the transportation and drilling operations on onshore or offshore oil 
and gas platforms. Past incidents of onshore and offshore oil and gas activities have 
shown that a minor hazardous situation in the process operation might develop a 
catastrophe. This is a main worry particularly in offshore platforms and tenninals 
whether in the form of fixed and/or mobile structures due to the scarcity of the space 
and compact geometry of the process area, less ventilation,. and difficult escape routes 
(Khan et ai, 2002). In the onshore sector, a refinery plant located near a coast line or 
within a marine port area can be engaged with marine related activities such as 
transportation of the oil products by pipelines or tanker ships via oil terminals. 
Therefore it will be categorised under the marine industry sector and the whole complex 
can be called petrochemical sea port. 
In the offshore sector of the process industry there are many types of floating 
production systems and units e.g. Floating, Production, Storage and Offioading (FPSO) 
units i.e. large, permanently moored oil tankers that have oil and gas processing 
facilities mounted onto their decks. Oil from subsea wells is piped on board the FPSOs 
through flexible flow-lines, and is processed before being stored in the FPSOs' cargo 
tanks. Processed oil or gas can then be discharged, through flexible hoses, into 
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offioading oil or gas tanker vessels through tandem or double banking operations. 
Processed oil or gas can be transferred from FPSOs to onshore base destinations though 
offshore pipelines. Normally FPSOs are employed in areas of deeper water such as Gulf 
of Mexico, West Africa, Australia and Brazil (Mather, 2009). Among the various 
installations/jackets or rig/vessel types (e.g. fixed or mobile drilling jack up units, semi-
submersible drilling/pipe laying units, drilling ships/barges) used in the offshore/process 
industry in this chapter, only FPSOs were included due to their double nature of being 
an offshore processing facility, and also a vessel. As it is considered to be an oflloading 
terminal, it replaces a conventional platform in its entirety. However as it is evidentihe 
process industry can extend from a plant refinery and be connected through onshore and 
offshore (subsea) pipelines to floating platforms or units such as a FPSO moored in the 
middle of the sea. 
Various sources (ABS, 2003; OCIMF, 2004 and Maclachlan, 2004~ Mather, 2009; 
UKHSE, 2010 and Sutton, 2010) there is literature in the offshore industry which 
mainly relates to the legislation and safety acts such as Mineral Working Act (MWA) 
1971, Health and Safety at Work Act (HSWA) 1974 and Statutory Instrument (SI) 
Number 289 in 1974 in UK. All of them have discussed comprehensively the issues 
such as safety cases and safety reports; Safety Management System (SMS); Formal 
Safety Assessment (FSA); Health, Safety and Environment (HSE)~ ISPS Code; Safety 
Case Regulations; Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA); the concept of As Low As 
Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) in judging the level of acceptable risk. Moreover in 
onshore process sectors, risk-based process activities and safety aspects are discussed 
mainly under integrity management, safety and reliability management or engineering 
(Sutton, 2010). None of the mentioned concepts have described specifically at a holistic 
level about a generic or even specific RM methodology or framework which 
consequently could encompass all the concepts. Conversely phrases such as hazard, 
safety, security, reliability, disaster, emergency and crisis frequently discussed in the 
mentioned concepts also can all be categorised under a unique phrase i.e. 'risk'. 
However other phrases such as identification, assessment, evaluation, analysis, 
mitigation, control, audits, inspection, review and reports can be considered as 
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subcategories for a unique phrase i.e. 'management'. Therefore using a phrase of 'RM' 
alone can justify all these scattered impressions. 
In the logistics industry (as shown in Figure 2.2) sea ports are a major component of the 
maritime industry and have an important role to play in world trade, international 
logistics and global supply chains. In respect of the modem sea ports presently there are 
two main dimensions: ports as trade gateways and corridors, and ports as logistics and 
distribution centres (lCS, 2007). In the present situation, the ocean freight transport 
commerce has changed its structure as a result of the new trends and preconditions that 
came with the introduction of the container and the rise of intermodality (Jarzemskis 
and Vasiliauskas, 2007). Therefore the major troubles sea ports encounter today, as a 
result of growing containerised trade, are lack of speed at sea port terminals and 
increasing congestion on the access routes serving their terminals (Woxenius et ai, 
2004). Furthermore in many places around the world, bimodal and trimodal inland 
tenninals (barge, rail, and road) have become inherent parts of the transport systems, 
mainly in areas having a high dependence on trade. In this respect marine based 
transport growth is slowly spreading to inland sides after a phase that concentrated on 
the expansion of sea port terminals and maritime shipping networks. There are many 
rationales for this growing attention. The complication of modem shipment distribution 
and the amplified focus on intermodal transportation solutions and capability issues 
appear to be the key driving factors. In addition ESCAP (2009) explains the 
massification (i.e. economies of scale through larger volumes) of the flows in networks, 
through a concentration of cargo on a limited set of sea ports of call and associated 
trunk lines to the hinterland. This has also shaped the right conditions for nodes to 
emerge along and at the end of these trunk lines. These nodes in the hinterland networks 
of sea ports have been referred to as dry ports, inland terminals, inland ports, inland 
hubs, inland logistics centres, inland freight villages etc. As a result inland terminals 
have become an intermodal and freight distribution unit that comes into three major 
functional categories. They can be marine barge terminals serviced from deep-sea ports, 
intermodal rail terminals connected to gateways and distribution centres linking supply 
chains. In addition inland ports are commonly integrating terminals (rail, barge or in 
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rare cases both) with distribution centres in operational characteristics mainly associated 
with satellite terminals or load centres. The above mentioned facts justify and support 
the inland terminals or dry port concept as an integrated part of a marine industry and 
logistics system in maritime business especially for port customers and users (shippers, 
shipowners, agents, freight forwarders. exporters and importers) to outsource their 
functions which will need a lot of territory with the cheaper hinterland locations. 
As discussed for the process industry, in port sectors there also exists literature on 
different legislations about health, safety, the environment and security issues for ports 
and terminals as shown in Table 2.2. Most of them address security, health, safety and 
environmental protection topics rather than the risk itself. On very rare occasions, 
development of the RM for the purpose of sea ports and terminals has been specifically 
discussed, for example by GAD (2006 and 2007), UNCTAD (2006) and UK HSE 
(2010). 
Table 2.2: Summary of existing literature about health, safety. environment and 
security issues in port sectors. 
Sources of Literature 
Health & safety at Wode Act (1974) 
SOLAS Convention (1974) 
UNCT AD (1976) 
MARPOL Convcotion (1978) 
Pilotage Act (1987) 
Dock Regulation (1988) 
Port Act (1991) 
UNCTAD(I993) 
TIbojevic and Carr (2000) 
DETR(2000) 
PMSC (2001) 
ISPS Code (2003) 
UNCTAD (2006) 
GAO (2006) and (2007) 
ICS (2007) 
World Bank (2007) 
DNV(2010) 
UK liES (2010) 
Health Safety Environment Security 
In Figure 2.2. international shipping is a highly competitive industry that provides a 
crucial service for society through the economic carrying of goods and passengers by 
merchant ships between sea ports, terminals, offshore structures and units etc via inland 
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waterways such as canals, channels, rivers and .open seas. As there are many 
stakeholders, it is essential tQ have agreed and shared regulations. For example, 
shipping is a capital-intensive industry and shipping cQmpanies require funding .of their 
operations. This finance largely CQmes frQm banks that derive their .own finance frQm 
IQans and the investments of their shareholders. Banks and their sharehQlders need a 
rule-based system to protect their risks. Similarly the carriage .of cargQ depends upon 
well-tested contracts and proficiency, which in turn are used to determine the outcome 
of an insurance claim in the event .of IQSS .or damage. Mariners are also obliged by 
CQntracts of employment and ship-owners have liabilities tQ make available seawQrthy 
ships fQr the trades. Not only does this CQver the physical cQndition of the vessels but 
the human factor, the manning and qualifications .of the crew, navigational equipment, 
fire safeguard, lifesaving ability and overall watertight integrity .of the vessel. Ships 
have to enter and wQrk in ports. They require pilots, stevedQres, shipyards and dry 
dQcks; they need services, stores, bunkers and water. Mariners always become visitors 
with immigration and health controls, which are somewhat brQadly dissimilar in the 
different countries they visit. Customs also have a direct interest on ships, their cargQ, 
crew and passengers for custom duties, smuggled goods and drugs. TherefQre, there is 
an understanding that shipping is used for many purposes. HQwever there are .other 
challenges such as new regulatiQns. For example, the ISM CQde dQes not yet have a 
bQdy law tested in CQurt about the commercial effects of mismanagement and 
administrations. TherefQre analysis of specific clauses may require accurate definitions. 
Operators, nevertheless, have to handle and run their vessels and ships' captains abQve 
all have to be resPQnsive tQ their legal responsibilities (Maclachlan, 2004). 
In the shipping industry and based .on the available literature from several SQurces (ABS, 
2003; MacIachlan, 2004; rcs, 2006; NE P&l Club, 2008) rules and regulations .or safety 
and security issues have been discussed in detail. Among them there are topics such as 
marine insurance, associated with Hull and Machinery (H&M), ProtectiQn and 
Indemnity (P&l), Freight, Demurrage and Defence (FD&D), war risk, security risk and 
strike insurances. Additionally in this regard there are international QrganisatiQns such 
as IMO and International Labour Organization (!LD); CQnveatiQns e.g. SOLAS 1974 
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and MARPOL 73/78; ISM and ISPS Codes; Collision avoidance regulations and 
International Maritime Dangerous Goods (JMDG) Code. They mostly emphasize on 
health, safety, environmental protection and security issues. Some of them, such as the 
Collision avoidance regulations are designed for the purpose of preventing the risk of 
collision. Insurance covers are normally used to transfer burden of risks from assureds 
to insurers. In fact there is a lack of development and integration of the RM perception 
within the shipping industry as well. Traditionally in shipping industry the concept of 
RM is only limited to marine insurance covers and issues such as claim handling. 
2.2.1. Lessons to be learnt from accidents 
Ultimately in terms of legislation in practice, the offshore and marine industry has 
suffered a lot and in the past and produced some disjointed, conflicting regulations, 
mainly in response to disasters involving considerable loss of life, culminating in the 
destruction of the Piper Alpha installation in UK waters in 1988. Based on Mather 
(2004) the Piper Alpha tragedy proved to be the catalyst for a radical change in the way 
the industry was both certified and regulated. The explosion accident on 20 April 2010 
on board the Deepwater Horizon, which was an offshore drilling platform working on a 
well one mile below the surface of the Gulf of Mexico, has led to a major oil spill 
(TNYT,2010). 
Lack of compliance with safety practice and mistakes in proper inspections has been 
found as main root causes for both the cases above. Still no one has argued strictly for 
lack of complying with a generic or any specific RM methodology. 
2.3. EXISTING RM METHODOLOGY FOR MARINE INDUSTRY 
APPLICATIONS 
Based on the above summaries it can be seen that there are different risk-based 
expressions and eventually all are used in these three sectors of the marine industry to 
identify, assess and mitigate the impact of risk factors that are threatening the marine 
industry. Furthermore there are many regulatory bodies and other responsible 
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individuals internationally involved in the industry whose main purposes are to avoid 
and prevent potentials for different hazards or risk factors andlor to take preventive and 
corrective actions. More or less all of them are trying to manage or control existing or 
probable hazards and somehow by using the risk-based related terms and application of 
some mitigation methods are trying to justify that they were involved in a RM related 
processes but eventually none of them are using a generic or a holistic RM methodology 
or framework. This cannot be seen even in regulatory applications. Whereas it can be 
seen its advanced form, as the QRA method or even the FSA methodology produced by 
the IMO applicable in offshore and shipping industries in the offshore side of the oil, 
gas and process industries for the purpose of safety cases to identify, assess and mitigate 
the hazards associated with the whole operations. The first one uses the words 
"quantitative risk assessment" but utilises hazard identification, risk evaluation and risk 
mitigation phases within its methodology. These steps are the ones used in a RM 
methodology. In the second one i.e. "Formal Safety Assessment" the steps are also 
hazard identification, risk assessment, risk mitigations, costibenefit analysis and 
recommendation respectively which justify being steps of a RM methodology. 
Moreover many participants in the marine industry are still not well familiar with a RM 
framework, its proper defmition and methodology. 
Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 1, it is a key issue that RM is embedded and 
integrated into the functions of the organisations as well as the decision of taking a 
strategic management approach within organisations. In order to overcome all the 
mentioned insufficiencies in marine industry applications e.g. offshore terminals and 
sea ports, a holistic and generic framework for RM has heen introduced in Chapter 3. 
This reinvention in the marine industry can be an optimum solution to cover all the 
mentioned deficiencies. The dictionary typically defines ''holistic'' as dealing with 
wholeness rather than focusing on its parts or different sides or viewpoints. In fact the 
term of "holistic" RM can he used in the simple sense for the management of all sources 
of risks (Hopkin, 2002). Miller and Waller (2003) clearly regard this as a necessary part 
of their view of integrated RM as they state: "the essence of integrated RM is 
consideration of the full range of uncertain contingencies affecting business 
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performance". However, in its proper sense, "holistic" implies a systemic perspective, 
which recognises system properties that are distinct from the properties of system 
components. In this sense, holistic RM would imply recognition and management of 
interactive effects between organisation activities and associated risks (Ward, 2005). In 
another instance linking the concept of enterprise-wide, holistic and integrated 
approaches Deloach (2000) defines enterprise-wide RM as: "a truly holistic, integrated, 
forward looking and process oriented approach is taken to manage all key business risks 
and opportunities - not just financial ones - with the intent of maximising shareholders 
value for the enterprise as a whole". Therefore a clear understanding of the terms in RM 
is important and a clear methodology essential to ensure for a strong framework. For 
this reason prior to discussing of different phases of RM it is better first to have a clear 
view of the meaning of the following terms: 
• Hazard: is something with the potential to cause harm to people, property, the 
environment, business etc (Sutton, 2010). 
• Risk: is defined as "a measure of human injury, environmental damage or 
economic loss in terms of both the incident likelihood and the magnitude of the 
injury, damage or loss" (CCPS, 2000). 
• Risk Management: is a central part of any organisation's strategic management. 
It is the process whereby organisations methodically address the risks and 
sources of uncertainties attaching to their activities with the goal of achieving 
sustained benefit within each activity and across the portfolio of all activities 
(IRM, 2002). 
• Offshore Terminals: relate to offshore installations/platforms/rigs in the form of 
offshore fixed or floating units engaged in the oil and gas explorations and 
exploitations. Fixed units are defined as all bottom-fixed structures, but 
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excluded Tension Leg Platforms (TLPs). Floating. Production. Storage and 
Offioading units (FPSOs). Floating. Storage Units (FSUs) and production jack-
ups rigs even while they are "fixed" throughout their production stage and 
therefore are classified as "fixed installations" by the UK's Health and Safety 
Executive (HSE) under the Safety Case Regulations. However these units are 
defined and reported under floating units which are defined as semi-
submersibles, jack-ups, ships, barges. FSUs, FPSOs, TLPs etc engaged in 
drilling, accommodation, production and storage (Oil and Gas UK, 2011). 
• Marine Ports: are areas of land and water including facilities, destined mainly for 
receiving vessels, loading, unloading and storage of cargoes, receiving and 
delivering the cargoes to land transport means. They may also include activities 
of firms (e.g. freight forwarders, shippers, exporters, importers and 
petrochemical, oil and gas companies, refineries etc) linked to the sea-borne 
trade (ICS, 2007). 
2.3.1. Hazard identification 
The first phase in any RM process is hazard identification (World Bank, 2007; GOA, 
2007; UNCTAD, 2006; IRM, 2002 and DETR, 2000). "Hazard identification should be 
approached in a methodical way to ensure that all significant activities within the 
organisatian have been identified and all the risk factors flowing from these activities 
are defmed" (IRM, 2002). Although in general terms many firms, organisations and 
government bodies are using the phrase of "hazard identification" as the first phase in 
their RM processes but more particularly in engineering and industrial sectors (e.g. 
offshore and marine industries) as it is discussed by (ABS, 2000. Pillayand Wang, 2003; 
Wang and Trbojevic, 2007) the phrase of "HAZID" (i.e. HAZard IDentification) is used 
instead of the frrst one. HAZID is a general term used to describe an exercise whose 
goal is to identify hazards (risk factors) and the associated events that have the potential 
to result in a significant consequence. For example, a HAZID of an offshore terminal or 
offshore petroleum facility may be conducted to identify potential hazards which could 
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result in consequences to personnel e.g. injuries and fatalities, environmental oil spills 
and pollution, and financial assets e.g. production loss/delay. The HAZID process can 
be applied to all or part of a marine port, an offshore facility, a vessel or it can be 
implemented to examine operational procedures for organisations. Depending upon the 
system being evaluated and the resources accessible. the process used to conduct a 
HAZID can differ (ABS, 2003). As ABS (2000) and Dickson (2003) explain that 
Literature Search, Physical Inspection, Organizational Charts, Flow Charts, Check-lists, 
What-if Review, Safety Audit. Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) are hazard 
identification methods. 
As an example in offshore terminals and marine ports mainly in oil, Liquefied Natural 
Gas (LNG) and/or Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) import and export tenninals HAZOP 
is the best solution for hazard identification purposes. HAZOP is a structured way of 
examining the planned or existing process operation. The objective of a HAZOP study 
is to identify problems that may represent risk to personnel or equipment, or prevent 
efficient operations (Lassen, 2008). Based on ABS (2000) literature search is one of the 
HAZID techniques used to express an exercise whose goal is to identify hazards and 
associated events that have the potential to result in a major effect. As Saunders et ai, 
(2007) have explained the benefit of literature search is to save time as the required risk-
based data is previously searched and available, and also it is less costly than other 
techniques. It is also likely to be of higher-quality, and the data can be used in 
conjunction with the other qualitative and quantitative methods. 
2.3.2. Risk evaluation 
Risk evaluation involves the development of an overall estimation of risk by gathering 
and integrating infonnation about scenarios, frequencies and consequences, and it is one 
major component of the whole RM process of a particular enterprise. In the process of 
risk evaluation, both qualitative and quantitative techniques can be used (Krishna et aI, 
2003). However as ABS (2003) discusses the word risk itself specifically is the product 
of "frequency" with which an undesirable event is anticipated to occur and the "impact" 
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of the event's outcome. In other words risk is composed of two parameters, frequency 
and impact; i.e. risk is equal to frequency multiplied by impact. Due to the highly 
subjective nature and lack of information, it is usually difficult to determine risk 
parameters precisely. A reasonable and suitable way to express these parameters is to 
use qualitative verbal expressions (i.e. linguistic variables) especially during experts' 
judgments. To estimate the occurrence frequency, for example, one may often use such 
verbal expressions as very low, low, medium, high and very high. In addition to 
estimate the consequence impact also one may often use such linguistics variables as 
slight, minor, moderate, critical and catastrophic. A variety of other techniques has been 
used for risk evaluation and analysis including Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA), 
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Fault Tree Analysis (FT A), Event Tree 
Analysis (ETA), Cause-Consequence Analysis (CCA),Human Reliability Analysis 
(HRA) of which some are qualitative and some are quantitative techniques (CCPS, 1992; 
Lees, 1996; Dickson, 2003, ABS, 2003 and Sutton, 2010). As Dickson (2003) explains 
these techniques have all been developed in the industrial setting, normally in response 
to some practical business problems. 
2.3.3. Risk mitigation 
IRM (2002) explains that "risk treatment is a process of selecting and implementing 
measures to modify the risk". Risk treatment includes as its major element, risk 
control/mitigation, but extends further to, for example, risk avoidance, risk transfer, risk 
financing, etc. Obviously as discussed previously marine insurance is one of the 
methods and strategies used extensively in the marine industry for risk mitigation 
purposes. Another example for risk mitigation in the process industry is Safety Integrity 
Level (SIL) that is a measure of the availability of protection layer or barrier. Protection 
layers include Basic Process Control System (BPCS), critical alarms and human 
intervention, Safety Instrumented Functions (SIF), physical protection and emergency 
response. All these mitigate the frequency of occurrence of the potential unwanted end-
consequence or mitigate the impact the end-consequence represents (Lassen, 2008). All 
statutory regulations, classification societies' rules, !MO Conventions and Codes are 
typical examples of strategies used for the purpose of risk mitigation. There are also 
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many other analytical tools for carrying out the cost-benefit analysis or for selecting the 
best strategy if there are more strategies for risk mitigation purposes. Among these 
methods, the most popular ones recently used by researchers were Analytic Hierarchy 
Process (AHP) which can be used either for prioritisation in order to rank the risk 
factors or be used as a decision making tool to select the best solutions for mitigating 
the risk factors (Golec and Taskin, 2007), Analytic Network Process (ANP) (Yuksel 
and Dagdeviren, 2007), Axiomatic Design (AD) (Kulak and Kahraman, 2005), and 
TOPSIS (Kahraman et ai, 2007). A variety of different strategies can be utilized 
depending on whether to take preventive or corrective actions during the risk mitigation 
phases of the RM cycles, i.e. whether to proceed toward proactive or reactive RM 
approaches, there could be different strategies to be utilised. 
As an example in order to carry out RM and complete the execution cycle properly, 
after hazard identification and risk assessment phases, by using the concept of As Low 
As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) in judging the level of acceptable risk, a risk 
factor itself will be judged and if it is not acceptable by application of the mitigation 
strategies it must be controlled and managed. However the -utilised strategies in the 
mitigation phases must be monitored in order to know whether they have reduced the 
risk factors to an acceptable level or not. For example if by measuring the amount of 
ALARP over time it was evidenced that the used strategies were not effective, then the 
utilised strategies must be changed. To enable this, SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, 
Opportunities, Threats) analysis can be used. A SWOT analysis is a popular tool for 
analysing internal and external environments in order to attain a systematic approach 
and support for a decision situation (KotIer, 1988~ Wheelen and Hunger, 1995). In a 
SWOT analysis the internal and external factors are referred to as strategic factors and 
summarised within the SWOT analysis. Additionally the final goal for any strategic 
planning process, of which SWOT is an early stage, is to develop and adopt a strategy 
resulting in a good fit between internal and external factors. SWOT can also be used 
when a strategic alternative emerges suddenly and the decision context relevant to it has 
to be analysed. If used correctly, SWOT can provide a good basis for successful strategy 
formulation (McDonald, 1993). 
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2.4. EXISTING HAZARDS IN OFFSHORE TERMINALS AND MARINE 
PORTS 
The literature review presented in this thesis is used to identify hazards and conduct the 
HAZID phase of the RM for the purpose of offshore terminals and marine ports. As 
discussed before in marine industry offshore terminals and marine ports may become 
exposed to externally (e.g. country and business) or internally (e.g. organisational and 
operational) driven sources of risks and uncertainties at any time. Through an 
appropriate hazard identification process (i.e. literature review), the mentioned sources 
of risks and uncertainties will be investigated through the following sections. 
2.4.1. Country risks 
Given the increasingly inclusive nature of investment ranges, knowing country risk is 
very important (Claude, 1996). A critical assessment of country risk is necessary 
because it reflects the capability and compliance of a country to service its financial 
commitments. Many risk rating agencies use different techniques to verify country risk 
ratings, combining a range of qualitative and quantitative information regarding 
alternative measures of economic, fmancial and political risks into associated composite 
risk ratings (Hoti and McAleer, 2004). 
As an example for managing the country risk which may affect the corporate business 
activities internationally, CBB (2008) explains, although the particulars of the country 
RM programme will differ among licensees, depending upon the nature and complexity 
of the licensee's international activities, a comprehensive RM programme for a country 
should entail: 
• A sufficient country risk assessment process. 
• Methods to identify and measure country risk exposures. 
• Suitable and effective monitoring and control procedures. 
• Stress management and testing and contingency planning. 
In another instance SEB (2006), a merchant banking in Europe in order to investigate 
country risk factors which normally are used by its clients and traders for doing 
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business and investment purposes, as an example the country of Mexico has been 
compared with the country of Russia. As it is shown in Figure 2.3 these countries have 
been compared against each other in respect of the five different risk factors as are 
depicted on the radar type chart. This kind of chart will be used in Chapter 5 in order to 
facilitate the required analysis. The depicted risk factors for these countries are also 
compared with an average (blue line) which was defmed for the Emerging Market (Le. 
Average EM) countries. Key ratios shown in Figure 2.3, illustrate the economical and 
financial indices for Mexico in 2006. 
Figure 2.3: An illustrative example of country risk analysis 
Source: Based on SEB Merchant Banking (2006) 
As per IeRG (2001) country risk refers to the risk of investing in a country, dependent 
on changes in the business environment that may negatively influence operating profits 
or the value of investments in a specific country. For example, fmancial factors such as 
currency controls, devaluation or regulatory changes, or stability factors such as mass 
riots, civil war and other potential events contribute to companies' operational risks. 
Evaluating country risks is a critical exercise when choosing sites for international 
business, mainly if investment is to be undertaken. Certain risks can be managed 
through insurance, hedging and other types of financial planning, but other risks cannot 
be controlled through such fmancial devices. Some of these latter risks may be 
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measured in a risk return analysis, with some countries' risks requiring higher returns to 
justify the higher risks. The study of country risks is also essential in order to expand 
alternative scenarios: Uncertainty may remain, but it can be transformed into planned 
uncertainty, with no swprises and with contingency plans in place. As a result in every 
country corporations may deal with a unique set of country risks (Conklin, 2002). 
Country risk is sometimes also referred to as political risk. In this context it refers to the 
unwanted events resulting from government policies or actions, and for this pwpose 
political risk assessment is a broader view of the influences of government policies and 
actions on selected industries or corporations (Fitzpatrick, 1983; Simon, 1984; Cosset 
and Suret, 1995; Rodrigue et ai, 0211). However country risk is a more general term. 
which generally only refers to risks affecting all companies operating within a particular 
country. 
With due regard to the above statements it has been pointed out that although political 
risk assessment has long been practiced by multiple nation enterprises for a broad 
review of the influences of government policies and actions, it has been rarely seen for 
port reviews (Fitzpatrick, 1983; Simon, 1984; Cosset, 1995 and Sur et al, 1995). 
Nevertheless, it is believed that the port business environments are associated not only 
with micro-port policies, but also with macro-economic and political practices of the 
host nations. As Tsai and Su (2005) explain in this highly competitive environment, 
complete understanding of the overall political influences appears to be increasingly 
valuable for carriers' (i.e. shipping lines) decisions. In addition, it is essential for a host 
government to perceive and recover its port environments. 
Governmental actions and policies, involving a parent country, a host country and 
overall international relationships, are seen as factors that can be lead to the political 
risk of business environments (Nigh, 1986). However, government actions or policies 
have multiple aspects. The most common classification is to divide political risk into 
two categories: micro-risks and macro-risks, depending on whether the risk factors 
affect selected/overall industries (Robock and Simmonds, 1983). Micro-risks represent 
the risks resulting from the political changes that influence only a selected field of 
business activity or foreign enterprises; while macro-risks represent those resulting from 
political changes that influence enterprise. The classification of micro and macro risks 
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presents an understandable structure to methodically identify risk factors (Friedmann 
and Kim, 1988). 
With respect to port projects the W orId Bank (2007) explains that the port operator is 
subject to the full range of national legal, economic, social, and political influences that 
detennine the stability of the nation in which the project is located. This must be 
investigated in detail, as this environment generates variety of risks, typically referred to 
as "country risks." 
Until now there have been no country RM studies on the port review, except the one 
Tisa and Su (2005) carried out in order to develop a port-to-port comparative risk 
assessment model (see Chapter 4). In their study they conducted a case study of the 
political environment evaluations for five East Asian counties (i.e. sea ports): Hong 
Kong, Singapore, Busan (South Korea), Kaohsiung (Taiwan) and Shanghai (China). 
Their empirical case concluded that the mentioned country's political risk was a strong 
indicator for the business environments of the host ports. 
Although for the purpose of country risk factors, ICRG (200 I) rating comprises 22 
variables in three subcategories of risk namely political, financial and economical risk 
but in previous country RM literatures, the factors were split into three categories: 
government policies, political and social systems, and macro-economic practices 
(Killer, 1992; Zhi, 1995; Alon and Martin, 1998). Of these, government policy is 
frequently divided to further categories in order to reflect its broad range of 
characteristics (Tisa and Su, 2002). As Tisa and Su (2005) explain considering the 
nature of the carriers' business as an important and main factor in port business, 
government policies was subdivided into the three main items of port development 
policy, port management policy and foreign enterprise policy. The first two of these 
categories i.e. port development policy and port management policy specifically will 
influence the global carrier business, while the third one i.e. foreign enterprise policy 
indicates the host nation's general attitudes towards foreign enterprises. These three 
sub-divided government policies, together with the other two factors identified earlier, 
i.e. political and social systems, and macroeconomic practices, are considered to be used 
as the main five risk factors which eventually can shape sub-framework of country 
risks. Tisa and Su (2005) for evaluation of the mentioned risk factors in their 
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investigation have used AHP method i.e. an Analytical Process Approach but for the 
purpose of this research and under the fuzzy environment a fuzzy AHP method i.e. 
F AHP will be utilised (see Chapter 4). 
2.4.1.1. Macro-ecoDomic practices 
Oxelheim and Wihlborg (1987) have explained that macro-economic uncertainty is a 
broad concept encompassing fluctuations in the level of economic activity and prices. 
Miller (1992) has categorized the macro-economic uncertainties into five.ruvisions such 
as inflation, changes in relative prices, foreign exchange rates, interest rates and terms 
of trade. Tisa and Su (2005) with respect to the macro-economic risks for ports in the 
host countries have categorised them into four main issues of economic invigoration, 
stability in interest and foreign exchange~ rates, GDP growth and balancing of national 
saving and debt. 
Some researchers have examined previously the economic purposes and contributions 
of offshore terminals and marine ports, value of trade and how these facilities can 
impact on a nation's economy (Goss, 1990a; Struyf and Vebreke, 2000). For example, 
Goss (1990a) explains how having efficient sea ports can raise the GDP of a nation. 
Furthermore Alderton (1999) and Marti (1990) express that often this literature will 
admire the benefit of the sea port sector to regional and national economic development 
in terms of being an economic multiplier. 
In another instance World Bank (2001) discussed uncertainties in the port industry 
which relates to fluctuations in exchange and iBterest rates, non-convertibility of the 
local currency into foreign currency and non-transferability. This risk is higher in those 
countries where political condition is highly unstable, the economy is weak and 
government policy does not attract Foreign Direct Investment. 
Exchange rate risk (i.e. variability in the value of the project or amount of loan resulting 
from unpredictable fluctuation in the exchange rate has become a supreme consideration 
of the private operator, if a guarantee cannot be obtained from the government or central 
bank of the host countIy. Optimal risk allocation principle - to assign risk to the party 
best able to manage it - does not work out for exchange rate risk in port finance. 
Operators can pass on some or all of the risk to a third-party by contractual arrangement 
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(e.g. swap contract) (Desai, 2005). Figure 2.4 gives a general idea how a port authority 
or private operator can reduce or mitigate monetary risk through a swap contract. 
Figure 2.4: Swap Contract 
Source: Desai (2005) 
Monetary risks such as interest and foreign exchange rates can be hedged or eliminated 
in different ways. Off-shore account with approval of local authority can eliminate 
whole risk raised through non-convertibility or non-transferability of local currency. 
However, where the operator cannot obtain authorization for off-shore account, 
guarantee for convertibility or transferability from the government or the eentral bank of 
a host country would be the best approach against monetary risk (W orId Bank, 200 I). 
With respect to the balancing of national saving and debt as previously discussed by 
Hoti and McAleer (2004) assessment of country risk is essential because it reflects the 
capability and compliance of a country to service its financial commitments. 
2.4.1.2. Political and social systems 
Relating to the social and political system risks affecting the ports in the host country 
Tisa and Su (2005) have categorised them into four main issues of political stability, 
government efficiency and incorruption, social stability and internationalisation. 
Political uncertainty is generally associated with major changes in political regimes 
(Shubik, 1983 and Ting, 1988). Political uncertainty reflects the threats and 
opportunities linked with probable or real changes in the political system. Political 
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volatility can result from a war, revolution or other political disorder. Democratic 
changes in governments or heads of state are another reason of political ambiguity that 
has not been widely recognized in the political risk literatures (Miller, 1992). Policy 
uncertainty refers to the instability in government policies that impact the business 
community (Ting, 1988). Some authors (e.g. Agmon, 1985; Bunn and Mustafaoglu, 
1978) do not distinguish between political and policy uncertainties but use the tenn 
"political risk" to encompass both of these uncertainties. 
Desai (2005) explains that political risks have financial, operational, security and 
reputational impacts. Corruption, bureaucracy, political shift, terrorism, legal and 
regulatory irregularities can be primary sources of political risks. Political risk is one of 
the significant risks involved in offshore and port projects. Furthennore it is expressed 
that the political risks arises from the unforeseen actions, decisions or inactions of a 
offshore/port authority or public entity. Here, inaction implies clearly the non-
compliance of the contract by the offshore and port authorities or governments. 
Moreover overestimation of government actions may result in expropriation,. 
nationalisation, and inefficiency in applying legal systems. Political risk-- appraisal is 
always a complex matter and there are no means, hedging or guarantees that eliminate 
risk entirely. In this respect and as an example the following corruption index compares 
the most corrupt and the cleanest countries with each other. 
Table 2.3: Countries corruption index 
Source: Based on Alderton (2008), Berlin Transparency International Group survey. 
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As explained above, political risk arises from non-compliance of the contract by the 
offshore/port authority or government, the efficiency of contractual commitments of 
such parties depends on the reliability of applicable laws and regulations. Legal systems 
must be formed on the basis of international rules and regulations. As an appropriate 
legal system is not enough for managing political risk, an operator may call for the 
involvement of multinational organisations such as the World Bank, Asian 
Development Bank, International Finance Corporation etc. The presence of such 
multinational organisations in port project forces the government to avoid imposing any 
measures that put the project in jeopardy. Other approaches for protecting against 
political risk are financial involvement of sponsors or lenders of host country, guarantee 
from export credit agents (World Bank, 2001). 
Regarding social uncertainty as Miller (1992) discusses it is generated from the beliefs, 
values, and attitudes of the residents that are not reflected in existing government policy 
or business practice. It also results from the difficulties inherent in predicting the 
probability of collective action and the direction of such action when people are faced 
with discrepancies between their own values and those embodied in the institutions 
impacting their lives. Eventually it can lead to political and policy uncertainty and 
would be characterized by social unrest, riots, demonstrations, or small-scale terrorist 
movements. If such movements subsequently develop into threats to the government, 
political instability can occur. The reason for separating the political and social 
dimensions of general environmental uncertainty is that they relate to two separate stake 
holder groups: government and society at large (Freeman, 1984). 
As Desai (2005) explains social risk is very often based on the quality (efficient, skilled, 
well-educated and trained etc) of the labour force, national law regarding the labour 
force, interference of labour unions in port operations and management. In many 
countries, a special importance has been given to dock workers under national law that 
increases the cost for port operation. Port authority or private operators may sustain a 
loss in terms of cost of unemployment payment, retraining etc while reforming the 
workforce. Whenever labour cost becomes too costly and raises port/terminal tariff, ship 
owners or shippers will try to avoid the port and use a neighbouring port. Weak labour 
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forces can be responsible for low production level, high damage level and theft due to 
high interference of labour union, and strike. 
In another case internationalisation is the same geographical expansion of trade and 
industry activities over a national country's borderlines. The term began to be used 
when the event slowly replaced imperialism as the central organisation principle 
framing cross-border relations between market economies started in the 1920s. The 
economic internationalisation process accelerated after World War II and appeared 
supreme until the early 1970s, when a new phenomenon of globalization began to 
appear (Gjellerup, 2000). Internationalisation is a phenomenon researched seriously 
over the last few decades from several viewpoints, including: international management, 
strategic management, organisation theory, marketing, small business management etc. 
Issues like the growth in global activities, international management and decision-
making, and factors getting advantage or disfavouring internationalisation have been 
studied for both large as well as small businesses (Ruzzier, 2006). Tisa and Su (2005) in 
their port related studies have found the internationalisation as one of the macro country 
risk factors. 
2.4.1.3. Foreign enterprise policy 
As per Tsai and Su (2005) regarding the foreign enterprises policy risks affecting the 
ports in the host country, they have categorised them into three issues of trade 
restriction, tax incentives and capital and remittance controls. 
As mentioned in the previous section for political and social system, policy uncertainty 
was referred to as instability in government policies that impact the business community 
(Ting, 1988). In respect of foreign enterprises policy Miller (1992) explains that some 
of the most related types of government policy uncertainties are unforeseen financial 
reforms, price controls and changes in the level of trade barriers. Even when policies do 
not transform, managers may be unsure as to the government's obligation to enforcing 
existing statutes. Multinational finns face government policy uncertainties in their home 
country as well as in the host countries. 
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2.4.1.4. Port development policy 
As per Tsai and Su (2005) development policy for sea ports indicates the host 
government's idea for ports' organisational pattern, liberalisation and 
internationalisation degree, industrial potential in adjacent areas, and position of port 
relative to other intercontinental ports within a nation. 
With reference to the port organisational pattern, liberalisation and internationalisation 
degree as UNCTAD (1993) explains subjects such as privatisation and 
commercialisation are the main topics. These subjects are contemporary because of the 
reforming of the international economic situation. In this regard over the last decade, 
there has been a universal trend of institutional reforming in the public sector. In some 
developed and developing countries, it has taken the form of commercialisation or 
privatisation of public enterprises. Based on UNCTAD (1995) in the former Russia and 
the former socialist countries in Eastern Europe and Asia, steps have been taken to 
change their centrally planned economies into market economies. Globalisation of 
manufacturing and national and global competition have been major driving factors for 
these changes. In the past, political decisions have transferred certain economic 
activities to the public sector. Now, market forces are increasingly being allowed to 
drive the entire national economy, which often involves institutional changes, away 
from public enterprise entered economies. 
As UNCTAD (1995) explains obviously in order to develop the liberalisation and 
internationalisation degree of the port, methods such as deregulation and 
decentralisation are useful ones. Additionally these methods will ease the port 
privatisation and commercialisation processes as well as they will recover the port 
competitiveness factors. As a competitive environment is built, benefits accrue quickly 
to the users. Labour-related deregulation is in numerous cases, the most vital part of the 
port reform. In France, for example, ignoring some labour laws which had allowed 
dockers a special employment status and updating others, has brought positive results in 
some French ports, such as the ports of Dunkirk and Rouen. 
Industrial potential in neighbouring areas and port positioning relative to other 
international ports within a same nation are also other competition factors which will 
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influence the host country'S VISIon during drafting and composing their port 
development policies (Tisa and Su, 2005). 
2.4.1.5. Port management policy 
As per Tsai and Su (2005) port management policy indicates the country's approach 
toward private financing policy of port infrastructure and equipment, port due and 
charge policy, efficient operation policy, and port customs practices. 
In this respect as per UNCT AD (1995) port management policies are aimed to grant the 
users with the lowest transport charge, or best logistics cost, which includes not only the 
charges paid by them to the port but also their own operating expenses incurred while in 
port. 
In offshore terminals and marine ports the significant changes are obviously not only 
the physical changes, such as the replacement of the berth by the terminal as the 
operational unit, but also the institutional changes as autonomous corporate bodies, 
namely offshore/port authorities and offshore/port operators, are now a standard feature 
in ports around the world. As explained in a previous report, (UNCT AD, 2006) port 
authorities are resorting to strategic planning to survive in a competitive environment 
through the use of cost leadership and service differentiation, in general, and strategic 
pricing in particular. Further, these port authorities are improving their managerial 
capabilities by implementing concepts, such as total quality-control, and relying on 
management tools, such as port pricing (UNCTAD, 2005). Perhaps the degree of the 
impact of competition on these corporate bodies can be measured by the increased 
reference made to clients instead of users. 
In another instance Alderton (2008) in respect of port management objectives explains 
that in the past, few ports and terminals seem to have had clear and explicit management 
objectives. However, the adoption of the ISM Code and the development of quality 
management by ports in the early 1990's, will have caused the minds of port/terminal 
boards to focus on this problem and come up with a variation of the following: 
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Ways of minimising costs: 
• Minimise payments by users in the port, including ships' time at a port. 
• Minimise users' total through transport costs. 
• Minimise port costs. 
Maximise of benefits: 
• They maximise benefits to the owners of port. 
• They maximise benefits to the town, region or country. 
2.4.2. Business risks 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (2004) has classified the business risk factor among the 
externally driven uncertainties which can impact any cOIporation. In another instance 
OGe (2002) categorized the commercial and strategic risks among the other risk factors 
that could be accounted as sources of uncertainties in a corporation. As it can be seen 
from the framework depicted in Figure 2.1, Ward (2005) has demonstrated areas of 
uncertainty within a corporation. Along with the externally driven risks or sources of 
uncertainties in a corporation, significant strategic uncertainty factors were competition, 
industry change and customer change/demand ones. IRM (2002) also has mentioned the 
same factors in the framework of their RM standards. 
2.4.2.1. Competition factors 
Over the past 20 years, competition among ports and tenninals around the world has 
increased dramatically, owing to several factors such as the increased competition in 
liner and tramp shipping, the development of inland transport networks, deregulation of 
inland transport operators and facilitation of transport procedures. The greatest engine 
of change has been the unitisation of general cargo which now moves in containers or 
on pallets. The outcome is the predominance of intermodal transport, over sea and land 
transport, and its reduced costs. Increased competition has forced port managers to give 
priority to users' needs and to assess their added value received from port services and 
facilities. This value is related to the increase in value of the cargo as a result of its 
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being moved from its place of origin to its destination (UNCTAD, 1995; Cullinane et aI, 
2002; Estache et aI, 2002 and Drewry, 2005). 
The World Bank (2007) explains that five forces will act together to shape the 
competitive landscape facing port authorities and port service providers: 
• The rivalry among existing competitors. 
• The threat of new competitors. 
• The potential for global substitutes. 
• The bargaining power of port users. 
• The bargaining power of port service. 
These features will influence ports of all sizes, driving needs for port development, 
service enhancement, pricing decisions, and other management actions. Winners and 
losers will appear in the global port sector, largely dependent on how port managers 
strategically position themselves in the evolving competitive landscape. 
Furthermore as Alderton (2008) has discussed a recent survey of the Atlantic market 
indicates that the traditional approaches to explain inter-port competition, including the 
hinterland concept,_Me not particularly importers' perspectives as shown in Table 2.4. 
Table 2.4: Port competition factors 
Source: Alderton (2008) 
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Although the port environment in general has become more and more competitive, it 
differs between regions and places depending on the extent to which these factors have 
impacted the nature of the port environment. In this context, the following key elements 
influencing the ports' competitiveness have been proposed based on the existing 
literatures (ADB, 2000; Peters, 2001; Tongzon and Heng, 2005; UNESCAP, 2005; 
Cargo News Asia, 2006; WCL, 2006; World Bank, 2007; ICS, 2007 and Alderton 2008; 
Yap and Notteboom, 2011). 
• Port (terminal) efficIency. 
• Landside accessibility. 
• Cargo handling charges. 
• Logistics and Value added services. 
• Port Reliability. 
• The depth of water. 
• Portlterminallocation. 
• Shipping frequency. 
• Adequate services (Ship repair, bunker and supply). 
• Quick response to ports' users need. 
• Adaptability to the changing market environment. 
2.4.2.2. Industry-change factors 
Since the environment in which marine ports operate has been transformed considerably, 
ports are affected by a variety of new forc~s driving global competition. including the 
far reaching unitisation of break bulk cargo, the rise of mega-carriers, the market entry 
of logistics integrators, the formation of network connections between port operators, 
the growth of inland transport networks etc (Notteboom and Winkelmans, 2001a, b). 
The previous section introduced the major players and competitors of the container 
trade which were taken into consideration. Now the most important challenges and 
changes which are occurring in the port industry are explained as follows (JuheJ, 2001; 
Slack, 2001; Drewry Shipping, 2002; ICS, 2005 and World Bank, 2007; Yap and 
Notteboom, 2011): 
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• Fluctuation in shipping industry. 
• Consolidation among ocean carriers. 
• Potential for global substitutes for port/terminal users. 
2.4.2.3. Customer change factor 
In the following section other risk factor affecting the business environment of the ports 
and terminals are discussed. 
• Increase in ship's size. 
• Change in customer demand on type of cargoes e.g. bulk, Ro-Ro and container. 
• Change in variety of products and services in ports and terminals. 
Over the last decade, technological development has accelerated the vessel dimension in 
such a way that seems to have no limit on the vessel size. This uncertainty in vessel size 
creates more challenges for ports. Larger ship needs new large dock gantry cranes and 
extensive dredging that involves a huge investment. Therefore, to establish new 
facilities anticipating new size dimension is a quite risky task (Slack, 2001). In another 
case as WCL Consulting Inc. (2006) explains in order to achieve economies of scale, 
ocean carriers are deploying larger capacity vessels (e.g. 10,000+ TEU post;.Panamax 
vessels) and at the same time rationalising their direct port calls by load centring at 
fewer "Hub" and "Transhipment" ports. Other risk factors mentioned in this section are 
fully discussed in Chapter 1 in support of Figure 1.1. 
2.4.3. Organisational risks 
In respect of the organisational risks shown in Table 2.1, organisational management 
and human resources are categorised as sources of risks and uncertainties that a 
corporate or a fIrm may become exposed to (OGC, 2002). 
Akerboom and Maes (2006) have explained that a general set of job and organisational 
characteristics which may raise different organisational and worker outcomes, is not a 
new idea. For example, models of healthy organisations take note that organisational 
performance and workers' health and welfare can be promoted by a common set of 
qualifications (Shoaf et ai, 2004). In the same manner, Zacharatos and Barling (2004) 
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have explained that the management of safety is no different from the management of 
organisational performance, and therefore many of the determinants of organisational 
performance are likely to affect organisational safety as well. In order to comprehend 
the significance of the organisational factors which may affect any firm or company, it 
is better to look at Figure 2.5. 
As shown in Figure 2.5, incidents are always preceded by a certain combination of 
technical, hwnan and/or organisational failures. In particular the definition of 
organisational failure plays an important role on majority of existing processes leading 
to accident which are explained by Vuuren (1998). Regardless of rising communal, 
industrial and scientific attention in the organisational causes of incidents, the idea of 
organisational failure is still only partially understood by researchers and hardly 
recognized by organisations (Vuuren and Van der Schaaf, 1995). 
To some extent arbitrarily, but after reading and analysing hundreds of accident 
scenarios, the following general failure types are summarised and classified into three 
groups (Wagenaar et ai, 1990): 
a) "Physical environment: design failures, missing defences, hardware defects, negligent 
housekeeping, and error enforcing conditions". 
b) "Human behaviour: poor procedures, lack of training". 
c) "Management: organisational failures, incompatible goals, lack of communication". 
Figure 2.5: A simple model of incident causation 
Source: Based on Van der Schaaf (1992) 
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While these failure categories are fonned through human action, they are not called 
'unsafe acts'. They are not immediately followed by a disaster; however they create 
inviting circumstances for unsafe acts to occur (Vuuren, 1998). 
As per OGC (2002) the following categories are some of the aspects that can be 
considered as a starting point in any organisation for identifying the main areas risk in 
relation to programmes: 
• Lack of clarity over roles and responsibilities. 
• Management incompetence. 
• Poor leadership. 
• Key personnel who have inadequate authority to fulfil their roles. 
• Inadequate corporate policies. 
• Lack of support to business processes. 
• Operational procedures-adequate and appropriate. 
• Inadequate or inaccurate information. 
• Poor staff selection procedure. 
• Indecision or inappropriate decision making. 
• Professional negligence. 
• Performance failure (people or equipment). 
In the following section organisational related risk factors or sources of uncertainties in 
the offshore terminals and marine ports that are faced by the different maritime related 
organisations will be investigated. Based on the existing literatures (UNCTAD, 1998; 
ISO, 2002; Oakland, 2002; ICS, 2007; BPM, 2010; DNV, 2010 and Marianos et ai, 
2011) organisational related risk factors are mainly discussed under heading of factors 
such as organisational structure, management, quality process, human resource, key 
performance indicators. 
2.4.3.1. Organisational structure 
Schein (1985) defmes three organisational problem areas that cover the problems 
encountered by consultants in the area of organisational development. His division of 
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problem areas is based on what he perceives as the three main themes in organisational 
science. The first theme is the structure of an organisation and deals with problems 
about how to divide tasks, authority, responsibilities, and resources to make the 
organisation function as efficiently as possible. The second theme deals with 
interpersonal relations between people working in the organisation. Finally the third 
theme deals with the strategy of an organisation. 
ICS (2007) explains that it is difficult to generalise as to the best organisational 
structure for a modem port, but a typical structure can be found in UNCTAD (1996). 
Moreover UNCTAD (1985) expressed that the selection of an appropriate form of port 
administration is a matter of port policy rather than part of the preparation of a specific 
port development plan. The basic system of port administration, whether it is to be an 
autonomous or a centrally directed administration should be determined by the national 
ports authority. However, there are certain organisational elements of the administration 
which are the responsibility of the local port authority. A check-list of these elements is 
given by UNCTAD shown in Table 2.5. Organisational structure of the port is the first 
elements among others which must be taken into consideration. 
Table 2.5: UNCTAD Check-list 
Organisational elements needed in a port administration 
@ganisational struct;0 
2. Administrative procedures. 
3. Costs analyse and control. 
4. Tariff structure. 
5. Consignment documentation and customs procedures. 
6. Electronic data processing and telecommunications systems. 
7. Data collection, analysis and dissemination procedures. 
8. Staffing and manning policies. 
9. Staff selection procedure. 
10. Training programmes. 
11. Marketing and public relations (including the education of potential users of a 
proposed new facility). 
Source: UNCTAD (1996) 
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2.4.3.2. Management 
Management acts as individuals considering and communicating decisions. They 
promote the need to develop and improve the organisation and to set targets (Oakland, 
2002). Regarding management failures Alderton (2008) has stated the following reasons 
as main contributing factors: 
• Lack of direct authority to effect remedial action. 
• Qualification required by the job for senior managers. 
• Lack of adequacy in upgrading knowledge. 
• Lack of continuity in senior manager's positions. 
2.4.3.3. Quality process 
International standard encourages the implementation of a process approach when 
developing, executing and improving the efficiency of a quality management system, to 
improve customer satisfaction by meeting customer needs. The application of a system 
of processes within a company, jointly with the identification and connections of these 
processes, and their management, can be called "process approach" (ISO, 2000). 
Alderton (2008) in respect of the insufficiencies observed in the ports' and teIminals' 
clearance procedures and documentatioasummarizes them as follows: 
• Late arriving documents. 
• Faulty document. 
• Outmoded documentation requirements and processing methods. 
• Outmoded clearance facilities for vessel and cargo. 
• Importers allowed ordering shipments without sufficient funds to take delivery 
on arrival. 
2.4.3.4. Human resources 
With the introduction of the Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) in the IMO decision 
making process concerning new rules, and the recent tanker disasters resulting in 
extensive oil spills, the public tension for improving safety conditions in port, offshore 
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and shipping industries has increased (Trbojevic and Carr, 2000). Taking into account 
that some types of safety report (case) regulations related to marine operations have not 
been recognized, and that the port, offshore and shipping industries are at the beginning 
of safety rules which are already in use in other industries. A step wise methodology for 
safety expansions for example in sea ports has been developed by Trbojevic and Carr. 
In their first step, during HAZID phase they found out the main risk parameters in their 
port dynamic risk model. Organisational and human risk factors were among the main 
parameters. On the other hand they found that the main elements leading to 
organisational risk factors were poor management practices, lack of ship specific 
knowledge and poor vessel maintenance. In respect of human risk factors poor decision 
making, poor judgement, lack of knowledge and poor communication were noted as 
main factors. In addition as per quality management standard's requirements, ISO 9001 
(2000), the Code 4.2 (human resource) explains that the employees performing the tasks 
which can affect the product quality shall be capable on the basis of proper education, 
training, skills and experience. 
2.4.3.5. Key performance indicators 
Based on PWHC (2007) "Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) mean factors by reference 
to which the development, performance or position of the business of the company can 
be measured effectively". Additionally Oakland (2002) expresses that the KPIs, tell the 
organisations whether they are moving towards or away from the mission, or remaining 
stationary. ICS (2007) explains that performance indicators are tools or instruments that 
allow port managers to measure port or terminal performance, and take corrective 
decisions to improve it when and where it is needed. Then ICS explains that an 
indication of port/terminal performance is important and will become increasingly so as 
ship size continues to grow, competition increases and capital intensity of port 
investment rises. 
As per ICS port/terminal operations performance can be considered under three broad 
categories: 
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• Physical performance refers to the output of existing assets and facilities. The 
performances of the port can be calculated as a whole or the performances for 
each set or group of facilities (berths, yards, cranes, sheds, storehouses and 
labour force), can be considered. 
• Quality performance is a factor of competition which may exceed the price of 
port services in importance. Port reliability, flexibility and application of rules 
are all included in the quality of port services. 
• Financial performance is described as the profit and loss contribution of each 
category of port operation and service. 
2.4.4. Operational risks 
Frost et al (2001) explain that operational integrity in corporate level generally 
encompasses the management of operational risks stemming from inappropriate cultural 
environments, lack of management supervision, errors, malice, fraud, poor health and 
safety and environmental compliance failures, physical disasters, and poor internal 
controls. Furthermore they express that the consequences of not managing operational 
risk properly go beyond direct financial losses. Failure at the level of operational 
continuity can lead to what organisations fear most, that is, a loss of reputation among 
the public at large and their shareholders. As Davidson (2003) explains operational risk 
addresses the risks associated with carrying out operations. Included here are matters 
such as running an assembly line, managing an office, and operating- a computer facility. 
Risk arises when events occur that threaten operations in some way. For example if a 
factory experiences a power failure, its assembly lines will stop, and it will be unable to 
produce its manufactured products on schedule. 
Furthermore Frost et al (2001) explain that while Operational Risk Management (ORM) 
practices in some industry sectors are well established - such as those in the nuclear 
power and air transportation industries - the need for a systematic approach to ORM is 
only now starting to enter into the wider business consciousness. One of the most 
immediate business drivers for taking ORM more seriously now than in the past is 
demonstrated by those organisations that have suffered catastrophic failure because of 
poorORM. 
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As per OGe (2002) the following categories are some of the aspects that can be 
considered as a starting point in any organisation for identifying the main areas risk in 
relation to programmes: 
• Safety being compromised. 
• Inadequate incident handling. 
• Breaches in physical security/information security. 
• Pollution incidents. 
• Failing to meet legal or contractual obligations. 
• Human error/incompetence. 
• Residual maintenance problem. 
• Failure to control IT effectively. 
In the following section impact of the above mentioned areas of risk and sources of 
uncertainties in the offshore terminals and marine ports under the heading of operational 
risk factors with the existing literatures are discussed. 
2.4.4.1. Port safety related risk factors 
The Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 urged the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) to 
retain an "acceptable level of safety" in the ports and waterways of the U.S. The law 
launched a clear, but subjective, goal for the Coast Guard's historic waterway 
management function. The awareness of this goal implied the capability to determine 
and to quantify together the intensity of risk in any waterway and the risk reduction 
value of safety involvements such as aids to navigation systems, pilotage, and vessel 
traffic systems. A George Washington UniversityNirginia Commonwealth University 
team was asked to build up a computer based set of techniques that could be used by the 
USCG to consider the Vessel Traffic Management (VTM) necessity for each of the 
most important Ports and Waterways in the U.S. (Harrald and Merrick, 2000). As a 
result they used the fleet composition, traffic conditions, navigational conditions, 
waterway configuration, potential consequences of transporting dangerous goods and 
subsequence lack of not using VTM systems as main risk factors for the purpose of their 
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model in order to measure the safety risk levels of their ports for the mentioned factors. 
By the use of expert judgements and an AHP method which will be explained in 
Chapter 4 they became able to evaluate and measure the levels of the U.S. ports' safety 
risk factors. For the purpose of this research the same model will be used as one of the 
subset frameworks of the operational risk model but instead of the AHP method it will 
be evaluated by the use of a Fuzzy AHP method (see Chapter 4). 
Two separate port risk assessment workshops were conducted for the port of Morgan 
City, LA, USA, in April 2000 and port of Coos Bay in September 7, 2000. In both the 
workshops same risk factors, models, methods and tools were used in order to evaluate 
the levels of the same risk factors for the mentioned ports (PRA, 2010). 
In respect of meeting safety standards in ports the Port Marine Safety Code (pMSC) has 
been designed and published in March 2000 by the Dff Ports Division. It aims to 
establish an agreed national standard for port marine safety and a measure by which 
harbour authorities can be held accountable for their legal powers and duties to run their 
ports and harbours safely (PMSC, 2001). It is noted that there is no known literature on 
this topic related to Iranian ports such as used in the case studies later in this research. 
2.4.4.2. Security related risk factors 
In support of RM issues during the operations, logistics and supply chain security of the 
ports and terminals Bichouet et al (2007) in the Lloyd's practical shipping guide 
explained that the concept of RM in ports continues to be overwhelmingly associated 
with operational risks such as security. In their argument they have categorised the port 
security related risk factors into the following major sections: 
• People Safety: Partners, customers, and service providers. 
• Asset Protection: Facilities, goods, products, and information. 
• Profitability: Cash, e-comrnerce, and royalties. 
UNCT AD (2006) on its debate towards a supply chain risk assessment framework has 
explained that some of the central aspects of the risk assessment and their meaning in 
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the context of the maritime supply chain security can be highlighted in a form of the 
following three sources of risks: 
• Environmental: uncertainties arising from external sources such as terrorist or 
environmental risks. 
• Organisational: internal uncertainties arising within the supply chain such as 
strikes or production failures. 
• Network-related: referring- to the uncertainties arising from the interactions 
between organisations in the supply chain. 
In the present maritime security regime, there is a tough highlighting on environmental 
and organisational risks and small spotlight on network-related vulnerabilities. 
2.4.4.3. Pollution related risk factors 
As Goulielmos (2000) explains marine pollution has received much attention by 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) (ESCAP, 1992), United Nations Conference 
on Trade And Development (UNCTAD, 1993), United Nations (1994, 1996), Comite 
Maritime International (CMI), International Navigation Association i.e. Permanent 
International Association of Navigation Congress (PIANC) used to be called in 1991, 
World Bank (Davis et ai, 1990) etc. IMO has, in particular, dealt with transport, 
handling and storage of dangerous substances in offshore terminals and marine ports. 
Advanced ports particularly those of the third generation have emerged as parts of the 
logistics chain (Goulielmos, 1998). The passive role of ports against anything was 
coming from sea towards the onshore and from shore side towards the sea has changed 
(Pronk, 1993), but their strategic position connecting sea and land makes them the best 
eyewitness for the pollution initiating from land, ships and from the ports themselves. 
Additionally Goulielmos (2000) explains that the consideration has not been paid to the 
ports environment at all. The port environment is endangered by ports' hinterland, ports' 
activities and operations, and ships activities. Ports pollution may also result from ship 
accidents, accidents in ports (Goulielmos and Pardali, 1998), land activities, ship 
58 
bunkering, noises, garbage, dust, dredging, port maintenance, ship air pollution, traffic 
congestion, sewage etc. The focus of the international community is mainly on ports' 
visitors i.e. the ships, because of the well-known marine accidents. Regardless of this, 
the issue of material dredging from ports has been addressed as early as 1975 (London 
Dumping Convention) and pollution of the sea from oil and the facilities for waste 
reception in ports and offshore terminals, as early as in 1973 (MARPOL 73/78, The 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from ships). The issue of oil 
pollution in emergency situations in ports has been addressed since 1990 (Convention 
of Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation). Figure 2.6 presents the 
extent of the pollutions generated in ports. 
Figure 2.6: Port Pollution and its causes. 
Source: Goulielmos (2000), constructed from UNCTAD (1993) 
As Goulielmos (2000) explains on the basis of an IAPH (International Association of 
Ports and Harbours) survey, filled in by 183 ports, the critical areas were three: 
• Dangerous materials. 
• Water pollution. 
• Dredging and dumping of dredged waste. 
The third factor is connected to port expansion or conservation. 
In this regard IAPH suggested that the following principles should be applied during the 
environmental policy making of the ports: 
• Limit sea (from ship, land, dredging) and air pollution (dust, noise). 
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• Use Environmental hnpact Analysis (E.I.A.) in port development. 
• Prevent risk of major accidents (Vessel Traffic System (VTS), emergency plans, 
and dangerous goods). 
• Manage waste and discharge (recovery, collection, recycling, supervised 
disposal areas). 
• Create quality areas. 
• Regulate against pollution. 
Lloyd's List has tabulated the most ship incidents (e.g. grounding, bunkering, collision, 
etc) that have occurred in ports world-wide which have caused the major pollution 
claims. The effect will vary greatly from port to port according to the particular physical 
features and situation of the port (Alderton, 2008). 
2.4.4.4. Contract related risk factors 
World Bank (2007) explains that legal risks with respect to port projects take place in 
association with the lack of accuracy in and the prospect of changes in the legislation 
and regulations overriding the project. It must be assumed that a set of rules exists at the 
time the project is initiated. The risk of changes in legislation or regulations can be 
initiated from the probability that condition in effect at the time of the agreement may 
change at a later date. 
Sharp (2009) expresses that in the offshore industry an oil company may lose a specific 
contract for supply of hydrocarbons to a designated market for commercial, political 
and operational reasons. For example such loss can result from a major operational 
damage or an accident which has happened to an offshore terminal. In this case there 
may be a delay in a contract (made between the contractor and operator) for 
reconstruction of the damaged parts or rectifying and repairing the faults as a result of 
the major damage or accident. As a result of delay the oil company using the terminal 
having had contract with oil importers in the market will face fmancialloss. 
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2.4.4.5. Human related risk factors 
As per Soares and Teixiera (2001) one of the oldest data banks that is frequently the 
basis for the majority of studies of worldwide information is operated by Lloyds. In 
respect of marine accidents, it is not shocking that around eighty percent of shipping 
accidents are caused by human factors. Therefore it has motivated interest in increasing 
methodologies that take into custody the nature of human errors in marine accidents and 
store them in data bases for additional numerical study as reported in Kristiansen et al 
(t999). They have mentioned pilots', ship's officers' and shore personnel error as main 
contributors for the human errors related risk factors. In another instance North of 
England P&l (Protection and indemnity) Club (2008) has reported the pilot's, ships' 
officers and crew and shore personnel's e.g. stevedores errors as the main categories of 
the human errors contributing to the major mentioned marine losses. 
In another case Otterland and Roos (1960) have explained human factors that 
contributed to shipwrecks and other accident to ships; they have distributed the 
accidents by different type of employee such as deck officers, marine engineers, 
remaining crew and ratings, pilots, persons in other ships and persons on shore. 
Again in another investigation which was made by Liu et al in 2005. The negligent 
causers in marine accidents found to be employees such as master, chief mate, chief 
engineer, second mate, pilot, third mate and second engineer. Moreover according to the 
UK P&l Club (2010) human error costs the maritime industry $541m a year. From their 
own analysis of 6091 major claims (over $100,000) spanning a period of 15 years, the 
Club has established that these claims have cost their members S2.6bn, 62% of which is 
attributable to human error. From this 62% (human error), 30% was contributed to the 
deck officers error, 15% was belonged to crew error, 8% to pilot error, 7% to shore 
person error and 2% was belonged to engineer officers error. 
HFW (2002) during its incident investigation and analysis of offshore and maritime 
incidents (accidents and near-misses) has found that eighty percent or more of them 
involve human error. Furthermore in the maritime system human resource could include 
the ships' crew, pilots, dock workers, YTS operators etc. The performance of these 
people dependents on many characters, both inherent and learned. HFW, during their 
61 
investigations found that the factors such as: people Knowledge, Skill, ability, alertness, 
judgement, decision making, safety culture, performance, crew competent, training and 
communication are the most significant factors that may cause organisational failure 
through the accidents. 
2.4.4.6. Technical risk factors 
As per Alderton (2008) inadequate maintenance policies will result in high proportion 
of equipment being out of service due to the following reasons: 
• Absence of preventive and running maintenance. 
• Lack of qualified maintenance personnel. 
• Lack of adequate stocks of spare parts. 
• Insufficient standardization of equipment types. 
As per ICS (2007) ports and terminals also require engineering skills to undertake the 
maintenance and development of the fabric of the port/terminal structure in areas such 
as civil engineering, offshore engineering, hydro graphic surveys, mechanical, marine 
and electrical etc works. As a part of the marine services, dredging and maintenance of 
port/terminal infrastructures, navigational aids, IT and equipment are among the main 
technical factors that will help the port/terminal to overcome its own short comings and 
remain competitive. For example in respect of IT Brancheau et ai, (1996) explain that in 
a current survey between IT consultants in the U.S. constructing a responsive IT 
infrastructure to carry existing applications whilst remaining responsive to change is 
rated as the number one main issue. In this regard thus, it is not astonishing that Port of 
Singapore Authority (PSA) placed importance on structuring a flexible and extensible 
IT infrastructure as its third victory factor. A high-quality IT infrastructure strengthens 
the competitive positioning of business plans for any company (Broadbent and Weill, 
1997). Furthermore, a flexible IT infrastructure is essential to offer long-term support 
for a business strategy that can swiftly react to changing environmental conditions 
(Eardley et ai, 1997). 
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2.5. SUMMARY 
This chapter has reviewed the theory and literature on RM and parent disciplines with 
the primary aim of identifying the boundaries of knowledge and describing the research 
problem. The chapter has thoroughly discussed the theory, practice and research 
developments into RM in offshore terminals and marine ports. It has also examined the 
literature on different and significant risk factors and their relationship with offshore 
terminals and marine ports. The parent and related disciplines examined included 
country, business, organizational and operational related risk factors. The review has 
uncovered several practices and problems related to the management of hazards and risk 
factors within offshore tenninals and marine ports. 
Summing up, alternative approaches that clearly incorporate subjectivity and empirical 
knowledge have to be addressed for an effective modelling and analysis of risk factors 
in general, and offshore terminals' and marine ports' country, business, organizational 
and operational related risk factors in particular. Recent developments in the field of 
RM create great potential for the development of decision support systems and 
knowledge based systems. Due to the characteristics of RM, emphasis on human 
judgement, a knowledge based decision support system seems to be an appropriate 
methodology. Several techniques for decision support systems development and 
uncertainty encoding procedures are available and can be used in this regard. 
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this chapter is to describe how the research was conducted in order to fulfil 
the aim and objectives. The aim of this research is to develop a RM framework for 
identifying, analysing and managing risk factors affecting offshore terminals and marine 
ports. The research is, therefore, a typical management study since it aims to enhance 
the practice of RM in offshore and marine industries. The development of the RM 
framework requires that relevant knowledge be elicited from experts who are working 
in the related fields. However the process of knowledge acquisition is complex, lengthy 
and tense with difficulties. After introducing a generic RM framework, this chapter will 
discuss the different research strategies and the choice of the most appropriate ones for 
the present study. The chapter deals with the whole issues of research design, namely 
research perspectives, research types, research methods, sampling selection, data 
collection and analysis techniques. The data collection methods adopted namely experts' 
judgements, are discussed briefly here and at length in the next chapter. 
3.2. A GENERIC RM FRAMEWORK 
Figure 3.1 provides an illustrative view of a generic RM framework proposed for the 
purpose of this research upon which the research methodology will be directed. 
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Risk Management Framework for Offshore Terminals and Marine Ports 
Chapter 2 Cltapters 4,5,6,7 
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Chapter 4 
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Cause Consequence 
Evaluation Evaluation 
Chapter 8 
Risk Mitigation 
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Figure 3.1: RM framework for offshore terminals and marine ports (copied from Chapter 1) 
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3.2.1. Hazard identification phase 
The risk-based framework in this research comprises the review of literature (i.e. 
Chapter 2) on the existing risk factors or in other word hazard identification i.e. HAZID 
process to develop a risk-based hierarchical model similar to clusters in order to conduct 
the rest of the RM processes easily and in a clear manner as are shown in Figure 3.1. 
3.2.2. Risk assessment phase 
The identified hazards or risk factors from Chapter 2 will be assessed and weighted in 
this phase and then they will be prioritised and ranked using a designed hierarchical 
model, a F AHP method and experts' judgements which are fully explained in Chapter 4. 
In Chapter 5 by using FST and an ER approach a new risk-based model will be 
implemented on three Iranian ports to show the applicability of the model during the 
port-to-port risk assessment For this purpose the formerly designed hierarchical risk-
based model, from Chapter 4 along with the new experts' evaluation results from the 
three Iranian ports while using the ER approach under fuzzy environment will be fed 
into the IDS software. As a result IDS will compute and rank the ports as per their risk 
index. 
In Chapter 6 the most significant risk factors or- hazards prioritised previously in 
Chapter 4 will be analysed in depth by the use of bow-tie method while using the FT A 
and ETA techniques under fuzzy environment. This will allow investigation of the 
causes of the most significant risk factors by FTA in addition to investigating their 
feasible consequences using ETA. As a result this will help to study individual risk 
factors in depth and to issue comments by experts, auditors, surveyors and investigators 
about lessons to be learnt and to give advice on how to avoid their recurrence. 
In Chapter 7 of the research a separate RM strategy will be implemented on the 
significant risk factors to show the capability of the RM frameworks that can take into 
66 
custody any of the risk factors exclusively. For this reason apart from the generic RM 
framework defined for the whole thesis (i.e. hazard identification. risk assessment and 
risk mitigation phases shown in Figure 3.1) a separate individual RM framework in the 
form of a robust individual strategy using a SRFT and SV A technique will be designed 
for the foremost revealed risk factors. 
3.2.3. Risk mitigation phase 
In Chapter 8 in order to mitigate the identified risk factors several alternatives (control 
options) will be proposed with the use of Fuzzy TOPSIS device (i.e. a decision making 
tool). The proposed alternatives will be gauged and ranked as per their priorities while 
using experts' judgements to see which one has more strategic importance. 
Apart from the HAZID process all the other phases in this research will be conducted 
under fuzzy environment. Fuzzy environment has been used to deal with the vagueness 
of the data collected during the course of research. This process will ensure the cycle of 
the RM used for the purpose of offshore terminals and marine ports is complete. Full 
details about fuzzy theory will be explained in Chapter 4. 
3.3. DESCRIPTIONS AND IDEAS LINKED TO RESEARCH DESIGN 
3.3.1. Research methodology 
The topic of research methodology and its procedures lies at the central part of every 
research study. Research methodology is concerned with the philosophical and 
theoretical foundations upon which the research is conducted in order for the knowledge 
yielded to be acceptable (Edum-Fotwe et ai, 1996). As a result, research methodology 
has to describe the justification for the particular techniques or techniques s used in a 
research. 
3.3.2 Research techniques 
Techniques, alternatively, are methods and tools by which information is collected, 
evaluated and presented. Although sometimes they are used interchangeably; data 
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collection techniques and data collection methods are considered different ideas in this 
research. A technique is defined as a systematic and orderly approach taken towards the 
collection of data so that information can be obtained from those data. A method is step-
by-step process that can be followed in order to gather data and analyse them to find 
information. A technique tells how to do something rather than what is being done (yin, 
2009). 
3.3.3 Research design 
Research design can be described as the basic research plan or strategy, as well as its 
fundamental reason that aims to permit the viability and validity of the research. 
Basically, research designs, plans or strategies seek to respond questions such as how, 
why, who, when, where, how much, how many in order to provide explanations, 
descriptions, classifications, associations, relationships and causalities. Selecting an 
appropriate research methodology is a difficult task and involves, among others, not 
only setting a very clear definition of the aim and objectives to be achieved, research 
questions or hypothesis, but also an understanding of data collection methods and 
techniques, type of data, data sources, measurement instruments and data analysis 
strategies. There are close linkages between research questions, methodology, data 
collection techniques, type of data and data analysis and they cannot be treated in 
isolation. Yin (1994) considered this logic link as a sequence of evidence. There are 
many research methods and data collection techniques ranging from experiments, 
surveys, case studies, historical, questionnaire, interviews, experts' judgements and 
observation, to video and photography. Some of these methods are more suitable to 
certain research studies than to others. Nevertheless. no single method fits all research 
questions and research situations. Each design provides answers to a specific set of 
questions. Therefore, the best approach is one that is essential to the kind of questions 
the research wishes to answer, taking into account the extent to which it complies with 
reliability and validity criteria. Many times research is conducted by combining several 
methods since the different methods are not mutually exclusive. In addition, there is no 
straight forward set of rules that can be followed when selecting a specific method for 
one set of circumstances and another method for another set of circumstances. The 
68 
following sections present two main research methods namely quantitative and 
qualitative as well as data collection methods and techniques used for the purpose of 
this research. 
3.4. SAMPLING SELECTION 
Collection of qualitative data in a research or study is to get a deeper understanding of a 
fact, as the significance of detailed data becomes inevitable. Saunders et al. (2009) have 
discussed the advantages of samples, and advised that selecting a sample allows the 
author to limit the amount of data that he/she wishes to collect, and only focus on a sub-
group, as opposed to all possible cases. 
Experienced professionals involved in the management of the offshore terminals and 
marine ports were chosen to be the sample population as they would be aware of the 
importance of hazards and risk factors they are involved with. Due to their ability to 
compare and define which hazards or risk factors have the higher impact on the 
operations and management of the offshore terminals or marine ports, they were the 
most suitable participants in this research. The reason behind conducting the test cases 
and case studies in the next chapters is that the experts used in this thesis have related 
and adequate educations, skills and experiences from the field (for more details about 
experts see Chapter 4). This provides a unique opportunity that will enhance the 
validity of the data collected, in terms of allowing a comparison between offshore 
terminals and marine ports. The Iranian Hormozgan Port Authority in Port of Shahid 
Rajaie was chosen to collect data due to the convenience of not being too far from the 
first case study location in Chapter 5. 
The sample size of this thesis was six experts described in Chapter 4 and three experts 
for the remaining chapters, consisting of managers from Iranian offshore terminals or 
marine ports. This sample size was considered acceptable for this study. Saaty (2001) 
stated that just a small sampling size «10 responses) was necessary if the data collected 
were gathered from the experts. This is due to that fact that professionals should share 
consistent belief and thus diminish the need for a huge sample size (see Chapter 4). 
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Convenience sampling method was used in this research. It is "convenience" because 
the researcher has privileged knowledge of offshore terminals and marine ports from his 
previous experiences as a Master Mariner. Convenience sample is also used due to easy 
access to the research case study area which is based in Iran where the researcher is 
from. 
3.5. METHODOLOGY FOR DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
This section describes the process of data collection used in the thesis along with 
justification and analysis of the data gathered. 
Data Collection Data Analysis 
1 1 
Qualitative Data: Consistency Test 
Literature Review >---t-..... Secondary Data 
+ 
Quantitative Data: Primary Data 
Figure 3.2: Methodology for data collection and analysis 
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The choice of data collection method should be in line with the research questions and 
its aim and the objectives (Saunders et ai, 2009). Two types of data collection methods 
have been used in this thesis. Primary data collection involves collecting new data, 
whereas secondary data collection concerns the collection of existing data. These 
methods in the form of qualitative and quantitative data have been categorised and 
depicted in Figure 3.2 and are fully explained in the forthcoming sections. 
3.5.1. Data collection 
A well-structured methodology, based on experienced should enable organisations to 
take full advantage of the findings. A methodology is based on research and 
consultancy (Rigby, 1969). 
In this thesis the research problem was to explain and provide a generic model and 
perhaps to justify RM processes in offshore terminals and marine ports. Due to scarcity 
of the research done in this area, to understand the research problem it is required to use 
an approach involving the use of multiple methods. Such an approach can entail 
qualitative and quantitative methods to gather and examine the data. 
Naslund (2002) has pointed out limitations of using the quantitative research methods 
alone and argues for the integration of qualitative techniques as well in order to enhance 
the current power of quantitative logistics research. 
As a result, qualitative research methods can be associated with face-to-face contact 
with people in the research setting, together with verbal data and observations. 
Qualitative data can also be collected in a number of forms, with methods ranging from 
the collection of evidence through interviews, which may be recorded and later 
transcribed; semi-structured interviews with crucially placed organisational personnel; 
personal correspondence with organisations; questionnaire survey; use of published and 
unpublished documents; literature reviews. Finally qualitative data can even be 
collected through experts' judgements. 
71 
Using the qualitative methods alone has a number of limitations. Stacey (1969) 
enumerates two problems specific to qualitative work in a particular participant 
observation. First, the full meaning of the data may not be grasped and temporary 
conditions can easily be taken to represent normal ones. Second, bias from the 
theoretical framework adopted and the data selected by the researcher, can also more 
easily creep into a study dependent only upon qualitative work (lick, 1979). 
Additionally Swartz and Boaden (1997) also discuss that the quantitative method alone 
can never indicate the richness of social phenomena. Thus it is required to combine 
methods to do this, using quantitative data to help simplify phenomena and look for 
patterns, while qualitative methods provide the means to account for those patterns in 
ways which resonate with our experience of the phenomenon. 
As it was discussed in Chapter 2 risk factors associated with offshore terminals and 
marine ports in the form of qualitative data were identified through the HAZID process 
i.e. literature review. As it is mentioned in Chapter 2 and based on Saunders et ai, 
(2007), the advantage of literature review is that it saves time since it has already been 
collected, and it is also less expensive than other methods. It is also likely to be of 
higher-quality, and the data can be used in conjunction with the data collected through 
other qualitative methods such as experts' judgements. 
In this thesis through conducting literature review in Chapter 2 various types of risk 
factors were identified in the first phase of the qualitative data collection. In the second 
phase the identified risk factors will be used during experts' judgements through 
utilising a F AHP method. Full explanations and discussions in respect of the nominated 
experts for the AHP and F AHP methods are explained in Chapter 4. 
On the other hand. based on Eldabi et ai, (2002) quantitative research places emphasis 
on procedure and statistical measures of validity. It relies on the measurement and 
analysis of statistical data to determine relationships between one set of data to another. 
It focuses on individuals. For example, a survey questionnaire or a comparison matrix is 
given to individuals as discrete objects of enquiry. 
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In this thesis data collected in the form of qualitative linguistics variables which were 
used during the experts' judgements will be transformed into quantitative data as per 
procedures explained in Chapter 4. The obtained quantitative data in this research are all 
in the form of Triangular Fuzzy Numbers (TFNs) that will be used for further 
calculations and analysis which in final stages of data analysis eventually will be 
defuzzified and transformed into a crisp value as fully mentioned in Chapter 4. 
3.5.2. Data analysis 
The collected data as explained in the previous sections must be further analysed prior 
to be used in other stages of the research. Analysing collected data needs specific 
strategies and techniques in order to produce a high quality analysis (Yin, 2009). 
In this research data was gathered thought experts' judgements with the use of making 
several pair-wise comparisons as will be described in Chapter 4. Based on Saaty (1980) 
an important consideration for this process is the consistency of the pair-wise 
judgements provided by the decision maker. Therefore in order to ensure that the 
gathered data are reliable and consistent, an additional test called consistency test will 
be carried out on the data collected (see Chapter 4). 
3.6. CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has explained and presented the various research designs in an effort to lay 
down the basics for the research. It has presented the main philosophical views behind 
the research methodologies. Different research perspectives, research types, data 
collection methods, data collection techniques and data sources were explained. The 
chapter explains in detail the reasons behind the selection of research methods and 
techniques for the present study. The next chapter will go on to discuss the issues of 
sample design (i.e. decision matrices), measuring instruments (i.e. pair-wise 
comparisons) and data analysis (i.e. consistency tests) details. Furthermore the next 
chapter presents the review of the theory and literature in the context of fuzzy sets and 
numbers. 
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CHAPTER 4: RISK PRIORITY ASSESSMENT 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
Offshore tenninals and marine ports play an important role in world trade, international 
logistics and global supply chain management. Their operations are associated with a 
high level of uncertainty because they operate in a dynamic environment in which 
hazards may cause possible accidents. This chapter discusses recently emergent RM-
related issues taking into consideration the externally and internally driven elements e.g. 
pure risks (i.e. uncertainty of damage to property by fire, flood or the prospect of 
premature death caused by accidents) and speculative risks (i.e. risks which are linked 
directly to the business function, decision making processes and management). To 
overcome the problem this chapter will propose a generic risk assessment model which 
is based on a RM framework to priorities and detect-the critical hazards that can lead to 
catastrophic damages to terminals and ports. The proposed model uses a FAHP method 
to detennine the relative weights of the risk factors identified during the offshore 
tenninals and marine ports operations and management. A test- case is examined to 
illustrate the applications of the proposed methods. This can help port professionals and 
port risk managers develop appropriate strategies and take preventive/corrective actions 
in later stages for mitigating risks toward a successful offshore terminals' and marine 
ports' operations and management. 
4.2. METHODOLOGY FOR RISK ASSESSMENT IN OFFSHORE TERMINALS 
AND MARINE PORTS 
A generic F AHP-based risk assessment model is proposed for detennining and 
assessing the levels of risk factors. The proposed model is a key part in the RM 
framework for offshore tenninals and marine ports. The schematic diagram of the 
proposed F AHP-based risk assessment model is illustrated in Figure 4.1. 
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Figure 4.1: A generic Risk Assessment Model for offshore tenninals and marine ports 
The proposed F AHP-based risk assessment model will be implemented on offshore 
terminals and marine ports during risk assessment phases via carrying out the following 
steps: 
75 
Step 1: Exploiting the identified risk factors (hazards) in offshore terminals and marine 
ports. The identified risk factors are obtained through HAZID process. 
Step 2: Developing a generic hierarchical structure based on the risk factors obtained in 
previous step. The risk-based hierarchy is structured in such a way that the title of the 
"sources of risks and uncertainties in offshore tenninals and marine ports" is the main 
goal and is placed on the top of the hierarchy labelled main goal. Country and business 
risks from externally driven environments plus organisational and operational risks 
from the internally driven environments are placed under Level O. Sub-risk factors are 
placed under Level 2 and finally the sub sets of Level 2 subs are gathered under Level 3 
risk factors. 
Step 3: By use of the experts' judgment and opinions, the significance of the risk factors 
structured hierarchically in Step 2 (i.e. Levell, Level 2 and Level 3 risk factors) will be 
explored. Thesejudgements will be carried out in the form of the pre-defined linguistics 
variables which have been explained in the previous sections of this chapter. The 
linguistic variables then will be transformed into the TFNs and will be made ready for 
the pair-wise comparisons. Moreover a consistency test will be conducted on the 
comparison matrices in order to ensure that experts' judgements and pair-wise 
comparisons were reasonable. 
Step 4: By use of the experts' judgements and-pair-wise comparison matrices the local 
weights of the risk factors in Level I, Level 2 and Level 3 will be determined. 
Step 5: Determination of global weights for the risk factors in Level 3. The global 
weights for Level 3 risk factors will be calculated directly by mUltiplying the local 
weights of the Level 1, Level 2 and Level 3 risk factors. 
Step 6: At the end the risk factors will be ranked directly as per their numerical 
priorities in order to show their significance. 
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4.3. RISK ASSESSMENT IN OFFSHORE TERMINALS AND MARINE PORTS 
The key phase of any RM framework or cycle is the risk assessment phase to evaluate 
the identified hazards or risk factors (USCG, 2010; UKHSE, 2010; UNCTAD, 2006; 
ABS, 2003; IRM, 2002; IMO, 2002; PMSC, 2001; USDOD, 2000; USDOE, 1994 and 
USNRC, 1986). In this regard ABS (2000) explains that the competence to make 
sensible decisions is crucial to a successful business scheme. Furthermore in today's 
complex world, business decisions are rarely straightforwar-d or easy. For this purpose 
risk assessment is typically applied as an aid to the decision-making process. There are 
a variety of qualitative and quantitative risk assessment methods which are used for 
different situations and in various industries. However before carrying out a risk 
assessment phase there is a need to effectively produce a generic model for the purpose 
of assessing the identified risk factors (hazards). Haimes (2002) argues if the adage, "To 
manage risk, one must measure it with appropriate metrics," constitutes the compass for 
RM, then modelling constitutes the road map that guides the analyst throughout the 
journey of risk assessment. However risk assessment of offshore terminals and marine 
ports is a new and challenging task as much of the available data is highly uncertain and 
vague, and many of the mechanisms may not be fully understood. As a result, a 
methodical approach is needed to handle quantitative and qualitative data when new 
knowledge and data become available. In this chapter a Fuzzy AHP method based on 
Chang's (1996) extent analysis will be used for assessing the identified hazards or risk 
factors. 
4.4. A CATEGORIZATION OF UNCERTAINTIES BY DEVELOPING THE 
HIERARCHY 
Review of a wide range of literature on uncertainty and RM from previous chapters 
served to identify the specific uncertain components i.e. risk factors. The identified risk 
factors need to be classified for an efficient assessment as included in the following 
section. 
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Many different classifications of risk factors have been developed over the years, 
however, based on different literatures most of them have considered the source factors 
(e.g. country, operational, organisational, business etc) as the most important criteria. In 
addition to the source criteria, there have been other forms of classifying risk factors, 
which take different perspectives. In this regard based on Balo and Price (2003) it i-s 
usual to categorise risk factors 
internal/external, positive/negative, 
insurable. 
into dynamidstatic, 
acceptable/unacceptable 
corporate/individual, 
and insurable/non-
As offshore terminals and marine ports are critical logistics infrastructures they are 
under constant pressure from the externally and internally driven sources of risks and 
uncertainties. Externally driven sources of risks mean that the basis and root cause of 
risk factors which are exerted on a specific offshore terminal and marine port is from 
outside of the port's or offshore terminal's physical sphere. Like country or business 
risk factors, their original sources are not within the port under debate. For instance a 
related decree planned and ratified in the Parliament of a country will put the facilities 
under direct legal responsibility to compel the decree. Another example is business 
related risk factors e.g. offshore terminals' reliability factors that will lead an offshore 
terminal customer (oil exporter/importer, shipping company etc) to use the most reliable 
operators' terminals. Therefore the main root cause of this risk factor that originates 
from the competition dynamic and created by other operators' terminals can be tracked 
among external elements. On the other hand for case of the internal sources of risks and 
uncertainties like operational (safety, human error, pollution) or organisational 
(management, quality issues, human recourse management) risk factors, their root 
causes can be tracked within the physical sphere of the nominated facility under 
analysis. 
For the purpose of offshore terminals and marine ports the main goal is to assess the 
identified risk factors. Based on the above discussion they can be properly classified 
into the external (e.g. country and business risks risk factors) and internal (e.g. 
organizational and operational risks risk factors) categories. 
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In maritime business offshore terminals and manne ports are used by different 
customers and users (shippers, shipowners, agents, freight forwarders, oil/gas 
companies, exporters, importers etc) who need to outsource their functions in a safe and 
reliable port/terminal with cheaper services and hinterland locations. Therefore for a 
port or an offshore terminal user, a vigilant assessment of target countries in order to 
decide whether or not to use the intended ports and offshore terminals within those 
countries is necessary. As it is discussed in the previous chapter country risk factors will 
cause businesses' unwanted consequence as a result of the uncertain and unexpected 
governmental policies or actions. Insufficient and incorrect actions and decisions in any 
country can destabilise the country socially, politically and financially. For example 
unexpected government policy can have significant effect on port/terminal pricing, 
taxes on cargo, port/terminal dues, cargo charges etc. Additionally insufficient 
government actions can exert social pressures on port/terminal and dock workers 
welfares and as a result it may lead to strike. As another example an oil importer will 
not use exporters' offshore terminals or petrochemical ports whose country is under 
United Nations' sanctions for its oil and gas products. Consequently these 
circumstances will put a port or an offshore terminal user in danger by using products 
and services of the related ports or offshore terminals. It can be noted that as the origin 
of the country risk factors which affect a port/offshore tenninal are from outside of the 
port/offshore terminal itself i.e. the country under question, then from this point of view 
they can be regarded as external sources of risks categories. 
During selecting the site of business in any port/offshore terminal their users will make 
sure that the selected place is the best one for their business applications. For example 
competitive advantage factors such as port/terminal efficiency or depth of water are 
factors which a ship-owner of a mega container ship or a very large oil tanker must 
consider before sending hislher ship to that port or offshore terminal. In any port 
shippers, freight forwarders, exporters and importers will check the ports' landside 
accessibility as a competitive advantage factor while transporting their goods and to see 
if they can use port services through their landside accessibility. Good quality bunkers, 
stores and repair facilities are other types of competitive factors which port/terminal 
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users will take into consideration before selecting a site for their business. For instance a 
bad quality bunker will put seaworthIDess of a ship under question and may even cause 
a severe damage to the ships' engines at any moment. Port location, shipping frequency 
and port's/offshore terminal's reliability are also other factors with which users may 
gain benefits if the choice is decided through a rational decision making process. As it 
can be seen this type of selection or business related decision making processes for a 
port user is not only confined to one port's boundaries. It is comparison of one port for 
example for its specific services like charges for handling of one container to load or 
discharge with other ports in vicinity for the same services. Thus again as such risk 
factors relate to the outside of a port's sphere they will be classified under an external 
category of the sources of risks and uncertainties for the purpose of offshore terminals' 
and marine ports' operations and management. Business risk factors have been 
discussed fully in the previous chapter. 
However in terms of internal categories, based on the literature review conducted 
previously, factors such as organizational risk factors can affect different processes and 
performance of a port or an offshore terminal. Factors such as performance indicators 
(e.g. financial, operational and quality performance indicators) allow port/terminal 
managers to assess their ports and offshore terminals performance, and take corrective 
decisions and actions to recover the problems accordingly. Mismanagement in a 
port/terminal and any negligence during human resource management within an 
offshore terminal or a port are also other types of internally driven sources of risk 
factors. For example port directors or port security managers play pivotal roles in 
managing the complex interrelationships of the port users necessary to increase the 
productivity, while simultaneously generating a safe and secure port environment. For 
this purpose there is a need for developing a generic hierarchy for understanding the 
relationship between risk and vulnerabilities in offshore terminals and marine ports, and 
specific ways in which their users can help to reduce the risk factors associated with 
those vulnerabilities. Nevertheless paying attention to human resource management is a 
key factor in managing an organisation like a port. All personnel e.g. pilots, gantry 
cranes' men, security officers, port state control officers, terminal managers and 
stevedores must be properly trained, assessed and qualified. Even their health, safety, 
environmental and security awareness should be continuously investigated and 
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monitored when planning for the future. Organisational structure of the offshore 
terminals and marine ports must be checked to ensure that adequate links and 
relationships are established between different departments and sections. By the use of a 
proper quality management system, sources of uncertainties while loading oil or gas 
from an offshore terminal or when bunkering in a port environmental and safety aspects 
must be taken into consideration. Additionally in respect of a product such as dry-
docking a ship, consideration must be taken to see if the material used during a repair or 
overhauling are standard and personnel doing the job are qualified. As a part of quality 
process, for example, port state control officers under !LO and IMO Conventions can 
check the safety and living condition of the ships' personnel. Additionally they can 
check stevedores' work conditions while working on board of the visiting vessels within 
the related ports or offshore terminals. As it can be seen if anything goes wrong with the 
ships' personnel or stevedores when working on board it will affect the ports' Iterminals' 
loyalty and its organisation. Customer satisfaction and complaints are also important 
indicators or elements that can contribute to assessing the quality process of a facility. 
Among the other internal sources of risks and uncertainties, source criteria like 
operational risk factors (e.g. safety, security, pollution, human error etc) are the main 
sources of the pure risks as it was discussed in Chapters 1 and 2. They can, however, be 
avoided by deployment of the incentives such as insurance covers. The main aim here is 
how to eliminate or avoid them from happening in practice professionally. Any type of 
operational risk factors can have a disastrous effect on operation of a port or an offshore 
terminal. A large tanker ship entering a harbour may collide with break water at the 
entrance of a port as a result of a pilot's error. As a matter of fact this will lead to safety 
problems. It may result in pollution and oil spills. grounding or collision with other 
vessels or eventually can be a source of fIre or explosion that would threaten the safety 
of the port, other vessels and the tanker ship itself all at the same time. For example in 
the case of the Sea Empress disaster in Milford Haven mentioned in Chapter 1, 72,000 
metric tons of crude oil was released when oil tanker Sea Empress went aground a 
kilometre of the entrance of Milford Haven in UK. This caused disastrous and 
devastating impact on the environment (DETR., 2000). Another example which can be 
referred is the case of the offshore terminal. Bombay High North Platform (2005) in 
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which a crewman on the support vessel Samudra Suraksha injured his fmger. Then the 
decision was taken to transfer him to the Platform for medical attention, in bad weather 
and high waves where the control of the vessel was lost. The vessel collided with risers 
on the Platform, causing explosions and eventually destruction of the whole site. 11 
people were confinned dead and 11 people were reported missing. Bombay High North 
Platform was destroyed, Vessel Samudra Suraksha sunk, one helicopter destroyed, and 
100,000 bbllday production lost for several weeks. After the investigation the key 
contributor f~und was the failure to assess risk of routine activities in abnormal 
conditions (ORD, 2009). 
Nowadays many offshore terminals and marine ports face tough governmental security 
regulations and business efficiency demands. Security has become a compelling 
essential which many port/terminal users are frustrated with. Maritime businesses and 
port interests responsible for the movement and storage of cargo, as well as cruise lines 
and ferry operations responsible for the safe transportation of paying passengers, 
understand the need for security and have spent a lot of money to enhance their own 
security after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. New international, national, state, 
and local laws and regulations were forged in the result of September 11, 2001 which 
demanded a lot of security compliances in and around port facilities and throughout the 
maritime industry. In respect of security issues as it is a new challenge the ports' 
security officers must review relevant government regulations and industry conventions 
to fully appreciate the standards that most port facilities must develop and adhere to. 
Nevertheless by taking into consideration the externally (e.g . .country and business risk 
factors) and internally (e.g. organisational and operational risk factors) driven sources of 
risks and uncertainties in offshore terminals and marine ports, they cannot be assessed 
or managed except to be set as a hierarchy of priorities in a complex problem. 
Forman and Gass (2001) express, in order to design a hierarchy, that one must set the 
appropriate levels, which will simplify the solution of the perceived problem. Anderson 
et aI, (2008) explain that the first section in AHP is to develop a graphical 
demonstration of the problem in terms of the main goal, the criteria to be used, and the 
decision alternatives; such a graph depicting the hierarchy for the problem. For this 
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purpose hierarchies structured hereafter are based on Figure 4.2 which illustrates a basic 
hierarchical structure for different sources of risks and uncertainties of an organisation 
or a firm within the industry. 
Figure 4.2: Hierarchical structure for sources of uncertainties within a corporation. 
Source: Based on Zhang and Patrick (2007) 
It can be seen in Figure 4.3, that as the main sources of risks and uncertainties under 
debate in the thesis are "offshore terminals and marine ports". The same phrase has 
been attached as a main goal. Then external and internal driven sources of risk 
classification as discussed in detail in Section 4.4 are positioned in Level o. 
Countrylbusiness and organizational/operational categories are located under Level 1. 
Subsets of the country, business, organizational and operational risk factors are under 
Level 2 and finally subsets of these subsets are categorised under Level 3 risk factors. 
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Figure 4.3: Main hieratical structure of risk factors in offshore terminals and marine 
ports 
84 
Figure 4.4: Country risks hierarchy for offshore terminals and marine ports 
Source: Tsai and Su (2005) 
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Figure 4.5: Business risks hierarchy for offshore terminals and marine ports 
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Figure 4.6: Organisational risks hierarchy for offshore terminals and marine ports 
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Figure 4.7: Operational risks hierarchy for offshore terminals and marine ports 
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4.5. DECISION MAKING UNDER UNCERTAINTIES 
In solving various real-world decision making problems, it is necessary to handle 
uncertainties efficiently and effectively. There are some factors which cause 
uncertainties in decision-making situations. Some of the reasons are problem 
complexity, ill-posed questions, impreCISIon in computations, ambiguity in 
data/knowledge representation, problems in input interpretations, and noise (KeIler and 
Tahani, 1992). This makes the decision making process extremely difficult and 
therefore there is a need for a systematic and comprehensive approach to support 
decision making (Saaty, 2001). Rule-based expert systems have been used for handling 
uncertainties. Generally, the expert systems are based on classical logic and developers 
need to add special methods for handling uncertainty. Some of the methods used for 
handling uncertainty in expert systems include heuristic approaches, probability theory, 
possibility theory and fuzzy logic theory (Murtaza, 2003). Among these methods fuzzy 
logic offers a more natural way of handling uncertainty. A considerable amount of 
research work has been performed in the areas of the fuzzy logic process (Takagi and 
Hayashi, 1991). 
4.5.1. Fuzzy logic (sets and numbers) 
Originally Fuzzy Set Theory (FST) was introduced by Zadeh (1965) to deal with 
vagueness of human judgement, which was oriented to the rationality of uncertainty due 
to ambiguity or vagueness. A major contribution of FST is its potential for 
demonstrating vague data. A fuzzy set is a set of objects with a range of grades of 
membership. Such a set is characterised by a membership (characteristic) function, with 
each object having a membership degree ranging between 0 and 1. The theory also 
allows mathematical operators and programming to apply to the fuzzy domain. 
Furthermore a fuzzy set is an extension of a crisp set. Crisp sets only allow full 
membership or non-membership at all, whereas fuzzy sets allow partial membership 
(BalIi and Korukoglu, 2009). 
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On the other hand fuzzy numbers are the particular classes of numbers. A fuzzy number 
is a fuzzy quantity M that corresponds to a generalisation of a real number r. Intuitively, 
M(x) should be a measure of how well M(x) "approximates" r (Nguyen and Walker, 
2000). A fuzzy number M is a convex normalised fuzzy set. A fuzzy number is 
characterised by a given interval of real numbers, each with a grade of membership 
between 0 and 1. It is possible to use different fuzzy numbers according to the situation 
and in practice triangular and trapezoidal fuzzy numbers are used (Klir and Yuan, 1995). 
In applications it is often suitable to work with Triangular Fuzzy Numbers (TFNs) due 
to their computational ease, they are useful in supporting illustration and information 
processing under a fuzzy environment (Ertugrul and Karakasoglu, 2007). A TFN i.e. M 
is shown in Figure 4.8. 
Figure 4.8: A Triangular Fuzzy Number (TFN), M 
Source: Based on Chang (1996) 
In this section, prior to the exploration of the F AHP method, the rationale for the FST 
will be briefly reviewed through the following definitions that will be used in this 
research hereafter. As depicted in Figure 4.8 a FTN is denoted simply as (l, m, u). The 
parameters l, m and U respectively denote the smallest possible value, the most 
promising value and the largest possible value that describe a fuzzy event. 
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A tilde ''"'J' will be placed on top of a character if the character corresponds to a fuzzy 
set. TFNs are defined by three real numbers, shown simply as (l,m,u). The parameters l, 
m and u, respectively, signify the smallest possible value, the most promising value, 
and the largest possible value that describe a fuzzy event (Kaufmann and Gupta, 1985). 
Their membership functions can be defined as follows: 
0, if .X $ l 
x-l . 
-, If·l<x<m 
m-l 
JlM(x)= 1, if . x = m 
~,if.m<x<u 
u-m 
0, if .x ~ u 
Figure 4.9: The intersection between M1and M2 
Source: Based on Zadeh (1965) and Chang ( 1996) 
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(4.1) 
There are various operations on TFNs. However, some of the main operations used in 
this study are illustrated here. Assume, two positive TFNs M1= (ll, ml, Ul) and 
M 2 = 02, m 2, U 2) are real numbers as are depicted in Figure 4.9. The distance 
measurement d(Ml1 Mz) is identical to the Euc1idean distance (Chen, 2000). Then under 
fuzzy environments their basic operations such as addition i.e.E9, multiplication i.e. ® 
and their inverse can be depicted as follows (Yang and Hung, 2007): 
Ml E9 M2 = (It, ml, UI) EB (l2, m2, U2) = ( ll+i2, ml+m2, UI+U2) 
Ml ®M2 =(ll, ml, UI)®(l2, m2, U2) = (iIxi2, ml xm2, UlxU2) 
Ml -1 = (ll, ml, Ul) -1 ::::: (I1Ul, I1ml, lIl1) 
(4.2) 
(4.3) 
(4.4) 
Other algebraic operations such as change of sign and subtraction with fuzzy numbers 
can be found in (Zimmennann, 1996 and Kahraman, 2001). 
4.6. ANALYTICAL HIERARCmCAL PROCESS (ADP) 
One commonly used method for deciding among the complex criteria structure in 
different lev.els is Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) , which was developed by Saaty 
(1980). The AHP is based on the subdivision of the problem in a hierarchical form. In 
reality, the AHP helps to put in order the reasonable analysis of the problem by dividing 
it into its single elements; the analysis then supplies an aid to the decision makers who, 
making several pair-wise comparisons, can appreciate the influence of the considered 
elements in the hierarchical structure. AHP can also give a preference list of the 
considered alternative solutions (Bentivegna et ai, 1994; Roscelli, 1990; Saaty, 1980; 
Saaty and Vargas, 1990). As explained in Anderson et ai, (2008) the fIrst phase in AHP 
is to develop a graphical illustration of the problem in terms of the main goal, the 
criteria to be used, and the decision alternatives. This graph illustrates the hierarchy for 
the problem. Figure 4.2 previously showed a sample of a risk-based hierarchy for 
different sources of risks and uncertainties of an organisation or a fIrm to be used in any 
industry. 
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At the next stage, based on Anderson et aI, (2008) the decision maker indicates a 
preference for each decision alternative based on each criterion. A mathematical process 
is used to synthesize the information on the relative importance of the criteria and the 
preferences for the decision alternatives to provide an overall priority ranking of the 
decision alternatives. 
To set up priorities using AHP, preferences between alternatives are determined by 
making pair-wise comparisons. These comparisons are made using a preference scale 
(Taha, 2003). The standard preference scale used for AHP is I to 9 scale which lies 
between "equal importance" and "extreme importance" (Sarkis and Ta11uri, 2004). In 
AHP, Saaty (1980) suggested a scale of relative importance from 1 to 9 for making 
subjective pair-wise comparisons shown in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1: 9-point intensity of relative importance scale 
Source: Based on Saaty (2008) 
Therefore, if the importance of one factor with respect to the second is given, then the 
importance of the second factor with respect to the first is the reciprocal. Ratio scale and 
the use of verbal comparisons are used for weighting quantifiable and non-quantifiable 
elements (Pohekar and Ramachandran, 2004). 
Nevertheless in order to determine the priorities as Anderson et aI, (2008) explained 
there is a need to construct a matrix of the pair-wise comparison ratings as depicted in 
Equation 4.5. As Torfi et al (2010) discussed a comparison matrix involves the 
comparison in pairs of the elements of the constructed hierarchy. The aim is to set their 
relative priorities with respect to each of the elements at the next higher level. 
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Cl Cz Cn 
Cl XII X12 X ln 
A= C2 .. X 21 X22 X 2n (4.5) 
Cn Xnl Xn2 Xnll 
The factors {Xij} can be inteIpreted as the degree of preference of ith criterion over jth 
criterion. It appears that the weight determination of criteria is more reliable when using 
pair-wise comparisons than obtaining them directly, because it is easier to make a 
comparison between two attributes than make an overall weight assignment. 
Subsequently as is explained before using the pair-wise comparison matrix, there will 
be a need to calculate the priority of each alternative in terms of its contribution to the 
overall goal. This aspect of AHP is referred to as synthesization. The exact 
mathematical procedure required to perform synthesization is beyond the scope of this 
chapter. However, Anderson et ai, (2008) and Karahalios (2009) argue that the 
following three-section procedure provides a good approximation of the synthesization 
result: 
(1) Sum the values in each column of the pair-wise comparison matrix. 
(2) Divide each element in the pair-wise comparison matrix by its column total; the 
resulting matrix is referred to as the normalized pair-wise comparison matrix. 
(3) Compute the average of the elements in each row of the normalized pair-wise 
comparison matrix; these averages provide the priorities for the criteria in order to rank 
the alternatives. 
Nevertheless a key section In AHP is making several pair-wise comparisons as 
previously described. Based on Saaty (1980) an important consideration in this process 
is the consistency of the pair-wise judgements provided by the decision maker. Based 
on Saaty (2008) and Karahalios (2009) consistency is fully explained as follows: 
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The basis of the AHP is the completion of an n Xn matrix (xi}) at each level of the 
decision hierarchy. This matrix A is of the form aij= l/xij, Xij> 0, where xijis an 
approximation to the relative weights (wdwj) of the n alternatives under consideration 
(Harker, 1987). Given the n (n - 1) /2 approximations to these weights which the 
decision maker supplies when completing the matrix, the weights W = (Wi) are found by 
solving the following eigenvector problem (Saaty, 1977): 
Aw=A.max w (4.6) 
where A. max is the principle eigenvalue of the matrix A. 
Saaty (1977) used the Perron root theorem, which states that there is one largest real 
positive eigenvalue for the matrix A with positive entries whose associated eigenvector 
is the vector of weights. This unique vector is normalized by having its entries sum to a 
unit. Thus, the activities in the lowest level of a hierarchy have a vector of weights with 
respect to each criterion In the next level derived from a matrix of pair-wise 
comparisons with respect to that criterion (Saaty, 1994). In an arbitrary random 
reciprocal matrix, A there exist some i,j and k for which XijXjk '* Xik. Then the average 
of normalized columns of the reciprocal matrix provides a good estimate of the 
eigenvector (Vargas 1982): 
1 • 
Wi = -I 
n j=l 
where i = 1,2, .... , n (4.7) 
When the numerous pair-wise comparisons are evaluated. some degree of inconsistency 
could be expected to exist in almost any set of pair-wise comparisons. The AHP method 
provides a measure of the consistency for pair-wise comparisons by introducing the 
Consistency Index (Cl) and Consistency Ratio (CR). which can be calculated by using 
Equations 4.8 and 4.9 (Dng et aI, 2006). The.it max is the maximum average of the 
values or the maximum eigenvalue of an nXn comparison matrix and is calculated by 
Equation 4.10 (Vargas, 1982). RI is the random index for the matrix size. n and depends 
on the number of items being compared and is shown in Table 4.2 (Saaty. 1994). If CR 
is valued less than or equal to 0.1 then a consistency is indicated and the pair-wise 
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comparisons are reasonable. However, this value is arbitrary and has not been proved 
mathematically. This is the reason that Saaty suggested that CR value could be near 0.2 
and any attempt to reduce this value will not necessarily improve the judgement. 
Furthermore, in real life it is often very difficult to achieve this value mainly due to the 
disagreement of experts (Dadkhah and Zahedi, 1993; Wedley, 1993). 
CI=Amax -n 
n-l 
Cl 
CR=-
RI 
• L XijWi= AmaxWj ; 
i=l 
where i=1,2, ___ , n 
Table 4.2: Average random index value 
Source: Based on Saaty (1994) 
(4.8) 
(4.9) 
(4.10) 
Saaty (1980) proposed AHP as a decision aid to help solve unstructured problems in 
economics, social and management sciences. Among the different contexts in which the 
AHP can be applied, mention can be made of the creation of a list of priorities, the 
choice of the best policy, the optimal allocation of resources, the prevision of results 
and temporal dependencies, the assessment of risks and planning (Saaty and Vargas, 
1990). 
Although the AHP is supposed to capture the expert's knowledge, the traditional AHP 
still cannot really reflect the human thinking style (Kahraman et ai, 2003). As Kulak 
and Kahraman (2005) explain in most of the real-world problems, some of the decision 
data can be precisely assessed while others cannot. They also explain humans are 
unsuccessful in making quantitative predictions, whereas they are comparatively 
efficient in qualitative forecasting. Furthermore Leung and Chao (2000) also have 
emphasised that in essence, the uncertainty in the preference judgments will give rise to 
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uncertainty in the ranking of alternatives as well as difficulty in determining consistency 
of preferences. 
For the purpose of risk assessment there are many methods such as AHP (Saaty, 1980), 
set theory (Ferreiros, 2007), graph theory (Wanger and Neshat, 2010), risk matrix 
(Marszal and Scharpf, 2002), etc which can be used for prioritisation of risk factors i.e. 
criteria. They enable the users to find relative weights of the risk factors and eventually 
to rank them in order to fmd the most significant ones. Among these methods AHP is 
probably the most simple, calculations are easy and its advantage is not only to 
determine relative weights of the risk factors but also it can be used as a decision 
making tool to select the best alternatives for different criteria. In a very brief sentence 
AHP method it cannot be only used to determine relative weights of the risk factors and 
rank them but also is a very useful and simple decision making tool. 
As Wang and Chen (2007) express the traditional AHP method is problematic in that it 
uses an exact value to express the decision maker's opinion in a comparison of 
alternatives. Moreover the AHP method is often criticized due to its use of unbalanced 
scale of judgments and its inability to adequately handle the inherent uncertainty and 
imprecision in the pair-wise comparison process (Deng, 1999). 
To overcome all these shortcomings, F AHP was developed for solving the hierarchical 
problems. Decision makers frequently fmd that it is more convincing to give interval 
judgments (i.e. ranges of values) than fixed value judgments. This is because decision 
makers are not usually capable of explicitly presenting their preferences in a comparison 
process (Kahrarnan et aI, 2003). 
4.7. FUZZY ANALYTICAL HffiRARCmCAL PROCESS (FAHP) 
The FAHP method can be observed as an advanced analytical technique developed from 
the traditional AHP. In other words FAHP is a synthetic extension of classical AHP 
method when fuzziness of the decision maker is considered. Despite the convenience of 
AHP in handling both quantitative and qualitative criteria of multi-criteria decision 
making problems based on decision maker's judgments, fuzziness and vagueness 
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existing in many decision-making problems may contribute to the inaccurate judgments 
of decision makers in conventional AHP approaches (Bouyssou et aI, 2000). Many 
researchers have studied the fuzzy AHP which is the extension of Saaty's theory in 
1980, confirming that fuzzy AHP shows a relatively more sufficient description of this 
kind of decision making process compared to the traditional AHP methods (Ozdagoglu 
and Ozdagoglu, 2007). 
Moreover in multipart systems, the experience and judgment of humans are represented 
by linguistic and vague patterns. Therefore, a much better representation of this 
linguistics can be developed as quantitative data; this type of data set is then refined by 
the evaluation methods of FST. On the other hand, the AHP method is mainly used in 
nearly crisp (non-fuzzy) decision applications and creates and deals with a very 
unbalanced scale of judgment. Therefore, the AHP method does not take into account 
the uncertainty associated with the mapping (Cheng et ai, 1999). The AHP's subjective 
judgment, selection and preference of decision-makers have great influence on the 
success of the method. The conventional AHP still cannot reflect the human thinking 
style. Avoiding these risks on performance, the fuzzy AHP i.e. a fuzzy extension of 
AHP, was developed to solve the hierarchical fuzzy problems (Ozdagoglu and 
Ozdagoglu, 2007). 
There are many fuzzy AHP methods proposed by various authors. The earliest work in 
fuzzy AHP appeared in Van Laarhoven and Pedrycz (1983) which compared fuzzy 
ratios described by triangular membership functions. Buckley (1985) determined fuzzy 
priorities of comparison ratios whose membership functions are trapezoidal. They 
extended Saaty's AHP (1980) to deal with the imprecision and subjectivity of the pair-
wise comparison process using fuzzy utilities represented by fuzzy numbers. Their 
fuzzy utilities need to be ranked to prioritise the concerned alternatives. This ranking 
method can be quite complex and may produce unreliable results (Chan and Kumar, 
2007). 
Mikhailov (2004) proposed a fuzzy preference programming method to derive optimal 
crisp priorities, which are obtained from fuzzy pair-wise comparison judgments based 
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on a-cuts decomposition of the fuzzy judgments into a series of interval comparisons. 
However, although fuzzy preference programming method claimed its superiority over 
some of the existing fuzzy prioritisation methods the mathematical complexity involved 
may restrict its practicability (Dagdeviren and Yuksel, 2008). 
Chang (1992, 1996) introduced a new extent analysis approach for the synthetic extent 
values of the pair wise comparison for handling fuzzy AHP. The proposed method with 
extent analysis is simple and easy to implement to prioritise decision variables as 
compared with the conventional AHP (Chan and Kumar, 2007). 
Chang (1996) introduced a new approach for handling FAHP, with the use of triangular 
fuzzy numbers for pair-wise comparison scale of F AHP, and the use of the extent 
analysis method for the synthetic extent values of the pair-wise comparisons. Chang et 
ai, (1999) discussed their proposed theory and methodology on the extent analysis and 
applications of the F AHP. 
Kahraman et ai, (2003) utilised Chang's extent analysis in their F AHP methodology for 
the purpose of the multi-criteria supplier selection problems. By using the extent 
analysis in their study Kahramana (2004) provided a multi-attribute comparison of 
catering service companies in Turkey. Ertugrul and Karakasoglu (2006) proposed the 
use of extent analysis in their F AHP to select the best supplier for a textile firm in 
Turkey. Chan and Kumar (2007) used the F AHP based on extent analysis to tackle the 
different decision criteria like cost, quality, service performance and supplier's profile 
including the risk factors involved in the selection of a global supplier in their business 
scenario. The extent analysis was used by Dagdeviren and Yuksel (2008) for developing 
a FAHP model to determine the level of Faulty Behaviour Risk (FBR) in work systems. 
Naghadehi et ai, (2009) used extent analysis to develop a fuzzy model to select the best 
possible underground mining method. Whilst doing so they took subjective judgments 
of decision makers into their consideration. F AHP was used in determining the weights 
of the criteria by decision makers. In their study rankings of the methods were 
determined by AHP. Anether attempt Celik et ai, (2009) applied the FAHP 
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methodology, based on extent analysis for shipping registry selection in the Turkish 
maritime industry. Balli and Korukoglu (2009) used the extent analysis in the operating 
system selection while using F AHP and Technique for Order Performance by Similarity 
to Ideal Solution (TOPS IS) methods. Finally, Ertugrul and Karakasoglu (2009) 
exploited the extent analysis and used the F AHP and TOPSIS methods in their study for 
performance evaluation of Turkish cement firms. 
F or the purpose of this research the extent F AHP is utilised, which was originally 
introduced by Chang (1996). Let X = {xl,.t2,.n, ... ,xn} an object set, and G = 
{gl,g2,g3, ... ,gn} be a goal set. Each object is taken and extent analysis for each goal 
performed respectively. Therefore, m extent analysis values for each object can be 
obtained, with the following signs: 
i = 1,2, ...... , n, 
where M~i (j = 1,2, ... , m) are TFNs. The sequences ofChang's analysis can be given in 
the following sections (Chang, 1996): 
Firstly: The value of fuzzy synthetic extent with respect to the i th object is defined as: 
(4.11) 
1/1 
To obtain L M~i' perform the fuzzy addition operation of m extent analysis value for 
j=l 
a particular matrix such that: 
(4.12) 
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and to obtain[ t t M~f r " perfonn the fuzzy addition operation of 
M~t(j= 1, 2, ... , m) values such that: 
• Br LL 
and then compute the inverse of the vector above, such that: 
(4.13) 
(4.14) 
Secondly: As shown in Figure 4.8 Mt = (lIt mll Ut) and Mz = (IZI mz,l.Lz) are two 
TFNs, the degree of possibility of Mz= (lZI m2, U2) ~ Mt == (lv mv Ut) defined as: 
(4.15) 
and can be equivalently expressed as follows: 
(4.16) 
(4.17) 
As shown previously Figure 4.9 illustrates Equation 4.17 where d is the ordinate of the 
highest intersection point D between IlMl and IlM2 • To compare Mt and Mz, we need 
both the values of: 
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Thirdly: The degree of possibility for a convex fuzzy number to be greater than k 
convex fuzzy Mi (i=l, 2, k) numbers can be defmed by: 
V (M ~ Mt , M2 , " .•. Mk ) = V[(M ~ M1) and (M ~ M2 ) and .... and (M ~ Mk )] 
= min V(M~ Mi), i = 1,2,3, ... ,k (4.l8) 
Assume that d (Ai) = minV (Si ~ Sk) for k = 1,2, ... ,n; k =F i. Then the weight vector is 
given by: W' = (d'{A1 ), d'(A 2), •.•••• d'(An»T (4.l9) 
where Ai is ith element and d' (At), .... ,d' (An) are priority weights calculated by 
Equation 4.18 before their normalisation. 
Fourthly: Via normalisation, the normalised weight vectors are: 
W = (d(Al)' d(A2), ...... , d(An))T (4.20) 
where W is a non-fuzzy number. 
In this chapter, it has been decided to use Chang's extent analysis method because the 
sections of this approach are easier than the other fuzzy AHP approaches. This method 
uses the TFNs as a pair-wise comparison scale for deriving the priorities of the factors 
(i.e. risks) and sub-factors (i.e. sub-risks). In addition TFNs are used for pair-wise 
comparison matrices. The rationale for using a TFN is that it is instinctively simple for 
the decision makers to use and compute. Furthermore, models using TFNs have 
produced to be a successful way to formulating decision problems where the existing 
information is subjective and inaccurate (Zimmerman, 1996; Chang et ai, 2002~ 
Kahraman et ai, 2004 and Chang et ai, 2007). 
Experts usually use the linguistic variable to assess the importance of a criterion over 
the other criterion or even to rate the alternatives with respect to various criteria. Table 
4.3 illustrates the idea of the Fuzzy Multi-Attribute Criteria Decision-making (FMACD) 
and it has been intentionally transformed the existing linguistic values to TFNs i.e. 
Equal, Weak, Fairly Strong, Very Strong, Absolute along with their intermediate values 
between them. The purpose of the transfonnation process is two-fold: firstly to illustrate 
the proposed FMACD method and secondly to benchmark the empirical results using 
other precise value methods in the later analysis (yang, 2007). Moreover Ma et ai, 
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(2007) and Karahalios (2009) highlighted the following issues when using linguistic 
variables: 
(1) Experts need to select linguistic terms for presenting their opinions by their 
preference. It is not demanded that all experts must use the same linguistic terms. 
(2) It is not required for all linguistic terms to-be placed symmetrically and to have total 
order. Therefore experts and decision makers have more independent right to present 
their opinions. 
(3) Each linguistic tenn should be treated as a whole and the only concern is on its 
determinacy and consistency. 
Among the commonly used fuzzy numbers, triangular and trapezoidal fuzzy numbers 
are likely to be the adoptive ones due to their ease in modelling easy interpretations. 
Ross (1985) and Anoop et al (2006) explain it is known that for engineering 
applications, to reduce the computational complexity, fuzzy sets with triangular or 
trapezoidal form are most commonly used. Both triangular and trapezoidal fuzzy 
numbers are applicable to the present study; however, this study uses TFN for FAHP 
application due to its easiness in use. In addition, modelling using TFNs has 
demonstrated to be an effective way for formulating decision problems (Chang and Yeh, 
2002; Chang, Chung, and Wang, 2007; Kahraman, Beskese, and Ruan, 2004; 
Zimmerman, 1996). 
In practical applications, the triangular form of the membership function is used most 
often for representing fuzzy numbers (Ding and Liang, 2005; Kahraman et ai, 2004; 
Karsak and Tolga, 2001; Xu and Chen, 2007). TFN can adequately represent the 
mentioned fuzzy linguistic variables, thus, it is used for the analysis hereafter. As is 
depicted in Table 4.3, TFNs: N1 , N3 , Nsand N9 are used to represent the pair-wise 
comparison of decision variables from "Weak Strong" to "Absolute", respectively and 
TFNs Nz, N4 , N6 , Na represent the middle preference values between them. Figure 4.10 
shows the membership functions of the TFNs, Ni= (If, mf, Ut), where i =1,2, ... ,9 and 
I;, mf, Ut are the lower, middle and upper values of the fuzzy number Ni respectively 
(Chan and Kumar, 2007). 
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During the calculations whenever it is supposed to carry out a pair-wise comparison 
between the same criterion e.g. to compare criterion Cl with Cl. C2 with C2 etc 
obviously the result is equal to I in which its converted TFN will be (1,1,1). Figure 4.10 
shows the level of consistency that exists among the values derived from Table 4.3. In 
this research intermediate values also will be used hereafter. 
Table 4.3: Linguistic Values and TFNs. 
Source: Adopted from Chan and Kumar (2007) 
Figure 4.10: Fuzzy triangular membership functions. 
Source: Adopted from Chan and Kumar (2007) 
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As stated in Zhao and Govind (1991) in order to defuzzify the TFNs with the use of the 
techniques developed by Sugeno in 1985 it is required to add together their converted 
linguistics' variables and then divide them by three in case of the triangular numbers to 
get their average (i.e. centre of area defuzzification technique). For the fuzzy numbers a 
defuzzification process follows to obtain crisp numbers. Based on Wang and Parkan 
(2006) and Karahalios (2009) the method to calculate the crisp number for a TFN, is to 
compute the centre of the fuzzy number's triangular area shown in Figure 4.11. 
Figure 4.11: The Defuzzification ofa TFN 
Source: Based on Wang and Parkan (2006) and Karahalios (2009) 
As different experts have different impacts on the final decisions and results i.e. global 
weights of the risk factors, logically these weights can be changed by the experts, on the 
basis of their experience, knowledge and expertise (Zeng et ai, 2007). Moreover 
absolute impartiality of expert knowledge is difficult to achieve but an important 
consideration in the selection of experts is whether to use a heterogeneous group of 
experts (e.g. both scientists and workers) or a homogenous group of experts (e.g. only 
scientists). The effect of differences in personal experience on expert judgement is 
assumed to be smaller in homogenous group compared to a heterogeneous group. A 
heterogeneous group of experts can have an advantage over a homogenous group 
through considering all possible opinions. However, criteria to identify experts are 
based on (1) a person's period of learning and experience in a specific domain of 
knowledge, thus influencing his or her judgmental and analytical behaviour, and (2) the 
specific circumstances in which experience is gained, e.g. in theoretical or practical 
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circumstances (Ford and Sterrnan, 1998) and Karahalios (2009). Therefore different 
experts will have different weighting factors in the calculations during pair~wise 
comparisons. 
4.7.1. Procedure for developing questionnaire survey and selecting experts 
A variety of text books and recommended guidelines have been reviewed before the 
construction of the questionnaire survey. From these sources three important issues 
were discovered: 
a) The questions in a survey should be simple, clear and appropriate for the level of 
the participants i.e. experts (Houtkoop-Steenstra, 2000). 
b) The personal details of participants such as education and age may reveal 
different schools of thought (Bradburn and Sudrnan, 1979). 
c) The structure of a questionnaire should be developed in different parts each 
targeting a part of the research goals (Frazer and Lawley, 2001). 
A sample copy of this questionnaire is shown in Appendix 1. Its aim is to collect experts' 
opinions with regard to the importance of the risk factors affecting offshore terminals' 
and marine ports' operations and management. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, section 3.3.3 the questionnaire was constructed in twenty 
three parts each one referring to a part of the hierarchical structures shown for Level 1, 
2 and 3 risk factors in figures depicted in Section 4.4. In the first section of each part 
personal details of the experts were included in order to verify their age, academic and 
industrial background. These data can be used afterwards for the evaluation of each 
expert's proficiency. The second section of each part is asking from each expert to 
evaluate in a scale of ten numbers the predefined linguistic terms including intermediate 
numbers and equal value as can be used for experts' everyday life. These linguistic 
terms are used by the experts in their answers in the rest of the questionnaire. The third 
section of each part of the questionnaire included example questions concerning the 
expertise of the experts in the industry. The expert should choose a set of pair- wise 
comparison to indicate the extent with which a risk factor is more important than 
another in a pair. The fourth section of each part is a matrix to be duly marked as per 
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experts' judgements. Finally these matrices will be used by the researcher to collect, 
calculate and analyse data gathered in later stages. 
For the purpose of this research all questionnaire survey forms were made in A4 papers 
and then they were sent to the nominated experts in Iran in the form of attachments to 
emails. It took near two and half months to obtain feed backs from experts as they were 
very busy with their managerial tasks. To carry out an optimum expert judgement in this 
chapter, six experts have been selected to carry out the judgement process in order to 
test the proposed model, methodology and the illustrated hierarchies. 
All experts have their Bachelor i.e. BSc and Master i.e. MSc degrees in maritime related 
fields. In addition each has served as a harbour pilot previously for no less than 5 years 
in different Iranian ports and offshore terminals namely ports of Shahid Rejaie, Bandar 
Mahshahr and Assaluyeh along with offshore terminals of Cyrus, Soroosh and Lavan in 
Persian Gulf. Additional information in respect of the mentioned offshore terminals and 
marine ports are available in MDB and PMO (20-11). Each expert has near 15 years' 
experience on offshore terminals' and marine ports' operations and management. The 
experts had different managerial positions in different operational fields (port 
administrationlharbour and offshore authorities; marine Quality, Health, Safety, 
Environmental and Security departments; offshore oil and gas explorations; emergency 
management units; port and offshore terminal development; commercial, legal and 
insurance departments) in Iran. 
The main factor in selecting these experts was based on their expertise that they have 
contributed in the fields related to the risk factors as illustrated in Figure 4.3. For this 
reason these experts will have equal weights in respect of each other regarding the 
comparison matrices. The experts were asked to compare the significance of the 
provided risk factors with each other. 
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4.8. TEST CASE 
For the purpose of this research and in order to justify the proposed methodology for 
risk assessment of offshore tenninals and marine ports the following test case will be 
conducted. 
Now with the use of experts' judgments and the introduced FAHP method, the local and 
global weights for all of the risk factors will be calculated in this section. These 
calculations are carried out in fulfilment of the discussed steps of the generic risk 
assessment model introduced in this chapter. Final results are shown in Tables 4.8, 11.19, 
H.20 and 11.21. For the purpose of this section as shown in Tables 4.4,4.5,4.6 and 4.7 
only comparison matrices for Level 2 risk factors have been calculated. Calculations for 
the rest of the eighteen pair-wise comparison matrices for Level 3 risk factors are 
available in Appendix ll. Furthennore, since experts have decided to equally distribute 
the weights among the risks factors associated in Level 0 shown in Figure 4.3, therefore 
in this regard their relative weight for each risk factor is 0.25 and this is used during the 
calculations, because it has no effect on global weights of the Level 3 risk factors. 
Nevertheless before carrying out the calculation hereafter and as it was discussed 
previously in Section 4.6 of this chapter an important consideration which should be 
taken into account during the pair-wise comparision is the consistency of pair-wise 
judgments provided by the decision makers. In addition also as it was discussed if eR 
i.e. Consistency Ratio become less than 0.1 in a specific matrix then pair-wise 
comparision for the matrix under calculations can be considered reasonable. In this 
regard as the calculations here in this research are based on the F AHP method, before 
carrying out the consistency tests it is necessary to defuzzify the TFNs in order to obtain 
the crisp values. The procedures for consistency tests and defuzzifications have been 
explained before in Sections 4.6 and 4.7. Although the exact and full mathemetical 
computation of the consistency ratio is beyond the scope of this chapter, an 
approximation of the ratio can be obtained with little difficulty. However all the pair-
wise comparision matrices have been tested for the amount of their consistency ratio 
and all CRs were less than 0.1 which are considered reasonable. For the purpose of this 
chapter CRs along with full consistency tests' calculations for all of the Level 2 
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companslOn matrices while usmg Equations 4.5, 4.6, 4.7, 4.8 and 4.9 have been 
calculated seperately and are shown along with the F AHP calculations for the related 
matrices in the following sections (Level 3 comparision matrices eRs are shown in 
Appendix II): 
Table 4.4: Level 2 Country Risks - Calculating local weights 
Country Risks (MP) (PSS) (FEP) (POP) (PMP) Local WeI&bta 
Macro-economic Practices (MP) (1,1,1 ) (2,3,4) (2,3,4) (3,4,5) (115,1/4,113) O.3U 
Polltical and Social Systems (PSS) (1/4,1/3,112) (1,1,1) (115,114,113) (114,113,112) (114,113,112) 0.061 
Foreign Enterprbe policy (FEP) (114,113,112) (3,4,5) (1,1,1) (115,1/4,1/3) (115,114,113) 0.052 
Port Development PoUcy (PDP) (115,114,1/3) (2,3,4) (3,4.5) (1,1,1) (115,1/4,1/3) 0.204 
Port Management PoUcy (PMP) (3,4,5) (115,1/4,113) (3,4,5) (3,4,5) (1,1,1) 0.371 
In Level 2 comparision matrix (5 x 5) for the country risk factors (RI) i.e. Table 4.4 the 
following results are obtained: Amax = 5.380 Cl = 0.095 RI=1.12 CR=O.085 < 0.1 
Country (MP) Risks (PSS) (FEP) (PDP) (pMP) Priority 
(MP) 0.17 3 0.27 3 0.25 4 0.42 0.25 0.12 0.24 
(PSS) 0.33 0.06 0.09 0.25 0.21 0.33 0.03 0.33 0.16 0.11 
(FEP) 0.33 0.06 4 0.36 0.08 0.25 0.03 0.25 0.12 0.13 
(PDP) 0.25 0.04 3 0.27 4 0.33 0.11 0.25 0.12 0.18 
(PMP) 4 0.68 0.25 0.Q2 4 0.33 4 0.42 0.48 0.40 
5.91 11.25 12.25 9.58 2.08 
Country (MP) (PSS) (FEP) (PDP) (PMP) Priority Risks 
(MP) 0.24 3 0.33 3 0.39 4 0.68 0.25 0.02 1.6 
(PSS) 0.33 0.07 0.11 0.25 0.03 0.33 0.05 0.33 0.012 0.3 
(FEP) 0.33 0.07 4 0.44 0.13 0.25 0.04 0.25 0.09 0.7 
CPDP) 0.25 0.06 3 0.33 4 0.52 0.17 0.25 0.09 1.1 
CPMP) 4 0.96 0.25 0.02 4 0.52 4 0.68 0.38 2.5 
with the use of Equations 4.5, 4.6,4.7 A max can be obtained as follows: 
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1.6 
-=6.6 
0.24 ' 
0.3 
-=2.7 
0.11 ' 
0.7 2:2:..=6.1 
o.i3 = 5.3, 0.18 ' 
2.5 
-=6.2' 0.40 ' A.max=~ = 5.380 5 
furthennore with the use of Equation 4.S Cl can be obtained as follows: 
CI=A.max- n • CI= ~=~=0.095. 
n-l' 5-1 4 
Finally with the use of Equation 4.9 and Table 4.2 (to get the related average random 
index value) CR can be obtained as follows: 
Cl 0.095 CR=- RI=1.12· CR=-=O.085. RI ' , 1.12 
From Table 4.4, synthesis values in respect to main goal are calculated as per Equation 
4.11 of the extent analysis and are depicted as follows: 
SI = (8.2,11.25,14.333) ®(1I55.831, 1144.749, 1134.15) = (0.147,0.251,0.419), 
S2 = (4.7,5.916, 7.333) ®(l/55.S31, 1144.749, 1134.15) = (0.OS4,0.132,0.125), 
S3= (4.65, 5.S33, 7.166) ®(1I55.831, 1144.749, 1134.15) = (0.083,0.130,0.210), 
S4= (6.4, 8.5, 10.666) ® (1/55.831, 1/44.749, 1134.15) = (0.115,0.190,0.312). 
S5= (10.2,13.25,16.333) ®(1/55.831, 1144.749, 1134.15) = (0.183,0.296,0.478). 
These fuzzy synthesis values are compared with each other by using Equation 4.17 of 
the extent analysis as follows: 
V(SI~S2)=I, V(SI~S3)=I, V(SI~S4)=I, V(SI~S5)=0.840; 
V(S2:::SI )=0.364, V(S2:::S3)=I, V(S2~S4)=O.633, V(S2:::S5)=O.163; 
V(S3:::S1)=O.342, V(S3~S2)=1, V(S3~S4)=O.613, V(S3~S5)=O.I40; 
V(S4~SI)=0.730, V(S~S2)=I, V(S4~S3)=I, V(S4~S5)=0.549; 
V(S5:::S1)=I, V(SS:::S2)=1, V(SS:::S3)=1, V(SS~S4)=L 
Then priority weights are calculated by using Equation 4.1S of the extent analysis as 
follows: 
d'(C1) = min (1, 1, 1,0.840) = 0.840, 
d'(C2) = min (0.364, 1, 0.633, 0.163) = 0.163, 
d'(C3) = min (0.342, 1,0.613,0.140) = 0.140, 
d'(C4) = min (0.730, 1, 1,0.549) = 0.549, 
d'(CS) = min (1, I, 1, 1) = 1. 
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W'= (0.840, 0.163, 0.140, 0.549,1) 
Collected priority weights are shown in vector W'. Finally after normalisation of these 
values as per Equation 4.20 of the extent analysis, priority weights in respect to the 
main goal will be calculated as follows for each criterion in Table 4.4: 
W=(0.312, 0.061, 0.052, 0.204, 0.371) 
Table 4.5: Level 2 Business Risks - Calculating local weights 
Business Risks (CF) (IC) (CC) 
Competition Factors (CF) (1,1,1) (1,2,3) (2,3,4) 
Industry Change (IC) (1/3,1/2,1) (1,1,1) (1,2,3) 
Customer Change (CC) (1/4,1/3,1/2) (1/3,112,1) (1,1,1) 
Local Weights 
0.566 
0.357 
0.080 
In Level 2 comparision matrix (3 x3) for the business risk factors (R2) i.e. From Table 
4.5 the following results are obtained: 
Amax = 3.066 Cl = 0.033 RI=O.58 CR=0.057 < 0.1 
BUllness 
Risks 
(CF) 
(lC) 
(CC) 
Buune .. 
Risks 
CCF) 
(1C) 
(CC) 
(C}) (lC) 
0.55 2 
0.5 0.27 
0.33 0.18 0.5 
1.83 3.5 
(CF) (lC) 
0.54 3 
0.33 0.27 
0.33 0.17 4 
(CC) Priority 
0.57 3 0.50 0.54 
0.28 2 0.33 0.29 
0.14 0.17 0.16 
6 
(CC) Priority 
0.58 3 0.48 1.6 
0.29 0.25 0.32 0.88 
0.14 0.16 0.47 
with the use of Equations 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7, Amax can be obtained as follows: 
~ = 2.9 0.88 0.47 
0.54 ' -0 29 = 3.4, - = 2.9; 
. 0.16 
, 9.2 
I\. =-=3066 max 3 . 
furthermore with the use of Equation 4.8 Cl can be obtained as follows: 
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CI= A max - n. Cl = 3.066-3 0.066 = 0.033. 
n-1' 3-1 2 
Finally with the use of Equation 4.9 and Table 4.2 (to get the related average random 
index value) CR can be obtained as follows: 
Cl 0.033 
CR= RI ' RI=O.58; CR = - = 0.057. 0.58 
From Table 4.5, synthesis values in respect to main goal are calculated as per Equation 
4.11 of the extent analysis and are depicted as follows: 
SI = =(4,6,8) ® (1115.5, 1I1l.333, 117.916) = (0.258,0.529,0.010), 
S2= =(2.333,3.5,5) ® (1115.5, 1I1l.333, 117.916) = (0.150,0.309,0.632), 
S3= =(31.750,37.952,44.334) ®(I115.5, 1I1l.333, 117.916) = (0.102,0.162,0.316). 
These fuzzy synthesis values are compared with each other by using Equation 4.17 of 
the extent analysis as follows: 
V(SI:::S2)=1, V(Sl:::S3)=1; 
V(S2~S 1 }=O.630, V(S2:::S3)= I; 
V(S3~S 1 )=0.136, V(S3~S2)=O.530. 
Then priority weights are calculated by using Equation 4.18 of the extent analysis as 
follows: 
d'(Cl) = min (1,1) = 1, 
d'(C2) = min (0.630, 1) = 0.630, 
d'(C3) = min (0.135, 0.530) = 0.135. 
W' = (1,0.630,0.135) 
Collected priority weights are shown in vector W'. Finally after nonnalisation of these 
values as per Equation 4.20 of the extent analysis, priority weights in respect to the 
main goal will be calculated as follows for each criterion in Table 4.5: 
W = (0.566,0.357,0.080). 
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Table 4.6: Level 2 Organisational Risks - Calculating local weights 
OrpalsatlODU Risk. (OS) (M) (QP) (HR) (PPI) Local .. etcb .. 
OrgauisatioDal Structure (OS) (1,1,1) (1,1,1) (1/4,113,112) (113,112,1) (113,112,1) 0.161 
Maaagemeat (M) 0,1,1) (1,1,1) (1/4,113,1/2) (1,2,3) (113,112,1 ) 0.122 
Quality ProcelS (QP) {2,3,4) (2,3,4) (1,1,1) (2,3,4) (1,2,3) 0.353 
HUD18D Resource (HR) (1.2.3) (113,112,1) (114,113.1/2) (1,1,1) (113,112,1) 0.118 
Port Performance IDdlcators (PPI) (1,2,3) (1,2,3) (1/3,112,1) (1,2,3) (1,1,1) 0.246 
In Level 2 comparision matrix (5 x5) for the organisational risk factors (R3) i.e. Table 
4.6 the following results obtained: A max = 5.440 CI=0.110 RI=1.12 CR=0.098 <0.1 
arp .... douI (OS) (M) (QP) (HR) (PPI) ...... 
(OS) 0.11 0.13 0.3 0.12 0.5 0.05 0.5 0.11 
(M) 0.11 0.13 0.3 0.12 2 0.23 0.5 0.11 
(QP) 3 0.33 3 2.50 0.41 3 0.35 2 0.44 
(HR) 2 0.22 0.5 0.96 0.3 0.12 0.11 0.5 0.11 
(PPI) 2 0.22 2 0.26 0.5 0.20 2 0.23 0.22 
---
9 7.5 2.4 8.5 4.5 
...... - (OS) (M) (QP) (HR) (PPI) ..... 
(OS) 0.11 0.14 0.3 0.24 0.5 0.06 0.5 0.11 
(M) 0.11 0.14 0.3 024 2 0.24 0.5 0.11 
(QP) 3 0.33 3 0.42 0.81 3 0.36 2 0.46 
(HR) 2 0.22 0.5 0.07 0.3 0.24 0.12 0.5 0.11 
(PPI) 2 0.22 2 0.28 0.5 0.41 2 0.24 0.23 
with the use of Equations 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7, A. max can be obtained as follows: 
0.66 
-=6 0.11 • 
0.84 
-=6 0.14 • 
2.38 
-=2.9 0.81 • ~=6.3 0.12 ' 
1.38 
-=6' 0.23 ' 
1 27.2 
11. =-= 5440 max 5 . 
furthennore with the use of Equation 4.8 Cl can be obtained as follows: 
CI= .it max - n. 
n-1 ' 
Cl = 5.440-5 ~ = 0.110. 
5-1 4 
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Priority 
0.11 
0.14 
0.81 
0.12 
0.23 
Priority 
0.66 
0.84 
2.38 
0.76 
I. 83 
Finally with the use of Equation 4.9 and Table 4.2 eR can be obtained as follows: 
Cl 0110 
eR= - RI=1.12· eR = -' - = 0.098. RI ' , 1.12 
From Table 4.6, synthesis values in respect to main goal are calculated as per Equation 
4.11 of the extent analysis and are depicted as follows: 
SI=(2,916, 3.333, 4.5) ®(lf44.5, 1/31.999,1121.748) = (0.065,0.104,0.207), 
SI=(3.583,4.833,6.5) ®(l/44.5, 1131.999, 1121.748) = (0.080,0.151,0.299), 
SI=(8, 12, 16) ®(l/44.5, 1/31.999, 1/21.748)=(0.180,0.375,0.736), 
SI=(2.916, 4.333,6.5) ®(lf44.5, l/31.999, 1121.748) = (0.065,0.135,0.300), 
SI=(4.333,7.5, 11) ®(1I44.5, 1131.999, 1121.748) = (0.097,0.234,0.506). 
These fuzzy synthesis values are compared with each other using Equation 4.17 of the 
extent analysis as follows: 
V(SI~S2)=O.730, V(SI~S3)=O.091, V(SI~S4)=O.821, V(SI~S5)=O.458; 
V(S2~SI)=I, V(S2~S3)=0.347, V(S2~S4)=I, V(S2~S5)=O.709; 
V(S3~SI)=1, V(S3~S2)=1, V(S3~S4)=I, V(S3~S5)=I; 
V(S4~SI)=O.730, V(S~S2)=O.932, V(S~S3)=O.333, C(S~S5)=O.672; 
V(S5~SI)=I, V(S5~S2)=1, V(S5~S3)=0.698, V(S5~S4)=1. 
Then priority weights are calculated using Equation 4.18 of the extent analysis as 
follows: 
d'(Cl) = min (0.730,0.091,0.821,0.458) = 0.458, 
d'(C2) = min (1, 0.347, 1,0.709) = 0.347, 
d '(C3) = min (I, 1, 1,1) = 1. 
d'(C4) = min (0.730, 0.932, 0.333, 0.672) = 0.333, 
d'(C5) = min (1, 1,0.698, I) = 0.69. 
W'= (0.458,0.347,1,0.333,0.698) 
114 
Collected priority weights are shown in vector W'. Finally after normalisation of these 
values as per Equation 4.20 of the extent analysis, the priority weights in respect to the 
main goal will be calculated as follows for each criterion in Table 4.6: 
W = (0.161,0.122,0.353,0.118,0.246) 
Table 4.7: Level 2 Operational Risks - Calculating local weights 
LocaJ 
<>peraHoaallUskl (SRRF) (SRRF'") (PRRF) (LRRF) (HERF) (TRRF) Welc~" 
Safety Related Risk Factors (1,1,1) (l/3,1I2,1) (l,I,I) (2,3,4) (113,112,1) (1,2,3) 0,186 (SRRF) 
Security Relaled Risk Facto ... (1,2,3) (1,1,1) (2,3,4) (2,3,4) (1,2,3) (2,3,4) 0,297 (SRRF'") 
Pollution Related Risk F .cton 
0,178 
(PRRF) (1.1,1) (1/4,1/3,112) (1,1,1) (2,3,4) (1/3,112,1) (1,2,3) 
Legal Related RIlIk Factors (1/4.113,112) (1/4,1/3,1/2) (114,113,112) (1,1,1) (113,112,1) (113,1/2.1) 0.007 (LRRF) 
HamaD Error Risk Factors 
0.143 
(BERF) (1,2,3) (1/3,112,1) (1,2,3) (1,2,3) (1,1,1) (2,3,4) 
T echolcal Related Risk (1/3,112,1 ) (1/4,1/3,112) (1/3,112,1) (1,2,3) (114,113,112) (1,1,1) 0.089 
Factors (fRRF) 
In Level 2 comparision matrix (6x6) for the operational risk factors (R4) i.e. From 
Table 4.7 the following results are obtained: 
Amax =6.148 Cl = 0.029 RI= l.24 CR=O.024 < 0.1 
Opo ... - (SIIJIJ) (SIIJIJ) (PIUIP) (LIIIIP) (IIIIIl') (TIIJtF) Priority Ithk. 
(SRRF) 0.16 O.S 0.17 0.13 3 0.19 0.5 0.11 2 0.17 0.15 
(SRRF*) 2 0.32 0.34 3 0.38 3 0.19 2 0.43 3 0.26 0.32 
(PRRF) 0.08 0.3 0.10 0.13 3 0.19 O.S 0.11 2 0.17 0.13 
(LRRF) 0.3 0.05 0.3 0.10 0.3 0.04 0.06 0.3 0.06 0.3 0.26 0.10 
(HERF) 2 0.32 0.5 0.17 2 0.25 3 0.19 0.22 3 026 0.23 
(TRRF) O.S 0.08 0.3 0.10 O.S 0.06 3 0.19 0.3 0.06 0.09 0.10 
6.3 2.9 7.8 16 4.6 11.3 
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o,.n.- (SIUtF) (SIUtF) (P1UIl) (UUtF) (IWlF) (TIIIlF) Priority ..... 
(SRRF) 0.15 0.5 0.16 0.13 3 0.3 O.S 0.11 2 0.20 1.05 
(SRRF*) 2 0.30 0.32 3 0.39 3 0.3 2 0.46 3 0.30 2.07 
(PRRF) 0.15 0.3 0.10 0.13 3 0.3 0.5 0.11 2 0.20 0.99 
(LRRF) 0.3 0.04 0.3 0.10 0.3 0.04 0.1 0.3 0.07 0.3 0.03 0.23 
(HER}) 2 0.30 0.5 0.16 2 0.26 3 0.2 0.22 3 0.30 1.44 
(TRRF) 0.5 0.08 0.3 0.10 0.5 0.06 3 0.2 0.3 0.07 0.10 0.62 
with the use of Equations 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7, Amax can be obtained as follows: 
1.05 2.07 0.99 0.38 1.44 0.61 1 max--~ = 6.148 
-=6.66, -=6.46, -=7.61, -=3.8. -=6.26. -=6.10; A 6 
0.15 0.32 0.13 0.10 0.23 0.10 
furthermore with the use of Equation 4.8 Cl can be obtained as follows: 
Cl= A. max - n. Cl = 6.148-6 ~ = 0.029. 
n-l' 6-1 4 
Finally with the use of Equation 4.9 and Table 4.2 (to get the related average random 
index value) CR can be obtained as follows: 
Cl 0.029 
CR= RI' RI=1.24; eR = -= 0.024. 
1.24 
From Table 4.7, synthesis values in respect to main goal are calculated as per Equation 
4.11 of the extent analysis and are depicted as follows: 
Sl=(5.666,8, 11) ®(1167, 1147.998,1132.164) = (0.08S,0.167,0.342), 
S2={9, 14,19) ®(1/67, 1147.998, 1/32.164) = (0.134,0.292,0.591), 
S3=(5.583, 7.833, 10.5) ®(1I67, 1147.998, 1132.164) = (0.083,0.163,0.326), 
S4=(2.416, 2.999, 4.5) ® (1167, 1/47.998, 1132.164) = (0.036,0.062,0.140), 
S5=(6.333, 10.5, IS) ®(1/67, 1147.998, 1132.164) = (0.095,0.219,0.466), 
S6=(3.166, 4.666, 7) ® (1/67, 1/47.998, 1/32.164) = (0.047,0.097,0.218). 
These fuzzy synthesis values are compared with each other using Equation 4.17 of the 
extent analysis as follows: 
V(Sl~S2)=O.62S, V(Sl~S3)=1, V(Sl~S4)=1, V(Sl~SS)=O.826, V(Sl~S6)=1; 
V{S2~Sl)=1, V(S2~S3)=1, V(S2~S4)=1, V{S2~S5)=1, V(S2~S6)=1; 
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V(S3~SI)=O.984, V(S3~S2)=O.598, V(S3~S4)=I, V(S3~S5)=0.805, V(S3~S6)=1; 
V(S4~SI)=O.344,V(S~S2)=0.025,V(S4~S3)=O.361,V(S4~S5)=O.223,V(S~S6)=0.726; 
V(S5~SI)=I, V(S5~S2)=0.820, V(S5~S3)=I, V(S5~S4)=1, V(S5~S6)=I; 
V(S6~S 1 )=0.655, V(S6~S2)=O.30 1, V(S6~S3)=O.672, V(S~S4)= 1, V(S6~S5)=O.502. 
Then priority weights are calculated by using Equation 4.18 of the extent analysis as 
follows: 
d'(Cl) = min (0.625, 1, 1,0.826, 1) = 0.625, 
d'(C2) =min (1,1,1,1,1) = 1, 
d'(C3) = min (0.984,0.598, 1,0.805, 1) = 0.598, 
d'(C4) = min (0.344, 0.025, 0.361,0.223,0.726) = 0.025, 
d'(C5)= min (1, 0.820, 1, 1, 1)=0.820, 
d'(C6) = min (0.655, 0.301, 0.672, 1,0.502) = 0.301. 
W' = (0.625,1,0.598,0.025,0.820,0.301) 
Collected priority weights are shown in vector W'. Finally after nonnalisation of these 
values as per Equation 4.20 of the extent analysis, priority weights in respect to the 
main goal will be calculated as follows for each criterion in Table 4.7: 
W = (0.186,0.297,0.178,0.007,0.243,0.089) 
4.9. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
Table 4.8 illustrates the fmal results estimated for the operational risk factors (i.e. an 
essential base for further investigations and developments in Chapters 5, 6 and 7) 
through the proposed F AHP methodology. The final results for the country, business 
and organisational risk factors are depicted in Appendix H. 
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Table 4.8: Level 3 Operational Risks - Global weights and rankings 
Levoll Risk 
Operational 
Risk 
Levollllisb 
Safety Related Risk 
Factors (SRRF) 
Security Related Risk 
Factors (SRRF·) 
Pollution Related Risk 
Factors (PRRF) 
Legal Related Risk 
Factors (LRRF) 
Hutnan Error Risk 
Factors (HERF) 
Technical Related 
Risk Factors (TRRF) 
Locol Leve13_ Wel&ltll 
(0.186) Composition of Calling Fleet (CCF) 
Traffic Conditions (TC) 
Weather Conditions (WC) 
Waterway Configuration (WC.) 
Potential Consequences ofOG 
Transportation (pCOOT) 
Potential Impacts of not having 
VfM(pNlM) 
(0.297) People's Safety (PS) 
(0.178) 
Port Asset (PA) 
Port Profit (PP) 
Ship Related Pollutions (SRP) 
Cargo Related Pollutions (CRP) 
Port/terminal Related Pollutions 
(PRP) 
City Related Pollutions (CRP) 
(0.007) Regulatory Changes (RC) 
Fraud in Contrallts (FC) 
(0.243) Pilots Related Errors 
Ships Personnel Related Errors 
PortItcrminal Personnel Related 
Errors 
Stevedores Related Errors 
(0.089) Lack of Equipmcnt Maintenance 
(LEM) 
Lack of IT Technology (UTT) 
Lack of Dredging and Navaids 
Maintenance (LONM) 
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Loc:01 
wtiP" 
(0.048) 
(0.340) 
(0.099) 
(0.398) 
(0.027) 
(0.088) 
(0.670) 
(0.274) 
(0.056) 
(0.496) 
(0.178) 
(0.220) 
(0.106) 
(0.693) 
(0.307) 
(0.498) 
(0.161) 
(0.189) 
(0.152) 
(0.078) 
(0.566) 
(0.356) 
GIoI>oI 
Wetpll 
(0.0089) 
(0.0632) 
(0.0184) 
(0.0740) 
(0.0058) 
(0.0168) 
(0.1989) 
(0.0813) 
(0.0166) 
(0.0877) 
(0.0316) 
(0.0389) 
(0.0187) 
(O.OOSS) 
(0.0024) 
(0.1210) 
(0.0390) 
(0.0459) 
(0.0369) 
(0.0069) 
(0.0503) 
(0.0316) 
RuIdap 
18 
6 
15 
5 
20 
16 
1 
4 
17 
3 
12 
10 
14 
21 
22 
2 
9 
8 
11 
19 
7 
13 
After pair-wise comparisions and global weights' calculations using Level 2 and Level 
3 risk factors as an example the final results for the operational risk factors i.e. R4 can 
be discussed in this section. The most significant risk factors (i.e. peoples' safety, pilots' 
errors and ships' pollutions) among all in respect of their effect to the offshore terminals 
and marine ports are marked under the rankings column in Table 4.8. These types of 
operational risk factors are the most significant ones that are determined to affect the 
offshore terminals and marine ports. Therefore these risk factors need to be analysed 
and eliminated precisely during the future works. 
As it can be seen in Table 4.8 among Level 2 risk factors security related risk factor has 
got the highest importance and among its sub risk factors in Level 3 the risk factor of 
people's safety has been found to be the most significant one. It is evident between 
people's safety, assets and profit priority is always with peoples safety. Ports, offshore 
terminals and ships are vulnerable to abuse by third parties. A greater potential threat to 
an offshore terminal or a port is that of terrorist activity, a threat which has been 
heightened by the attack on the World Trade Centre on September 11, 2001. This will 
endanger the poeoples' safety in offshore terminals and marine ports. Maritime business 
and port interests responsible for the movement of cruise lines and ferry operations 
responsible for the safe transportation of passengers understand the need for security 
and have spent a lot of money to enhance their own security after the September 11 
terrorist attacks. New international, national, state, and local laws and regulations were 
forged as a result of the September 11, 2001 tragedy demanding a lot of security 
compliances in and around port facilities and throughout-the maritime industry. 
In Table 4.8 along with Level 2 risk factors human error risk factors have the second 
highest importance and among its sub risk factors in Level 3 the risk factor of pilot 
related error has been found to be the most significant one. With reference to the marine 
accidents (FEL, 1993; BTC, 2002; DNV, 2002; Lees, 2005; NE P&l Club, 2008 and 
MAffi, 2010), it is not surprising that approximately eighty percent of shipping 
accidents are caused by human factors. Although in terms of human related errors the 
errors caused by of deck officers, ships crew or port personals are more regular than 
pilots' errors, but consequences er impacts of the errors committed by pilots especially 
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within the port areas are very severe. As it was discussed before an accident such as 
collision of a ship with break water or another nearby ship at entrance of a port as a 
result of a pilot's mistake may lead into catastrophic tragedies. Therefore it has 
motivated interests in developing methodologies that can capture the nature of human 
errors in marine accidents and store them in data bases for further statistical study as 
reported in Kristiansen et ai, (1999) and (Kristiansen, 2005). In their reports they have 
mentioned pilots as one of the main contributors for the human errors related risk 
factors. In order to manage this risk factor, ABS (2000)'5 methodological applications 
such as root cause analysis or human reliability analysis are found useful. 
It can be seen from Table 4.8 that between Level 2 risk factors pollution related risk 
factor has got the third highest importance and amongst its sub risk factors in Level 3 
the risk factor of ship related pullutions has been found to be the most significant one. 
As it can be seen from Table 4.8 there are different causes of pullotion in offshore 
terminals and ports' boundries but as it has been explained previously the impact of the 
ships related poIlutions especially to both marine environment and coast/land side are 
greater and in many cases are catastrophic. The example of such claims is the case of 
Deepwater Horizon (i.e. an offshore drilling platfom) in Gulf of Mexico which had led 
to a major oil spill. Moreover in offshore terminals and marine ports pollution may 
result from ship accidents, land activities, ship bunkering, noises, garbage, dust, 
dredging, port maintenance, ship air pollution, traffic congestion, sewage and others. 
The attention of international community has been concentrated mainly on ports' 
visitors (i.e. the ships), because of the well-known marine accidents. Nevertheless there 
are solutions which address this risk factor such as marine insurance, proper compliance 
with the related international conventions and regulations (e.g. MARPOL Convention 
and HSE Regulation) by offshore terminals, marine ports and ships. 
In addition the developed risk-based model in this chapter is used to evaluate and 
analyse the risk factors associated with offshore terminals and marine ports. By using 
the developed risk-based model risk managers can obtain a broad view of the risk 
factors in offshore terminals and marine ports. The proposed risk-based model is 
suitable for comprehensive risk assessments. It can be adopted by different users in the 
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offshore and manne industry. The developed risk-based model can be simply 
established at various hierarchical levels according to the needs of users and existing 
data. It can be used in different offshore terminals and marine ports. The risk-based 
model is designed based on general point of view, which covers the general features of 
different offshore terminals and marine ports and can be used in any particular 
application. It can measure risk factors by considering numerous risk factors. It can 
aggregate various groups of risk factors along with a consistent order to generate useful 
risk-based information for decision makers. It is flexible to existent applications of risk 
assessment. In addition it can be simply applied on the other risk factors not mentioned 
in this study (such as natural disasters, etc). 
4.10. CONCLUSIONS 
Offshore terminals and marine ports are vital for the maritime transportation system, 
thereby facilitating global trade. There are risk factors within these logistics 
infrastructures, all of which require attention in respect of their identification, 
assessment, mitigation and costlbenefit analysis with the use of an appropriate RM 
approach, if they are going to remain responsive to strategic needs and future challenges. 
This chapter critically reviewed the identified risk factors revealed through the literature 
review in Chapter 2. In order to carry out an appropriate check on the proposed risk 
assessment methodology a variety of test cases were conducted. Test cases were carried 
out using a generic risk assessment model based on a proposed RM framework in 
Chapter 3. Moreover FAHP method was used for detennining the relative weights of 
the identified risk factors. Eventually after determining the global weights of the risk 
factors, they were ranked accordingly as per their priority and the most significant ones 
were recognised and discussed. 
121 
In this chapter a new hierarchical risk-based model was designed and tested while using 
the procedures explained for the risk assessment methodology. In next the chapter it is 
appropriate to use the same risk-based model on real cases (i.e. offshore terminals or 
marine ports) in order to prove the applicability and robustness of the newly developed 
risk-based model. 
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CHAPTER 5: DECISION SUPPORT FOR RISK 
EVALUATION 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter a F AHP method was used for assessment and prioritisation of 
the identified hazards which were previously revealed through the HAZID process in 
Chapter 2. The relative weights of all risk factors/hazards for the generic risk-based 
model and its other subsets were determined. In order to apply the developed generic 
model to any specific offshore terminal or marine port (e.g. for the purpose of their 
audit, port-to-port or offshore terminal-to-offshore terminal risk evaluation) there will 
be a need again to use the experts' judgements and decision makers' preferences for the 
purpose of that specific offshore terminal or marine port. This new process through 
expert judgment will help to determine the actual risk levels of the selected port or 
offshore terminal. 
In the past, the risk valuation was all based on the knowledge of managers. However, 
now managers have understood that it is hard to carry out an evaluation since there are 
many risk factors that their organisations are involved with and the measurement of 
some risk factors are vague due to the extremely subjective nature and lack of past 
experience. Therefore it is necessary to have a decision-aid means to help managers to 
complete their risk evaluations (Li and Liao, 2007). 
As a result in order to evaluate the actual risk factors in real situations by use of the 
generic models there will be a need to carry out another risk measurement process. This 
new process will be carried out in order to calculate the levels of the present risks within 
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the selected sea port and/or offshore terminals. The result of these evaluations will be 
aggregated with the predetennined global weights of the risk factors calculated for the 
generic model in the previous chapter. This aggregation updates all the related risk 
factors within the selected site or facility (i.e. combination of the global weights 
calculated for the generic model in the previous chapter with the evaluated risk levels 
within the selected sea port and/or offshore tenninal in this chapter). For this reason and 
in order to evaluate the new levels of the risk factors for any specific port or offshore 
tenninal a new methodology will be used hereafter. 
5.2. FUZZY SET THEORY (FST) 
FST was introduced by Zadeh in 1965. The significance of fuzzy variables is that they 
facilitate gradual transition between states and consequently. possess a natural 
capability to express and deal with observation and measurement uncertainties. 
Traditional variables, which may be referred as crisp variables do not have this 
capability (Pillay and Wang. 2003). Full explanations for the reason behind using FST 
and its methodology are explained in Chapter 4. In this chapter FST will be used again 
due to the nature of data collected. 
5.2.1. Risk evaluation using FST 
In the previous chapter a hierarchical structure of risk factors in the form of a generic 
model was constructed (see Figure 4.7); then relative weights for all risk factors were 
calculated by the use of a F AHP method. The next task is to measure the risk level of 
each elementary risk factor in respect of the any individually selected port or offshore 
terminal. For this reason there is a need to define a framework related to the different 
parameters and ratings of the risk factors in order to determine the risk levels. 
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As Li and Liao (2007) and ABS (2003) explain there are parameters that may affect 
each risk level of every elementary risk factor. These parameters include occurrence 
likelihood (frequency) and consequence severity (impact). 
Occurrence likelihood describes the expected number of occurrences of an unwanted 
incident, while the consequence severity expresses the scale of unwanted event that can 
harmfully affect subjects of interest i.e. number of people affected (injured or killed), 
property damaged, amount of a spill, area affected, outage time, mission delay, dollars 
lost or other measures of negative impact (ABS, 2003). 
In this respect ABS (2003) explains that a general risk evaluation and presentation 
method is just to multiply the occurrence likelihood of each unwanted event by each 
consequence severity, and after that sum-up these products for all situations considered 
in the evaluation. 
Thus with respect to the above description, risk levels can be obtained by the use of the 
aforementioned parameters through the following equation: 
R=LxS (5.1) 
where R is the risk associated with each hazardous event, L represents the occurrence 
likelihood of the hazard; S represents the consequence severity of the hazard and R 
denotes the multiplication relationship between the occurrence likelihood and 
consequence severity. This definition has been applied to risk assessment in many 
applications among other applications explained in the next section. In this chapter, 
Equation 5.1 will be used to determine the risk levels associated with each risk factor in 
any specific port or offshore terminal. 
This definition indicates that if Land/or S are represented by fuzzy numbers, R will also 
be a fuzzy number (Anoop et ai, 2006). 
R=L® S (5.2) 
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Although in the previous chapter a linguistic approach of the FST was discussed in the 
next section its usage on other applications will be reviewed. 
S.2.2. A brief review of the past research on FST 
As Pillay and Wang (2003) explain since FSTwas proposed almost four decades ago, it 
has found many useful applications. The linguistic approach based on fuzzy sets has 
given very good results for modelling qualitative information. It has been widely used 
in different fields, for example, clinical diagnosis (Degani and Bortolan, 1988), 
marketing (Yager et ai, 1994), infonnation retrieval (Bordogna and Pasi, 1993), 
technology transfer strategy selection (Chang and Chen, 1994), mechanical system 
design (Wang et aI, 1995), education (Law, 1996), risk modelling in software 
development (Lee, 1996a and Lee, 1996b), decision making (Bordogna et ai, 1997), 
environmental engineering (Deshpande, 1999), environment modelling (Sadiq et ai, 
2004), process plant (Khan et ai, 2002; Khan and Haddara, 2003; Krishnasamy et ai, 
2005), water pipe deterioration analysis (Kleiner et ai, 2006) and hieratica1 risk 
assessment of water supply systems (Li, 2007). In the next section it will be described 
how to use and verify the risk parameters (occurrence likelihood and severity of 
consequence) under fuzzy environments. 
S.2.3. Linguistic variables for risk parameters 
Due to the highly SUbjective nature of data collected, it is usually difficult to measure 
risk parameters precisely. A practicable and suitable way to explain these parameters is 
to use qualitative verbal expressions (i.e., linguistic variables) particularly during 
experts' judgments. To estimate the occurrence likelihood, for example, one may often 
use such variables as very low, low, medium, high and very high. In addition to estimate 
the consequence severity one may also often use such variables as slight, minor, 
moderate, critical and catastrophic. 
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The subjective linguistic variables can also be defined in tenns of membership functions. 
As Li and Liao (2007) have expressed "a membership function is a curve that defmes 
how each point in the input space is mapped to a membership value between ° and I". 
Among these membership functions, the simplest are the triangular fuzzy number and 
trapezoidal fuzzy number (see Chapter 4). TFNs are selected for use in this chapter to 
represent the linguistic variables. They are shown in Table 5.1 and Figure 5.1 based on 
Yang and Hung (2007). Thus membership degrees of risk parameters can be assigned 
by experts, with reference to Table 5.1 in a fuzzy environment. 
Table 5.1: Transfonnation for Fuzzy membership functions. 
Grade Occurrence Consequence Severity 
Likelihood(i) (5) 
1 Very Low (VL) Slight (SL) 
2 Low (L) Minor (MI) 
3 Medium (M) Moderate (MO) 
4 High (H) Critical (CR) 
5 Very High (VH) Catastrophic (CA) 
VL L M 
Membership 
function 
H 
(0.00,0.00,0.25) 
(0.00,0.25,0.50) 
(0.25,0.50,0.75) 
(0.50,0.75,1.00) 
(0.75,1.00,1.00) 
VH 
1 y-----------,-----------~----------~--------__, 
0.95 
0.9 
0.85 
0.8 
0.75 
0.7 
0.65 
0.6 
0.55 
0.5 
0.45 
0.4 
0.35 
0.3 
0.25 
0.2 
0.15 
0.1 
0.05 
o +---~----~~~~--~----~---T----~~~----~--~ 
0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90 1.00 
Figure 5.1: Fuzzy triangular membership functions 
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In addition based on the definition of the risk (i.e. Equation 5.2) and the five grades 
defined for occurrence likelihood (l) and consequence severity (5) of the risk level 
shown in Table 5.1, the linguistic description for risk evaluation can be defined as per 
Table 5.2. Furthennore the five triangular linguistic tenus for risk levels (R) can be 
demonstrated as per Table 5.3. 
Table 5.2: Linguistic description for risk levels (R) 
Linguistic variables of risk levels 
(R) 
Very low (VL) 
Low (L) 
Medium (M) 
High (H) 
Very high (VH) 
Description of linguistic values 
If likelihood is very low and severity is slight 
If likelihood is low and severity is minor 
If the likelihood is medium and severity is 
moderate 
If the likelihood is high and severity is critical 
If the likelihood is very high and severity is 
catastrophic 
Table 5.3: linguistic variables and TFNs for risk levels (R) 
Risk evaluation variables Grade (P) 
Very low (VL) 1 
Low (L) 2 
Meruum(M) 3 
High (H) 4 
Very high (YH) 5 
Membership function 
(0.00,0.00,0.25) 
(0.00,0.25,0.50) 
(0.25,0.50,0.75) 
(0.50,0.75,1.00) 
(0.75,1.00,1.00) 
In the next section a new methodology will be utilised to aggregate the above risk 
evaluation process and enable its application on the real cases, such as risk evaluation 
on sea ports and offshore terminals. As Li and Liao (2007) explain risk evaluation is 
regarded as a Multi-Attribute Decision-Making (MADM) problem with uncertainty. 
Consequently for the purpose of this chapter a new evaluation approach based on the 
framework of the Evidential Reasoning (ER), under fuzzy environments is proposed to 
be used hereafter. 
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5.3. DECISION MAKING UNDER UNCERTAINTY 
Several decision problems in engineering and management involve multiple attributes 
in cooperation with quantitative and qualitative characters. A decision may not be 
properly taken without fully taking into account all attributes in question (Huang and 
Yoon, 1981; Saaty, 1988; Stewart, 1992; Chen and Hwang, 1992; Yang and Singh, 
1994; Royand Vanderpooten, 1997; Be1ton and Stewart, 2002 and Sadiq el at, 2008). 
On the other hand as Fredlob and Schleifer (1999) explain there is a close relationship 
between complexity and uncertainty and it is said that as the complexity increases, 
certainty decreases. "Therefore there is a growing need to develop theoretically sound 
methods and tools for dealing with Multiple Attribute Decision Analysis (MADA) 
problems under uncertainty in a way that is rational, reliable, repeatable, and transparent" 
(Yang and Xu, 2002). 
5.4. APPLICATION OF THE BELIEF DEGREES IN DETERMINING THE 
RISK LEVELS 
Based on Liu et ai, (2002) fuzzy logic structures are knowledge-based or rule-based 
structures built from human understanding in the form of fuzzy IF-THEN rules. For 
example, a fuzzy IF-THEN rule for safety analysis is: 
IfFR (i.e. Failure Rate) is frequent AND CS (i.e. Consequence Severity) is catastrophic 
AND FCP (i.e. Failure Consequence Probability) is likely, THEN safety estimate is 
Poor. 
There is an additional type of uncertainty in representing infonnation when the expert is 
incapable of forming a strong correlation between premise and conclusion. That is, 
evidence available is not adequate or experts are not 100% sure to believe in an 
assumption but only to certain degrees of belief or with credibility. For example, it is 
possible to have fuzzy rules with belief degrees for all possible consequent terms as 
follows: 
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IF FR is frequent AND CS is critical AND FCP is unlikely THEN safety estimate is 
{(Good, 0), (Average, 0), (Fair, 0.7), (Poor, 0.3)}. 
Here {(Good, 0), (Average, 0), (Fair, 0.7), (Poor, O.3)} is a belief distribution 
representation of the safety consequent, representing that experts are 70% sure that 
safety level is Fair, and 30% sure that safety level is Poor. 
As Li and Liao (2007) explain, in order to measure the risk level of each risk factor, it is 
essential to convert the fuzzy ratings of all parameters into belief structures with the 
same set of evaluation grades. In another instance Yang and XU (2002) have expressed 
that an attribute can be evaluated to individual or a subset of the evaluation grades with 
different degrees of belief. Therefore in order to become familiar with belief degrees 
the following explanation by Cat (2006) is found to be useful: 
"Let X be a classical set of objects denoted by x, called the universe. Let C be a classical 
subset of X and m(x) be a function from X to the pair of values {O, I} such that if x E C, 
m(x)=l, and if xe C, m(x) =0. In classical sets, then, either elements of the universe 
belong to a set or they do not. The set is characterised by a sharp boundary and is 
identical with its members. By contrast, a fuzzy set F, is a subset characterised by the 
set of pairs 11 F = {(x, ~(x»), x EX} ", where PF(x) represents the degree of 
membership with possible values ranging over the real interval [0, 1]. A Membership 
Function (MF) value of one means full representation of the set under consideration. A 
MF value of zero implies that value does not belong to the set under consideration. A 
membership somewhere between these two limits indicates the degree of membership. 
In each context of application of the predicate F , the fuzzy set F will be normalised if 
there exists one x, such that ~(x) = 1. A fuzzy set whose MF only takes on the value 
of zero or one is called crisp" (Cat, 2006). 
Now with the use of aforementioned descriptions the evaluation of risk level of each 
risk factor for the purpose of this chapter can be explained by the following linguistic 
variables or evaluation grades: 
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H = [Hb H2 , H3 , H4 , HsJ ={Very low, Low, Medium, High, Very high} (5.3) 
In order to transform the fuzzy ratings of all parameters into belief structures with the 
same set of evaluation grades (i.e. linguistic variables) and be able to calculate the risk 
levels of each risk factor, risk levels must be calculated by use of Equation 5.2 after the 
fuzzy ratings of all parameters associated with each risk factor are obtained through the 
experts' judgements. 
As discussed earlier and explained by ASS (2003), the risk is the combination of 
occurrence likelihood and consequence severity. When the occurrence likelihood and 
consequence severity are supposed to be independent of each other, their combination is 
equivalent to the product of the two. Therefore under the same assumption of 
independence, the risk level of every risk factor under a fuzzy environment can be 
calculated as the product of the two fuzzy numbers denoted by l = (av bL• CL) and S = 
(as. bs, cs) as follows (see Chapter 4): 
(5.4) 
As an example and according to Table 5.1, if a risk as per experts' preference has 
occurrence likelihood (l) of (0.00, 0.25, 0.50) (i.e. Low) and consequence severity (S) 
of (0.50,0.75, 1.00) (i.e. Critical), the FTNLS as per Equation 5.4 will be FTNLS = (0.00, 
0.1875,0.50). 
Now for the purpose of Equation 5.4 there are five steps to convert FTNLS into fuzzy 
risk H i.e. a normalised fuzzy set of 5 linguistic variables or evaluation grades (i.e. 
belief structure). These steps are based on Miri Lavasani (2010). The proposed steps are 
illustrated in Figure 5.2 and Table 5.4. 
Step 1: Map the new calculated FTNLS over FTNR (5 grades defined over the universe 
of discourse of risk i.e. VL, L, M, H, VH triangles shown in Figure 5.1). The new 
calculated FTNLS is marked as thin circles in Figure 5.2. 
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Step 2: Determine the points where the newly mapped FTNLS (i.e. the thick circles) 
intersects each linguistic term of FTNR shown in Figure 5.2. 
Step 3: Use a maximum figure if FTNLS and a linguistic term of FTNR intersect at more 
than one point. 
Step 4: Establish a set of intersecting points that defines a non-normalised 5 grades in 
the form of fuzzy set (i.e. thick circles marked in Figure 5.2, HR [0.57, 0.89,0.45,0, 0], 
which is the intersection of H with FTNLS (/lp, P = 1,2,3,4,5) {Very low, Low, 
Medium, High, Very high} respectively. 
Step 5: Normalise the HR (5 non-normalised grades) to obtain H (5 normalised grades) 
which is known as a belief structure. In order to find the normalised values (i.e. H grades) 
all the HR grades must be added together and in case of Table 5.4 sum of the HR grades 
will be 1.91. Then in order to calculate the H grades each HR grades must be divided by 
1.91. 
Table 5.4: Converting FTNLS (fuzzy ratings) to H (belief structure) based on Figure 5.2 
FTNLS (0.00, 0.1875, 0.50) 
Grade (P) VL L M H VH 
HR 0.57 0.89 0.45 0 0 
H [0.30,0.47,0.23,0,0] 
As mentioned previously in the next section a new methodology based on ER will be 
utilised in order to aggregate the above risk evaluation process with the relative weights 
calculated in the previous chapter, enabling its application in offshore terminals and 
marine ports. 
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Figure 5.2: Converting FTNLS (fuzzy ratings) to HR (5 non-nonnalised grades) 
5.5. APPLICATION OF THE ER APPROACH IN OFFSHORE TERMINALS 
AND MARINE PORTS. 
In risk and safety analysis, fundamentally vague data may exist with conditions of "lack 
of specificity" originating from evidence not adequately strong to completely support a 
theory but only with degrees of belief or credibility (Binaghi and MadelIa, 1999). 
Dempster-Shafer (D-S) theory of evidence (Dempster, 1968; Shafer, 1976) based on the 
idea of belief function is well suited to modelling subjective credibility induced by 
partial evidence (Smets, 1988). The D-S theory expands the scope of traditional 
probability theory, describes and handles uncertainties using the theory of the belief 
degrees, which can model incompleteness and ignorance clearly. 
133 
The theory of evidence was originally created by Dempster (1967) and later developed 
by Shafer (1976), it is frequently referred to as Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence or 
D-S theory. The D-S theory was first used for data aggregation in expert systems as an 
approximate reasoning device (Lopez de Mantaras, 1990). Consequently it has been 
used to handle multiple criteria decision analysis problems of both a quantitative and 
qualitative nature with uncertainty (Yang and Singh, 1994; Yang and Sen, 1994; Yang, 
200 I). The ER rule of combination defines how to combine evidence obtained from two 
or more sources. It can synthesise all the related risk factors. Furthermore the ER 
framework is different from most conventional MCDM modelling frameworks in that it 
employs a belief structure to represent an assessment as a distribution (Li and Liao, 
2007). In this chapter ER will be utilised for the aggregation pwposes. 
5.5.1. A brief review of the past researches on ER 
In recent years, the ER approach has been used in decision problems of engineering 
design, organisational self-assessment, safety and risk assessment and supplier 
assessment, e.g., motorcycle assessment (Yang and Singh, 1994), safety analysis and 
synthesis using fuzzy sets and evidential reasoning (Wang et aI, 1994), general cargo 
ship design (Sen and Yang, 1994), marine system safety analysis and synthesis (Stewart, 
1992; Wang, Yang and Sen, 1995), Multi-person and multi-attribute design evaluations 
using evidential reasoning based on subjective safety and cost analyses ( Wang et ai, 
1996), software safety synthesis (Wang, 1997; Wang and Yang, 2001), a retrofit ferry 
design (Yang and Sen, 1997), executive car assessment (Yang and Xu, 1998), rule and 
utility based evidential reasoning approach for MADA under uncertainties (Yang, 2001), 
addressing the contractor selection problem using an evidential reasoning approach 
(Sonmez, 2001), organisational self-assessment (Yang and Dale, 2001), on the 
evidential reasoning algorithm for multiple attribute decision analysis under uncertainty 
(Yang and Dong, 2002), application of a fuzzy based decision making methodology to 
construction project risk assessment (Zeng et ai, 2007), decision support for risk 
analysis on dynamic alliance (Li and Liao, 2007) and evidential reasoning approach for 
bridge condition assessment (Wang and Elhag, 2008). 
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5.5.2. ER based methodology 
The core of the ER approach is~ an evidential reasoning algorithm generated on the basis 
of a multi-attribute evaluation framework and the evidence combination rule of the D-S 
theory (Yang and Xu, 2002). It is different from the majority of conventional MADM 
modelling techniques in the following aspects (Li and Liao, 2007): 
• It utilizes a belief structure to represent an evaluation as a distribution instead of 
as a single numerical score, which can capture variety types of uncertainties 
such as vague data gathered during subjective judgments. 
• When decision makers are not able to grant exact judgments because of shortage 
of information available, the ER approach allows decision makers to illustrate a 
degree of belief of less than 1. No other MADM approaches can handle this 
level of uncertainty. 
• It utilizes the evidential combination rule to aggregate the belief degrees rather 
than scores. In this manner, the ER approach can look after the qualitative 
aspects of subjective attributes in combination processes. 
In order to describe the ER approach, as an example it is preferable to refer to the 
operational risks model (see Figure I1I.l in Appendix Ill). There is a simple three levels 
of evaluation hierarchy with a general attribute R, (i.e. Operational Risks) in level I, six 
associated sub-attributes (sub-risk factors) (e.g. Ri> R2 • R3 • ... , R6 ) in level 2 and 
moreover subs of sub-attributes (subs of sub-risk factors) (e.g. Rll, R12 , R13 , .•. I R16) 
in level 3. Suppose the weights of the sub-attributes in level 2 are given by W = (WlI 
W2, W3, ••• , Wd; L = 6, where Wi is the relative weight for a level 2 attribute or risk 
factor. Ri is normalized so that; 
L 
o ~ Wi S; 1 and L Wi = 1. 
i=1 
The same condition exists for the level 3 risk factors respectively. 
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Nevertheless in this respect weights play an important role for the assessment purposes. 
They may be estimated using existing methods such as expert rating method and AHP 
(Li and Liao, 2007). The weights used here for operational risk factors have been 
calculated previously by the Fuzzy AHP method using Chang's (1996) extent analysis. 
Moreover as Li and Liao (2007) explained attributes may be measured with reference to 
a set of evaluation grades with various belief degrees. The use of evaluation grades 
helps data gathering and allows capture of the decision-makers favourite, experience 
and perception. The general scale of evaluation grades is defined as: H = 
{Ht> H2 , H3 , .••• , HN}' As it was discussed in section 5.4, five evaluation grades for risk 
factors are defined as follows: 
However the assessment of an attribute (a risk factor) Ri, denoted by S (Ri)' can be 
represented using the belief structure as follows (Yang, 2001): 
where Pn,i(Ra denotes a degree of belief that the attribute (risk factor) Ri is assessed to 
N 
the evaluation grade Hn and Pn,i(Ri) ~ 0 with L Pn,i(Ri) $ 1. 
.;1 
N IV 
An assessment S (Ri) is complete ifL Pn,i(Ri) = 1 and incomplete ifL Pn,i(Ra < 1. 
It=! 0=1 
Let Tnn,i be a basic probability mass representing the degree to which the ith basic 
attribute (risk factor) Ri supports a hypothesis that the general attribute R is assessed to 
the nth evaluation grade Hn. Let mH,i be a remaining probability mass unassigned to 
any individual grade after Ri has been assessed. Tnn,i and mH,i are calculated as follows 
(yang, 2001): 
mn,i = WiPn,i (Ri), n = 1,2, ... , N i = 1,2, ... , L, 
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N N 
mH,i = 1 - L mn,i = 1- wi L Pn,i (Ri), i = 1,2, ... , L. 
0;1 r-I 
Now in order to assess the sub-attributes (sub-risk factors) of the attribute (risk 
factor) Ri, the EJ(i) can be defined as the subset of the ith basic attribute i.e. sub-risk 
factors of the Ri as follows (this part can be used for the purpose of the level 3 risk 
factors): 
Let mn,l(i) be a probability mass defined as the degree to which all the ith attributes in 
EJ(i) support the hypothesis that Ri is assessed to the grade Hn· mH,/(i) is the remaining 
probability mass unassigned to individual grades after all the basic attributes in 
EJ(i) have been assessed. Obviously, mn,J(l) = mn,l and mH,/(l) = mH,l mn,/(L) and 
mH,J(i) can be generated by aggregating all the all the basic probability assignment, 
using the ER algorithm (Yang, 2001). 
The details about the ER algorithm capable of combining both complete and incomplete 
assessments can be found in the references e.g. (Yang and Singh, 1994; Yang and Sen, 
1994; Yang, 1999 and Yang, 2001). 
The aforementioned ER algorithm based on Yang (2001) is integrated into a software 
package called IDS (Yang and Dong, 2002). In the next section the IDS software will be 
used for sensitivity analysis following a case study in order to aggregate the input data 
by using the ER algorithm. 
5.6. CASE STUDY 
A case study is conducted to evaluate the three Iranian ports of Bushehr, Shahid Rajaie 
and Chabahar under a fuzzy environment, according to the decision makers or experts' 
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preferences. These ports are marked in Figure 5.3. Furthermore this case study will 
demonstrate the applicability of the proposed model during the sea ports'loffshore 
terminals ' audits, sea port-to-sea port or offshore terminal-to-offshore terminal risk 
evaluations or comparisons etc. Operational risk factors (i.e. Figure 111.1 in Appendix 
Ill) have been chosen to be used as an illustrative example for the evaluation of these 
sea ports. Figure 5.3 shows the location of the three selected Iranian Ports in the South 
of Iran. 
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Figure 5.3 : The Ports of Bushehr, Shahid Rajaie and Chabahar. 
The first sea port is Bushehr and is located in the Northern coasts of the Persian Gulf. It 
is a natural harbour. In this port the depth of water is close to 7 metres in the external 
anchorage leading to internal anchorage by the external channel 9200 meters in length 
and from the internal anchorage to Bushehr berths. The channel is 140 metres in 
average width. The port enjoys the existence of favourable hinterlands and the 
proximity to neighbouring countries such as Kuwait, Iraq, Turkey, Armenia and 
Azerbaijan. There are 14 of berths which can be used to accommodate vessels for the 
purpose of the liquid bulks, containers, refer and general cargoes (PMO, 2009). 
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The second Port of Shahid Rajaie, an artificial harbour having an exceptional 
geographical location with modem equipment and facilities is one of the most important 
ports of Iran. It is located at the entrance to the Persian Gulf, at the Strait of Hormoz and 
North of Qeshem Island, in the Southern part of Iran. It is one of the huge ports situated 
20 km west of the Bandar Abbas city. It is well connected with rail and road network to 
T ehran, the capital and biggest city of Iran, and other cities of Iran as well as 
neighbouring landlocked countries. 
The port of Shahid Rajaie occupies a fifty five percent share of the commercial 
transaction of Iran through sea. It is considered to be the economical gateway in the 
field of sea transportation within Middle East and the CIS countries because of ideal 
geographical location at Persian Gulf and international national rail-road connection 
with Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Turkey. Maximum draft for this port is 13 metres. 
This port having 25 berths can accommodate oil, container, general cargo, bulk, multi-
purpose vessels (PMO, 2009). 
The third port is Chabahar, a natural harbour, located outside of the Persian Gulf in the 
Oman Sea, South East of Iran. The maximum draft for this port is 11 metres. The port 
can accommodate general cargo and bulk carriers up to 25000 tonnage. There are only 
road connections from this port to Pakistan, Afghanistan and Turkmenistan (PMO, 
2009). 
Three selected experts for the purpose of this case study will use the appropriate 
linguistic variables shown in Table 5.1 in order to rate these_ports forthe 22 operational 
risk factors shown in Figure IIU in Appendix III As per Table 5.1, the experts will 
have to choose an appropriate grade of occurrence likelihood and consequence severity 
for each risk factor in order to rate the mentioned sea ports. 
Appendix m illustrates an evaluation sheet which is used to facilitate the evaluation 
process of the operational risk factors for the mentioned ports by using the experts' 
judgments (see Chapter 4 for the procedures of how to collect and analyse data). The 
nominated experts have long personal experience of serving in these ports especially in 
managerial positions. Contribution of the experts' and their weights distributions for 
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purpose of the calculations and the defuzzification process of the TFNs have been 
discussed in detail in Chapter 4. The results of the experts' judgements for operational 
risks model in respect of the Port of Bushehr, one of the three Iranian ports mentioned 
in the case study, are depicted in Table 5.5. 
Table 5.5: Calculations based on Equation 5.4 for the Port of Bushehr. 
Risk OL se FTN, FTNs FTNLS H. H 
Jt411 2 3 (0.00,0.25,0.50) (0.25,0.50,0.75) (0.00,0.12,0.37) (0.69,0.735,0.215,0,0) (0,42,0.45,0.13,0,0) 
R4U 2 3 (0.00,0.25,0.50) (0.25,0.50,0.75) (0.00,0.12,0.37) (0,69,0.735,0.215,0,0) (0,42,0.45,0.13,0,0) 
R413 4 2 (0.50,0.75,1.00) (0.00,0.25,0.50) (0.00,0.19,0.50) (0.56,0.90,0.45,0,0) (0.29,0.47,0.24,0,0) 
R414 3 4 (0.25,0.50,0.75) (0.50,0.75,1.00) (0.12,038,0.75) (0.27.0.76.0.8,0.4.0) (0.12,0.34,0.36,0.18,0) 
R41S 2 4 (0.00,0.25,0.50) (0.50,0.75,1.00) (0.00,0.1 9,0.50) (0,57.0.90.0.45.0,0) (0.29.0.47.0.24.0.0) 
R416 3 4 (0.25,0.50,0.75) (0.50,0.75,1.00) (0.12,0.38,0.75) (0.27,0.76,0,8.0.4.0) (0.12.0.34.0.36.0.18.0) 
R421 2 5 (0.00,0.25,0.50) (0.75,1.00,1.00) (0.00,0.25,0.50) (0.50,0,0.50,0.0) (0.50,0,050,0.0) 
R422 3 5 (0.25,0.50,0.75) (0.75,1.00,1.00) (0.19,0.50,0.75) (0.1.0.55.0.0.5,0) (0.09.0.48.0.0.43.0) 
R423 3 3 (0.25,0.50,0.75) (0.25,0.50,0.75) (0.06,0.25,0.42) (0,44,0,0.4,0,0) (0,52,0.0.48.0,0) 
R431 2 4 (0.00,0.25,0.50) (0.50,0.75,1.00) (0.00,0.19,0.50) (0,57.0.90,0.45,0.0) (0.29,0.47,0.24,0,0) 
R432 2 3 (0.00,0.25,0.50) (0.25,0.50,0.75) (0.00,0.12,0.37) (0,69,0.735.0.215,0,0) (0,42.0.45,0.13,0,0) 
R433 2 4 (0.00,0.25,0.50) (0.50,0.75,1.00) (0.00,0.19,0.50) (0,57,0.90,0.45,0,0) (0.29,0.47,0.24,0,0) 
R434 3 4 (0.25.0.50,0.75) (0.50,0.75,1.00) (0.12,0.38,0.75) (0.27,0.76,0,8,0.4.0) (0.12,0.34,0.36,0.18,0) 
R441 3 3 (0.25,0.50,0.75) (0.25,0.50,0.75) (0.06,0.25,0.42) (0,44.0,0.4,0.0) (0,52,0,0.48,0.0) 
R442 2 3 (0.00,0.25,0.50) (0.25,0.50,0.75) (0.00,0.12,0.37) (0,69,0.735,0.215,0,0) (0.42.0.45,0.13.0.0) 
R451 2 3 (0.00,0.25,0.50) (0.25,0.50,0.75) (0.00,0.12,0.37) (0.69,0.735,0.215,0,0) (0,42,0.45,0.13,0,0) 
R4S2 2 3 (0.00,0.25,0.50) (0.25,0.50,0.75) (0.00,0.12,0.37) (0.69,0.735,0.215,0,0) (0,42.0.45.0.13,0,0) 
R453 2 3 (0.00,0.25,0.50) (0.25,0.50,0.75) (0.00,0.12,0.37) (0,69,0.735.0.215,0,0) (0.42.0.45.0.13.0.0) 
R454 2 3 (0.00,0.25,0.50) (0.25,0.50,0.75) (0.00,0.12,0.37) (0,69,0.735,0.215,0.0) (0,42.0.45,0.13,0,0) 
R461 2 4 (0.00,0.25,0.50) (0.50,0.75,1.00) (0.00,0.19,0.50) (0.57,0.90,0.45,0,0) (0.29,0.47.0.24.0,0) 
R462 3 3 (0.25,0.50,0.75) (0.25,0.50,0.75) (0.06,0.25,0.42) (0.44.0,0.4,0.0) (0,52,0,0.48,0,0) 
R463 4 4 (0.50,0.75,1.00) (0.50,0.7S,I.00) (0.25,0.56,1.00) (0,0.45,0.9,0.725.0.36) (0,0.18.0.37,0.30.0.15) 
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The results of the experts' judgements for operational risks model in respect of the Port 
of Shahid Rajaie in the case study are depicted in Table 5.6. 
Table 5.6: Calculations based on Equation 5.4 for the Port of Shahid Rajaie. 
Risk OL se FTNL FTNs FTNu H. H 
R411 2 2 (0.00,0.25,0.50) (0.00,0.25,0.50) (0.00,0.06,0.25) (0.81,0.56,0.0.0) (0.59,0.41,0.0,0) 
R412 3 4 (0.25,0.50,0.75) (0.50,0.75,1.00) (0.12,038,0.75) (0.27,0.76,0,8.0.4.0) (0.12.0.34.0.36,O.l8,O) 
R413 2 2 (0.00,0.25,0.50) (0.00,0.25,0.50) (0.00,0.06,0.25) (0,81.0.56.0,0,0) (0,59,0.41,0,0,0) 
R414 2 3 (0.00,0.25,0.50) (0.25,0.50,0.75) (0.00,0.12,0.37) (0,69,0.735.0.215,0,0) (0,42,0.45.0.13.0,0) 
R41S 4 4 (0.50,0.75,1.00) (0.50,0.75,1.00) (0.25,0.56,1.00) (0.0.45,0.9,O.725,0.36) (0,0.18,0.37,0.30,0.15) 
R416 3 3 (0.25.0.50,0.75) (0.25,0.50,0.75) (0.06,0.25,0.42) (0,44,0,0.4.0.0) (0,52.0,0.48,0.0) 
R421 2 4 (0.00,0.25,0.50) (0.50,0.75,1.00) (0.00,0.19,0.50) (0.57.0.90.0.45.0,0) (0.29.0.47.0.24.0,0) 
R422 2 4 (0.00,0.25,0.50) (0.50,0.75,1.00) (0.00,0.1 9,0.50) (0,57,0.90,0.45.0,0) (0.29,0.47,0.24,0,0) 
R423 2 4 (0.00.0.25,0.50) (0.50,0.75,1.00) (0.00,0.19,0.50) (0,57,0.90,0.45,0,0) (0.29,0.47,0.24,0,0) 
R431 3 4 (0.25,0.50,0.75) (0.50,0.75,1.00) (0.12,0.38,0.75) (0.27.0.76.0,8.0.4.0) (0.12,0.34,0.36,0.18,0) 
R432 3 4 (0.25,0.50,0.75) (0.50,0.75,1.00) (0.12,0.38,0.75) (0.27,0.76,0,8,0.4.0) (0.12,0.34.0.36.0.18.0) 
R433 3 3 (0.25,0.50,0.75) (0.25,0.50,0.75) (0.06,0.25,0.42) (0,44,0,0.4,0,0) (0.52,O,O.48,O.O) 
R434 2 3 (0.00,0.25,0.50) (0.25,0.50,0.75) (0.00,0.12,0.37) (0,69,0.735.0.215,0,0) (0.42.0.45.0.13.0.0) 
R441 3 4 (0.25,0.50,0.75) (0.50,0.75,1.00) (0.12,0.38,0.75) (0.27,0.76.0,8,0.4.0) (0.12.0.34.0.36.0.18.0) 
R442 2 4 (0.00,0.25,0.50) (0.50,0.75,1.00) (0.00,0.19,0.50) (0,57,0.90,0.45.0,0) (0.29,0.47,0.24,0,0) 
R4S1 4 4 (0.50,0.75,1.00) (0.50,0.75,1.00) (0.25,0.56,1.00) (0,0.45,0.9,0.725,0.36) (0.0.18.0.37,0.30.0.15) 
R452 4 3 (0.SO,0.75,1.00) (0.25,0.50,0.75) (0.12,0.38,0.75) (0.27.0.76.0,8,0.4.0) (0.12,0.34,0.36,0.18,0) 
R4S3 3 3 (0.25,0.50,0.75) (0.25,0.50,0.75) (0.06,0.25,0.42) (0,44,0,0.4,0,0) (0,52,0.0.48,0,0) 
R454 4 4 (0.50,0.75,1.00) (0.50,0.75,1.00) (O.5O,0.56,1.00) (0.0.45,0.9,0.725.0.36) (0,0.18,0.37.0.30.0.15) 
R461 3 3 (0.25,0.5O,0.75) (0.25,0.50,0.75) (0.06,0.25,O.42) (0,44,O,O.4,O.0) (0,52,0,0.48,0,0) 
R462 4 4 (0.50,0.75,1.00) (0.50,0.75,1.00) (0.25,0.56,1.00) (0,0.45,0.9,0.725,0.36) (0,0.18,0.37,0.30.0.15) 
R463 3 4 (0.25,0.50,0.75) (0.50,0.75,1.00) (0.12,038,0.75) (0.27,0.76,0,8,0.4.0) (0.12,0.34,0.36,0.18,0) 
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The results of the experts' judgements for operational risks model in respect of the Port 
ofChabahar in the case study are shown in Table 5.7. 
Table 5.7: Calculations based on Equation 5.4 for the Port ofChabahar. 
Risk OL se FTN£ FTNs FTNu HIl H 
R411 (0.00,0.00,0.25) (0.00,0.00,0.25) (0.00,0.00.0.02) (0,0.03,0,0,0) (0,1,0,0,0) 
R412 (0.00,0.00,0.25) (0.00,0.00,0.25) (0.00,0.00,0.02) (0,0.03,0,0,0) (0,1,0,0,0) 
R413 4 (0.25,0.50,0.75) (0.50,0.75,1.00) (0.12,0.38,0.75) (0.27,0.76,0,8.0.4.0) (0.12,0.34,0.36,0.18,0) 
R414 (0.00,0.00,0.25) (0.00,0.00,0.25) (0.00,0.00,0.02) (0,0.03,0,0,0) (0,1,0,0,0) 
R41S (0.00,0.00,0.25) (0.00,0.00,0.25) (0.00,0.00,0.02) (0,0.03,0.0,0) (0,1,0,0,0) 
R416 2 (0.00,0.00,0.25) (0.00,0.25,0.50) (0.00,0.00,0.12) (0,0.33,0,0.0) (0,1,0,0,0) 
R421 2 (0.00,0.00,0.25) (0.00,0.25,0.50) (0.00,0.00,0.12) (0,0.33,0,0,0) (0, I ,0,0,0) 
R422 3 (0.00,0.25,0.50) (0.25,0.50,0.75) (0.00,0.06,0.25) (0,81,0.56,0,0,0) (0,59,0.41,0,0,0) 
R423 2 (0.00,0.00,0.25) (0.00,0.25,0.50) (0.00,0.00,0.12) (0,0.33,0,0,0) (0,1,0,0,0) 
R431 3 (0.00,0,00,0.25) (0,25,0.50,0.75) (0.00,0.00,0.19) (0,0.44,0,0,0) (0,1,0,0.0) 
R432 2 (0.00,0,00,0.25) (0.00,0.25,0.50) (0.00,0.00,0.12) (0,0.33,0,0,0) (0,1,0,0,0) 
R433 2 (0.00,0.00,0.25) (0.00,0.25,0.50) (0.00,0.00,0.12) (0,0.33,0.0,0) (0,1,0,0,0) 
R434 (0,00,0.00,0.25) (0.00,0.00,0.25) (0.00,0.00,0.02) (0,0.03,0,0.0) (0,1,0,0,0) 
R441 2 (0.25,0.50,0.75) (0.00,0.25,0.50) (0.00,0.06,0.25) (0,81.0.56,0,0,0) (0,59,0.41,0,0,0) 
R442 2 (0.00,0.25,0.50) (0.00,0.25,0.50) (0.00,0.06,0.25) (0,81,0.56,0,0,0) (0,59,0.41,0,0,0) 
R4S1 2 2 (0.00,0.25,0.50) (0.00,0,25,0.50) (0.00,0.06,0.25) (0.81,0.56.0.0,0) (0,59,0.41,0,0,0) 
R4S2 2 (0.00,0.25,0.50) (0.00,0.25,0.50) (0.00,0.06,0.25) (0,8I,O.~,O,O,0) (0,59,0.41,0,0,0) 
R453 2 (0.00,0.00,0.25) (0.00,0.25,0.50) (0.00,0.00,0.12) (0,0.33,0.0,0) (0,1,0,0,0) 
R454 2 (0.00,0.00,0.25) (0.00,0.25,0.50) (0.00,0.00,0.12) (0,0.33,0,0,0) (0,1,0,0,0) 
R461 (0.00,0.00,0.25) (0.00,0.00,0.25) (0.00,0.00,0.02) (0,0.03,0,0,0) (0,1,0,0.0) 
R462 2 2 (0.00,0.25,0.50) (0.00,0.25,0.50) (0.00,0.06,0.25) (0,81,0.56,0,0.0) (059.0.41.0,0,0) 
R463 2 (0.00,0.00,0.25) (0.00,0.25,0.50) (0.00,0.00,0.12) (0,0.33,0,0,0) (0,1,0,0,0) 
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The following grades are as a result of the final calculations made by using the method 
explained in Section 5.4 with the use of Equation 5.4. These results along with the 
relative weights which were determined in Chapter 4, are shown in Table 5.8 and will 
be fed into the IDS software for further aggregation in order to obtain the final result (i.e. 
to determine the ranking and overall risk levels of the ports). 
Table 5.8: Relative weights and belief degrees for three Iranian ports. 
Risk Weight H(Bushehr) H(Shahid RaJaie) H (Chabahar) 
R411 (0.0089) (0,42,0.45,0.13,0,0) (0,59,0.41,0,0,0) (0,1,0,0,0) 
R412 (0.0632) (0,42,0.45,0.13,0,0) (0.12,0.34,0.36,0.18,0) (0,1,0,0,0) 
R413 (0.0184) (0.29,0.47,0.24,0,0) (0,59,0.41,0,0,0) (0.12,0.34,0.36,0.18,0) 
R414 (0.0740) (0.12,0.34,0.36,0.18,0) (0,42,0.45,0.13,0,0) (0,1,0,0,0) 
R415 (0.0058) (0.29,0.47,0.24,0,0) (0,0.18,0.37,0.30,0.15) (0,1,0,0,0) 
R416 (0.0168) (0.12,0.34,0.36,0.18,0) (0,52,0,0.48,0,0) (0,1,0,0,0) 
R421 (0.1987) (0.50,0,0.50,0,0) (0.29,0.47,0.24,0,0) (0,1,0,0,0) 
R422 (0.0813) (0.09,0.48,0,0.43,0) (0.29,0.47,0.24,0,0) (0,59,0.41 ,0,0,0) 
R423 (0.0166) (0,52,0,0.48,0,0) (0.29,0.47,0.24,0,0) (0,1,0,0,0) 
R431 (0.0877) (0.29,0.47,0.24,0,0) (0.12,0.34,0.36,0.18,0) (0,1,0,0,0) 
R432 (0.0316) (0,42,0.45,0.13,0,0) (0.12,0.34,0.36,0.18,0) (0,1,0,0,0) 
R433 (0.0389) (0.29,0.47,0.24,0,0) (0,52,0,0.48,0,0) (0,1,0,0,0) 
R434 (0.0187) (0.12,0.34,0.36,0.18,0) (0,42,0.45,0.13,0,0) (0,1,0,0,0) 
R441 (0.0055) (0,52,0,0.48,0,0) (0.12,0.34,0.36,0.18,0) (0,59,0.41,0,0,0) 
R442 (0.0024) (0,42,0.45,0.13,0,0) (0.29,0.47,0.24,0,0) (0,59,0.41,0,0,0) 
R451 (0.1210) (0,42,0.45,0.13,0,0) (0,0.18,037,0.30,0.15) (0,59,0.41,0,0,0) 
R452 (0.0390) (0,42,0.45,0.13,0,0) (0.12,0.34,0.36,0.18,0) (0,59,0.41,0,0,0) 
R453 (0.0459) (0,42,0.45,0.13,0,0) (0,52,0,0.48,0,0) (0,1,0,0,0) 
R454 (0.0369) (0,42,0.45,0.13,0,0) (0,0.18,0.37,0.30,0.15) (0,1,0,0,0) 
R461 (0.0069) (0.29,0.47,0.24,0,0) (0,52,0,0.48,0,0) (0,1,0,0,0) 
R462 (0.0502) (0,52,0,0.48,0,0) (0,0.18,0.37,0.30,0.15) (0,59,0.41,0,0,0) 
R463 (0.0316) (0,0.18,0.37,0.30,0.15) (0.12,0.34,0.36,0.18,0) (0,1,0,0,0) 
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By using the infonnation gathered and feeding it into the IDS software, results and 
graphical displays were generated, depicted in Figures 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6. 
The average score of the operational risk factors obtained for the Port of Chabahar is 
0.7811. Therefore the Port of Chabahar with the highest average score will be the safest 
port among the three. After the Port of Chabahar, the Port of Bushehr stands second in 
ranking with an average score of 0.7433 and the Port of Shahid Rajaie stands in the 
third position with an average score of 0.6562. In terms of riskiness of the ports they 
can be ranked as follows: 
RShahtdRaJate > RBushehr> RChabahar; R = Riskiness of the ports. 
In order to prove the aforesaid capability of the IDS software reference can be made to 
the previous works ofYang and Xu (2002) and Wang and Elhag (2008). Yang and XU 
(2002) using the IDS software for comparison of the Kawazaki, BMW, Yamaha and 
Honda motorcycles have ranked them for their overall performance. For the purpose of 
comparison they have ranked them as per their average scores derived from the IDS. 
The one with the highest score stood first. In the same manner Wang and Elhag (2008) 
have used the IDS for condition assessment of three bridges. 
Moreover the following evaluation results are also derived out from the IDS for the Port 
of Shah id Rajaie. As can be seen in Figure 5.4 the belief degrees of the operational risk 
factors for the grades of medium, high and very high (i.e. the worse possible cases) have 
a higher percentage than those shown in Figure 5.5 for the Port of Bushehr and in 
Figure 5.6 for the Port of Chabahar. In this respect Bushehr is second and Chabahar, as 
can be seen from Figure 5.6, has got zero percentage for the grade of very high, a 
minimum percentage in comparison to the other two ports for its worst case. This 
comparison can provide evidence that the overall level of the operational risks in the 
Port of Chabahar is lower than the other two ports. 
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Figure 5.4: Evaluation results for Port of Shahid Rajaie. 
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Figure 5.5: Evaluation results for Port of Bushehr. 
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Ver Low Risk 
Comparison of the grades can be explained for these ports in respect of the very low, 
low and risk grades as well. As can be seen, again it is clearly illustrated that the 
percentage amount of the very low grade is comparably small for the Port of Shahid 
Rajaie and Port of Bushehr. This means the Port of Chabahar' s risk level is lower than 
the other two ports in respect of the belief degree of very low. In overall percentage of 
the very low, medium, high and very high risk grades, the Port of Chabahar is lower 
than the same grades in the other two ports. 
In another attempt the percentage scores for 22 individual operational risk factors which 
were calculated and separately derived out from the IDS software are plotted for the 
three Iranian ports in Figure 5.7. 
As an example in Figure 5.7 in places where it has been marked with black circles on 
the radar chart it can be seen that in the risk level (score) for the factor R451 , a risk 
related to the pilot' s errors is higher in Port of Shahid Rajaie with a score of 39 while 
the Port of Bushehr scores 82 and the Port of Chabahar scores of 90. As was explained 
before a higher score means that the related risk factor is safer. 
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In order to read the following chart it can be said that moving out from the centre 
reduces the risk while points closer to the centre are worse with lower scores. 
R411 
R453 ",,-~.u...---1 R416 --Bushehr 
--Shahid Rajaie 
R452 R421 
--Chabahar 
R433 
Figure 5.7: Percentage Scores of the operational risk factors for three Iranian Ports. 
5.7. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
There are several methodologies for validating knowledge-based systems but the most 
common are informal validation, validation by testing, field tests, subsystem validation 
and sensitivity analysis. Among these methods sensitivity analysis is a powerful 
technique in systems relying on uncertainty management (Gonzalez and Dankel, 1993). 
Axiom 1: A minor decline or increase of the belief degrees for the risk factors should 
result in a corresponding change of the output data (i.e. risk levels). 
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Figure 5.8: Depiction of Axioms 1. 
F or the Port of Chabahar in Axiom 1, if only the grade of Very Low for all the risk 
factors shown in Figure 5.8 is decreased by 20% and respectively this 20% is added to 
the opposite side of the grades (i.e. the grade of Very High) then this will cause a 
reduction for all of the risk factors as shown in Figure 5.8. 
Axiom 2: A minor decline or increase of the relative weights for the risk factors should 
result in a corresponding change of the output data. 
In order to check if the results obtained are in line with Axiom 2 it was decided to 
decrease only 10% of the FTNs of the experts' judgments just for one of the experts and 
only for one of the risk factors . As can be seen in Table 5.9 after reducing 10% for one 
of the experts' FTNs in the safety related risk factor and aggregating the changed FTNs 
again, the new results for the safety related risk factor will be obtained as shown in 
Table 5.9. 
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Table 5.9: Re-calculation of pair-wise comparison matrix of operational risk factors in 
Level 2 
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From Table 5.9, the new synthesis values in respect to the main goal were calculated 
again as per Equation 4.5 shown in Step 1 of the extent anaJysis (see Chapter 4) and are 
depicted as follows: 
SI=(5.511, 7.766, 10.668) ®(l/66.965, 1147.967, 1132.131) = (0.082,0.162,0.332), 
S2=(9.034, 14.07, 19.106) ®(1166.965, 1/47.967, 1/32.131)= (0.135,0.293,0.595), 
S3=(5.617, 7.867, 10.534) ®(1166.965, 1147.967, 1132.131) = (0.084,0.164,0.328), 
S4=(2.424, 3.011, 4.517) ®(1I66.965, 1/47.967, 1132.131) = (0.036,0.063,0.141), 
S5=(6.367, 10.57, 15.106) ®(1/66.965, 1/47.967, 1132.131) = (0.095,0.220,0.470), 
S6=(3.178, 4.683, 7.034) ®(1I66.965, 1147.967, 1132.131) = (0.047,0.098,0.219). 
These fuzzy synthesis values are compared with each other using Equation 4.17 (see 
Chapter 4) and the new values are obtained as follows: 
V(SI~S2)=O.601, V(Sl~S3)=O.992, V(Sl~S4)=1, V(Sl~S5)=0.803, V(Sl~S6)=1; 
V(S2~SI)=I, V(S2~S3)=1, V(S2~S4)=1, V(S2~S5)=1, V(S2~S6)=1~ 
V(S3~SI)=I, V(S3~S2)=0.599, V(S3~S4)=1, V(S3~S5)=O.806, V(S3~S6)=1; 
V(S4~SI)=O.373,V(S~S2)=O.025,V(S4~S3)=O.361,V(S4~S5)=0.227,V(S42:S6)=O.729 
V(S52:S1)=1, V(S5~S2)=0.821, V(S52:S3)=I, V(S52:S4)=1, V(S52:S6)=I; 
V(S6~SI)=O.681, V(S62:S2)=0.301, V(S62:S3)=O.672, V(S62:S4)=1, V(S6~S5)=O.504. 
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Then the priority weights are calculated using Equation 4.18 shown in Step 3 of the 
extent analysis (see Chapter 4) as follow: 
d'(CI)=min(0.601, 1,0.992, 1, 1)=0.601, 
d'(C2) = min (1, 1, 1, 1, 1) = 1, 
d'(C3) = min (1,0.599, 1,0.806, 1) = 0.599, 
d'(C4) = min (0.373,0.025,0.361,0.227,0.729) = 0.025, 
d'(CS)=min(1, 0.821, 1, 1, 1)=0.821, 
d'(C6) = min (0.681, 0.301, 0.672, 1,0.504) = 0.301. 
W' = (0.601,1,0.599,0.025,0.821,0.301) 
Collected priority weights are shown in vector W. Finally after normalisation of these 
values as per Equation 4.20 shown in Step 4 of the extent analysis (see Chapter 4), the 
priority weights in respect to the main goal will be calculated as follows for each 
criterion in Table 5.10: 
WNew= (10.179, jO.299, jO.179, jO.008, jO.245, jO.090) 
W01d = (0.186,0.297,0.178,0.007,0.243,0.089) ; i.e. Table 4.8 
As it is shown here, the new normalised weights ( WNew ) will be obtained as a result of 
10% decrease in one of the experts' TFNs in the first risk factor (i.e. safety related risk 
factor). While this decrease has resulted in a decline in the normalised weight of the first 
risk factor, it has also caused accordingly an increase of the normalised weights for the 
rest of the five risk factors in respect ofWold . All the new results are calculated and 
compared with the old results in Table 5.10. 
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Table 5.10: Re-calculated global weights for operational risk factors in Level 3 
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In respect of Axiom 2 all new and re-calculated relative weights (new input data) are 
fed into IDS software in order to see the new results. Following feeding the new relative 
weights, new average scores (new output data) for three Iranian ports are obtained as 
follows: 
The previous scores were 0.6562, 0.7433 and 0.7811 for the Ports of Shahid Rajaie, 
Bushehr and Chabahar respectively but the new results after changing the relative 
weights for the same ports are 0.6552, 0.7440 and 0.7817. To carry out this axiom it 
was decided to decrease only 10% of the FTNs of the experts' judgments just for one of 
the experts and only for one of the risk factors. Moreover as it is evident from Table 
5.10 the amount of change on the new global weights are very small. 'Therefore after 
feeding new global weights into the IDS software and aggregating them with experts' 
judgement on three nominated ports the amount of changes on the new results are small. 
Axiom 3: A minor decline or increment in the input data i.e. belief degrees for any 
individual risk factor, should result in a decrease or an increase in the overall average 
scores correspondingly. 
The gradual change (red line, line Chabahar 2)in Figure 5.9 on the overall score for the 
operational risk factors of the Port of Chabahar has been compared against its fIxed 
value score (i.e. 0.7811) derived previously from the IDS software. In this case the 
belief degrees for each one of the individual risk factors have been changed and after 
that the new overall scores for operational risk factors have been recorded. These 
processes have been repeated 22 times in order to complete the shown cycle of the red 
line. 'The change of the belief degrees can be of any type but for the case of the Port of 
Chabahar these changes are based on the same changes which were explained in Axiom 
1. As it can be seen from Figure 5.9 the most significant change is for the risk factor 
R.21 that is, people's safety in the Port of Chabahar which itself is the subset of the 
security risk factor in level 3 as shown in Appendix Ill, Figure III.I. 
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Figures 5.9: Effect of the changes in the input data on overall scores for the Port of 
Chabahar in order to fulfil Axiom 3. 
5.8. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
After implementing the risk-based model in a real case of port-to-port comparison with 
the use of IDS software it was possible to check sensitivity of the model by applying 
minor changes. Apart from overall changes evidenced on the output data as a result of 
changes from the input side Figure 5.9 also depicts when final analysis was carried out 
on all risk factors. The amount of change on ~2 1 i.e. safety of people in offshore 
terminals and marine ports was found to be the most significant one. 
At any time people working in offshore terminals and marine ports or passengers can 
become potential targets for terrorists. Terrorism is almost certainly a form of attack that 
most people fear. Furthermore, terrorists often have much greater destructive ability 
than other malicious groups do, thus giving them the potential especially to cause a lot 
of harm to people and endanger their safety. Ports' and offshore terminals ' 
infrastructures (e.g. a passenger quay/terminal, a petrochemical port or an offshore LNG 
FPSO having alongside an LNG gas carrier) are types of targets for terrorists to attack. 
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Although the possibility of such attacks could be less in more advanced and secure 
offshore terminals or marine ports, if they occur their impacts would be catastrophic. 
This in fact can put even a whole country in a crisis situation. The terrorist attack on 
New York City on 11th of September, 2001 was an example of this type of possible 
occurrence (i.e. Rm) that can be referred to. In that incident although the main targets 
were the twin towers of the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon building, many 
people directly (passengers and people working inside the twin towers and the pentagon 
building) or indirectly (fire men and emergency units) lost their lives in a short period of 
time as a result and put the whole US in a crisis situation. 
Additionally the advantage of the proposed ER based methodology in this chapter is to 
enable aggregation of both qualitative and quantitative gathered data with diverse 
natures into a single structure. That is combining the previously calculated relative 
weights of the risk factors through the F AHP method with the newly collected belief 
degrees through expert judgement. The ER can also handle and illustrate data with 
uncertainties, for which their distributions are vague. Furthermore it has the capability 
to update estimates based on the recently received information. The ER based 
methodology is structured in such a way that new data can be managed at any phase and 
in any shape. It is a simple configurable programme for computer applications therefore 
it could be used as a risk evaluation technique for the purpose of offshore terminals and 
marine ports. 
5.9. CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter three categories of tasks have been fulfilled in connection to each other 
in order to complete the risk evaluation process. Obviously this phase is one of the main 
parts of the RM framework in respect of offshore terminals and marine ports. 
In the ftrst part of this chapter after introducing the FST, its application on the different 
areas specially on engineering and management topics was investigated. It was 
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employed for handling of the risk levels by the use of risk parameters under fuzzy 
environments. 
In the second part in order to aggregate the relative weights calculated via a F AHP 
method in the previous chapter with the new evaluation results while using FST, an ER 
approach was found to be the most useful. A brief summary of its application in the 
other area of the works was investigated. Moreover reasons of using belief degrees and 
D-S theory were explained to solve the fuzzy rule-based theory. A methodology 
incorporating the ER algorithm based on Yang (2002) was explained and used for the 
purpose of this chapter. 
Finally, the third part of this chapter proved the applicability and sensitivity of the 
proposed model. To perfonn this while using a case study on three Iranian ports, with 
the use of the FST and ER approach, the IDS software was used to perform the 
sensitivity analysis. In fact the same approach and methodology can be applied on 
offshore terminals to investigate the level of their riskiness or to see which one is more 
reliable and safer when comparing them with each other. Finally operational risk factors 
were examined in respect of the mentioned three Iranian ports to check the sensitivity of 
the proposed risk-based model to any change. 
In Chapter 4 a generic risk-based model was developed; all the risk factors were 
prioritised and ranked. Then in Chapter 5 the same risk-based model was used along 
with the IDS software for port-to-port risk-based evaluation purposes. In the next 
chapter with the use of the Cause and Consequence Analysis the most significant risk 
factors (i.e. significant hazards identified from the previous chapter) will be investigated 
in more detaiL The complementary chapter i.e. Chapter 6 will attempt to complete the 
risk assessment phase of the proposed RM framework for the purpose of offshore 
terminals and marine ports. 
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CHAPTER 6: CAUSE AND CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapters all the risk factors identified via a risk-based hierarchy model 
were assessed, prioritised and ranked. Then the same model was implemented on the 
real cases for port-to-port evaluation purposes. At the same time the model was tested 
by the use of sensitivity analysis in order to confirm that the developed model was an 
appropriate one. The most significant hazards can be investigated more in depth for 
their causes and effects in this chapter. There has been growing public and private 
sector concern regarding the threat of the risks associated with the different industry 
sectors (e.g. offshore terminals and marine ports) to people, assets and the environment. 
The investigation of almost all the major accidents and various losses in terms of delays 
and costs shows that those tragedies could have been avoided with effective RM 
programmes (Wang, 2004). Therefore a high quality RM or at least a high quality risk 
analysis is necessary for sustainable development. 
6.2. RISK ANALYSIS 
Risk analysis contains the expansion of an overall assessment of any risk factor by 
collecting and putting together information about scenarios, probabilities and 
consequences, and it is a major part of the whole RM process of a particular activity. In 
the process of risk analysis, both qualitative and quantitative techniques can be used. A 
simple process of risk analysis is shown in Figure 6.1 (Krishna et 01.,2003). 
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Figure 6.1: The process of risk analysis 
Source: Based on Krishna et aI, (2003) 
With the rapid development of industrialisation, the risk .of incidents is increasing. 
Additionally it has become increasingly recognised that there is an extensive tendency 
for losses due to accidents to rise even more rapidly than gross national product (Lees, 
1996). 
However no course in RM would be complete without the inclusion of a major 
component on risk analysis. As Dickson (2003) expresses risk analysis acts as a kind of 
hub, around which many other practical aspects ofRM rotate. Various stages of the risk 
analysis are shown in Figure 6.2. 
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Figure 6.2: Various Stages of Risk Analysis 
Source: Based on Dickson (2003-) 
Furthermore Dickson explains that every risk is caused by some factor or factors and 
results in some effect or effects. It can be viewed rather like a chain. The cause is linked 
to the nature of the risk and the risk itself is linked to the effect. 
A variety of techniques have been used for risk analysis including Physical Inspections, 
Organisational Charts, Flow Charts, Safety Review, Checklist Analysis, Relative 
Ranking, "What-if' Analysis, Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA), Hazard and 
Operability Study (HAZOP), Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Fault Tree 
Analysis (FTA). Event Tree Analysis (ETA), Cause-Consequence Analysis (CCA), 
Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) (CCPS, 1992; Lees, 1996; Dickson, 2003 and ABS, 
2003). These techniques have all been developed in an industrial setting, normally in 
response to some practical business problems (Dickson, 2003). 
Moreover a risk manager is not without practical support when starting the assignment 
of risk analysis. A risk manager can call on an armowy of methods designed to aid the 
assignment. It is improbable that one method will resolve all problems or indeed that 
one method alone is appropriate for all industry types. There is a range of techniques 
and methods, some of which are quantitative in nature and some qualitative, on which a 
risk manager can call (Dickson, 2003). 
On the base of the Dickson's perception and for the purpose of risk analysis theme in 
this chapter it has been preferred to launch the Bow-tie method i.e. Cause and 
Consequence Analysis (CCA) analysis as per subsequent description and literatures. 
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6.2.1. Bow-tie analysis 
Bow-tie is a modem, fast and easy to use device that allows making bow-tie diagrams. 
Bow-tie applies the modem concepts in RM to the broadly known and proven bow-tie 
methodology. Moreover the bow-tie illustration provides a dominant graphical 
representation of the risk assessment process which is easily understood even by the 
'non-specialist'. A bow-tie framework has been proposed to integrate broad groups of 
cause-consequence models (Visser, 1998). The traditional fault tree and event tree 
models are "bow-tied" and the fault tree's "top event" is connecting with the event 
tree's "initiating event". The bow-tie will be regarded as a "lens" for focusing on causes 
of an event and "projecting" that onto the space of the event's consequences. The 
consequences will eventually be attributed into decision problems for the purpose of 
RM. The bow-tie' s consequence side can make an interface with the decision models, 
ultimately decisions taken will be reflected back towards the causes (Groeneweg, 1998). 
Bow-tie framework not only has_proven a valuable conception in mishap prediction, but 
also has demonstrated its importance in analysing the past accidents and signifying 
improvements to avoid further re-occurrence of undesired events (Bellamy et aI, 2007). 
In particular it has proved to provide a suitable level of simplification of the causal 
factors in order to be able to summarise large quantities of data into a relatively small 
number of common scenarios, which can cover the majority of the accidents. In an 
accident scenario, the link between an accident and all its possible causes can be 
represented in the form of a fault tree (HSE, 2010). In the same time, the relationship 
between an accident and its possible multiple consequences can be represented by 
means of an event tree. Fault and event trees can be integrated in the fonn of a bow-tie 
diagram where the centre event represents "the release of a hazardous agent" as 
presented in Figure 5.3. This framework is particularly useful for analysing accidents, as 
their causes and consequences remain linked together. Moreover, it provides the user 
with a simplified classification framework where the usually varied infonnation 
available in incident reports can be consistently stored and summarised according to a 
fixed common criteria. 
A number of research groups have used the bow-tie framework to manage the 
occupational risks by developing a risk assessment model and software tools (DNV, 
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2001 and RIVM, 2008). Indeed the bow-tie technique is a tool that has together 
proactive and reactive components and methodically works through the hazard and its 
management. It uses a methodology known as the Hazards and Effects Management 
Process (Edwards, 1999; Zuijderduijn, 1999; Blom, Everdij and Daams 1999). Based on 
TSO (2006) the bow-tie technique is used to show how efficient a marine facility's 
safety management system is performing and also to complete gap analyses. The bow-
tie framework can be used to demonstrate how the pertinent safety management system 
element requirements are met with respect to the control and management of hazards 
and risk factors (Groeneweg, 1998; Cockshott, 2005; ABS, 2007; Bellamy et aI, 2007; 
Trbojevic, 2010 and HSE, 2010). 
Figure 6.3: A bow-tie diagram 
Source: Modified from Storybuilder manual (2008) 
DNV (2001) in its offshore technology report and as a part of its marine risk assessment 
methods has introduced the bow-tie as a semi-quantitative analyse tool. RIVM (2008) 
national institute for public health and the environment in Netherland for development 
of a risk assessment model and software has used the bow-tie model for managing the 
occupational risks. In other efforts ABS (2007) has introduced the bow-tie as a solution 
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for management of risk especially when dealing with the five default hazard categories: 
Safety, Health, Environment, Business and Security. 
In respect of offshore tenninals and marine ports and with an approach for developing 
Integrated Safety Management System (ISMS) for managing navigation and other 
marine operations DETR (2000) has proposed the same methodology of the bow-tie 
analysis. The methodology requires that all risk factors are identified and evaluated, that 
suitable controls and barriers are in place to manage these risk factors, and that the 
linkage between risk controls, operating procedures, harbour by-laws, and the 
management activities is explicitly established. This methodology has been applied to a 
number of marine ports in the UK in compliance with the Port Marine Safety Code 
(PMSC) requirement (Trbojevic, 2010). 
In introducing bow-tie analysis as a transport RM tool Cockshott (2005) explains that 
the "bow-tie" technique is a productive RM means, providing a graphic illustration of 
the link between hazards, basic events, controls and effects. It is easily understood by 
management, engineers, Occupational Health, Safety and Environmental (OHSE) 
professionals, process operators and maintenance personnel involved in RM. Rapid risk 
ranking methods are frequently used to evaluate the risk factors of simple cause-
consequence pairs and are straightforward in application. 
For the purpose of this research risk factors associated in sea ports and offshore 
tenninals were identified in Chapter 2 and their mitigation will be discussed fully in the 
next chapter. This chapter will only evaluate the most significant risk factors with the 
use of the bow-tie methodology utilizing both FT A and ETA methods. 
6.2.2. FTA 
FT A was first introduced in 1961 and has long been adapted for many applications such 
as in nuclear, rail, oil and gas industries and especially in the process industry (i.e. 
onshore and offshore sectors). In addition it is used to predict the probability of the 
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hazardous incidents in order to identify the most significant risk contributors. Moreover 
a fault tree is a logic and graphical representation that explores the interrelationships 
between a potential critical event in a system and the reasons for this event (Hoyland 
and Rausand, 1994). A typical fault tree consists of the top event, the basic events, and 
the logic gates. Figure 6.4 illustrates the key fault tree analysis symbols. There are two 
important types of events i.e. top event and basic event. The top event represents an 
undesirable state of the system and the basic event represents the state of the systems 
component. FT A uses logic gates to describe the relationships between the basic events 
and the top event. The AND logic gate denotes that the output is in a failure state, if all 
the inputs are in failure state. The OR logic gate denotes that the output is in failure 
state, if at least one of the inputs is in failure state. An intermediate event represents an 
intermediate state of the system that is related directly or indirectly to the top event with 
a logic gate (Dokas et ai, 2009). 
Figure 6.4: Standard fault tree symbols 
Source: Based on Wang (2004) 
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6.2.2.1. Fuzzy FTA 
The conventional FT A has been used broadly, however, it is often very difficult to 
assess the precise failure rates or failure probabilities of individual components or 
failure events. This happens particularly in systems like nuclear power plants where 
available data are insufficient for statistical inferences or the data show a large variation 
(Jakson et aI, 1981). To overcome these difficulties the use of FST (as a part of 
possibility theory) (Liang and Wang, 1993; Singer, 1990) is being considered to 
overcome the difficulties of probability theory. Possibility theory is a mathematical 
theory for dealing with certain types of uncertainty and is an alternative to probability 
theory. Zadeh first introduced possibility theory in 1978 as an extension of his FST (see 
Chapter 4). 
In this respect the failure possibility defmed by a triangular fuzzy number on the 
interval [0,1] is used to characterise the possible deviation of the basic events. Therefore 
the concept of the failure possibility is applied to replace failure rate or failure 
probability in fault tree analysis (Liang and Wang, 1993). In this study the same will be 
used hereafter and the failure possibilities are considered as triangular fuzzy sets to 
incorporate the uncertainties in the parameters. 
In normal cases where there are sufficient data and considering the fact that the 
probability of the events are only relative frequencies of their occurrences (Andrews and 
Moss, 2002; Henley and Kumamoto, 1981) for an AND gate event, its probability can 
be obtained by the Equation 6.1 . 
• 
P(AND) = IT Pi (6.1) 
;=1 
where P is the probability of top event; Pi denotes the failure probability of the basic 
event i and n is the number of basic events associated with the AND gate. For an OR 
gate event, its probability is determined by Equation 6.2 . 
• 
PeOR) = 1- IT (1- Pi) (6.2) 
i=1 
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Furthermore there is also a gate called NEG gate in which its probability is equivalent to 
I-Pi (Cheong and Lan, 2004). 
Due to the scarcity of the hazard events and insufficient data as explained before it is 
realistic to use fuzzy FT A instead of its traditional version. The fuzzy fonn of "AND" 
and "OR" operations functions can be obtained in Equation 6.3 and Equation 6.4 as 
follows (Cheong and Lan, 2004): 
• 
P(AND)= IT Pi (6.3) 
;=1 
• 
PeOR) = i e IT (1 e Pt); i = (1,1,1) (6.4) 
;=1 
where e is a symbol of subtraction in this thesis under fuzzy environments where basic 
operation for subtraction i.e. e can be defined as follows (Yang and Hung, 2007): 
(6.5) 
6.2.3. ETA 
In risk analysis, the event tree analysis has been used to identify and quantify frequency 
of outcomes of an initiating event. In addition it is successively used in pre-incident 
applications, to examine the incident precursors and post-incident application, and to 
identify the potential outcome events for an accidental event (CMPT, 1999; AlChE, 
2000; ABS, 2000; Lees, 2005 and Ferdos, 2009). Qualitative analysis in an event tree 
identifies the potential outcome events of an initiating event, whereas quantitative 
analysis estimates the outcome event probability or frequency (likelihood) for the tree. 
Traditionally, quantitative analysis of an event tree uses crisp probabilities of events to 
estimate the outcome event probability or frequency. As explained by ABS (2000) and 
Ferdous (2009) in conventional event tree analysis, the branch probabilities have been 
treated as exact values. This provides a quick analysis and it uses crisp probabilities in 
each branch or path of the event tree. Figure 6.5 illustrates a sample of a conventional 
event tree and the outcome event frequencies, which are crisp numbers. 
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Figure 6.5: Sample of a conventional event tree 
Source: Based on ABS (2000) and Ferdos (2009) 
As it is shown Pn denotes the SuccesslY esfTrue probability of the nth event whereas the 
(1- Pn ) denotes the FailurelNolFalse probability of the nth event within the same column. 
Sn is also the calculated outcome event frequency for the nth outcome event within the 
depicted event tree. ABS (2000) explains that this type of analysis can provide (1) 
qualitative descriptions of potential problems (combinations of events producing 
various types of problems from initiating events) and (2) quantitative estimates of event 
frequencies or likelihoods, which assist in demonstrating the relative importance of 
various failure sequences. 
6.2.3.1. Fuzzy ETA 
In practice, it is difficult and costly to obtain exact values of event probability because 
in a most of cases these estimates are the result of an expert's inadequate knowledge, 
incomplete information, poor quality data or unsatisfactory analysis of a failure 
mechanism. These unavoidable problems impart uncertainties in the ETA and make the 
entire risk analysis process less credible for decision making (Ferdous et ai, 2009). To 
explain uncertainties in input data (i.e. event frequency) and spread them throughout 
ETA, as an substitute to objective data, experts' judgments are utilised, particularly 
when the data gathering is either difficult or very costly (Rosqvist, 2003). On the other 
hand as the experts' judgments are in the form of qualitative expressions they may 
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suffer from inconsistency if lack of harmony between various experts arises. The 
traditional probabilistic framework is not very useful in dealing with unclear, 
incomplete and inconsistent concepts (Druschel et ai, 2006). Abrahamsson (2002), 
Thacker and Huyse (2003) and Wilcox and Ayyub (2003) have discussed the techniques 
to handle uncertainties during experts' judgments and to interpret them for the pmpose 
of conducting risk analysis. In this regard as was explained in the previous chapters FST 
has proven effective and efficient in handling these types of uncertainties (Cheng, 2000; 
Sentz and Ferson, 2002; Wilcox and Ayyub, 2003; Bae et ai, 2004; Agarwal et ai, 2004; 
Ayyub and Klir, 2006). Based on the previous explanation the revised event tree with 
fuzzy parameters is illustrated in Figure 6.6. Therefore under fuzzy environments Pn 
denotes the Success/True/Y es possibility of the nth event whereas(1 e Pn ) denotes the 
FailurelFalselNo possibility of the nth event within the same column. Furthermore Sn is 
also the defuzzified outcome event's occurrence possibility scores (Le. occurrence 
likelihood) for the nth outcome event within the nominated event tree. 
Figure 6.6: Sample of a fuzzy event tree 
Source: Based on Huang (2001) and Ferdos et ai, (2009) 
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6.3. METHODOLOGY FOR APPLICATION OF THE FTA AND ETA UNDER 
FUZZY ENVIRONMENTS. 
As Andrew and Ridley (2002) have explained a cause and consequence analysis as 
shown in Figure 6.3 is based on the occurrence of critical event, which for example may 
be an event, involving the failure of components or subsystems that is likely to produce 
hazardous effects. Once a critical event has been identified, all relevant and potential 
causes of it and its potential effects are developed using two conventional reliability 
analysis methods (i.e. FT A and ETA). FT A is used to describe the causes of an 
undesired event. ET A shows the consequences that a critical event may lead to if one or 
more protection systems do not function as designed. 
In this chapter with the use of the CCA (i.e. bow-tie method) and FST, failure 
possibilities for any of top events and also occurrence likelihoods for consequences of 
the basic events for three most significant operational risk factors found in Chapter 4 
will be analysed. These three risk factors will be evaluated and analysed with the use of 
three independent case studies. This will help to examine the introduced risk analysis 
tool (i.e. bow-tie method) for the purpose ofRM in offshore terminals and marine ports. 
Figure 6.7 illustrates a generic risk analyse model integrated into a RM framework for 
the purpose of this thesis. 
FST, experts' judgements, converting linguistic terms to fuzzy numbers and 
defuzzification processes will be used to obtain the possibilities of the basic events as 
well as failure possibility of the top event hereafter. As in this chapter TFNs will be 
employed, further explanations relating to TFNs can be found in Chapter 4. Additional 
information and steps required for the assessment of the risk factors by the use of CCA 
and FST in the form ofFFTA and FETA can be explained as follows: 
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Risk Assessment 
Risk Assessment Model 
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Bow-tie Method 
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Figure 6.7: A generic risk analyse model 
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Reactive RM 
Corrective action 
Proactive RM 1---...... 
Preventive action 
6.3.1. Procedure for carrying out a FFTA 
Steps for carrying out a FFT A in this chapter are summarised as follows: 
Step 1: Select a top event (i.e. a risk factor) and build a logic fault tree diagram for it. 
Step 2: Divide the basic events of any fault tree logic diagram into probability analysis 
of the known events and possibility analysis (subjective linguistic evaluations) of 
unknown or vague events. 
If all of the events are unknown a subjective linguistic evaluation as explained in Steps 
3 and 4 should be carried out in the form of a possibility analysis in order to obtain the 
failure possibilities for basic events and eventually for top event under fuzzy 
environments. If all of the events are unknown they will be evaluated by the use of the 
fuzzy fault tree concept i.e. possibility analysis/approach (see Case Studies I and 2). 
Conversely if all the events are known, they will be evaluated by the use of the 
conventional or traditional ITA method i.e. probability analysis (see Case Study 3). 
Nevertheless if some of them are known and the remainder are unknown they will be 
evaluated by an approach using combining both the possibility and probability concept 
(see Case Study 4) explained in Steps 5 and 6 respectively. 
Step 3: Conduct the linguistic assessments for vague events. 
Subjective linguistic variables will be further defmed in tenns of membership functions. 
As previously explained a membership function is a curve that defines how each point 
in the input space is mapped to a membership value between 0 and 1. Furthermore it 
was explained that of these membership functions, the simplest are the triangular fuzzy 
number and trapezoidal fuzzy number (Li and Liao, 2007). TFNs in this chapter are 
preferred to be used to represent the linguistic variables shown in Table 4.3 and Figure 
4.9 (Yang and Hung, 2007) respectively (see Chapter 4). 
169 
Step 4: Transform linguistic expressions into fuzzy numbers and aggregate the experts' 
opinions into one fuzzy number. 
For this purpose as Clemen and Winkler (1999) explained due to different opinions of 
possibility of the basic events, it is necessary to combine or aggregate the opinions into 
a single one. There are many methods to aggregate fuzzy numbers; an appealing 
approach is the following one (see Chapter 4): 
If 
Mi=L l1j Aij j=l, 2, ... , n (6.6) 
i=! 
where Aij is the linguistic expression of a basic event i given by expert}. m is the 
number of basic events. n is the number of the experts. l1j is a weighting factor of the 
expert} and Mi represents combined fuzzy number of the basic event i. 
Based on the principle of FST explained in Chapter 4 for addition of the TFNs (Yang 
and Hung, 2007). Mi is also a triangular fuzzy number. These calculations will be 
demonstrated in Case Studies I and 2. 
Step 5: If all the basic events are unknown convert fuzzy numbers into the Fuzzy 
Possibility Scores (FPSs). If some of the basic events are known and the others are 
unknown then convert fuzzy numbers of the failure possibilities i.e. FPSs for the vague 
events into their Fuzzy Failure Probabilities (FFPs) using Equation 6.7 (Onisawa and 
Nishiwaki, 1988). 
FFP = {l~kJFPS =1= 0 
OJ FPS = 0 
1 
K = [(l-FPS)]'3 x 231 
, FPS . (6.7) 
When fuzzy ratings are integrated into a FT A problem, the concluded ratings will also 
become fuzzy numbers. With the purpose of verifying the relationship among them, 
fuzzy numbers must be converted to crisp scores, named as Fuzzy Possibility Score 
(FPS) (Yuhua and Dataob, 2005). As fuzzy numbers in this chapter are TFNs, the centre 
of area defuzzification techniques are selected to be used. As Zhao and Govind (1991) 
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explain defuzzification is the process of producing a quantifiable result in fuzzy logic. 
For this purpose three fuzzy parameters will be added together; by dividing their total 
by three their average or centre of gravity will be found (i.e. defuzzification). 
Step 6: Convert the available failure probabilities (crisp values) of the real data into 
Fuzzy Failure Probabilities (FFPs) using Table 6.1 (Lind, 1983; Miller and Swain, 
1987). 
Table 6.1: Guide line for Lower and Upper Bound of the Estimated Failure Rate. 
Source: Based on Lind (1983) and Miller and Swain (1987) 
Step 7: If all the basic events are known obtain the failure probability of the top event 
using Equations 6.1 and/or 6.2. Conversely if all the basic events are unknown obtain 
the failure possibility of the top event by integrating FPSs of the vague basic events 
using Equations 6.3 and/or 6.4. However if some of the basic events are known and the 
others are unknown then obtain the final FFP for the top event by integrating FFPs 
obtained through Steps 5 and 6 using Equations 6.3 and/or 6.4. In order to defuzzify 
FFP of the top event three fuzzy parameters will be added together and then will be 
divided by three to find the centre of their gravity i.e. defuzzification (transforming the 
fuzzy number to crisp value) (Tuhua and Dataob, 2005; Zhao and Govind, 1991). 
Step 8: Analyse and interpret the results. 
In fuzzy fault tree applications many researchers have used different data (whether 
researchers have used entirely unknown data or they have used mixture of the known 
and unknown data) in order to obtain failure rate of a top event. In this chapter by 
carrying out 2 illustrated experiments that are shown in Case Studies 1 and 2 the fmal 
results will be analysed under fuzzy environments. In the shown experiments by 
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elimination of each basic event their importance and effects on the possibility failure of 
the top event will be investigated. 
6.3.2. Procedure for carrying out a FETA 
The following sub-sections describe the steps to analyse an event tree using FST. In the 
proposed approach, the subjective judgment of event possibility is assumed linguistic 
and described using TFNs. The fuzzy possibility of an initiating event is then used to 
estimate the outcome events' possibilities that are also estimated as fuzzy numbers. The 
fuzzy based approach used for ETA comprises the following five steps: 
Step I: For an initiating event, the set of potential consequence and no consequence 
states must be defined to construct an event tree logic diagram. 
Step 2: Defme initiating event's frequency (see Steps 2,3 and 4 of the FFTA). 
Step 3: Determine each of the outcome events' frequency independently (i.e. their 
probability if data are known or their possibility in the form of TFNs and FPSs if data 
are entirely or partially unknown) for all the tree paths by using the procedures shown in 
Figure 6.6 and Step 4 of the FFTA. 
Step 4: If frequencies are entirely or partially unknown defuzzify the outcome events' 
possibilities (i.e. FPSs) to obtain a crisp values for event tree consequences. 
Step 5: Analyse and interpret the results. 
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6.4. PRACTICAL EXAMPLES 
Due to the scarcity of data FFT A and FETA in Case Study 1 will be applied on one of 
the most significant risk factors which were previously identified through the 
prioritisation process in Chapter 4. The other risk factor in Case Study 2 is an 
illustrative one and is only used to show the applicability of the proposed combination 
approach under fuzzy environments. 
6.4.1. Case Study 1 
This case study relates to the risk factor ~Sl (pilot's related errors) identified through 
the HAZID process in the literature review (see Chapter 2). The top event is "pilot's 
related errors", which for example can be initiated by channel, canal, harbour and/or 
local offshore-based pilots giving 'an inappropriate command'. This may happen when 
a tanker ship is navigating inside a narrow channel or a canal. In another instance the 
same situation can happen during tandem operations for a Shuttle Tanker or a LNG 
Tanker while approaching offshore tenninals in oil and gas fields whether the tenninals 
are fixed or floating e.g. FPSO units. As a result consequences of the "pilof s related 
errors" can be grounding, collision (with other ships, jetties in ports and structures or 
installations of offshore tenninals), fire, explosion, spillage, loss of life, etc (Trbojevic 
and Carr, 2000 and NE P&l Club, 2008). There are many consequences as a result of 
the pilof s related errors but the major consequences of -pilotage errors are shown in 
Figure 6.15 (Trbojevic and Carr, 2000). 
As Trbojevic and Carr explain during a pilotage if a hazard is released, the accidental 
event can escalate to one of several possible consequences. Furthermore they explain 
that in the analysis of marine or engineering operations (Trbojevic et ai, 1994) the fault 
and event trees describe not only mechanical failures, but also operators' (human) front 
line and recovery errors. 
As per investigations carried out by Trbojevic and Carr (2000) the major causes of 
pilotage error in the fonn of different basic events are shown in Table 6.2. 
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Table 6.2 : Potential basic events which can cause the top event or risk factor Of~5 1. 
Source: Based on Trbojevic and Carr (2000) 
Figure 6.8 is fault tree diagram of the risk factor ~5 1. 
Figure 6.8: Fault tree diagram for top event of "Pilot' s Related Errors" along with basic 
events. 
Due to the scarcity of data and the fact that all the basic events are vague and in order to 
evaluate the risk factor i.e. ~5 1 it has been decided to carry out the evaluation using the 
experts' judgements. To carry out experts' judgements in this chapter, three experts 
have been selected to carry out the judgement process. 
After collecting the experts' opinions through the evaluation sheet shown in Appendix 
IV by use of Equations 4.2, 4.3 and 6.6 the following calculations are carried out in 
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order to determine the FPSs for the basic events listed in Table 6.2 and shown in Figure 
6.8. Table 5.l and Figure 5.1 are used for carrying out the estimations: 
BE1=W1 ® L ffi W2®VLffi W3® L=(0.00,O.l7,0.42) 
BE2= W1 ® M E& W2 ® L E& W3 ® M = (0.17,0.42, 0.67) 
BE3= W1 ® L E& W2 ® L E& W3 ® L = (0.00,0.25,0.50) 
BE4= WJ ® L ffi W2 ® L ffi W3 ® M = (0.08, 0.33, 0.58) 
BEs= W 1 ® M ffi W 2 ® L ffi W 3 ® L = (0.08, 0..33, 0.58) 
BE6=WJ®L E& W2 ®L E& W3® L=(O.00,O.25,0.50) 
BE7= WJ ® L ffi W2® L ffi W3® L = (0.00, 0.25, 0.50) 
BE8=WJ®VLffi W2®VLffi W3®VL=(0.00, 0.00, 0.25) 
The calculated Fuzzy Possibility Scores (FP Ss) are depicted in Table 6.3. 
Table 6.3: Fuzzy Possibility Scores (FPSs) 
Basic Event Number FPSs 
1 (0.00,0.17,0.42) 
2 (0.17, 0.42, 0.67) 
3 (0.00, 0.25,0.50) 
4 (0.08, 0.33, 0.58) 
5 (0.08, 0.33, 0.58) 
6 (0.00, 0.25,0.50) 
7 (0.00, 0.25, 0.50) 
8 (0.00, 0.00, 0.25) 
Now the occurrence possibility of the top event (i.e. pilot's related errors) will be 
calculated by the use of the fuzzy fault three analysis using Equation 6.4 as follows: 
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• 
P(OR) = I 8 IT (1 8 Pi); 1=(1,1,1) 
i=1 
PTE(R45l) = 1 8 [(1 8 PBEl ) ® (1 e PBEZ ) ® (1 e PBE3 ) ® (1 e PBE4) ® (1 e PBES ) 
® (i e PBE6 ) ® (1 e PBE7 ) ® (1 e PBES )] = (0.297, 0.955, 0.997) 
In the previous step the defuzzified occurrence possibility of the top event was 0.750. 
Now by elimination of each basic event the new defuzzified failure possibility numbers 
will be obtained respectively as shown in Table 6.4. Subsequently the amount of each 
deviation i.e. ( PTE(R451) e PTEi ) has been recorded in the deviation index column in 
Table 6.4. A basic event with a higher deviation index will reduce the failure possibility 
of the top event (Rm) more. As it is shown in Table 6.4 basic event number 2 (i.e. BE2) 
has the highest deviation index value. 
Table 6.4: Importance of elimination of each basic event in occurrence possibility of 
the top event. 
Elimination Possibility Approach 
or Basic Fuzzy number Failure Deviation 
Events I m u possibility index Ranking 
BEl 0.297 0.946 0.995 0.746 0.004 4 
BE2 0.154 0.922 0.991 0.689 0.061 I 
BE3 0.297 0.940 0.994 0.744 0.006 3 
BE4 0.236 0.933 0.993 0.721 0.029 2 
BEs 0.236 0.933 0.993 0.721 0.029 2 
BE6 0.297 0.940 0.994 0.747 0.003 5 
BE7 0.297 0.940 0.994 0.747 0.003 5 
BEs 0.297 0.955 0.996 0.749 0.001 6 
Figure 6.9 illustrates the sensitivity analysis carried out for the top event or risk factor 
~sJ, based on the results shown in Table 6.4. It shows how the occurrence possibility 
for the top event is reduced by elimination of each basic event. 
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Figure 6.9: Sensitivity analysis of the top event or risk factor ofRm 
Figure 6.1 0 illustrates the event tree analysis of the RtSI (Pilot's related errors) along 
with linguistic fuzzy variables after aggregation of the experts' judgements as described 
before. 
Figure 6.10: Event tree analysis for risk factor RtSI 
Source: Consequences are based on Trbojevic and Carr (2000) 
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In order to evaluate the consequences of the risk factor Rts I it has been decided to carry 
out the evaluation using the experts' judgements. The same experts used in previous 
section have been asked for the evaluation purposes here. Experts' opinions are 
collected through the evaluation sheet shown in Appendix N. Table 5.1 and Figure 5.1 
are used for carrying out the estimations: 
P1 = Wl ® L+W2 ® M+W3 ® L = (0.08, 0.33, 0.58); SI = 0.330 defuzzified value 
(I e i\)®P21 ®P321 == (0.42,0.67,0.92) ® (Wl ®MffiW2®LffiW3®L) ® 
(Wl ®VLffiW2®HffiW3®H) =(0.42,0.67,0.92) ® (0.08,0.33,0.58) ® 
(0.58,0.83, 1.00) = (0.006, 0.061, 0.534); S2 = 0.200 defuzzified value 
(I e i\) ® P21 ® (1 e P321 ) = (0.42,0.67,0.92) ® (0.08,0.33,0.58) ® 
(0.00, Q17, 0.42) == (0.00, 0.037, 0.224); S3 = 0.087 defuzzified value 
c1ep1) ®P22®P322 ==(0.42,0.67, 0.92) ® (Wl®LffiW2®LEaW3®L) ® 
(WI ® VH Ea W2 ® H ED W3 ® VH) = (0.42, 0.67,0.92) ® (0.00, 0.25, 0.50) ® 
(0.67,0.92, 1.00) = (0.00, 0.154, 0.46); S4 = 0.205 defuzzified value 
(1 8 P1 ) ® P22 ® (i e P322) = (0.42, 0.67, 0.92) ® (0.00, 0.25, 0.50) ® 
(0.00,0.08,0.33) = (0.00, 0.013, 0.152); Ss = 0.055 defuzzified value 
Cl e 151 ) ®P23 = (0.42, 0.67, 0.92) ® (Wl ®VLEaW2®VLEDW3®VL) = 
(0.42,0.67,0.92) ® (0.00,0.00,0.25) = (0.00, 0.00,0.23); 
S6 = 0.077 defuzzified value 
The fmal results for different consequences are listed in Table 6.5. 
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Table 6.5: Occurrence likelihoods for different consequences 
Consequences likelihoods 
No consequences 0.330 
Grounding 0.200 
Pollution as a result of grounding 
Collision 
Pollution as a result of collision 
Loss oflife 
6.4.2. Case Study 2 
0.087 
0.205 
0.055 
0.077 
This case study relates to the hazards associated with the potential incidents and 
accidents in offshore terminals (i.e. installations/rigs) which are in the form of offshore 
fixed units engaged in the oil and gas explorations and exploitations located within the 
Caspian Sea. 
There are many hazards with different natures and categories but in this study only the 
ones which can directly affect an offshore terminal and cause physical damage or in 
extreme cases would lead to total destruction of the offshore tenninals as shown in 
Table 6.6 will be examined. That means "damage to offshore terminals" will be 
regarded as an illustrative risk factor (Le. Top Event) for the pwpose of this case study. 
As was mentioned before there are many other types of hazards which can affect the 
offshore sites indirectly and they cannot be regarded as direct causes of a damage or 
destruction. Some of these are blowouts, cranes, falling objects, leakages, spills/releases, 
well problems etc which it has been decided not to incorporate in this study. Apart from 
the basic events (hazards) such as BEl to BE4 which can be classified under operational 
risks, others e.g. BEs to BE9 can only be initiated via external sources of uncertainties 
such as natural disasters, act of war, terrorism, etc. 
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Table 6.6: Potential Basic Events which can cause the Top Event of "damage to 
offshore terminals". 
Source: Based on (UKHSE, 2010; Mather, 2009 and Sharp, 2009) 
Figure 6.11: Map of Caspian Sea 
Source: Based on World Atlas (2011) 
As shown in Figure 6.11 the Caspian Sea is the largest lake on the planet. The sea is 
bordered by the countries of Azerbaijan, Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Iran .. 
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There are many oil and natural gas production platforms along the edges of the sea 
especially within the coasts of Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. In addition, large 
quantities of sturgeon live in its waters, and the caviar produced from their eggs is a 
valuable commodity. Fresh water flows into the sea via the Volga River and Ural River 
in the North, however, the sea remains somewhat salty only in the centre and South of 
the Caspian Sea. The highest depth of water is 1025 m in the South. 
To date the Caspian Sea has not been struck by any heavy storms, earthquakes/tsunamis 
or severe ice. However occasional passing fronts in autumns and winters with North 
Atlantic origin disturb the sea in timely bases but cannot be accounted as severe types to 
damage the offshore terminals. As they pass in West-East direction, the area they affect 
is small in comparison to other seas e.g. North Sea, Mediterranean Sea. Additionally in 
the North of the Caspian Sea during winters formation of ice is always evident. Ice 
formation had not taken place in central parts and Southern parts of the sea (Barannik et 
ai, 2004). 
Presently there is no available data or report on terrorism activities in the region. The 
nearest of such activities can be traced in Republic of Chechnya (Groznyy) in Russia 
which is near to Northwest of Caspian Sea (CNN, 2011). There is no report on any war 
or potential political perils except the international disputes which have been going on 
for nearly a decade among the states bordering the Caspian Sea for settling the dispute 
about the legal status of the sea (Haghayeghi, 2003). 
All five littoral states of Iran, Azerbaijan, Russia, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have 
plans to further exploit the sea's estimated oil reserves. Presently major oil companies 
e.g. TOTAL, BP, EXXONMOBILE, CHEVRON etc with a good reputation are active 
in the Caspian Sea near coasts of Azerbaijan especially in conjunction with the major 
pipeline project of BAKU-JIHAN. Such activities mean drilling new wells, highlighting 
risks for an incident that could cause catastrophic effects such as damage to offshore 
terminals within the landlocked Caspian Sea i.e. the largest inland body of water on 
earth (OWJE, 2011). 
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"The accident in the Gulf of Mexico shows that such a disaster could happen anywhere. 
The United States, with its super-modern technologies, is barely capable of stopping 
this disaster," Gulaliyev says. "You can imagine the scale of the damages to the 
environment from such incidents in countries like Azerbaijan" (RFERL, 2011). 
As a result major consequences for the risk factor i.e. "damage to offshore terminals" 
can be loss of life, property, reputation and damage to the environment (ABS, 2000). 
Figure 6.12 is the fault tree diagram for the Top Event i.e. "damage to offshore 
terminals" . 
Figure 6.12: Fault tree diagram for Top Event of "damage to offshore terminals". 
Occurrence probabilities (crisp values) for hazards BE" BE2, BE3 and BE4 in the form 
of frequencies (per year) are (0.2140), (0.0385), (0.0034) and (0.0016) respectively. The 
origin of data is based on the accident statistics for the offshore fixed units from 1990 to 
2007. These data are based on the combination of original data gathered from different 
databases as mentioned in (Oil and Gas UK, 2012). The available probabilities will be 
transformed into FFPs using Table 6.1 in order to combine these failure probabilities 
with the failure possibilities calculated in the following section. The calculated FFPs of 
the known probabilities are shown in Table 6.8. 
On the other hand as there is no data for hazards of BE5, BE6, BE7, BEg and BE9, via 
using possibility approach the FPSs obtained through the experts ' judgements will be 
transformed into FFPs using Equation 6.7. 
After collecting the experts ' opinions through the evaluation sheet shown in Appendix 
IV using of Equations 4.2, 4.3 and 6.6 the following calculations are carried out in order 
to determine the FPSs for the mentioned basic events listed in Table 6.7. Furthermore 
182 
Table 5.1 and Figure 5.1 are used for carrying out the estimations. Further explanations 
for collecting data, calculating the results, experts' judgements etc for the purpose of 
carrying out the estimations are the same as those described in Case Study 1. The 
calculated Fuzzy Possibility Scores (FPSs) are depicted in Table 6.7. 
BE5=WI® L ffi W2 ®VLffi W3® L=(O.OO, 0.17,0.42) 
BE6= W1 ® L ffi W2 ® L ffi W3 ® M = (0.08,0.33,0.58) 
BE7 =W1 ® VL EB W2 ® L ffi W3 ® VL = (0.00, 0.08, 0.33) 
BEg= W I ® VL ffi W 2 ® VL ffi W 3 ® VL= (0.00, 0.00, 0.25) 
B~= W1 ® L ffi W2 ® L ffi W3 ® L = (0.00,0.25,0.50) 
Table 6.7: Table of Fuzzy Possibility Scores (FPSs) for unknown failure rates. 
Basic Event Number 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
FPSs 
(0.00,0.17,0.42) 
(0.08, 0.33, 0.58) 
(0.00, 0.08, 0.33) 
(0.00, 0.00, 0.25) 
(0.00, 0.25, 0.50) 
In this regard the calculated FFPs of the unknown failure rates are shown in Table 6.8. 
Table 6.8: Table of Fuzzy Failure Probabilities (FFPs) for the known and unknown 
failure rates. 
Basic Events (Hazards) Number 
BEl 
BE2 
BE3 
BE4 
BEs 
BE6 
BE7 
BEg 
BE9 
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FFP 
(0.0428,0.2140,0.4280) 
(0.0077,0.0385,0.0770) 
(0.0011,0.0034,0.0102) 
(0.0005,0.0016,0.0048) 
(0.0000,0.0001,0.0027) 
(0.000006,0.0012,0.0048) 
(0.0000,0.000006,0.0012) 
(0.0000, 0.0000, 0.0005) 
(0.0000, 0.0005, 0.0049) 
After collecting the experts' opinions and integrating them by means of Equations 4.2 
and 4.3, with the use of Equation 6.6 the required calculations will be carried out in 
order to find out the fmal FFP of the nominated top event. The calculated FFP of the top 
event was found to be 0.265. Then by eliminating each basic event the new FFPs for the 
top event will be obtained respectively as shown in Table 6.9. Subsequently each 
deviation i.e. [PrE e PTEd has been recorded under the deviation index column in 
Table 6.9. 
Table 6.9: Importance of elimination of each basic event in occurrence probability of 
the top event. 
Elimination FFPs for new Top Events after elimination Defuzzified 
of Basic of the related Basic Events JHazards) FFPsfor Deviation 
Events I new Top index Ranking m u 
Events 
BEl 0.010 0.045 0.1l4 0.0563 0.2087 1 
BE2 0.045 0.219 0.451 0.2383 0.0267 2 
BE3 0.051 0.246 0.488 0.2616 0.0034 3 
BE4 0.052 0.248 0.491 0.2637 0.0013 6 
BEs 0.052 0.250 0.492 0.2647 0.0003 9 
BE6 0.052 0.248 0.489 0.2630 0.0020 4 
BE7 0.052 0.249 0.489 0.2633 0.0017 5 
BEg 0.052 0.249 0.492 0.2643 0.0007 8 
BE9 0.052 0.249 0.491 0.2640 0.0010 7 
FFP for the top event is calculated by the use of the fuzzy fault three analysis using 
Equation 6.4 as follows: 
• 
P(OR) = I e n (1 e Pi); 1=(1,1,1) 
;=1 
PrE = le [(1 e PBEl) ® (1 e PBEZ ) ® cI e PBE3 ) ® (i e PBE4 ) ® (1 e PBES) ® 
(i e PBE6)® (1 e PBE7)® (i e PBES)® (i e PBE9)] = (0.052,0.249,0.493) 
In the previous step the defuzzified occurrence possibility of the top event was 0.265. 
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Figure 6.13 illustrates the sensitivity analysis carried out for the top event based on the 
results shown in Table 6.9. It shows how the failure possibility for the top event is 
reduced by elimination of each basic event. 
0.3 
0.25 
-r 0.2 
/ 0.15 
/ 0.1 I 0.05 
- TOP EVENT 
_ New Top Events after elimination of the related s..slc Events (Hazards) 
0 
BE 1 BE2 BE3 BE6 BE7 BE4 BE9 BE8 BES 
Figure 6.13: Sensitivity analysis for top event of i.e. "damage to offshore terminals" 
Figure 6.14 illustrates the event tree analysis for the risk factor of "damage to offshore 
tenninals" along with linguistic fuzzy variables after aggregation of the experts ' 
judgements as described before. 
P 
No COllsequence 
, 
Dama2e to offshore tenuinals Loss of Life 
P21 
Loss of Property 
I e Pt Pzz 
With Consequences O~Ullll!le to EnvirolUuent 
PH 
Loss of Reputation S s 
Figure 6.14: Event tree analysis for risk factor "damage to offshore tenninals" 
Source: Consequences are based on ABS (2000) 
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Estimations for the event tree shown in Figure 6.14 are as follows: 
Pl = W\ ®H+W2®H+W3 ®VH = (0.58, 0.83,1.00); SI = 0.803 defuzzified value 
cI e Pl)®PZ1= (0.00, 0.17, 0.42) ® (Wl ®M®W2®M®W3®M) = 
(0.00,0.17,0.42) ® (0.25,0.50,0.75) = (0.00,0.085,0.315); 
S2 = 0.133 defuzzified value 
(1 e P1) ®PZ2 = (0.00, 0.17, 0.42) ® (WI ®H®W2®H®W3®VH) = 
(0.00,0.17,0.42) ® (0.58,0.83, 1.00)= (0.00, 0.141,0.42); 
S3 = 0.187 defuzzified value 
Cl e P1 ) ® PZ3 = (0.00, 0.17, 0.42) ® (WI ® MEB W2® LEB W3 ® M) = 
(0.00,0.17,0.42) ® (0.17,0.42,0.67)= (O.GO, 0.071, 0.281); 
S4 = 0.117 defuzzified value 
(i e P1 ) ®PZ4= (0.00, 0.17, 0.42) ® (Wl ®L®W2®L®W3®L) = 
(0.00,0.17,0.42) ® (0.00,0.25, 0.50)= (0.00, 0.042, 0.21); 
Ss == O~084 defuzzified value 
As there is no data for the mentioned consequences, a possibility approach has been 
incorporated in to this section of the study. In order to estimate the occurrence 
possibility scores for the consequences initiated from the mentioned risk factor it was 
decided to carry out the evaluation using the experts' judgements. The same experts 
used for FFT A have been asked for the evaluation purposes here in this section. The 
final results obtained are listed in Table 6.10 for consequences. 
Table 6.10: Occurrence likelihoods for different consequences. 
Consequences likelihoods 
No Consequences 
Loss of Life 
Loss of Property 
Damage to Environment 
Loss of Reputation 
0.803 
0.133 
0.187 
0.117 
0.084 
186 
6.5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
In Case Study 1 as is shown in Table 6.2 basic event number two (i.e. Pilot unaware of 
ship's behaviour) had the highest importance on the failure possibility of the top event. 
Most of the times when pilots board vessels during ships' arrivals and departures from 
or to offshore tenninals and marine ports when they arrive to the conning positions they 
do sign in but they do not read the Pilot Cards (i.e. an internationally recognised check 
list form explains ship's details and particulars needed for navigating pilots and 
normally are designed by flag state administrators or by their recognised third-parties 
e.g. approved classification societies. Moreover Pilot Cards are designed using 
procedures and guide lines mentioned in quality management systems or ISO Standards) 
properly. If pilots read the ships' details properly and ask for any clarification from the 
ships' masters or officers in charge about the ships' characteristics or manoeuvrability if 
they are in doubt, they would avoid the mentioned error. Moreover as can be seen 
consequence number one (i.e. Pilot error with no consequences) has the highest 
occurrence likelihood. As pilot error with no consequence can he regarded as a near 
miss situation therefore it is evident that the occurrence likelihood of near miss 
situations as a result of pilot error is high. As on board ships there are always secondary 
standby devices ready to be used during emergencies, or pilots boarding ships 
sometimes have additional back-ups (e.g. tugboats or additional pilot), normally most 
pilot errors can be avoided in due time. Results obtained for consequences in this case 
study can be used as a bench mark and only for comparison purposes in offshore 
terminals and marine ports by harbour masters and port/terminal risk managers. 
In Case Study 2 basic event number one (i.e. Fire and explosion) had the highest 
importance. Offshore terminals are structures involved with processing, drilling, 
producing, loading of cargoes having oil and gas properties. As a result any incident can 
very quickly turn into an accident such as fire and eventually, or instantly, an explosion. 
It can be seen that consequence number one which is damage to offshore terminals with 
no consequences (i.e. near miss situations) had the highest occurrence likelihood. 
Offshore terminals maintain a high level of safety precautions and additionally there are 
available alert systems which can be activated during emergency situations and in early 
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stages. Therefore most likely incidents on offshore platforms before turning to accidents 
can be mitigated in appropriate time. Results obtained for consequences in this case 
study can be used as a bench mark and only for comparison purposes in offshore 
terminals by HSE or risk managers. 
In addition the methodology for application of the FTA and ETA under fuzzy 
environments can be regarded as another solution to prevail over the limitation of the 
traditional approach. Traditional approaches lack adequate data concerning the relative 
frequencies for causes and effects of hazardous events (i.e. top events or initiating 
events). Via using TFNs, it is possible to manage the fuzziness involved in the phrase of 
the occurrence of a basic event or a consequence. Moreover, the state of each basic 
event or consequence can be explained in a more simple way, by using the FST. Tables 
showing the importance of elimination of each basic event in occurrence possibility of 
the top event (i.e. Tables 6.4 and 6.9) can provide useful information for improving the 
Quality, Health, Safety, Environment and Security (QHSES) performance in offshore 
terminals and marine ports. 
6.6. CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter four significant risk factors (hazards), three of which were identified and 
prioritised in Chapter 4, have been analysed by the use of the CCA in order to complete 
the risk assessment phase of the RM framework proposed for the purpose of this 
research. 
In the first part of this chapter after introducing the CCA or bow-tie method, reasons for 
its usage were described and its application in marine industry was investigated. 
Subsequently it was used for analysing the nominated risk factors, their causes and 
consequences. 
In the second part in order to evaluate the main causes of these risk factors while using 
the FFT Altraditional FT A and experts' judjements, the occurrence 
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possibility/probability for the top events was calculated and by eliminating each basic 
event the occurrence likelihood for the top event was obtained to see the number of 
changes. Consequently the significant basic events influencing the nominated risk 
factors were identified via this procedure. 
In the third part in order to analyse the consequences of these risk factors using the 
FET Altraditional ETA and experts' judgements, the possibility/probability of each 
consequence was calculated. Consequently the most significant consequence was 
revealed. 
In the next chapter in order to independently manage any of the identified hazards 
associated with offshore terminals and marine ports an individual RM approach will be 
utilised. To fullfill this the most significant risk factor is selected to be dealt with. 
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CHAPTER 7: SECURITY RISK MANAGEMENT AND 
CASE STUDIES 
7.1. INTRODUCTION 
Through the previous chapters risk factors associated with offshore terminals and 
marine ports were identified, assessed, prioritised and ranked accordingly. The most 
significant risk factors were analysed separately by CCA. Among them the most 
significant one revealed was security related risk factor. As a result due to importance of 
the mentioned risk factor this chapter will define a separate strategy for RM of the same 
risk factor. The following sections will investigate the case in depth in order to design 
an appropriate additional framework to handle the security related risk factor. 
As a typical example in offshore terminals and marine ports Petrochemical Sea Ports 
and Offshore Terminals (PSPOTs) are essential elements for the operation of every 
country's economy that can affect their cost structures, industrial competitiveness and 
existing standards. In fact these logistics infrastructures can provide fundamental 
support to energy, transportation, agriculture and manufacturing sectors in any nation. 
However these crucial components of the global transportation historically have not 
been yet subjected to comprehensive governmental regulation and security oversight. In 
this regard the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 was the first paradigm-shifting 
event for transportation systems' security in general. For the maritime industry, that 
event has prompted remarkable shifts in the focused perspectives on security now 
required by anyone even remotely associated with the management of port and offshore 
terminal security, as well as the ships, adjacent plants or facilities involved. 
Many of the sea ports are situated near chemical plants such as oil refmeries, fertilizer 
plants and different petrochemical production units. Otherwise many are in a form of 
complexes especially for importing or/and exporting of crude oil, Liquefied Natural Gas 
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(LNG), Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) as well as the various hazardous petrochemical 
products such as naphtha, ammonia, chlorine, urea, sulphur, coal etc. Some of these 
terminals are in a form of a fixed or floating offshore terminal situated in middle of sea 
used for the same purposes such as Floating, Production, Storage and Offloading (FPSO) 
units all of which have fixed process facilities on board. Their processing facilities are 
used to separate natural gas, crude oil, water and mud prior to loading of tandem tankers 
in middle of sea. 
Any accidental or intentional release or undesirable event relating to the mentioned 
hazardous materials can adversely affect the health and safety of employees and the 
public in great extent whilst harming the environment. Accidental releases can result 
from possible accidents within the facilities or natural disasters. Accidents take place 
when employees make mistakes or are due to equipment malfunctions. Natural disasters 
are phenomena such as earthquake, flooding, tsunami, lighting strikes, tropical 
revolving storms etc, all of which can have destructive effects on the petrochemical 
seaports and tenninals. On the other hand intentional releases can be as a result of 
planned and malicious acts. However all of the mentioned events whether they are as a 
result of intentional or accidental acts can cause toxic releases, fires, explosions and 
eventually can lead to massive fatalities, property damages, economic losses and 
environmental harms (Ishikawa and Tsujimoto, 2009). 
As PSPOTs handle hazardous products and cargoes on a regular basis, they can easily 
become potential targets for malicious attacks (Sutton, 2010) under the three main 
categories i.e. those by members of the public, sabotage and terrorism. Public members' 
security breaches are acts such as vandalism, theft and activists. While they may wish to 
cause damage, they do not usually want to create a catastrophe. In case of a sabotage 
attacker who can create a very threatening situation the acts are not intended for a worst 
case. Terrorism is probably the form of attack that people fear the most, not least 
because terrorists internationally want to create fear. Moreover, terrorists often have 
much greater destructive capability than that of other malicious people, thus giving 
them the potential to cause a lot of damage and to operate at a long range (Sutton, 2010). 
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Accidental events are outside the scope of this chapter and they will not be discussed 
any further here. They can be investigated under process safety or process risk and 
reliability management but not under the heading of Security Risk Management (SRM). 
The intentional events as mentioned i.e. only the three categories of malicious anti-
security or deliberate acts will be covered in this chapter for the purpose of the PSPOTs. 
In this regard a SRM framework will be introduced in the next section to overcome the 
security challenges within the PSPOTs. 
7.2. SECURITY RISK MANAGEMENT 
Based on the existing literature from Borodzicz (2004) the ancient philosophers of 
China, Greece and Egypt were certainly not the only members of early civilizations to 
have been worried regarding security. In fact some fonn of security must have been the 
basis for these early civilizations to exist. Moreover "the relationship between risk and 
security is perhaps more than simply a linguistic term. Indeed, security can be seen as 
an element of risk management in a holistic sense" (Borodzicz, 1996). 
From PSPOT's risk perspective, security can be viewed reasonably as just another 
hazardous exposure. Although SRM may be viewed as a cost against the operation, it 
also represents a significant threat if not treated seriously. In fact treating PSPOTs' 
security risk factors as a loss prevention activity can help a broader assessment of 
PSPOTs exposure. As explained earlier this could acknowledge terrorists' threats, but 
also allow for a wider security agenda. Such losses could be the result of either internal 
or external terrorists' crime, but they could also start from an accident or natural disaster 
with no relationship to criminal behaviour. Terrorist attacks such as in the New York 
(11th of September, 2001), Madrid (11th of March, 2004), London (7th of July, 2005), 
Bali (1st of October 2005) and Mumbai (26th of November, 2008) are examples that 
can happen again in any place at any time even in PSPOTs. 
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A terrorist attack on a port, especially if several of such attacks occur simultaneously, 
can also disrupt nations' economies. Ports have a tendency to be large and extensive, 
therefore it is unlikely that any attack would destroy a port's infrastructure. On the other 
hand a terrorist attack on an offshore terminal can easily destroy or sink the facility. For 
example an attack on a petrochemical port could disrupt this distribution node for a 
considerable time and would probably lead to a delay at all ports within the vicinity 
until security measures are reviewed and upgraded. In the case of petrochemical and 
process facilities if they are situated nearby or within the ports' or onshore terminals' 
borders the overall view like the one explained above will be changed. In fact these 
kinds of sea ports and terminals will be considered as process facilities rather than being 
described like a normal transportation centre. In this case ahnost the same security 
threats, vulnerabilities and risk factors applicable to process industries with a little 
modification will be applied to these critical logistics centres. 
Additionally there is a significant security risk due to the hazardous nature and quantity 
of chemicals and cargoes being handled by~ships, ports and offshore terminals, extreme 
processing conditions of temperature and pressure, and value of the products to the 
nation. Terrorists having adequate information may use them to cause toxic releases, 
fires and explosions. Some of this information are such as the location of hazardous 
chemicals, position of FPSOs, storage tanks and contains onshore, pipelines, bypass 
valves, crucial safety and warning systems, emergency shutdown/stop buttons or 
devices, locations and time schedules for entering and leaving ships. Different types of 
ships will be also in interest of terrorists (e.g. tandem tankers, crude oil tankers, LNG, 
LPG, chemical tankers, bulk carriers carrying hazardous cargoes). Additional type of 
information are that such as location of the shore based terminals in which the loadings 
and discharging take place, the amount, duration and type of cargo, their inventory, type 
of the chemical operations and other sensitive information. This can result in severe 
impact on economy, health, safety of people and public, environmental pollution and 
damage as well as casualties (CSC, 20 I 0) both in "on-site and off-site" locations. 
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However a theoretical approach toward a generic SRM for the purpose of PSPOTs in 
this chapter aims to identify the threats resulting from terrorism. The proposed 
framework also -establishes appropriate security procedures for assets characterisation, 
assessing the security risk factors (threats), security threat/vulnerability analysis and 
moreover takes appropriate measures against the identified/assessed threats. For this 
reason a generic SRM framework for PSPOTs can be demonstrated in Figure 7.1. 
Step 1: Assets Characterization 
r-----------
Step 2: Security Threat Analysis (STA) 
Step 3: Security risk evaluation using threat matrix 
Step 4: Security Vulnerability Analysis (SVA) 
Step 5: Security Risk Factor Table (SRFT) model 
L __________ _ 
Step 6: Security Measures and Rings of Protection 
Step 7: Recommendations 
Figure 7.1: A generic SRM framework for the purpose of PS POTs 
Security threats like acts of terrorism on a facility such as a PSPOT can be avoided if 
the security chain reaction shown in Figure 7.2 within a facility can be broken. This can 
be achieved by an intentional and planned programme (e.g. SRM) as a security 
sequence which develops to halt or reduce the progress of a security incident (e.g. a 
terrorist attack). An appropriate security triangle for this is shown in Figure 7.2. This 
diagram indicates that if any of the illustrated elements is sufficiently halted or 
194 
controlled the risk of a security attack by terrorists can be prevented. This can be 
satisfied by exactly knowing which assets in a PSPOT are critical or by undertaking an 
appropriate ST A and/or SV A to halt and reduce the level of the security threats or 
vulnerabilities. For the purpose of the aforementioned statements as shown in Figure 7.1 
i.e. Steps 1,2 and 4 which are used for assets characterisation, STA and SVA, will be 
dealt with separately in Section 7.4. 
Vulnerabilities Threats 
Assets 
Figure 7.2: Security triangle 
7.3. FUZZY SET THEORY 
FST is fully discussed in Chapter 4. The subjective linguistic variables (see Section 7.4, 
Step 3 and Step 5) used in this chapter for evaluation of the security risk factors (threats) 
can be defined in tenns of membership functions. A membership function is a curve that 
defmes how each object or point (i.e. security risk factor) e.g. low and high in the input 
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space is mapped to a membership value. For example triangular numbers are used to 
defme fuzzy linguistic scales (five points) of very low, low, medium, high and very high 
shown in Figure 7.3. Additionally another example (i.e. trapezoidal numbers) for 
defming the fuzzy linguistic scales (three points) of low, medium and high is illustrated 
in Figure 7.4. Figure 7.4 was previously used in the work of the Baipai et al (2010); 
further explanations can be found in their work. 
Figure 7.3: Example of fuzzy triangular membership functions 
Source: Modified from Yang and Hung (2007) 
Figure 7.4: Fuzzy trapezoidal membership functions 
Source: Bajpai et aI, (2010) 
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Consequently as the results of the calculations carried out for the purpose of this chapter 
in the form of fuzzy numbers, an additional defuzzification process is utilised in order to 
convert them into crisp numbers. The centre of area defuzzification technique is 
selected to be used for this purpose hereafter. This technique was developed in 1985 
(Sugeno, 1999). It is the most commonly used technique and is accurate. This method 
can be expressed for triangular and trapezoidal fuzzy numbers as per following formulas: 
Triangular fuzzy number M= (/, m, u) can be defuzzified to a crisp number of M by: 
M= (l+m+u) 
3 
For a trapezoidal fuzzy number of M= (I, m, n, u): 
M = 2. x (u+n)2-Cuxn)-(l+m)2+Clxm) 
3 (u+n-m-l) 
(7.1) 
(7.2) 
7.4. METHODOLOGY TO CARRY OUT THE PROPOSED SRM IN PS POTS 
An appropriate methodology comprising seven steps was shown in Figure 7.1. The 
illustrated steps can be easily applied to different petrochemical ports' or offshore 
terminals' facilities and operations at varying degrees of detail as necessary. 
Step 1: Assets characterisation: To divide the PSPOTs into areas or zones and to 
characterize them in order to know critical assets, their importance and their 
interdependencies and the supporting infrastructure (API, 2003 and Nolan, 2008). 
In case of the PSPOTs apart from visiting ships, critical assets are mainly export and 
import terminals where ships will be made fast alongside the specialised jetties or 
moored to Catenary Anchor Leg Mooring (CALM) buoys. port control tower or vessel 
traffic service/management, lights, sound or fog signals, warehouses, maintained depth 
of water, breakwaters, fire fighting, policing, security, emergency, health and patrol 
units, office buildings, support vessels, accommodation barges, tugs, pilot boats, 
dredgers, loading/discharging arms and platforms, power generators, area lightings, 
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CCTV s, fences, gates, emergency shutdown valves, cargo transfer equipment, safety 
and security equipment, alarms, gas detection systems and any other equipment and 
devices related or connected to the adjacent processing units or plants etc (OCIMF, 
2004 and Mather, 2009). 
Step 2: Security Threat Analysis (STA): To undertake a STA by identifying sources, 
types and determining likelihood of threats. Then each probable threat within the 
process area is evaluated (NoIan, 2008). 
As Kamien (2006) explains a threat analysis can be based on types or sources of threats. 
In this regard the United States' Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP) focuses on the 
category of weapon that terrorists may use - chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, 
and explosive. Another option is to focus on the sources of threat - on any organisation 
with the motivation, capability, and opportunity to launch a successful attack on their 
systems. Therefore it is important to develop a range of scenarios that can correspond to 
potential types of attacks. Moreover each scenario should contain assets, weapons, and 
mode of delivery. In case of PSPOTs and based on the sources of threats whether they 
are based from internal or external sources is illustrated in Table 7.1. 
Table 7.1: Examples of sources of threats in PSPOTs 
Source: Adapted from Sutton (2010) 
The following lists are potential types of threats in PSPOTs as a result of terrorists' 
deliberate acts (IS PS Code, 2003 and Sutton, 2010): 
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• Release of hazardous cargo from ship or shore-based storage tanks, causing toxic 
gas dispersion, fire and explosion. 
• Theft of confidential information from PSPOTs facilities. 
• Major damage to port and offshore terminal infrastructure e.g. FPSO, storage tanks, 
entrance channel. 
• Cargo loading or discharging tampering by changing control settings. 
• Creation of hazardous situations through tampering with valves, or adding 
contaminants, and so on. 
• Devastating port and offshore terminal operators, security guards, and so on. 
• Theft of hazardous products for utilizing elsewhere. 
• Vandalism of onshore or offshore based cargo control rooms and equipment. 
• Immobilizing safety and security units and systems. 
• Immobilizing port/terminal control and vessel traffic services/management centres. 
• Immobilizing ships. 
• Bomb threats by third party, port/terminal employ.ees or an entered ship. 
• Cyber threats (threats to critical equipment that are attached to computers having 
Internet). 
• Terrorists' attack from ship to a port or an offshore tenninal by the use of ship's 
cargo i.e. use of a ship as a mode of delivery. 
• Terrorists' long reach attack using military-style weapons like an attack from air to 
port e.g. passenger planes or long-range missiles, attack from sea to a port or an 
offshore terminal e.g. pirates or speed boats. 
• A terrorist attack upon a ship in a port area or while afloat or alongside of an 
offshore terminal. 
Other factors such as types and volume of cargoes handled or presented in PSPOTs, 
meteorological conditions, different type of access to the port/terminal facility, 
operating hours etc are among the factors which can affect the threats' likelihood. The 
likelihoods of the probable threats can be estimated by experts using the defined five 
points of the triangular fuzzy numbers. By use of a threat matrix explained in the next 
section the estimated likelihoods will be used for evaluating and prioritising of the 
security risk factors (threats) of a PSPOT. Furthennore in a PSPOT the various 
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mentioned terrorist acts can be organised in such a way to be carried out even by 
international or domestic pirates (e.g. Somalia pirates), stowaways and illegal entrants. 
Step 3: Security risk evaluation using threat matrix: There are different security risk 
evaluation methods and tools to help security experts to estimate the different security 
risks' levels within the selected facilities. In this regard both qualitative and quantitative 
approaches are found useful. In qualitative methods the parameters used as decision 
basis are subjective and estimated by experts' judgements. Quantitative methods 
describe the risk by calculations, and a numerical target value is compared with the 
result. Which methods to apply rely primarily on whether the necessary risk reduction is 
specified in a numerical manner or qualitative manner. The scope and extent of the 
analysis would also be an influencing factor (Marszal and Scharpf, 2002). Risk matrix, 
or as often referred to, hazard matrix which is called threat matrix in this chapter, is one 
of the most accepted risk determination methods due to its ease. The threat matrix takes 
likelihood (frequency) and severity (consequence or impact) of the threats into account 
qualitatively, based on a classification of the threat parameters. Figure 7.5 shows a 
typical threat matrix diagram which is adapted for security risks evaluation purposes. 
The severity and likelihood of threats make one axis each, enabling the user to plot the 
situation under consideration in the diagram. If each box in the diagram has an attached 
classified security risk level e.g. very high risk, the determination process is simple. The 
severity categories may be expressed in terms of human (people's security), economic 
(assets or profit losses) or environmental loss. The categories also divide the threat 
severities into minor, slight, moderate, critical and catastrophic categories according to 
the level of threat's severity. The likelihood categories are also divided into very low, 
low, medium, high and very high ones. The categories can be selected qualitatively, 
using experts' judgments as explained above and shown in Figure 7.5, but quantitative 
tools (e.g. fuzzy set numbers explained in Section 7.3) can also be utilized by experts to 
make it easier for the threat levels to be estimated. In Figure 7.5, different threat levels 
are illustrated. For example, minor severity/low likelihood leads to very low security 
risk (threat) requisite. This means that the security risk is considered tolerable. Minor 
severity/medium likelihood leads to a low security risk, while critical severitylhigh 
likelihood will leads to a high security risk requisite. 
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As ABS (2003) discusses a common risk evaluation and presentation method is simply 
to multiply the likelihood CL) of each undesirable event by each severity (S), and then 
sum these products for all situations is considered in the evaluation. 
Thus with respect to the above descriptions, security risk levels can be obtained by use 
of the mentioned parameters through Equations (5.1) and (5.2). These equations are 
fully discussed in Chapter 5. In this chapter they specifically will be used for calculating 
the security thr-eats. 
Figure 7.5: Typical threat matrix designed for security risk evaluations in PSPOTs 
Source: Adapted from ABS (2000) 
As Buybott (2007) explains a threat matrix can be used to measure each of the 
individual security risk factors (threats) associated within a facility without having a 
clear background of the various prevention measures that may be part of a specific 
threat scenario. In this case the evaluated threat levels can be used as a preliminary stage 
to make a decision on the extent of a SV A that should be performed, as well as the 
levels of security measures and safeguards that should be maintained or to be 
implemented at an initial stage. As a result of combining of both the qualitative and 
quantitative approaches to security risk factors (threats) can be ranked for further use 
and purposes. As per Figure 7.3 appropriate fuzzy linguistic scales along with their 
membership functions have been illustrated for the occurrence likelihoods. The same 
fuzzy scales and numbers are applicable for the corresponding occurrence severities. 
That means that a fuzzy triangular number of (0.50,0.75, 1.00) as shown in Figure 7.3 
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can be used for both of the occurrence likelihood of very high and occurrence severity 
of catastrophic. 
As an example and according to Figure 7.3, if a security risk factor (threat) as per 
expert's preference has occurrence likelihood (L) of (0.00, 0.25, 0.50) i.e. low, and 
consequence severity (05) of (0.50, 0.75, 1.00) i.e. critical, the CR) as per Equation 4.3 
will be (0.00, 0.1875, 0.50). However as the result is a triangular number it can be 
defuzzified to obtain a crisp number as per Equation 7.1 which is equal to 0.23. In fact 
the same operation in this step must be carried out for all of the security risk factors one 
by one in order to obtain a crisp number for each. Then they can be prioritised and 
ranked according to their significance. Then as per their priorities a detailed SV A can be 
planned and carried out in order to continue the proposed SRM framework. 
Step 4: Security Vulnerability Analysis (SVA): To identify vulnerabilities against each 
threat by the use of brainstonning and checklist approach (Nolan, 2008 and Sutton, 
2010). 
As Kamien (2006) discusses SV A is used to evaluate vulnerability of the critical assets 
in the scenarios i.e. for a given weapon and a given target, the probability that an attack 
will be successful depends on our ability to detect it, the warning time, the system's 
response, and the ability of the attacker to overcome the response. In assessing these 
factors, it is important to consider, for each target, any current countermeasures, 
relevant physical layouts, geographical configurations, etc, that might prevent access to 
the target, ability to detect an attack in progress, or assistance in defeating a detected 
attack. In this regard based on Sutton (2010) many companies and organisations carry 
out a SV A in order to identify areas where they may be the most vulnerable, and to 
make a decision on how to improve security. The team that conducts and supports a 
SV A must be intimately familiar with the industrial or commercial processes under 
examination. For example, an oil or gas refinery operator should not be chosen to 
support a review of a fertilizer plant. The typical review team should also have a 
balanced number of individuals from different organisations such as company 
employees, consultants, equipment fabricators, intelligence agencies and law 
enforcement officials. 
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Based on Nolan (2008) three types of individuals are needed to support a SV A: (1) a 
team leader, (2) a recorder/scribe, and (3) the experts. The experts are commonly (1) the 
project manager or engineer who has designed the facility, (2) a person familiar with 
how the facility will be operated e.g. a process or a safety engineer, and (3) a person 
familiar with loss or security risk aspects related to the facility WIder examination. 
SV As will normally be applicable to all facilities; however, there will be more concern 
to apply its review to highly visible, valuable and important facilities or operations. 
As a SV A is a qualitative form of an assessment the following steps must be carried out 
by SVA team members in order to achieve a successful analysis (ISPS Code, 2003; 
Gupta, 2005 and Nolan, 2008): 
• Split the PSPOT facility into zones of different security levels e.g. critical-risk, 
high-risk, moderate-risk and low-risk areas. The main plan is to classify the critical 
locations in the onshore or offshore terminals, refineries and plants that can be 
potential targets e.g. FPSOs, storage tanks and ships. 
• Identify the threats from potential terrorists in each zone. 
• Identify the vulnerabilities within each zone. Develop various scenarios in which the 
realistic threats identified through STA could be understood. 
• State worst possible impacts in-site/off-site in case of a successful terrorist attack to 
determine severity (S). 
• Examine efficiency of the existing security measures for any specific threat. 
• Recommend additional security measures to reduce likelihood (L) or severity (S) of 
a possible attack. 
Step 5: SRFT model: The security condition for facilities like PSPOTs can be 
demonstrated practically by making a SRFT (ACS, 2002; Bajpai and Gupta, 2005 and 
CSC, 2010). In SRFT several security risk factors that can influence the entire security 
of PSPOTs are illustrated. After scoring the security risk factors listed in SRFT by 
experts or security auditors, using the three points trapezoidal fuzzy numbers shown in 
Figure 7.4. The totaJ score obtained from SRFT wil1lead to make out and estimate the 
existing security risk level of a PSPOT. 
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Based on CSC (2010) SRFT can be used as a security risk assessment tool and as per 
Bajpai and Gupta (2005) in a form of a pre-screening tool to determine whether another 
detailed threat and vulnerability analysis is required. The person or team developing a 
SRFT should be also reasonably familiar with the facility in question. Moreover the 
following explanations are found valuable about the security risk factors being used in a 
SRFTmodel. 
Usually terrorist groups and organisations focus on targets that can impact upon large 
populations. Thus, a facility situated in a rural location is much less attractive than a 
target like a petrochemical port located just near a city. As a result, being close to 
centres of high population areas increases the attractiveness of a facility as a target. A 
facility like a port neighbouring a major petrochemical tank farm is inherently at higher 
risk than many others. As large tanker ships from different destinations arrive at these 
ports, terrorists can plan in advance different ways to use these floating explosives as a 
delivery device just to destroy the terminals, refmery and plants in order to affect the 
nearby populations. To a lesser extent crude oil or LNG tanker ships can be used as a 
delivery device to destroy a FPSO which will cause huge physical, economic, 
environmental etc losses to a nation. Furthermore terrorists mostly try to generate panic 
by targeting large, recognized organisations, such as major corporations. A small and 
medium sized enterprise or private flflD in a country is less likely to be targeted than a 
facility identified under ownership of a wealthy government. 
The presence of existing security controls in PSPOTs lowers their attractiveness as a 
target. For example a port facility on its shore side which has very tight perimeter 
control with all- access points secured, having extra monitors (e.g. sensors, patrols 
and/or video surveillance i.e. CCTVs) is a more difficult target than PSPOTs without 
this equipment. On the coastal side, if a petrochemical port is not controlled and 
watched by its coastguard patrols it is more prone to a terrorist attack than a PSPOT 
having 24 hours security watch. Additionally following 9/11, as the ISPS Code has been 
established, it has been embodied in Chapter Eleven of the Safety of Life at Sea 
Convention (SOLAS) 1974 of the International Maritime Organization (IMO). Due to 
the fact the Code has been enforced internationally by the IMO since July 2006 all the 
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signatory states have to comply with the Code. The implementation of the Code since 
July 2006 helps ports to monitor their security levels. As a result in fact after 9/11 the 
vulnerability of an attack on nations' states through ships and ports has been more 
realised. In this respect as per ISPS Code there are three major areas of concern (ISPS 
Code, 2003 and ICS, 2007): 
• The use of ship as a delivery system for a terrorist attack within a port. 
• A terrorist attack upon a ship. 
• The use of cargo used as a delivery system for targets away from the port. 
In this regard as per regulations mentioned in the ISPS Code, pre-arrival security 
formalities and checks on tanker ships as well as ships' physical security inspections by 
port security officers or coastguard agencies prior to cargo operations will reduce the 
probability of a potential attack to ship or port facility by terrorist groups. 
The presence of interested targets i.e. weapons that terrorists may use - chemical, 
biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive - to carry out terrorist attacks in any 
PSPOT facility will raise the security risk of the port. As the amount of a specific target 
increases, the security risk will increase correspondingly. In other words in a PSPOT if 
the ability of target identification by terrorists increases the security risks will increase 
as well. Therefore the presence of the mentioned weapons as targets in a PSPOT will 
increase the security risk. There are a variety of chemicals of fear, including Chemical 
Weapon (CW) agents such as mustard gas, chlorine, ammonia and hydrogen cyanide. 
The most hazardous biological agents include anthrax and smallpox. Other organisms 
are also of worry, including viruses like yeUow fever or bacteria - like anthrax. There 
are radiological agents with advanced precise action and longer half-life and the 
chemical form all contribute to the increased target potential of radiological materials. 
Even uranium composites may be attractive for use in a "dirty bomb". While the risk of 
significant radiological injury from a dirty bomb is much less than the risk of injury 
from the explosion, the psychological impact of such an occurrence on the affected 
population will be considerable. In this regard safety specialists in PSPOTs should train 
their employees regarding the real importance of a potential terrorist attack with the 
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mentioned natures (CSC, 2010). In this regard training of port employees must be a part 
of the port's security risk management programme. In fact more practical trainings will 
reduce the potentials for a port facility to become a target. Additionally long term 
employees are much less likely to take part in a planned terrorist activity than new 
employees. Thus, new employees require much higher concern than long term 
employees to achieve the same level of security. 
There are also worst case outcomes impacting on a port facility and its surrounding area 
as a result of any terrorist attacks. They can be evaluated based on the development of 
scenarios of the consequences of a terrorist incident at a port facility. To evaluate the 
worst case scenario and to estimate the severity of the outcome on a port facility and on 
its surrounding locations professional experts are required to score these factors 
carefully in order to obtain a sensible result (llSC. 2010). 
There are other factors in PSPOTs that must be taken into account during building a 
SRFT such as visibility status of the FPSOs, ships or tank farms used for storage of the 
imported crude oil or natural gas or storage of the processed highly dangerous 
substances for export and internal use within the host country. If they are highly visible 
from the nearby areas this will increase the potential of an attack. Apart from visibility 
the number, capacity, volume and size of the storage tanks, FPSOs and ships also will 
play an important role for an attack to take place. Presence of terrorist groups in the 
region or vicinity of facilities, security background or history of the facilities in respect 
of the number of security incidents happened, etc plays important roles in examining-a 
security level of the facility. At the end reliability and status of readiness of the 
emergency units in respect of health, safety, environment, security of PS POTs will play 
an important role prior, during and after a successful terrorist attack (ISPS Code, 2003 
and Sutton, 2010). 
Step 6: Security measures and rings of protection: To list security safeguards against 
threat scenarios and to evaluate them to see if the protective measures are adequate. 
Rings of protection are needed to be used as a risk mitigation method and they can be 
used for different applications. For the purpose of SRM in PSPOTs the same is 
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applicable. In this regard the American Chemistry Council (ACC, 2001) states that 
security tends to emphasize "rings of protection," meaning that, if possible, the most 
important or most valuable assets should be placed in the centre of concentric levels of 
increasingly stringent security measures. 
For example, where practicable, in a petrochemical port electronic control rooms of the 
refinery units should not be placed right next to the building's reception area; rather, it 
should be located deeper within the building so that, to reach the control room, terrorist 
would have to go through and pass numerous rings of protection, such as a fence at the 
facility boundaries, a locked exterior door, an alert receptionist, an elevator with key 
controlled floor buttons, and a locked door to the control room. To determine if the 
rings of protection are efficient, security programmes must usually be evaluated through 
the use of penetration tests and security drills in which the port/terminal facility has to 
have individuals who can play the role of attacker to see if the barriers work as expected. 
The same are applicable on ships interfacing with offshore terminals, FPSOs ports or 
different units situated within port facilities e.g. ports controls, export/import terminals, 
etc (ISPS Code, 2003). 
Based on IMO (2003) and under the ISPS Code, security measures as rings of 
protection for ships and port facilities are defmeti by Security Level I (i.e. the level for 
which minimum appropriate protective security measures shall be maintained at all 
times), Security Level 2 (i.e. the level for wbich appropriate additional protective 
security measures shall be maintained for a period of time as a result of heightened risk 
of a security incident) and Security Level 3 (i.e. the level for which further specific 
protective security measures shall be maintained for a limited period of time when a 
security incident is probable or imminent, although it may not be possible to identify the 
specific target). However in very unsafe situations when the predicted security risk 
status is extreme, an additional ISPS security measure (i.e. Level 3 + State of high alert) 
will used as an extra ring of protection in petrochemical sea ports and offshore 
terminals. In this step the mentioned security levels are integrated in Table 7.2 which 
originally was based on CSC (2010) and used to be a part of their risk assessment tool. 
In Table 7.2 crisp numbers of 24, 48 and 72 (shown under column of actual points 
obtained) are used to measure the security risk status in a sea port or an offshore 
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terminal after scoring of the security risk factors using a SRFT. In Table 7.2 formation 
of the crisp numbers is based on the total number of security risk factors made-up in 
SRFTs (i.e. Tables 7.4 and 7.5) and the numbers used in Figure 7.4 for defming of the 
linguistic scales used in the SRFTs. 
Table 7.2: Security measures and recommendations based on a score obtained from 
SRFT 
Source: Adapted from CSC (2010) 
Step 7: Recommendations: To determine if the recommendations are appropriate 
(ranking of security risk factors after using a threat matrix or a SRFT can be used to 
determine necessity). 
Table 7.2 illustrates further guidelines to be adhered to in different security conditions, 
depending on the level of security a port or an offshore terminal facility maintains. 
Apart from taking into consideration the issues such as health, safety, environmental 
factors, the incorporated guidelines must be consistent with the elements for enhancing 
the security of PSPOTs. For example, initiatives such as port/terminal facility security 
plan, emergency response and emergency preparedness plans are used as mitigation 
methods. Also in this regard there are further recommendations along with the essential 
countermeasures which can be used for the purpose of key concepts such as how to 
detect, delay and respond to a terrorist attack. These plans are developed to ensure the 
application of measures designed to protect the PSPOT facility and ships, persons, 
cargo, cargo transport units and ship's stores within the PSPOT facility from risks of a 
security incident. Consequently after ranking the security risk factors by use of the 
SRFT, the required guidelines can be modified and applied on PSPOTs. 
All steps explained here will be applied and are linked to case studies 1 and 2 as 
demonstrated and are discussed in the following sections. 
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7.5. CASE STUDY 1: PETROCHEMICAL SEA PORT OF (a) 
Sea Port (a) shown in Figure 7.6 is a petrochemical complex. including Zones A. B and 
C which are described thoroughly in Table 7.3. 
Figure 7.6: Sketch for Petrochemical Sea Port of (a) 
Source: Modified from Bajpai and Gupta (2005) 
• Zone A: a refinery with different petrochemical units for refining the imported 
crude oil and natural gas with the ability to produce naphtha, ammonia and other 
types of petrochemical products (Bajpai and Gupta, 2005); 
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• Zone B: including import tenninals for receiving and storage of crude oil and 
LNG cargo by Crude Oil Carriers and LNG tanker ships as well as export 
tenninals for exporting naphtha by product carriers, ammonia by LPG tankers 
and bagged fertilizer cargo i.e. urea by dry bulk cargo ships; 
• Zone C: a fertilizer plant with capability to produce urea (Bajpai and Gupta, 
2005). 
Table 7.3: Area description for Petrochemical Sea Port of (a) 
Zone A ( Reftaery ) 
1 Atmospheric distillation unit 
2 Vacuum disti1latioo unit 
3 Catalytic reforming unit 
4 Calcinations unit 
5 Cokcrunit 
6 DSC Control room 
7 Ammonia Plant 
8 LPG bottling 
!I Naphtha Tank Farm 
10 Power Plant 
11 Control room 
12 Effiuent treatment plant 
13 Crude Oil Tank Farm 
14 Natural Gas TankFann 
IS Ammonia TankFann 
Zoae B ( Harbour .ad TermJaals) 
16 Canteen 
17 Seaman Club 
18 Administrative Building for Oil Refinery 
1!I Administrative Building for Fertilizer Plant 
20 Car and port's machinery parking 
21 Poct Control 
22 Crude Oil Import Terminal 
23 LNG Import Terminal 
24 Naphtha Export Terminal 
25 Ammonia Export Tcnninal 
26 Fertilizer Export Terminal 
32 Gate 
33 Guard room 
34 Administrative Block 
35 Fire Brigades 
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Zone C (Fertilizer Plant) 
27 PO\\a Plant 
28 Coal storage 
l!l Urea Plant 
30 Urea storage and Bagging plant 
31 Ash Pond 
Symbols and limits 
Coast Lines •••••••••• 
Railway _. __ 
Export Pipelines 
Fences 
Zone Margins 
GwmiTowers 
.!J 
Table 7.4: Security Risk Factor Table (SRFT) for Petrochemical Sea Port of (a) 
Source: Modified from CSC (2010) 
In construing and complying with the proposed SRM methodology in this chapter the 
Port (a) has been divided into three different zones as depicted in Figure 7.6 and the 
sections are listed in Table 7.3. In order to calculate the total security score of the 
petrochemical port (a) there is a need to modify the SRFT which was designed 
originally by CSC (2010). The newly designed SRFT and the identified security risk 
factors are based on the following descriptions. 
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Petrochemical port (a) is situated within 1 km distance from a very small city. The 
direction of the city from the port is shown in Figure 7.6. As it is shown there is a 
permanent wind gusting only during daytime from sunrise to sunset in the fonn of land 
breeze from sea toward shore in the shown direction. Except for some of the tall 
buildings in the petrochemical complex, port storage tanks, ships and other units 
situated within the harbour, the refinery and fertilizer plant are not visible from outside 
the port. Vertical tall walls and existing break waters around the port make all of them 
obscured and invisible. The port is under ownership of the government. Up to this time 
there have not been any reports terrorist activities except some criminal actions that 
have happened outside the port area. There has not been any type of accident reported. 
Traffic conditions, types and volume of hazardous cargoes are traceable through port 
authorities by the involved bodies or persons. 
The port authority has been implementing the ISPS Code since July 2006. Ship to port 
security interface ISPS procedures and formalities are always maintained in very high 
intensity. Existing security measure types along with the other security risk factors 
which are considered as the most important contributing factors affecting the port are all 
listed in the newly designed SRFT i.e. Tllble 7.4. 
A port security auditor as an expert has been asked to perform this task in order to rate 
the port (a) fur the security risk factors listed in Table 7.4. Appendix V illustrates the 
SRFT and additional information which are used to facilitate the scoring process. The 
security auditor has used the fuzzy linguistic scales of trapezoidal numbers shown in 
Figure 4 to rate the risk factors. The fuzzy trapezoidal numbers used for corresponding 
linguistic scales shown in Figure 7.4 are: low (0,0,1,2), medium (1,2,3,4) and high 
(3,4,5,5). After rating all security risk factors using the mentioned linguistic scales, 
defuzzification is conducted in order to obtain the corresponding crisp numbers in the 
form of scores before adding them all together to obtain the total score. The total score 
is the security score of the port (a) which is used to determining further examination in 
association with Table 7.2. The total score obtained for the port (a) is found to be 40.14. 
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7.6. CASE STUDY 2: ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE OF AN OFFSHORE 
TERMINAL 
Halcrow Group Limited is owned by the Halcrow Trust and employee shareholders (a 
UK. based company). It was appointed by Venice Port Authority to carry out a 
feasibility study in November, 2010 for a new £1.1 billion offshore deep water terminal 
outside Venice Lagoon. As part of the encouraged plan, a new platform will be 
positioned about 14km from the mainland where the depth of water is 20m. 
Figure 7.7: Offshore Terminal of Venice under study 
Source: Based on Halcrow (2010) 
The Port of Venice is part of the new Northern Adriatic multiport system, created to 
play a greater role in handling extra Europe-Asia and Europe-Mediterranean cargo 
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flows over the next ten years. The offshore terminal will provide a consolidated port 
base in the Mediterranean and absorb incoming vessels from the Suez Canal. 
The location of the Port of Venice (and that of other North Adriatic ports) is 
exceptionally suitable for goods imported or exported both from markets in the Far East 
and those in the Southern Mediterranean. The port will also act as a "refuge berth" when 
the MOSE barriers (Venices' anti-flood system) are closed (Halcrow, 2010). 
The port will be equipped to receive oil tankers, container ships, feeder container ships 
as well as to provide space for future expansion into other categories of goods, such as 
solid bulk cargo coming in on Capesize vessels (Halcrow, 2010). 
Nevertheless for the purpose of this chapter and ignoring the above mentioned facts the 
map shown in Figure 7.7 will be used only as an illustrative example to carry out this 
case study. The map is divided into three separate zones of A, B and C shown in Figure 
7.8 and is explained as follows. 
The offshore terminal shown in Figure 7.8 is equipped to receive crude oil tankers via 
T -jetties of Alpha and Bravo, (see Zone A). The two berth oil terminal site is designed 
to receive ships of over 150,000 tonnes, unloading directly into an underwater pipeline 
linked to the onshore refineries. 
Additionally the mentioned offshore terminal has three container terminals namely 
Terminal 1, 2 and 3 (see Zone B). They enable containers to be transferred to or from 
inland terminals where they can be processed and distributed by rail and road links to 
the main local inland routes, as well as to and from markets in central and Eastern 
Europe. The facility is able to handle three ships of capacity between 6,000 and 14,000 
TEU at the same time. Each container tenninal has five gantry cranes and ten small 
semi locked jetties enabling smaller container feeder ships operating between onshore 
and offshore terminals to load and discharge containers constantly. 
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Figure 7.8 : Venice Offshore Terminal 
Support services (see Zone C) including terminal's port control, master tug boats, pilot 
vessels, coast guard, HSE and security section, emergency heliport, medical centre, 
buildings for staff, canteens and offices all of which are supplied by undersea electrical 
cables supplemented with electricity derived from renewable sources. The outer 
breakwater will protect the terminal in all weather. 
In order to examine the proposed SRM methodology In this chapter the offshore 
terminal depicted in Figure 7.8 will be used to calculate the total security score designed 
in the SRFT. The identified security risk factors and the total security score gained are 
based on the following descriptions. 
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Table 7.5: Security Risk Factor Table (SRFT) for Offshore Terminal 
Source: Modified from CSC (2010) 
Venice offshore terminal is near eight nautical miles from the Port of Venice situated in 
Northeast of Italy in Adriatic Sea. This offshore terminal apart from visiting ships and 
other official visitors coming from the mainland is designed to accommodate 105 staff 
working in the site involved with different operations. The facility is owned and 
handled by a private Italian company looking after a medium range of shipping traffic 
within the facility. Occasionally there are swells and wind gusts coming from open sea, 
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the direction from which is shown in Figure 7.7. In this context for safety reasons the 
breakwater of the facility is designed in such a way to minimise the effect of winds and 
swells to provide a good shelter for visiting ships. The breakwater also helps to reduce 
the visibility of the berthed ships and the whole operations within the facility for the 
purpose of security. Although there are no storage tanks for the processed gases and 
chemicals within the site the terminal always handles lots of containers in the form of 
Dangerous Good (DG) Containers. These specially designed containers in fact carry 
different types of ]MO classed DGs such as different hazardous processed gases and 
chemicals. As soon as the mentioned DG containers arrive to site, very quickly they will 
be transferred and loaded into the outgoing container or feeder ships but will only 
remain on the jetties in terminals 1, 2 and 3 for a very short period of time. The 
imported crude oil will be pumped out from the berthed crude oil tankers via pipelines 
to shore based refineries or other destinations. There is no history on security incidents 
or any sign for the presence of terrorist groups or similar activities in the regions. 
The Venice Port Authority and in fact this offshore facility have been implementing the 
ISPS Code since July 2006. Ship to port security interface ISPS procedures and 
formalities are always maintained in very high level and intensity. Existing security 
measure types along with the other security risk factors which are considered as the 
most important contributing factors affecting this offshore tezminal are all listed in the 
modified SRFT i.e. Table 7.5. 
A port security auditor as an expert has been asked to perform this task in order to rate 
the port (a) for the security risk factors listed in Table 7.5. Appendix V illustrates the 
SRFT and additional information which are used to facilitate the scoring process. The 
security auditor has used the fuzzy linguistic scales of trapezoidal numbers shown in 
Figure 7.4 to rate the risk factors. The fuzzy trapezoidal numbers used for 
corresponding linguistic scales shown in Figure 7.4 are: low (0,0,1,2), medium (1,2,3,4) 
and high (3,4,5,5). After rating all security risk factors using the mentioned linguistic 
scales, defuzzification is conducted in order to obtain the corresponding crisp numbers 
in the form of scores before adding them all together to obtain the overall score. Total 
security score obtained for the mentioned offshore terminal is 23.88. 
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7.7. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
In Case Study 1 the obtained total score for the port (a) was 40.l4. By matching the 
obtained total score with the actual security points available in Table 7.2 it is understood 
that this number lies within the range from 24 to 48 (i.e. where the security risk status is 
moderate). This means that the port (a) must maintain and take measures as per ISPS 
Code security level 2. The related recommendations are explained in Table 7.2. 
Moreover as it can be seen from Table 7.4 security risk factors (i.e. port's ownership, 
worst impact on-site/port facility and meteorological conditions) with the maximwn 
score of 4.22 for each can be regarded as the most significant risk factors for the 
petrochemical port of ( a). 
In Case Study 2 the obtained total score for the mentioned offshore terminal was 23.88. 
By matching the obtained total score with the actual security points available in Table 
7.2 it is understood that as this number lies within the range from 0 to 24; therefore the 
security risk status is low. This means the Venice offshore terminal must maintain and 
take measures as per ISPS Code security level 1. The related recommendations are 
explained in Table 7.2. Moreover as it can be seen from Table 7.5 security risk factors 
i.e. visibility status of ships and infrastructures, range of shipping traffic and worst 
impact on-site/port facility each with a maximum score of 2.5 can be regarded as the 
most significant security risk factors of the Venice offshore terminal. 
In both case studies all of the mentioned security risk factors in SRFTs are inherent. 
They are unavoidable in terms of their likelihood, they cannot be reduced andlor 
mitigated permanently. Therefore the maximwn efforts to reduce the level of such 
threats are only to reduce their severities. In this case an appropriate emergency 
preparedness plan or proper instructions must be developed by specialists and experts 
such as SV A team members to reduce the impact of such probable threats. 
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7.S. CONCLUSIONS 
Security of PSPOTs is binding for all nations and antiterrorism IS a critical 
accomplishment. The security threats cannot be eliminated altogether, but they must be 
reduced. An appropriate SRM requires changes in organisational culture that take time 
and expertise if they are to succeed. The key is to follow a systematic approach to 
identify critical assets, assess security risk factors, and make smart decisions for 
managing the potential security risk factors. Therefore it is important to tailor the SRM 
programmes to potential consequences by the resources involved at the moment. Major 
consequences of terrorism allow for carrying out a more detailed SRM. Through a 
resource allocation process based on available details and through STA and/or VSA, 
effective and efficient management of the potential security risk factors is possible. 
Ultimately in this chapter a generic SRM methodology tailored and modified for the 
purpose of PS POTs is introduced to overcome the security threats as a result of the 
potential terrorists' attacks. For future work, security and risk management 
professionals or experts in offshore terminals and marine ports, especially those 
operating under a petrochemical environment can integrate the· study carried out in this 
chapter with crisis, business continuity management and resilience related studies. This 
will help the offshore and port industries to survive if they are under permanent danger 
of the potential security threats. 
In the next chapter in order to mitigate the identified hazards associated with offshore 
terminals and marine ports a Fuzzy TOPSIS technique will be used. This will help to 
select the previously introduced risk mitigation strategies for managing the related 
identified risk factors. Through the next chapter a RM framework for offshore terminals 
and marine ports will be concluded. 
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CHAPTER 8: SELECTING THE BEST MITIGATION 
STRATEGIES 
8.1. INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapters potential risk factors affecting the offshore tenninals and 
marine ports were identified and assessed. Then as a risk-based model was developed it 
was implemented on real cases for port-to-port risk-based comparisons. In a later stage 
the most significant risk factors were analysed individually using CCA. In order to 
complete the predefmed addressed RM framework it is required to mitigate the 
identified risk factors and complete the RM framework. This chapter intends to 
introduce a number of risk mitigation strategies and inspect their priorities over the 
previously identified risk factors using an appropriate MCDM tool. 
8.2. MCDM METHODS 
MCDM problems are discussed previously in Chapter 4. Nevertheless several methods 
exist for MCDM (Vincke, 1992 and Zeleny, 1982). There are no better or worse 
techniques, but some techniques are better suited to particular decision problems than 
others (Mergias et ai, 2007). Among these methods, the most popular ones lately used 
by researchers are the Analytic Hierarchy Process (ARP) (Golec and Taskin, 2007), 
Analytic Network Process (ANP) (Yuksel and Dagdeviren, 2007), Axiomatic Design 
(AD) (Kulak and Kahraman, 2005), TOPSIS (Kahraman et 01,2007), ELECTRE (Wang 
and Triantaphyllou, 2005) and PROMETHEE (Dagdeviren, 2008). It is necessary to 
develop all fundamentals linked to the condition in detail before selecting a suitable 
MCDM method to solve the problem (Bufardi et ai, 2004; Mergias et 01,2007). "The 
MCDM method choice decision should wait until the analyst and the decision- makers 
understand the problem, the feasible alternatives, different outcomes, conflicts between 
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the criteria and level of the data uncertainty" (Mergias et aI, 2007). There are other 
additional methods such as scoring models (Nelson, 1986) and utility models (Munoz 
and Sheng, 1995) which are used occasionally in this respect. 
For the purpose of offshore terminals and marine ports as the importance weights of the 
criteria ( risk factors) were calculated by the AHP method under a fuzzy environment 
(see Chapter 4), in order to obtain feasible alternatives (mitigation/control options) by 
further extension of the F AHP method, a TOPSIS method is preferred to be employed 
under the same fuzzy environments. FTOPSIS will be used hereafter for 4 reasons: (a) 
TOPSIS technique is reasonable and clear; (b) the calculation procedures are simple; (c) 
the idea allows the chase of best alternatives for each criterion illustrated in a 
straightforward mathematical outline, (d) the most significance weights are included in 
the comparison procedures (Wang and Chang, 2007). 
As Yoon and Hwang (1985) explain TOPSIS is one of the useful MADM techniques to 
manage real-world problems. TOPSIS technique was initially proposed by Hwang and 
Yoon (1981). According to this method, the paramount alternative would be the one that 
is closest to the positive ideal solution and farthest away from the negative ideal 
solution (Benitez, Martin, and Roman, 2007). The positive ideal solution is a resolution 
that increases the benefit criteria and reduces the cost criteria, whereas the neg~tive 
ideal solution increases the cost criteria and reduces the benefit criteria (Wang and 
Elhag, 2006). Overall, the positive ideal solution consists of all best values attainable 
for the criteria, while the negative ideal solution consists for the all worst values 
attainable of criteria (Wang, 2007). 
8.3. A BRIEF REVIEW OF PAST RESEARCHES ON FTOPSIS 
In Chapters 4 and 5 respectively FAHP and ER were implemented. Apart from the fact 
that both techniques were decision making tools specifically FAHP was used for 
calculating the weights of the risk factors while ER also was used when experts are not 
one hundred percent sure to believe in an assumption but only to certain degrees of 
belief. In this chapter it is intended to use another decision making technique (i.e. 
FTOPSIS) which has not been used before in the thesis. More features of FTOPSIS are 
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detailed in the following sections. There are many fuzzy TOPSIS methods proposed by 
various researchers. The latest contributions are described as follows. 
Chen (2000) has used the extensions of the TOPSIS for group decision-making under a 
fuzzy environment. As per the theory of the TOPSIS, he has defined a closeness 
coefficient to conclude the ranking order of air alternatives by calculating the distances 
to both the fuzzy positive-ideal solution and fuzzy negative-ideal solution at the same 
time. Yurdakul and Ic (2005) by using the F AHP and FTOPSIS methods have 
developed a performance measurement model that could be used to get an overall 
performance score by measuring the success of a manufacturing company in its 
operational activities. In another instance Zarghaami et aI, (2007) have used the 
TOPSIS technique as a fuzzy multiple attribute decision making on their water 
resources projects case study for ranking water transfers to Zayanderud basin in Iran. 
Buyukozkan et ai, (2008) for selection of the strategic alliance partner in logistics value 
chain after creating the evaluation criteria hierarchy and computation of the criteria 
weights by applying the AHP method, have used the FTOPSIS to get the fmal partner 
ranking results. 
Ebrahimnejad et ai, (2009) have used the TOPSIS in a fuzzy decision-making model for 
risk ranking with an application to an onshore gas refmery. Furthermore they have 
proposed that the selection of a proper MCDM model for risk ranking depends on the 
project's nature, the precision of data gathered on risk and knowledge. Dagdeviren et ai, 
(2009) in their work have developed an evaluation model based on the AHP and the 
TOPSIS, to help the users in defence industries for the selection of optimal weapon 
under fuzzy environments where the vagueness and subjectivity are handled with 
linguistic values parameterised by TFNs. Another example is Celik et aI, (2009)'s work 
i.e. application of axiomatic design and TOPSIS methodologies under fuzzy 
environments for proposing competitive strategies on Turkish container ports in 
maritime transportation network. Ertugrul and Karakasoglu (2009) in their work have 
used F AHP method for determining the weights of the criteria by decision makers and 
then rankings of the Turkish cement firms were calculated by a FTOPSIS method. The 
proposed method was used for evaluating the performance of the 15 Turkish cement 
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firms in the Istanbul Stock Exchange by using their financial tables. Then the rankings 
of the finns were determined according to their results. As mentioned by Kandakoglu et 
ai, (2009) they have used both F AHP and FTOPSIS to support the critical decision 
process on shipping registry selection under multiple criteria. In the latest work Torfi et 
ai, (2010) have used a FAHP to compute the relative weights of their evaluation criteria 
and FTOPSIS to rank their alternatives. 
In this thesis a F AHP method has been used for calculating the relative weights of the 
risk factors (i.e. criteria) and here in this part by extending the F AHP, FTOPSIS can be 
utilised for selecting the most suitable alternatives i.e. mitigation factors. As in Chapter 
4 while using F AHP, relative weights of the risk factors in offshore terminals and 
marine ports were calculated. Therefore in this chapter FTOPSIS is based on the 
existing literatures will be utilised hereafter. 
8.4. THE FTOPSIS METHODOLOGY 
The principles of a TOPSIS technique is based on selecting the best alternative, which 
has the shortest distance from the positive-ideal solution and the longest distance from 
the negative-ideal solution (Hwang and Yoon, 1981). It is often difficult for a decision 
maker to allocate an accurate performance rating to an alternative for the criteria under 
investigation. The good point of using a fuzzy approach is to allocate the relative 
importance of the criteria using fuzzy numbers instead of precise numbers. This 
research expands the TOPSIS to the fuzzy environment. The Fuzzy MCDM can be 
briefly illustrated in a matrix format as shown in Equation 8.1 and Equation 8.2. 
Cl C2 Cj ···C" 
AI XII X I2 Xln 
A2 ,..... X 21 X 22 X2n 
= 15 (8.1) Ai Xli 
Am ,..., X ml X m2 x"'" 
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(8.2) 
where Xij' i = 1; 2; ... ,m;j = 1,2, ... , n and Vlj,j = 1,2, ... , n are linguistic TFNs, 
xij = (aij. bij• Cij) and Wj = (ajV bj2• Cj3)' Note that Xij is the performance rating of the 
ith alternative, Ai, with respect to the jth criterion, Wj represents the weight of the jth 
criterion, Cj . The normalised fuzzy decision matrix denoted by R is shown in Equation 
8.3: 
R = [rhlmxn (8.3) 
The weighted fuzzy normalised decision matrix is depicted in Equation 8.4: 
Vll V 12 Vln mrll W2r l2 wnrln 
V= V 21 V 22 V2n = W1r21 W2r22 wnr2n (8.4) 
V m1 V n2 Vmn mrmJ W2rm2 Wnrmn 
The advantage of using a fuzzy approach is to allocate the relative importance of the 
risk factors using fuzzy numbers rather than exact numbers. This study utilises the 
TOPSIS under fuzzy envir.onments. This technique is particularly appropriate for 
solving the group decision making problems under fuzzy environments. Using the 
mentioned fuzzy approach, the designed fuzzy TOPSIS process is then defined as 
follows (Torfi, 2010): 
Step 1: Select the linguistic variable (Xij) i = I, 2, ... , m; j = I, 2, ... , n for mitigation 
options with respect to risk factors and the appropriate linguistic variables (Vlj; j = 1, 
2, ... , n) for the weights of the risk factors. The fuzzy linguistic variable (Xij) preserves 
the property that the ranges of normalised TFNs belong to [0, 1]; thus, there is no need 
for a normalisation procedure. For example, the 15 defined by Equation 8.1 is equivalent 
to the R defined by Equation 8.3. 
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Step 2: Create the weighted normalised fuzzy decision matrix. The weighted normalised 
value V is determined by Equation 8.4. 
Step 3: Select the positive ideal (A'") and negative ideal (A-) solutions. The fuzzy 
positive ideal solution (FPIS, A*) and the fuzzy negative ideal solution (FNIS, A-) are 
shown in Equation 8.5 and Equation 8.6: 
A* = {vt, Vii"" V;} = {(maxiVijl i = I, ... , m),j=l, 2, ... , n} 
A- = {V1-,VZ-, .,', Vn-} = {(minivijl i = I, ... , m),j=l, 2, ... , n} 
(8.5) 
(8.6) 
Maximum and minimum operations do not give TFN but it is likely to state the 
approximated values of minimum and maximum as TFNs (Kwang, 2005). It is known 
that the elements Vij 'tIiJ are normalised positive TFNs and their ranges belong to the 
closed interval [0, I]. Thus, it can defme the fuzzy positive ideal solution and the 
negative ideal solution as vt= (1, I, 1) and Vi-= (0, 0, 0), j=l, 2, ... , n (Isiklar and 
Buyukozkan, 2006). 
Step 4: Determine the separation measures. The distance of any mitigation option from 
A* and A- can be estimated using Equation 8.7 and Equation 8.8. 
n 
dl~= '" d (v .. v-~) " =1 2 m L..J I}'}, , , ... , (8.7) 
n 
di= Ld (Vijl Vj-), i =1,2, ... , m (8.8) 
j=l 
Step 5: Determine the similarities to ideal solution. This step resolves the similarities to 
an ideal solution by Equation 8.9: 
d~ 
CC. = I 
1 d~+d~ 
t t 
(8.9) 
Step 6: Ranking the mitigation options. Select a mitigation option with maximum CC; 
or rank mitigation options according to cet in downward order (Yang and Hung, 2007). 
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8.5. RISK MITIGATION 
Risk mitigation is a decision making process whereby actions are taken in view of the 
outcomes of risk assessment. Standard risk prevention strategies aim either at reducing 
the probability of an incident (pre-accident intervention) or at minimising the degree of 
fatalities if the accident occurs (post-accident intervention). This process is generally 
combined with Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) for optimal decision-making (UNCTAD, 
2006). 
eBA is one of the best standard methods for identifying the best benefit-to-cost ratio, 
typically by contrasting loss earnings, or the cost of failure, in opposition to the benefits 
of fulfilment. CBA was first introduced by the Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) 
guidelines as approved by IMO in 2001 and later on adopted in agendas such as 
regulatory assessment of maritime security (UNCTAD, 2006). 
In another instance IRM (2002) expresses risk treatment as a process of selecting and 
implementing measures to modify the risk. Risk treatment includes as its major element, 
risk control/mitigation, but extends further, for example, risk avoidance, risk transfer, 
risk financing etc. 
In this respect Ward (2005) explains that a proactive RM is an ex ante approach to 
handling uncertainty. The focus is usually the identification of potential threats and 
planning for and influencing future events. Where uncertainty presents potential future 
threats, a proactive RM seeks to modify the future incidence and quality of threats and 
their possible impact on performance goals. 
Nevertheless, Ward (2005) argues that on the other hand a reactive RM is an after-the-
end approach, usually concerned with mitigating the effects of threats that have 
occurred, when in managing crisis situations. An effective reactive RM requires the 
capability to rapidly identify and respond to a wide range of possible events in order for 
problems to be remedied. 
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Figure 8.1: Proactive and reactive management of uncertainty. 
Source: Based on Ward (2005) 
Ultimately as Irukwu (1991) explains once hazards have been identified and the 
associated risks assessed, all techniques to manage risks fall into one or more of these 
four major categories: 
• Avoidance (eliminate, withdraw or not become involved). 
• Reduction (optimise - mitigate). 
• Sharing (transfer - outsource or insure). 
• Retention (accept and budget). 
In Chapters 4. 5. 6 and 7 all of the discussed risk factors identified through the literature 
review (see Chapter 2) were assessed, evaluated and analysed. In this chapter in order to 
complete the RM framework it is necessary to complete this cycle via a mitigation 
phase. In this respect for mitigating the risk factors first it is essential to identify the 
different mitigation strategies or sources and then by utilising an appropriate methodical 
means to prioritise them for their application purposes. 
As it was shown before in Figure 4.3 different sources of risks and uncertainties in 
offshore terminals and marine ports were divided into two main categories of the 
external (country and business risk factors) and internal (organisational and operational 
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risk factors) risk factors. Nevertheless in order to manage the mentioned risk factors it is 
necessary to identify the most ideal strategies for their mitigation. Figure 8.2 illustrates 
a decision hierarchy structured for selection of the best strategies to mitigate the hazards 
or risk factors in offshore teInlinals and marine ports. 
Goal 
Alternatives selection for mitigating 
risk factors 
Alternatives 
Figure S.2: Decision making using 10 alternatives for mitigating risk factors in offshore 
teIminals and marine ports (see Table 8.1). 
8.6. IDEAL ALTERNATIVES FOR RISK MITIGATION 
8.6.1. Deregulation and privatisation 
To meet challenges of globalisation, ports have to increase both capacity and efficiency 
while reducing costs. Traditionally, ports were not only publicly owned but also 
politically controlled and regulated. This replaces the possibility of market failure 
(because the port is a monopoly and not subject to competitive disciplines) with state 
failure: inefficient ports, choking trade and development. To overcome these sorts of 
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problems there are two possible remedies, deregulation or privatisation (UNCTAD, 
1995; ICS, 2007 and World Bank, 2007). 
Deregulation is the reduction of the role of the government in an enterprise, with market 
forces replacing government regulation as the regulator of acceptable industry 
performance (ICS, 2007). 
When valuable competition can be maintained in the related markets and activities, 
privatisation has been demonstrated to have huge prospects for reducing costs and 
getting better service quality. Without competition, privatisation can still bring some 
improvements, but the gains are quite restricted (World Bank, 2007). 
A review of the top 100 container ports in the world carried out in 1997 showed that 88 
of these ports have been privatised to some degree (Juhel, 200 1). The extensive carrying 
out of port privatisation policies in Asia, North America, Europe and Latin America is 
explained, respectively in Cull inane and Song (2001), Ircha (2001), Notteboom and 
Winkelmans (2001), Hofmann (2001) and Stache et ai, (2002). Juhel (2001) expands on 
a new global perspective on port privatisation. 
8.6.2. Quality standards: IMS (ISO: 9000,14000,18000) and ISO 20000 
Economic uncertainty has forced companies to find ways to become more efficient in 
order to maintain their profitability and integrity. Formal performance improvement 
programmes such as ISO series of 9000, 14000, 18000 which as a whole are called 
Integrated Management Systems (IMS), and also ISO 20000 helps companies to 
improve their quality and operational efficiency, granting companies a competitive edge 
(ICS, 2007; UNCTAD, 1995; ISO, 2002; Oakland, 2002; BPM, 2010 and DNV, 2010). 
One of the earlier examples of Quality Management Systems is the case of the Port of 
Nantes in France which is available in UNCTAD (1998) monographs on port 
management. In the monograph the following features of the Quality Management 
Systems used within the mentioned port are detailed: 
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• The development of quality schemes: 
Beginning of the projects. 
Design of the schemes. 
Choice of activities. 
The question of certification. 
• Quality management at the agri-food terminal: 
Treatment of incoming vessels - quality charter. 
The quality of the agri-food tenninal technical facilities. 
Cargo handling. 
• Another aspect of quality - safety at the oil terminal: 
Use of industrial hazard analysis. 
Production of safety recommendations. 
Recommendations for vessels calling at the oil terminal. 
Evaluating the benefits. 
Additionally one of the latest examples for IMS implementation is the case of the Port 
ofFelixstowe in February 2011 (Port ofFelixstowe, 2011). 
Based on BPM (2010) and others the following are brief descriptions for ISO series that 
can be used as risk mitigation options (alternatives) during ports and offshore terminals 
operations and managements. 
8.6.2.1. ISO 9000 
Quality Management ISO 9000 is rapidly becoming the most essential international 
standard since it ensures quality, saves money and helps ports and offshore terminals to 
convince customer expectations. ISO 9000 provides a quality management system for 
recovering and controlling the quality of services and products. It also decreases the 
costs linked with lesser quality management processes, making ports and terminals 
more competitive (BPM, 2010 and ISO, 2000). 
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In addition organisations such as ports and tenninals for achieving world-class 
performance can use the framework shown in Figure 8.3 as defined by Oakland (2002). 
As it can be seen in his framework ISO 9000 is a key factor for analysing the processes. 
Figure 8.3: The framework for total organisational excellence 
Source: Based on Oakland (2002) 
OCIMF (2004) explains that marine terminals should have a management system in 
place which is able to demonstrate and document proof of compliance with regulatory 
requirements and company policy and procedures. Terminal management should 
--designate a person to be responsible for ensuring compliance with the regulations and 
company policy and procedures. Furthermore terminals should seek assurance that 
vessels visiting their berths comply with applicable international, national and local 
marine regulations. 
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8.6.2.2. ISO 14000 
Environmental Management ISO 14000 ensures that offshore terminals and marine 
ports reduce the consequence of their activities on the environment by executing 
specific controls at the process stage. ISO 14000 enables ports and terminals to 
decrease the penalties and fines imposed when environmental laws are violated. 
Furthermore, the acceptance of ISO 14000 reduces waste, cutting down overhead, and 
ensuring the efficient use of materials (BPM, 2010). 
In this respect as OCIMF (2004) explains, marine terminals should have procedures in 
place for the handling or control of waste and harmful emissions generated as a result 
of its operations. For this purpose terminals should have terminal oiVchemical spill 
response or contingency plans and should at regular intervals carry out oil spill 
response drills. For this purpose by implementing ISO 14000, it will help to meet all the 
required criteria. 
8.6.2.3. ISO 18000 
Occupational Health and Safety Management System (OHSMS) ISO 18000 can be 
applied by sea ports and offshore terminals as a part of their RM scheme to address 
changing legislatien and look after their labour force. An OHSMS promotes a safe and 
healthy working environment by providing a framework that permits ports and 
terminals to constantly discover and manage their health and safety risks, reduce the 
probability of accidents, help legislative fulfilment and improve overall performance 
(BPM, 2010). 
As per OCIMF (2004) marine terminals should have dynamic and broad safety 
programmes intended to deliver a high level of safety performance in respect of fire 
protection, access to the terminal, notices (warninglsafety/pollutionlsecurity), life 
saving , first aid, occupational health and hazardous substances. In this respect ISO 
18000 can meet all these challenges. 
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8.6.2.4. ISO 20000 
Technology Management ISO 20000 is an IT governance scheme planned to regulate 
IT policy by adopting standard best practice procedures in IT service. ISO 20000 is 
rapidly becoming essential to modem business, while IT and business become more 
dependent on each other. By attaining fulfilment under ISO 20000, offshore terminals 
and marine ports can boost the efficiency for delivery of IT services by providing an 
expertise framework (BPM, 2010 and ISO, 20000, 2010). 
8.6.3. Safety cases and safety reports 
Based on Wilson et ai, (1995) .. the purpose of a safety case is to present a clear, 
comprehensive and defensible argument supported by calculation and procedure that a 
system or installation will be acceptably safe throughout its life (and 
decommissioning)" . 
In seaports, especially petrochemical ones and in offshore terminals whether in the form 
of floating structures such as LNG FPSOs etc or in the form of fIXed structures e.g. 
fixed offshore terminals for loading and unloading of LNG tanker ships, the safety case 
and safety reports play an important role in meeting standards, certifications, for 
insurance purposes etc. Without conducting an appropriate safety case and safety report, 
if an offshore terminal continues to operate, it will be difficult for the operators to 
defend any claim raised against them after a potential accident or incident occurs. 
8.6.4. Health, Safety and Environment Management Systems (HSE-MS) 
Based on WG and BP (2011) in most countries an inclusive legal structure exists that 
necessitates companies to handle their own HSE matters in such a way to anticipate, 
avoid and restrict occupational injuries, ill health and harm to the environment. 
Availability of an appropriate HSE Management System (HSE-MS) with the intention 
of fulfilment with these requirements is necessary. It is based on the widely recognised 
management systems discussed earlier i.e. IMS. 
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HSEMS can be integrated with the management of other aspects of the business e.g. in 
offshore terminals and marine ports in order to: 
• Minimise risk to individuals and the euvironment. 
• Improve business performance. 
• Assist ports and offshore terminals to establish a responsible image within the market 
place and on behalf of stakeholders. 
8.6.5. Internal audits and in-spections 
As per APB (1995) and OCIMF (2004) the internal control system includes the control 
environment and control procedures. It contains all the policies and procedures (internal 
controls) adopted by the directors and management of an entity to help in attaining their 
objective of ensuring, so far as possible, the tidy and competent manner of its business, 
including obedience to internal policies, the protection of assets, the avoidance and 
identification of fraud and error, the precision and unity of the accounting records and 
appropriate preparation of consistent financial information. 
For instance inspections of the foreign entering vessels by Port State Control (PSC) 
under IMO and ILO regulations are examples of internal audits/controls/inspections in 
sea ports and offshore tenninals. This process internationally is known as ships' vetting. 
8.6.6 Vessel Traffic Management Systems (VTMS) 
Successful VTM is essential to the safety of sea ports, offshore terminals and waterways. 
The United States and other maritime countries have had complexity in establishing 
reasonable criteria for selecting ports requiring vessel traffic systems and for knowing 
the level of complexity of the VTMS required. The importance of the VTM becomes 
such that the US congress directed the USCG to reconsider the Vessel Traffic Service 
(VTS) acquirement with focus on meeting user requirements (Harrald and Merrick, 
2000). 
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8.6.7. ISPS Code 
In recent times offshore terminals and marine ports have turned into parts of critical 
infrastructure within the trading system. Some places categorize them as "hub Ports" 
that due to their size and capacity have become vital to the global supply chain 
(Bateman, 2003 and APEC, 2003). Current post September 11, 2001 concerns about 
maritime commerce relate to the impact of a terrorist incident in such a location and the 
disorderly result on seaborne trade. However an efficient ISPS Code regime during 
maritime trade will require more than just the carrying out of these systems but the 
recognition and response to organisational complexity at two levels: (1) at sea ports and 
port-related infrastructures e.g. offshore terminals or petrochemical ports and (2) within 
the interrelated "system of systems" that is the world maritime trading network (Bames, 
2004). 
8.6.8. Port Risk Manager (PRM) 
The role of the PRM is like the discussions about the role of port planners in port 
strategic planning. However both of these tasks should be kept fIrmly within 
management. Instead; risk managers can contribute to RM development by acting as 
"fmders of strategies", as "analysts", and as "catalysts", in much the same way as 
Mintzberg (1994) planners can contribute to strategy development. 
The AIRMIC propose that the corporate risk manager (the same is applicable for port 
risk manager) should take action as a coordinator and advisor with responsibilities such 
as to (Butterworth, Reddaway and Benson, 1996): 
• Design an integrated RM strategy, philosophy, and policy statement for 
communication all through the organisation. 
• Launch and preserve a detailed RM methodology suitable to the company's 
requirements; to contain formalised hazard identification techniques, 
quantitative and qualitative risk assessment and cost effective methods for risk 
reduction and transfer. 
• Monitor the application and efficiency of RM. 
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8.7. APPLICATION OF THE FTOPSIS ON OFFSHORE TERMINALS AND 
MARINE PORTS 
In Chapter 4 all of the relative weights for risk factors (i.e. criteria) in offshore terminals 
and marine ports by use of the F AHP method were calculated. In this Chapter ten 
mitigation options (i.e. alternatives) which were identified previously in Section 8.2 will 
be applied on offshore terminals and marine ports using the FTOPSIS method. This 
process is carried out to rank the alternatives as per their priorities for risk mitigation 
purposes as per the following steps: 
Step I: At this stage of the decision procedure, the established decision matrices are 
based on the evaluation sheet shown in Appendix VI. It is used for comparing ten 
alternatives (mitigation options) for each of the criterion (risk factor) separately. 
Furthermore for the fuzzy evaluation of the established matrices in order to evaluate the 
alternatives, linguistic variables were used. TFNs in this chapter were preferred to 
represent the linguistic variables as shown in Table 5.1 and Figure 5.1 (Yang and Hung, 
2007) respectively. 
The same experts introduced in Chapter 4 have contributed to the evaluation purposes 
here in this chapter. After collecting the experts' opinions through the evaluation sheet 
constructed, explained and depicted in Appendix VI by using Equation 6.5 the results of 
the evaluations while using Equation 8.1 and Equation 8.2 are calculated and illustrated 
in Tables 8.l, 8.2, 8.3 and 8.4. Furthermore criteria or attributes used in these tables are 
the Level 2 risk factors which were developed in the form of a risk-based model in 
Chapter 4. Moreover the relative weights calculated in Chapter 4 for the Level 2 risk 
factors are used in these tables to develop the fuzzy weighted decision tables in the next 
step. 
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Table S.l: Evaluation matrix for alternatives to mitigate the country risk factors. 
Alternatives Cl (Rll) C2 (Rl2) CJ(RIJ) C4(R14) C5(RlS) 
At (0.75, 1.00, 1.00) (0.42,0.67,092) (0.67, 0.'2, 1.00) (0.50, 0.75, 1.00) (0.00. 0.08, 0.33) 
A2 (0.75,1.00, LOO) (0.75, 1.00, 1.00) (0.75, 1.00, 1.00) (0.75, 1.00, 1.00) (0.75, 1.00, 1.00) 
A3 (0.00, 0.00, 0;25) (0.00,0.00,0.25) (6.17, 0.42, 0.67) (0.75, 1.00, 1.00) (0.75,1.00,1.00) 
A4 (0.00, 0.00, 0.25) (0.00,0.00,0.25) (0.00, 0.00, 0.25) (0.75, 1.00, 1.00) (0.08, 0.33, 0.58) 
AS (0.00, 0.00, 0.25) (0.00,0.00,0.25) (0.00, 0.00, 0.25) (0.75,1.00,1.00) (0.75, 1.00, 1.00) 
A6 (0.00, 0.00, 0.25) (0.00, 0.00, 0.Z5) (0.00, 0.00, 0.25) (0.58, 0.83, 1.00) (0.75,1.00,1.00) 
A7 (0.00, 0.08, 0.33) (0.00,0.00,0.25) (0.00, 0.00, 0.25) (0.75,1.00, 1.00) (0.75, 1.00, 1.00) 
AS (0.00, 0.00, 0.25) (0.00,0.00,0.25) (0.00, 0.00, 0.25) (0.58, 0.83, 1.00) (0.75, 1.00, 1.00) 
A9 (0.00, 0.00, 0.25) (0.08, 0.33,0.58) (0.00, 0.00, 0.25) (0.25, 0.50, 0.75) (0.75, 1.00, 1.00) 
AIO (0.00, 0.00, 0.25) (0.00, 0.00,0.25) (0.00, 0.00, 0.25) (0.75, 1.00, 1.00) (0.75,1.00,1.00) 
Weight 0.312 0.061 0.052 0.204 0.371 
Table 8.2: Evaluation matrix for alternatives to mitigate the business risk factors. 
Alternatives Cl (R21) C2(R22) C3 (R23) 
At (0.75, 1.00, 1.00) (0.08, 0.33, 0.58) (o.g, 0.83, 1.00) 
A2 (0.75, 1.00, 1.00) (0.58, 0.83, 1.00) (0.75, 1.00, 1.00) 
A3 (0.75, 1.00, 1.00) (0.00, 0.00, 0.25) (0.75, 1.00, 1.00) 
A4 (0.00, 0.00, 0.25) (0.00, 0.00, 0.25) (0.00, 0.00, 0.15) 
AS (0.00,0.00,0.25) (0.00, 0.00, 0.25) (0.00, 0.00, 0.25) 
A6 (0.75, 1.00, 1.00) (0.00, 0.08, 0.33) (0.00,0.17,0.42) 
A7 (0.75, 1.00, 1.00) (0.00, 0.00, 0.:Z5) (0.00, 0.00, 0.:z5) 
A8 (0.75,1.00, 1.00) (0.00, 0.00, 0.25) (0.67, 0.92, 1.00) 
A9 (0.00,0.00,0.15) (0.00, 0.00, O.l.~ (0.00, 0.00, 0.25) 
AtO (0.75, 1.00, 1.00) (0.00, 0.00, 0.25) (0.00, 0.08, 0.33) 
Weight 0.566 0.357 0.080 
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Table 8.3: Evaluation matrix for alternatives to mitigate the organisational risk factors. 
Alternatives Cl (R31) C2 (R32) C3 (R33) C4 (R34) CS (R3S) 
Al (0.08, 0.33, 0.58) (0.33, 0.42, 0.67) (0.%5, 0.50, 0. 75) (0.33, 0.58, O.83) (U8, 0.83, UO) 
A2 (0.58, 0.83, 1.00) (0.75, 1.00,1.00) (0.75, 1.00, 1.00) (0.75,1.00,I.00) (0.75, 1.00, 1.00) 
A3 (0.75,1.00,1.00) (0.75, 1.00,1.00) (0.75, 1.00, 1.00) (0.75,1.00,1.00) (0.75,1.00,1.00) 
A4 (0.00, 0.00, US) (0.00, 0.00, 0.25) (0.00, 0.00, o.z5) (0.00, 0.00, O.%S) (0.00, 0.00, 0.%s) 
AS (0.00, 0.00, 0.%5) (0.58, 0.83, 0.75) (0.00, 0.%5, 1.00) (0.75,1.00,1.00) (0.00, 0.00, 0.%5) 
A6 (0.58, 0.83, 1.00) (0.67, 0.92, 1.00) (0.67, 0.92, 1.00) (0.58, 0.83, 1.00) (0.75, 1.00, 1.00) 
A7 (0.25, 0.50, 0.7S) (0.75,1.00,1.00) (0.75,1.00,1.00) (0.67,0.92, 1.00) (0.67, 0.92, 1.00) 
A8 (0.00,0.00,0.%5) (0.00, 0.00, 0.25) (0.00, 0.00, 0.25) (0.00, 0.00, O.%S) (0.00, 0.00, 0.25) 
A9 (0.00,0.00,0.%5) (0.58, 0.83, 1.00) (O.SO, 0.75, 1.00) (0.00,0.17,0.42) (0.00, 0.00, o.zS) 
AIO (0.75, 1.00, 1.00) (0.75,1.00,1.00) (0.75, 1.00, 1.00) (0.75, 1.00, 1.00) (0.75, 1.00, 1.00) 
Weight 0.161 0.122 0.353 O.US 0.246 
Table 8.4: Evaluation matrix for alternatives to mitigate the operational risk factors. 
Alternatives 
-Cl (R41) C2 (R42) C3 (R43) C4 (R44) CS (R4S) C6(R46) 
At (0.00,0.00, U5) (0.00, 9.00, 0.25) (8.00, 0.00, 0.15) (0.00, 0.00, 0.25) (0.00,0.00, 0.25) (0.00, 0.00, D.l..'1) 
A2 (0.00, 0.00, U5) (0.00, 0.00, 0.25) (0.00, 0.00, U5) (0.75, 1.00, 1.00) (0.00, 0.00, 0.25) (0.75,1.00,1.00) 
A3 (0.00, O.lS, 0.50) (0.00,0.17,0.41) (0...1,0.67,0.92) (0.67,0.92, 1.00) (0.75, 1.00, 1.00) (0.75, 1.00, 1.00) 
A4 (0.08, 0.33, 0.58) (0;00, 0.15, O.SO) (0.75, 1.00, 1.00) (0.01, 0.33, 0.58) (0.00,0.17, 0A2) (0.17, 0.42, 0.67) 
AS (0.75, 1.00, 1.00) (0.67, 0.92, 1.00) (0.00, 0.17, 0.41) (0.00, 0.17, OA1) (0.01, 0.33, 0.58) (0.17,0.42,0.67) 
A6 (0.75, J .00, 1.00) (0.75, 1.00, 1.00) (0.08, 0.33, 0.58) (0.00, 0.17, 0A2) (0.75, 1.00, 1.00) (0.67,0.92, 1.00) 
A7 (0.75, 1.00, 1.00) (0.75, 1.00, 1.00) (0.75, 1.00, 1.00) (8.58, 0.92, 1.00) (0.75, 1.00, 1.00) (0.75, 1.00, 1.110) 
A8 (0.75, 1.00, 1.00) (0.75, 1.00, 1.00) (0.75, 1.00, UNI) (0.00, 0.00, 0.2..'1) (0.75, 1.00, 1.00) (0.67, o.n, 1.00) 
A9 (O.SO, 0.7S, 1.00) (0.75,1.00,1.00) (0.00, 0.17, 0.42) (0.00, 0.00, 0.25) (0.00, 0.08, 0.33) (0.00, 0.08, 0.33) 
AIO (0.75, 1.00, 1.00) (0.75, 1.00, 1.00) (0.75, 1.00, 1.00) (0.75, 1.00, 1.00) (0.75,1.00,1.00) (0.75,1.00,1.00) 
Weight 0.186 0.297 0.178 0.007 0.243 0.089 
Step 2: After the fuzzy evaluation matrix was determined, the next step is to obtain a 
fuzzy weighted decision table. Using the criteria weights calculated by F AHP in 
Chapter 4 through this step, the weighted evaluation matrices are established using 
Equation 8.3 and Equation 8.4. 
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Step 3: The resulting fuzzy weighted decision matrices are shown in Tables 8.5, 8.6,8.7 
and 8.8. 
Table 8.5: Weighted evaluation for the alternatives to mitigate the country risk factors. 
Alternatives Cl (RH) C2 (RI2) C3 (R13) C4(R14) C5(R15) 
At (0.134,0.312, 0.312) (0.026. 0.041, 0.056) (0.035, 0.041, tI.OS1) (UIl, 0.15.5, O.lO4) (0.000, O.e.so, o.m) 
A2 (0.23<1,0.312, 0.3U) (0.046, 0.061. 8..061) (O.03'.O.osl, 8.052) (0.15.5, O.lO4, 8..204) (0.271, 0.371, Cl.l71) 
A3 (0.000, 0.000, 0.078) (0.000,0.000, 0.015) (O.G09, 0.022, 8..035) (U", G.l04, Cl.104) (0.l7l, 0.371. 0.371) 
A4 (0.000, 0.000, 0.078) (0.000.0.000, 8..015) (0.000,0.000. "'U) (8.153. O.lO4, Cl.104) (O.ll.JO, 0.122, Cl.l15) 
A5 (0.000, 0.000. 0.078) (0.000. 0.000, 0.115) (8.000, 0.000. o.oU) (U", 8.Z04, Cl.104) (0.l7l, 0.371, 0.371) 
A6 (0.000, 8..110, e.o78) (0.000.0.110, 8..015) (0.000,0.000. O.OU) (8..111. U69. Cl.104) (1.271.0.371, Cl..J71) 
A7 (0.000. 0.025, 0.10.5) (0.000.0.000, e.ol5) (0.000, 0.000. o.OU) (0.1". '.D4, Cl.l04) (0.271, 0.311, L!'71) 
A8 (0.000,0.000, 0.078) (0.000.0.000, 0.015) (0.000, '.000. "'U) (O.UI, 0.169, 0.204) (Ool7I, 0.371, 0.371) 
A9 (0.000,0.000, 0.071) (0.005, 0.020, 0.0.55) (0.000, 0.000, O.OU) (0.051.0.102, 0.1") (8.271, 0.311, Cl..J71) 
AIO (0.000,0.110, 0.071) (0.000,0.000, 0.015) (0.000,0.000, "'U) (0.1",0.%04, Cl.l04) (0.l7l, 8.371, 0.371) 
A* (1.000. 1.000. 1.000) (1.000. 1.000, 1.000) (1.000, 1.000, 1.000) (1.000. 1.000, 1.000) (1.000. UOO, 1.000) 
A- (0.000. 0.110, 0.000) (0.000. 0.000. 0.000) (0.000,0.000, 0.000) (0.000. 0.000. MOO) (0.000 .... 00. 0.000) 
Table 8.6: Weighted evaluation for the alternatives to mitigate the business risk factors. 
Alternatives Cl (R21) C2(R22) C3 (R23) 
Al (0.424,0.566, 0.5(6) (0.029,0,118,0.207) (0.046, 0.066, 0.080) 
A2 (0.424, 0.566, 0_'i66) (0.207, 0.296, 0.257) (0.060, 0.080, 0.080) 
A3 (0.424,0.566, 0.M6) (0.000, 0.000, 0.089) (0.060, 0.080, 0.080) 
A4 (0.000,0.000,0.141) (0.000, 0.000, 0.089) (0.000, 0.000, 0.020) 
A5 (0.000,0.000,0.141) (0.000, 0.000, 0.089) (0.000, 0.000, 0.020) 
A6 (0.424, O_~ 0_'i66) (0.000, 0.029, 0.118) (0.000,0.014, 0.034) 
A7 (0.424,0.566, 0.5(6) (0.000, 0.000, 0.089) (0.000,0.000,0.020) 
A8 (0.424, 0.566, 0.5(6) (0.000, 0.000, 0.089) (0.054,0.074,0.080) 
A9 (0.000,0.000,0.141) (0.000, 0.000, 0.089) (0.000, 0.000, 0.020) 
AIO (0.424, 0.566, 0.5(6) (0.000, 0.000, 0.089) (0.000, 0.006, 0.026) 
A* (1.000,1.000, 1.000) (1.000, 1.000, 1.000) (1.000, 1.000, 1.000) 
A- (0.000,0.000, 0.000) (0.000, 0.000, 0.000) (0.000, 0.000, 0.000) 
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Table 8.7: Weighted evaluation for the alternatives to mitigate the organisational risk factors. 
Alternatives Cl (R31) C2 (R32) C3 (R33) C4 (R34) CS (R3S) 
Al (0.001,0.053, 0.093) (0.040, 0.051, 0.0.1) (0.088, 8.176, 0.l65) (0.839. 0.868, 8.0911) (0.143. 0.184, 0.].46) 
A2 (8.093.0.134, 8.161) (0.091, 0.111, 0.111) (O.~S, 0.353, 0.353) (0.088, '.118, 0.118) (0.1114,0.146, D.lA6) 
A3 (O.IlI, 0.161, o.J61) (0.091, D.111, 0.112) (0.265, 0.353, 0.353) (0.088, 0.118, 0.118) (0.1"', 0.246, 0.].46) 
A4 (0.00&, 0.000, 0.001) (0.000, 0.000, 0.030) (0.000. 0.000, 0.088) (0.000, 0.000, 0.019) (0.000,0.000. 0.061) 
AS (0.000, 0.000, 0.048) (0.071, 0.101, 0.121) (0.000, 0.0'8, 0.353) (0.088, 0.118, 0.118) (0.000, '.000. 0.061) 
A6 (0.093. 0.134, D.161) (0.082, D.IU, 0.122) (0.236. 0.325. 0.353) (D.06B, 0.098, 0.118) (0.1 .... U.6, 0.].46) 
A7 (0.040,0.080,0.121) (0.0\11. 0.111, 0.111) (O.~S, 0.353. 0.353) (0.079, 0.109. 0.118) (0.165,0.226, 0.].46) 
AS (0.000. 0.000, 0. .... ) (0.000, 0.000, 0.030) (0.000, 0.000, 0.088) (0.000. 0.000. O.02!1) (0.000. 0.000. 0.0(1) 
A9 (0.000, 0.000, 0 ..... ) (0.071, 0.101, 0.1l2) (0.176,0.265,0.353) (0.000, 0.020. 0.050) (0.000, 0.000. 0.0(1) 
AIO (0.121,0.161,0.161) (0.091. O.lll, 0.112) (O.~s, 0.353. 0.353) (0.088, 0.118, 0.118) (0.1"', 0.146, 0.].46) 
A* (1.000, 1.000, 1.000) (1.000, 1.000, 1.000) (1.000, 1.000, 1.000) (1.000, 1.000, 1.000) (1.000,1.000,1.000) 
A- (0.000, 0.000, 0.000) (0.000, 0.000, 0.000) (0.000. 0.000, 0.000) (0.000, 0.000. 0.000) (0.000, 0.000. 0.000) 
Table 8.8: Weighted evaluation for the alternatives to mitigate the operational risk factors. 
Alteratives Cl (R41) C2 (R42) C3(R43) C4(R44) C5(R45) C6 (R46) 
Al (0.000, 0.000, 0.009) (0.000, 0.000, 0.074) (0.000.0.000, 0.0«) (0.000, 0.000, 0.0(2) (0.000,0.000, 0.061) (0.000, '.000.0.1106) 
A2 (0.000, 0.000, 0.009) (0.000,0.000,0.074) (0.000,0.000, 0.044) (0.005, 0.007, 0.007) (0.000,0.000, 0.061) (0.067,0.8119,0.019) 
A3 (0.-000, 0.009, 0.017) (0.000.0.050,0.125) (0.075,0.11',0.164) (O.OO!I, 0.006, 0.0(7) (0.11l, 0.143, O.lo43) (0.067,0.8119,0.019) 
A4 (0.001,0.061,0.108) (0.000,0.074,0.1011) (0.133,0.171, U71) (8.001, 0.002, 0.004) (0.000,0.041,0.102) (0.015,0.031, Il.060) 
AS (0.13f, 0.186, 0.186) (0.1", 0.273, D.lf7) (0.000, 0.030, 0.075) (0.000,0.001, 0.003) (0.019,0.080, 0.141) (0.01', 0.037, 0.060) 
A6 (O.I3f, 0.186, 0.186) (0.223,0.297, 0.lf7) (0.014,0.059,0.103) (0.000,0.001, 0.003) (0.112, 0.243, 0.l43) (0.068, 0.08l, G.GII9) 
A7 (0.13f, 0.186, 0.186) (0.223,0.297, 0.297) (O.lll, 0.171, 0.171) (8.004, 0.006, 0.087) (0.112, 0.243, 8.243) (0.067,0."',0.019) 
AS (0.139, UN, U86) (0.223, o.m, O.lf7) (Ull, 0.171, o.t7l) (0.000,1.000, o.e02) (0.11l, 0.243, 0.l43) (0.068, 0.08l, 0.8119) 
A9 (0.093, 0.139, 0.186) (0.213. o.l97, G.lf7) (0.000, 0.030, 0.075) ( • .eoo. 0.000, 8.002) (0.000,0.019, 0.080) (0.000, 0.007, 0.0lt) 
AIO (0.139,0.186, 0.186) <&.llJ, 0.297, 0.2'7) (9.Ill, o.J7I, 0.171) (o.08!!, 0.007, 1.0(7) (0.11l, 0.243, O.lo43) (0.067, e."', 0.8119) 
A* (1.000, 1.000, 1.000) (J.ooo, 1.000, 1.000) (1.000, 1.000, 1.000) (1.eoo. 1.100, LOOO) (1.000, 1.000, 1.000) (1.000, 1.000, l.IIOII) 
A- (0.000,0.000, 0.000) (0.000, 0.000, 0.000) (0.000, 0.000, 0.000) (0.000, 0.000, 0._) (0.000,0.000, 0.000) (0.000, '.000, 0.000) 
As it was explained before the fuzzy positive ideal solution and the negative ideal 
solution for the ten alternatives (mitigation options) were considered as V;= (1, 1, 1) 
and V1-= (0, 0, 0) respectively. 
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Step 4: For the fourth step, the distance of each alternative from d; and di can be 
calculated using Equation 8.7 and Equation 8.8. In order to illustrate the calculations 
used in Step 3 by using the defmition 4.2 and the Equation 8.10 the following example 
derived from Table 8.5 for the alternative Al is used. 
As previously was shown in Figure 4.9 let M1= (ll, ml, Ul) and M2 =(12, m2, U2) be 
two TFNs, then the vertex method can be defined to calculate the distance between 
them, as follows (Yang and Hung, 2007): 
d; = Ji [(1- 0.234)2 + (1- 0.312)2 + (1- 0.312)2] 
+ J~ [(1 - 0.026)2 + (1- 0.041)2 + (1- 0.056)2] 
+ J~ [(1 - 0.035)2 + (1 - 0.048)2 + (1 - 0.052)2] 
+ J~ [(1 - 0.102)2 + (1 - 0.153)2 + (1 - 0.204)2] 
+ Ji [(1- 0.000)2 + (1- 0.030)2 + (1- 0.122)2] = 4.428 
di = J; [(0 - 0.234)2 + (0 - 0.312)2 + (0 - 0.312)2] 
+ Ji [(0 - 0.026)2 + (0 - 0.041)2 + (0 - 0.056)2] 
+ Ji [(0 - 0.035)2 + (0 - 0.048)2 + (0 - 0.052)2] 
+ Ji [(0 - 0.102)2 + (0 - 0.153)2 + (0 - 0.204)2] 
+ Ji [(0 - 0.000)2 + (0 - 0.030)2 + (0 - 0.122)2] = 0.608 
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(8.l0) 
Step 5: This step solves the similarities to an ideal solution by the use of Equation 8.9 as 
follows: 
d:- 0.608 
CCi = * 1 _ _ = 0.1207 d i +d i 4.428+0.608 
Similar calculations are done for the other alternatives and the results of fuzzy TOPSIS 
analysis for country, business, organisational and operational risk factors are 
summarised in Tables 8.9, 8.10, 8.11 and 8.12. 
Step 6: Based on the CCi values, rankings for mitigation alternatives for different 
criteria i.e. RI, R2, R3 and R4 can be depicted separately in Tables 8.9, 8.10, 8.11 and 
8.12. 
Table 8.9: Fuzzy TOPSIS results for mitigating country risk factors. 
Alternatives D; D, CC, Rankings 
At 4.428 0.608 0.1207 3 
A2 4.085 0.923 0.l843 I 
A3 4.422 0.609 0.1210 2 
A4 4.660 0.393 0.0778 8 
AS 4.440 0.592 0.1176 5 
A6 4.464 0.571 0.1134 6 
A7 4.477 0.608 0.1196 4 
A8 4.464 0.571 0.1134 6 
A9 4.511 0.528 0.1048 7 
AtO 4.440 0.592 0.1l76 5 
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Table 8.10: Fuzzy TOPSIS results for mitigating business risk factors. 
Alternatives Di Dl CCt Rankings 
At 2.307 0.726 0.2394 2 
A2 2.160 0.853 0.2831 1 
A3 2.384 0.648 0.2137 3 
A4 2.919 0.143 0.0467 8 
A5 2.919 0.143 0.0467 8 
A6 2.422 0.614 0.2022 5 
A7 2.450 0.585 0.1927 7 
AS 2.388 0.644 0.2124 4 
A9 2.919 0.143 0.0467 8 
AlO 2.446 0.589 0.1941 6 
Table 8.11: Fuzzy TOPSIS results for mitigating organisational risk factors. 
Alternatives Di D, CCl Ran kings 
At 4.459 0.587 0.1163 6 
A2 4.104 0.907 0.1810 3 
A3 4.128 0.924 0.1829 2 
A4 4.919 0.143 0.0282 9 
A5 4.627 0.477 0.0934 7 
A6 4.146 0.868 0.1731 4 
A7 4.181 0.844 0.1680 5 
AS 4.919 0.143 0.0282 9 
A9 4.585 0.463 0.0917 8 
AlO 4.085 0.924 0.1845 1 
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Table S.t2: Fuzzy TOPSIS results for mitigating operational risk factors. 
Alternatives Di D, CC, Rankings 
At 5.936 0.112 0.0185 9 
A2 5.851 0.196 0.0324 8 
A3 5.505 0.527 0.0874 6 
A4 5.623 0.439 0.0724 7 
AS 5.423 0.617 0.1021 4 
A6 5.200 0.820 0.1362 3 
A7 5.085 0.923 0.1536 
AS 5.095 0.914 0.1521 2 
A9 5.510 0.513 0.0879 5 
AIO 5.085 0.923 0.1536 
S.S. FINAL RESULTS 
Based on the CCi values shown in Tables 8.9,8.10, 8.11 and 8.12 separately and as it 
was mentioned in Chapter 4 that the risk factors RI, R2, R3 and R4 had equal weights 
in respect of each other, in order to calculate the final CCi values it is necessary to sum 
up the CCis and then divide them by four to get the final CCi values as shown in Table 
&.13 which also illustrates the fmal rankings of the alternatives. 
Table S.13: Overall Fuzzy TOPSIS results for mitigating risk factors. 
Alternatives Names CCt Rankings 
At Internal Audits and Inspections 0.1237 7 
A2 Privatisation 0.1702 (2) 
A3 ISPS Code 0.1512 5 
A4 ISO 20000 0.0563 10 
AS Port Risk Manager 0.0899 8 
A6 Safety Cases and Safety Reports 0.1562 4 
A7 IMS (ISO: 9000,14000,18000) 0.1585 CD 
AS VTMS 0.1265 6 
A9 Deregulation 0.0828 9 
AID HSE-MS 0.1624 CV 
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Additionally Figure 8.4 depicts the results for different criteria i.e. RI (Country risk 
factors), R2 (Business risk factors) , R3 (Organisational risk factors) and R4 
(Operational risk factors) and the sensitivity of the results on different mitigation 
alternatives for the purpose of managing the mentioned risk factors in offshore 
terminals and marine ports. 
0 .3 
0.25 
0.2 
0 .15 
0.1 
0.05 
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Figure 8.4: Sensitivity of the results on different mitigation alternatives. 
8.9. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
-+-R1 
_ R2 
R3 
-*- R4 
In this chapter the FTOPSIS technique was used. It is an appropriate tool to help 
MAD M under a fuzzy environment where the available data is subjective and vague. 
The FTOPSIS allows decision makers to include and aggregate subjective judgments. 
The basic principle of the TOPSIS technique is that the selected mitigation factor should 
have the farthest distance from the negative ideal solution and shortest distance from the 
positive ideal solution. The proposed FTOPSIS technique can be used as an optional 
technique for costlbenefit estimations in conditions where together qualitative and 
quantitative information must be combined. By using the method proposed and 
presented in this chapter, offshore terminal and port managers can select the ideal 
solutions or alternatives (i.e. mitigation factors) based on their requirements while 
considering the factors such as benefits and costs. 
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Importance of the Mitigation Alternatives 
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. Figure 8.S: Importance of the Mitigation Alternatives (An) for controlling risk factors . 
The final results indicate that A2 (Privatisation) is the best alternative with CCt value of 
0.1702. Alternatives of AlO (HSE-MS) with DCt value of 0.1624 and A7 (IMS) with 
CCi value of 0.1585 are ranked in second and third positions respectively. Furthennore 
in order to justify and analyse the above mentioned results the following comments 
from different sources should be taken into account. Figure 8.5 depicts the most 
significance mitigation alternatives for the purpose of offshore tenninals and marine 
ports in an illustrative manner. 
Regarding A2 i.e. privatisation and in order to provide evidence for its importance 
World Bank (2007) explains motives that force without delay governments or 
port/offshore authorities to enter in the privatization course of action. The Port of 
Cartagena in Colombia and Port of Buenos Aires in Argentina are some of the examples 
mentioned by the World Bank (2007) that privatization led ports to improve their 
perfonnance, become more competitive and better managed. This in fact can reduce 
business, operational and organizational risk factors. Other examples for privatisation 
are the cases of ports in United Kingdom, Ports in New Zealand and Ports in Morocco 
246 
which are explained in detail by UNCTAD (1995) as to how these ports are reformed 
and improved as a result of privatisation. 
In another effort ICS (2007) expresses that in a private port everything is owned and 
operated by the private sector, apart from regulatory and statutory functions which are 
performed by the public authority. In private ports managements are less influenced by 
political decisions and there will be higher efficiency in asset and human resources 
management. 
In respect ofthe HSE-MS (i.e. AIO) as it was explained in Chapter 4 e.g. for the case of 
the explosion of an offshore terminal (i.e. Platform of ONGC at Bombay High which 
happened in July 2005), the root cause of the suffered loss was due to the danger from 
ineffective HSE controls and management systems and what barriers were missing can 
be listed as follows (OLI, 2011): 
• Design: Unprotected marine risers close to boat landing. 
• Operational: Failure to assess risk of routine activities in abnormal conditions. 
• Cultural: Investigation "poked glaring holes at the 'safety culture' within ONGC, 
and criticised India's most valuable company on every safety aspect." 
Therefore in offshore terminals and marine ports, industrial users should: 
• Rebuild an appropriate HSE-MS based on a variety of the identified risk factors. 
• Create a policy/process/procedure/work instruction for managing the related risk 
factors. 
• Plan techniques to ease the execution of a detailed HSE-MS. 
Based on Oil and Gas UK (2011) several projects were undertaken by DNV on behalf 
of the UK HSE with the purpose of obtaining accident statistics for offshore fixed and 
floating units on the UK Continental Shelf (UKCS). In this respect, four databases 
holding information about incidents having occurred on offshore units on the UKCS 
were interrogated. Additionally the main objective of the project was to obtain complete 
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statistics for accidents and incidents having occurred on offshore fixed and floating 
units engaged in the oil and gas exploration and exploitation on the UKCS in the period 
1990-2007. Data for each accident type (explosion, fire, blowout, helicopter, list, spill 
etc) were illustrated and compared for durations 1990-1999 and 2000-2007. Many of 
the accidents, with some exceptions, were reduced as a result of effective HSE controls 
and management systems which were put in place. 
Regarding application of the IMS (i.e. A 7) in offshore tenninals and marine ports, it 
will provide port and tenninal operators, contractors and authorities an extensive stance 
and understanding of port operations essential to operate economically, eliminating the 
number of overlapping processes across their operations. Based on BPM (2010) the 
programmes i.e. IMS will facilitate to cut costs, maximize potentials, and clear the way 
for ports'/tenninals' developments. Examples of this e.g. the Port of Felixstowe in UK 
and the Port ofNantes in France are explained and referenced in Section 8.3.2. 
The latest proposed form of RM related ISO which at the end of the year 2009 was 
introduced, is ISO 31000. It is anticipated to be a family of standards relating to RM 
classified by the ISO. The purpose of ISO 31000 is to provide principles and generic 
guidelines on RM. It seeks to provide a universally known model for specialists and 
companies employing RM processes to change many of the existing standards, 
methodologies and paradigms that differed between industries. However still it is not 
tested in offshore terminals and marine ports (ISO 31000, 2011). 
8.10. CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter in order to mitigate the identified hazards (risk factors) through the 
HAZID process, the FTOPSIS method was utilised in order to complete the RM 
framework for the purpose of offshore terminals and marine ports. 
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In the first part of this chapter different mitigation strategies or control options were 
identified through the existing literature. 
In the second part in order to apply the recognised risk mitigation options the FTOPSIS 
technique was introduced to complete the last phase of the RM framework. 
In the third part the alternatives (i.e. mitigation strategies) were ranked as per their 
priorities for mitigation or controlling the risk factors in offshor.e terminals and marine 
ports. 
The contributions made on this thesis and the areas of future work for the pwpose of 
appropriate RM in offshore tenninals and marine ports will be discussed in the next 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS 
9.1. INTRODUCTION 
RM framework and risk-based model for managing hazards and risk factors in the 
offshore and marine industries have been developed in this research and the validity of 
the proposed risk -based model in the field carried out. It is now appropriate to reflect 
the outcome of the study detailed in previous chapters in the form of following sections. 
9.2. CONCLUSIONS 
Offshore terminals and marine ports are essential elements for the operation of every 
country's economy that can affect their cost structures, industrial competitiveness and 
living standards. Moreover as discussed earlier hazards or risk factors exist in these 
logistics infrastructures, all of which require attention in respect of their identification, 
assessment and mitigation with the use of an appropriate RM approach, if offshore 
terminals and marine ports are going to remain responsive to the strategic needs and 
future challenges. 
As a result in this research by using the HAZID process with an appropriate literature 
review, it was possible to identify major externally and internally driven risk factors (i.e. 
Country, business, organisational and operational risk factors) associated with offshore 
terminals and marine ports. Hazard identification was carried out using the documents 
and references from the different offshore, marine and logistics related sources (see 
Chapter 2). 
In order to cope with the identified risk factors a generic RM framework was developed 
and an appropriate research methodology was defined. The proposed research 
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methodology was used to analyse and handle each phase of the defined RM framework 
(see Chapter 3). 
In the next phase of research a F AHP method based on Chang's extent analysis along 
with experts' judgments was used to assess a developed risk-based hierarchy model to 
determine the relative weights of the identified risk factors presented in different levels 
of the risk-based model. Eventually after determining the global weights of the risk 
factors they were ranked according to their priority. For this reason F AHP as a decision 
making tool was found to be a useful method for assessing the complex multi criteria 
alternatives involving subjective and uncertain judgments. Additionally during risk-
based modelling, the F AHP method was found to be a useful analytical tool for finding 
the relative weights of the risk factors. In this regard the illustrated calculations for this 
method have shown the flexibility and effectiveness of the proposed risk assessment 
methodology to directly tap the subjectivity and preferences of the decision makers (see 
Chapter 4-). 
The proposed generic risk-based model illustrating the identified risk factors and their 
global weights could be applied to any specific offshore terminal or marine port during 
the course of their audits, port-to-port or terminal-to-terminal risk evaluation periods. 
As a result this can help the ports' and terminals' managers and professionals, to take 
corrective and preventive actions at early stages to overcome various problems, the 
problems which are- always sources of delays and costs to the parties involved. For this 
reason in the subsequent phase, in order to evaluate the actual risk factors in any port for 
real situations by use of the developed generic risk-based model, another risk 
measurement process was carried out. This new risk-based measurement was carried out 
in order to calculate the levels of the present risk factors within the selected or any 
specific port/offshore terminals. The results of these evaluations were aggregated with 
the predetermined global weights of risk factors calculated for the generic risk-based 
model. The purpose of this aggregation was to update all the related risk factors within 
the selected sites, e.g. offshore terminals or marine ports (i.e. combination of the global 
weights calculated for the developed generic risk-based model with the newly evaluated 
risk levels for the nominated port). As a result in order to evaluate the new levels of the 
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risk factors for the selected ports, FST and experts' judgements along with the ER 
approach were utilised. The ER in this research was found to be a useful decision 
support tool that could deal with fuzziness in data for aggregation and updating the 
gathered data. The ER based aggregation in this research was carried out using the IDS 
software in order to update data (see Chapter 5). 
As every risk factor is caused by some basic event or events and results in some effect 
or effects, it can be viewed rather like a chain. The cause is linked to the nature of the 
risk factor and the risk factor itself is linked to the effect. With the use of this view in 
the next phase of the research in order to analyse the most significant risk factors or 
hazards identified, CCA under fuzzy environments was used. There are many other risk 
analysis methods such as What-if analysis, Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA), Hazard 
and Operability Study (HAZOP) and Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA). In 
this research CCA was found to be a useful one. For example in this regard, the PHA 
method is mostly used for offshore terminals and marine ports (specifically during their 
design stages). However this research was only investigating the hazards during their 
operations and management which is unrelated to the design agenda. Furthermore 
What-if analysis, PHA, HAZOP and FMEA are only qualitative methods and not the 
quantitative tools. This research has used both quantitative and qualitative analysis 
within offshore terminals and marine ports. The bow-tie model using the fault tree and 
event tree analysis was found to be a suitable tool for managing both quantitative and 
qualitative data and also integrating broad classes of cause-consequence analysis. In 
other words the familiar fault tree and event tree models were 'bow-tied' in this way 
and indeed attaching the fault tree's «top event" with the event tree's «initiating event". 
As FT A and ET A were both quantitative and qualitative methods, by using the experts' 
judgements these methods were incorporated to complete the CCA phase of the research. 
In this way the most significant hazards and risk factors evidenced in the offshore 
terminals and marine ports were interpreted more specifically while using the FT A and 
ETA under fuzzy environments (see Chapter 6). 
In the next phase of the thesis a separate and individual RM strategy was tailored and 
implemented on the furthermost significant risk factor to show the capability of the RM 
that can take into custody any of the identified risk factors separately. For this purpose 
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by using STA, SV A, threat matrix, SRFT etc techniques, the most significant risk factor 
identified in this research was individually handled (see Chapter 7). 
In the last phase of the research and in order to mitigate the identified hazards or risk 
factors by using an appropriate MCDM tool and to complete the RM framework it was 
decided to use a TOPSIS method under fuzzy environments. After a set of alternatives 
was compared against a set of criteria the best alternatives (i.e. identified mitigation 
strategies) were ranked in ascending orders. The most suitable mitigation strategies 
were selected. The mitigation factors can be used in a form of a single package (e.g. 
Integrated Management System) in order to become more effective. Some of these 
mitigating factors have been used previously by DNV, Lloyds Register and different 
insurance companies as a part of their IMS packages for mitigating the identified risk 
factors in different industries such as offshore and port sectors (see Chapter 8). 
9.3. CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE 
The main contribution of the research was the creation of a generic RM framework and 
a generic risk-based model, to guide the industrial RM professionals such as 
port/terminal risk managers, auditors etc through a series of well-defined structured 
phases and steps necessary to make knowledgeable, reliable and efficient changes to 
their business processes in offshore and marine industry. It is a holistic framework with 
relevant tools and techniques, enabling the offshore and port industrial RM 
professionals to facilitate the process-based change effectively at any point. The 
implemented framework provides a logical and organised procedure. It has been shown 
that the benefits can be gained from using the defined RM framework. Moreover 
management research is the systematic and objective process of gathering, recording 
and analysing data for improving managerial decision-making. The discussion of the 
results in the light of the theory and practice has enabled determination of the 
implications of the research to the body of knowledge. 
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The research has thus established important fmdings and suggestions on RM that will be 
valuable to the decision-making process in the offshore and marine industry. The most 
important contribution was to establish the framework comprising the process, 
techniques and tools for structuring, assessing, analysing and managing risk factors that 
affect offshore terminals and marine ports. The proposed RM framework provides a 
platform to facilitate a generic risk-based model. The proposed risk assessment 
methodology is in fact an objective way to handle subjective information in establishing 
a risk analysis to guide the development of risk control measures. This can help the 
offshore terminal and marine port managers and professionals, e.g. HSE or risk 
managers, to take corrective and preventive actions at early stages to overcome various 
problems which are always sources of problems to the parties involved. 
The main managerial implication of the research is to help HSE and risk managers in 
offshore and marine industry to design and establish an integrated RM strategy, 
philosophy and policy statement for communication throughout their sites and facilities. 
The proposed RM framework and risk-based model will facilitate HSE and risk 
managers to establish and maintain a detailed RM methodology. It includes fonnalised 
hazard identification techniques, quantitative and qualitative risk assessment and cost 
effective methods with the aim of elimination, reduction and controlling of the 
prospective risk factors and hazards in offshore and marine industry. 
9.4. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The research has achieved its aim of developing a RM framework for managing risk 
factors affecting offshore terminals and marine ports. Although it is not claimed to be a 
definitive framework it can play a valuable role as a methodology for addressing risk 
factors. Several important issues were raised both at the beginning and throughout the 
research process. Some of these have been analysed, described, and incorporated into 
the study. Others, however, could not be incorporated due to scope, time constraints and 
because the research has prominently been exploratory and experimental. The aspects 
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that were not covered in detail are part of suggestions for further work that should be 
pursued. In this respect additional research seems therefore to be needed on the 
following aspects: 
The proposed risk-based model could be extended to incorporate other categories of risk 
factors such as natural disasters, etc that were not included in the present study. 
Furthennore, in extending the RM framework it would be desirable to consider the main 
phases of RM in offshore terminals and marine ports namely hazard identification, risk 
assessment, risk mitigation and risk review. Such a structure would be useful to main 
players in offshore and marine industry including managers, clients, operators, 
contractors, insurers and regulators. Furthermore, it would be important to investigate 
RM practices from their perspective. 
In offshore and marine industry in conditions where the nature of data is vague and 
subjective, many of judgements and estimations require to be involved subjectively 
during data analysis. Other than the ER approach used in this research, it would also be 
useful to develop new approaches such as a Bayesian Network capable of dealing with 
uncertainty and combining expert judgement with empirical or historical data to 
evaluate hazards and risk factors. 
The difficulty associated with generating membership functions has been considered a 
major drawback in developing fuzzy based methodologies. The development and 
experiments of membership functions using different methods such as Artificial Neural 
Networks and Genetic Algorithms should be encouraged. These optimisation 
technologies seem to be effective in generating much more reliable membership 
functions with optimal value than casual methods and would help in firming up a family 
of these functions. 
The offshore and marine industry, by taking into account a strategic management 
approach, is advancing toward a risk-based regulatory scheme. This gives risk and 
QHSES managers more flexibility to use innovative and the most recent risk-based 
models, RM frameworks and MCDM tools. The FAHP, ER, SVA, CCA and FTOPSIS 
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methods used in this research may be some of these useful approaches. It may be 
helpful if these tools utilised in this study could be additionally implemented to 
facilitate other risk-based modelling and MADM occasions. Therefore, the practical 
application of the mentioned tools to offshore and marine industry can be highlighted. 
Furthermore, since the proposed RM framework and risk-based model in this research 
are generic, such a framework and model can be further incorporated for the risk-based 
topics outside the offshore and marine industry. In fact this can support and contribute 
towards the advertising of their applications in other industry related sectors. 
The RM framework developed in this PhD can be integrated (or embedded) into all of 
the functions and processes within the different industry users while taking strategic 
management approaches to RM development, thus improving risk-based decision 
making. 
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APPENDIX I 
Questionnaire used in Survey 1 for the purpose of 
Chapter 4 
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Liverpool John Moores University 
School of Engineering, Technology and Marine Operations 
LOOM Research Institute 
Byrom Street 
L33AF 
UK 
Phone: +44 (0) 151 231 2028 
Fax: +44 (0) 151 231 2453 
Email: k.mokhtari@2007.1jmu.ac.uk 
Date: 10.03.2010 
Dear Sir, 
Offshore terminals and marine ports play an important role in world trade, international 
logistics and global supply chain management. Their operations are associated with a 
high level of uncertainty because they operate in a dynamic environment in which 
hazards may cause possible accidents. 
A research project at Liverpool John Moores University is currently being carried out 
with regard to a generic risk assessment model which is based on a risk management 
framework to identify the critical hazards that can lead to catastrophic damages to 
offshore terminals and marine ports. Therefore the proposed model will be used to 
determine the relative weights of the risk factors identified during the offshore tenninals' 
and marine ports' operations and management. Now the requirement for this 
investigation is to use experts' judgements who are working in the related fields to 
compare the provided risk factors in order to enable researcher to prioritise the risk 
factors and to detect the most significance ones. Eventually this can help port 
professionals and port risk managers to develop appropriate strategies and take 
preventive/corrective actions for mitigating risks toward a successful offshore terminals' 
and marine ports' operations and management. 
Thus this survey sets out to provide an organized method for collecting views and 
information pertaining to the implementation of an appropriate risk management 
framework in offshore terminals and marine ports. I should be most grateful if I could 
ask you to spare some of your very valuable time to complete the accompanying 
questionnaire and to email or post it to myself at the address as shown above. Your vital 
feedback will greatly benefit and contribute in the formulation of an industry wide 
opinion. I can assure you that the confidentiality of your response wiU be honoured and 
respected. 
Best Regards 
Captain Kambiz Mokhtari 
PhD Student 
MSc, BSc, Master Mariner. MrCS 
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SECTION 1: PERSONAL DETAILS 
- Please mark the appropriate answer for each question: 
1. Please mark your age range: 
A. Less than 30 years old 
B. Between 30 and 40 years old 
C. 40 years old or more 
2. Please mark your appropriate qualification: 
A. Postgraduate 
B. Undergraduate 
C. High School Diploma 
3. Please mark your work experiences: 
A. Work experience < 10 
B. 10 ~ Work experience ~ 20 
C. 20 < Work experience 
SECTION 2: MEASUREMENT SCALES 
Please select one of the linguistic values including intennediate values and equal value 
from the following table that in your opinion is the most appropriate one and use it 
during pair -wise comparisons in the next section for marking the provided matrix. 
Table 1.1: Linguistic Values and TFNs 
Linguistic Values TFNs 
Weak Strong N1= (1, 1,2) 
Fairly Strong N3= (2,3,4) 
Highly Strong Ns=(4, 5, 6) 
Very Highly Strong N7= (6,7,8) 
Absolute N9= (8,9,9) 
Intermediate values N2= (1, 2,3) N4 = (3, 4,5) N6= (5, 6, 7) Ns= (7,8,9) 
Equal value = (1,1,1) 
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SECTION 3: EXPLANATIONS AND EXAMPLES 
Read the followings and put check marks on the below shown pair-wise comparison 
matrix. If a risk factor on the left is more important than the matching risk factor on the 
right, put your check mark to the left of the importance "Equal" under the importance 
level you prefer. If anyone of risk factors on the left is less important than its' matching 
risk factors on the right, put your check mark to the right of the importance 'Equal' 
under the importance level you prefer. Now with respect to the risk factors associated 
with offshore tenninals' and marine ports' operations and management which are 
depicted in following matrix first read the below examples and then start marking the 
following matrix: 
Question 1: How important is "Country Risks" when it is compared with "Business 
Risks" during of the offshore terminals' and sea ports' operations and management? 
Question 2: How important is "Operational Risks" when it is compared with 
"Organisational Risks" during of the offshore terminals' and sea ports' operations and 
management? 
SECTION 4: RISK MATRIX SAMPLE 
Table 1.2: Risk matrix 
Risk Factors Importance of one risk factor over another 
lie .. 
..: ..: 
Main risk factors in £ :;- N N :;- Wi' F:' 
e ~ ~ .. F:' <0- Wi' I1i' I1i' :;; .. 
06 " >4 ." ... .. N 
"" 
.. ... of >4 ~ 06 
offshore terminals ;;- t:: i ~ :! d !! e d d :! ~ ~ t:: ... .. 
- -
..: i b 11 r t r .. .. 11 r i 11 b i and marine ports !! 11 I - . E !! :r. t i e JI g t e i :I i O! 1 '" 1 .: I :z: ; i I '" - '" ~ 1 I = J i ~ t' :E l 'li .It ~ i:' i:' • : ". ~ ;g 'li ~ ~ .. .! .! > .! .: .! .! !Io .! .! .! 
Country Risks Busines. Risks 
Country Risks Organisational Risks 
Country Risks Operational Risks 
Business Risks Organisational Risks 
Business Risks Operational Risks 
Operational Risks Organisational Risks 
292 
APPENDIX 11: Calculations for Level 3 risk factors not 
shown in Chapter 4. 
Tables H.l, 11.2, 11.3, II.4 and 1I.5 are used to show the pair-wise comparision and local 
weights' calculations for risk factors associated with Level 3 country risks in offshore 
terminals and marine ports. 
Table 11.1: Local weights and pair-wise comparison matrix for Macro-economic 
Practices 
MaCl'O-«ODOmic Practices 
Economic Invigoration (El) 
Stability in Interest Rates and Foreign 
Exchange Rates (AIRFER) 
(El) 
(1,1,1) 
(1/9.1/9,1/8) 
(AIRFER) 
(8,9,9) 
(1,1,1) 
GDP growth (GDPG) (5,6,7) (l/3,1I2,1) 
Balancing of national saving and dept (BNSD) (1/3,112,1)' (115,1/4,113) 
A. max = 4.231 Cl = 0.077 RI=t>.90 CR=0.086< 0.1 
(GDPG) (BNSD) Local Weight. 
(117,116,115) (1,2,3) 0.519 
(1,2,3) (3,4,5) 0.181 
(1,1.1) (1/6,1/5,114) 0.202 
(4,5,6) (1,1,1) 0.097 
From Table n.1, synthesis values in respect to main goal are calculated as per Equation 
4.11 shown in Section 1 of the extent analysis and are depicted as follows: 
SI = (10.143, 12.167, 13.2) ®(1I39.908, 1/33.728, 1127.287) = (0.254,0.361,0.484), 
S2 =:: (5.111, 7.111,9.125) ®(I/39.908, I/33.728, 1/27.287) = (0.128,0.211,0.334), 
S3 =:: (6.5, 7.7, 9.25) ®(1I39.908, 1/33.728, 1127.287) = (0.163,0.228,0.339), 
S4 =:: (5.533,6.75,8.333) ®(I/39.908, 1133.728, 1/27.287) =:: (0.139,0.200,0.305). 
These fuzzy synthesis values are compared with each other by using Equation 4.17 
shown in Section 2 of the extent analysis and new values are obtained as follows: 
V(Sl2:S2)=1, V(SI2:S3)=1, V(SI2:S4)=I; 
V(S22:S1)=t>.348, V(S22:S3)=t>.91, V(S22:S4)=I; 
V(S32:S1)=O.390, V(S32:S2)=I, V(S32:S4)=I; 
V(S42:S1)=t>.187, V(S42:S2)=t>.711, V(S42:S3)={).835. 
Then priority weights are calculated by using Equation 4.18 shown in Section 3 of the 
extent analysis as follow: 
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d'(CI) = min (I, 1, 1)= I, 
d'(C2) = min (0.348, 0.9lO, 1) = 0.348, 
d'(C3) = min (0.390, 1, 1) = 0.390, 
d'(C4) = min (0.187,0.71 1,0.835) = 0.187. 
W' = (1,0.348,0.390,0.187) 
Collected priority weights are shown in vector W'. Finally after nonnalisation of these 
values as per Equation 4.20 shown in Section 4 of the extent analysis, priority weights 
in respect to the main goal will be calculated as follows for each criterion in Table n.I: 
W == (0.519,0.l81,0.202,0.097) 
Table 11.2: Local weights and pair-wise comparison matrix for Political and Social 
Systems 
PoHticaland Sodal SysteJDll 
Political Stability (PS) 
Stability in Interest Rates and Foreign Exchange Rates 
(AlRFER) 
(PS) 
(1,1,1) 
(1/9,118,117) 
(GEl) 
(7,8,9) 
(I,I,I) 
Government inefficiency and corruption (GEl) (3,4,5) (1/5,114,113) 
Social Stability (SS) (1/3,112,1) (115,1/4,113) 
Amax =4.19 Cl = 0.063 RI=0.90 CR=0.071 <0.1 
(I) 
(1/5,1/4,1/3) 
(3,4,5) 
(1,1, I) 
(3,4,5) 
(SS) Local Weight. 
(1,2,3) 0.477 
(3,4,5) 0.357 
(1/5,114,1/3) 0.108 
(1,1,1) 0.108 
From Table ll.2, synthesis values in respect to main goal are calculated as per Equation 
4.11 shown in Section 1 of the extent analysis and are depicted as follows: 
SI == (9.2, 11.25, 13.333) ® (1138.499, 1/31.625, 1125.244) = (0.239,0.356,0.528), 
S2 == (7.111, 9.125, 11.167) ® (1/38.499, 1131.625, 1125.244)= (0.185,0.288,0.442), 
S3 = (4.4,5.5,6.666) 0(1138.499, 1131.625, 1125.244) = (0.114,0.174,0.264), 
S4 = (4.533,5.75, 7.333) ®(1/38.499, 1/31.625, 1125.244) = (0.118,0.182,0.290). 
These fuzzy synthesis values are compared with each other by using Equation 4.17 
shown in Section 2 of the extent analYSis and new values are obtained as follows: 
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V(SI2:S2)=I, V(SI2:S3)=I, V(Sl~S4)=1; 
V(S22:SI)=O.749, V(S2~S3)=1, V(S2~S4)=1; 
V(S32:SI)=O.l21, V(S3~S2)=O.409, V(S3~S4)=O.948; 
V(S42:SI)=O.227, V(S42:S2)=O.498, V(S42:S3)=1. 
Then priority weights are calculated by using Equation 4.18 shown in Section 3 of the 
extent analysis as follow: 
d'(CI) =min(1, I, 1)= 1, 
d'(C2) = min (0.749, 1, I) = 0.749, 
d'(C3) = min (0.121,0.409,0.948) = 0.121, 
d'(C4) = min (0.277,0.498, I) = 0.277. 
W' = (1,0.749,0.121,0.227) 
Collected priority weights are shown in vector W'. Finally after normalisation of these 
values as per Equation 4.20 shown in Section 4 of the extent analysis, priority weights 
in respect to the main goal will be calculated as follows for each criterion in Table II.2: 
w = (0.477,0.357,0.058,0.108) 
Table 11.3: Local weights and pair-wise comparisons for Foreign Entezprise Policy 
Local 
Foreign Enterprise PoKey (eRe) (11) (fR) WelghCs 
Capital and remittance control (CRC) (1,1,1) (1/3,112,1) (4,5,6) 0.556 
Tax incentives (TI) (1,2,3) (1,1,1) (113,112,1) O.Z60 
TnuJe restriction (fR.) (116,115,114) (1,2,3) (1,1,1) 0.184 
A. max = 3.102 Cl = 0.051 RI=O.58 CR=O.088 < O.l 
From Table n.3, synthesis values in respect to main goal are calculated as per Equation 
4.11 shown in Section 1 of the extent analysis and are depicted as follows: 
SI = (5.333, 6.5, 8) ® (1/17.25, 1113.2, 119.833) = (0.309,0.492,0.813), 
S2 = (2.333, 3.5, 5) ® (1117.25, 1/13.2, 1/9.833) = (0.135,0.265,0.508), 
S3 = (2.167, 3.2,4.25) ®(1/17.25, 1/13.2, 1/9.833) = (0.126,0.242,0.432). 
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These fuzzy synthesis values are compared with each other by using Equation 4.17 
shown in Section 2 of the extent analysis and new values are obtained as follows: 
V(SI~S2)=I, V(SI~S3)=1; 
V(S2~Sl)=O.467, V(S~S3)=I; 
V(S3~S 1 )=0.330, V(S3~S2)=O.928. 
Then priority weights are calculated by using Equation 4.18 shown in Section 3 of the 
extent analysis as follow: 
d'(CI) = min (I, I):::: 1, 
d'(C2) = min (0.467, I) = 0.467, 
d'(C3) = min (0.330, 0.928) = 0.330. 
W' = (1,0.467,0.330) 
Collected priority weights are shown in vector W~ Finally after nonnalisation of these 
values as per Equation 4.20 shown in Section 4 of the extent analysis, priority weights 
in respect to the main goal will be calculated as follows for each criterion in Table 1l.3: 
W= (0.556,0.260,0.184) 
Table 11.4: Local weights and pair-wise comparison matrix for Port Development 
Policy 
Port Development PoDcy (pOp) (LID) (lPNA) (PRN) Local Weights 
Port Organisational Pattern (POP) (1,1, I) (2,3,4) (117,1/6,115) (113,112,1) 0.156 
Liberalisation and Internationalisation Degree (LID) (1/4,113,112) (1,1,1) (2,3,4) (2,3,4) 0.325 
Industrial Potential in Neighbouring Areas (IPNA) (5,6,7) (1/4,113,112) (1,1,1) (1,2,3) 0.414 
Positioning Relative to othcrports within Nation 23) (1/4,1/3,112) (PRN) (I, , (1/3,112,1) (1,1,1) 0.105 
It max = 4.205 Cl:::: 0.068 RI=0.90 CR=O.076 < 0.1 
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From Table HA, synthesis values in respect to main goal are calculated as per Equation 
4.11 shown in Section 1 of the extent analysis and are depicted as follows: 
SI = (3A76, 4.667, 6.2) ®(I/32.7, 1/25.166, 1118.559) = (0.106,0.185,0.334), 
S2 = (5.25, 7.333, 9.5) ®(l/32.7, 1125.166, 1118.559) = (0.160,0.291,0.512), 
S3 = (7.25,9.333, 11.5) ®(1132.7, 1/25.166, 1118.559) = (0.222,0.371,0.620), 
S4 = (2.583,3.833,5.5) ®(1/32.7, 1125.166, 1118.559) = (0.079,0.152,0.296). 
These fuzzy synthesis values are compared with each other by using Equation 4.17 
shown in Section 2 of the extent analysis and new values are obtained as follows: 
V(SI~S2)=O.621, V(SI~S3)=O.376, V(SI~S4)=I; 
V(S2~SI)=I, V(S2~S3)=O.784, V(S2~S4)=I; 
V(S3~SI)=O.121, V(S3~S2)=1, V(S3~S4)=I; 
V(S4~SI)=O.852, V(S~S2)=O.494, V(S~S3)=0.253. 
Then priority weights are calculated by using Equation 4.18 shown in Section 3 of the 
extent analysis as follow: 
d'(CI) = min (0.621,0.376, I) = 0.376, 
d'(C2) = min (1,0.784, 1) = 0.784, 
d'(C3) = min (1, 1, 1) = 1, 
d'(C4) = min (0.852, 0.494, 0.253) = 0.253. 
W' = (0.376,0.784,1,0.253) 
Collected priority weights are shown in vector W'. Finally after normalisation of these 
values as per Equation 4.20 shown in Section 4 of the extent analysis, priority weights 
in respect to the main goal will be calculated as follows for each criterion in Table 11.4: 
W = (0.156,0.325,0.414,0.105) 
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Table II.S: Local weights and pair-wise comparison matrix for Port Management 
Policy 
Port Mana:emeat PoUcy (PI) (PDC) (EPOP) (CP) Loc:al Wei2htw 
Private Financing of port infrastructure and (1,1,1) (3,4,5) (113,112,1) (116,115,114) 0.073 
equipmc:nt (PF) 
Port Dues and Charges (PDC) (l/5, 114, 113) 0,1,1) (6,7,8) (3,4,5) 0-'32 
Efficient P<I1 Opcratioo Policy (EPOP) (1.2,3) (11S,ln,1I6) (1,1,1) (2,3,4) 0.155 
Custom Practices (CP) (4,5,6) (1/5,114,113) (1/4,113,112) (1,1,1) 0.140 
Amax =4.16 Cl = 0.053 RI=0.90 CR=O.059 < 0.1 
From Table 11.5, synthesis values in respect to main goal are calculated as per Equation 
4.11 shown in Section 1 of the extent analysis and are depicted as follows: 
SI = (4.5, 5.7, 7.25) ®(1/37.583, 1130.676, 1124.275) = (0.120,0.186,0.299), 
S2 = (10.2, 12.25, 14.333) ®(1/37.583, 1/30.676, 1124.275) = (0.271,0.399,0.590), 
S3 = (4.125, 6.143, 8.167) ®(1137.583, 1130.676, 1124.275) = (0.110,0.200,0.336), 
S4 = (5.45,6.583, 7.833) ® (1137.583, 1/30.676, I124.275) = (0.145,0.215,0.323). 
These fuzzy synthesis values are compared with each other by using Equation 4.17 
shown in Section 2 of the extent analysis and new values are obtained as follows: 
V(Sl?S2)=O.116, V(SI?S3)=O.931, V(Sl2:S4)=O.841; 
V(S2~SI)=I, V(S2~S3)=1, V(S2~S4)=1; 
V(S32:S1)=1, V(S3~S2)=O.246, V(S3~S4)=0.927~ 
V(S~S 1)=1, V(S4?S2)=O.220, V(S42:S3)= I. 
Then priority weights are calculated by using Equation 4. I 8 shown in Section 3 of the 
extent analysis as follow: 
d'(el) = min (0.116, 0.931, 0.841) = 0.116, 
d'CC2)=min(l, I, 1)= 1, 
d'CC3)= . (1 0 -mm , .246,0.927) - 0.246, 
d'(C4) = min (1, 0.220, I) = 0.220. 
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W' = (0.116,1,0.246,0.220) 
Collected priority weights are shown in vector W'. Finally after normalisation of these 
values as per Equation 4.20 shown in Section 4 of the extent analysis, priority weights 
in respect to the main goal will be calculated as follows for each criterion in Table II.5: 
W = (0.073,0.632,0.155,0.140) 
Tables 11.6 and 11.7 are used to show the pair-wise comparision and local weights' 
calculations for risk factors associated with business risks within sea ports and offshore 
terminals. 
Table 11.6: Local weights and Eair-wise comEarison matrix for ComEetition Factors 
Compedtlo. Faden (PTE) (LA) (CBC) (l.VAS) (RI (DlIt) (ft.1 (SI') (AS) (PRtJN) (Aaa) 
..... (l ........ ~(rnl (I.lJ) 1l"" .... 12I (l~.J4) (~ "",,"-"') "'?J'I ~"'" (1",.11',11_, , ...... ("',I) ,6,',11 
........ _<LAl 
...... ) (I,l,u ,lIIJJ7....., ... ,~ (IJ6.IIf,1l<) (lo,Jll,lll) Q,!I,I) (111.117.1'11) "",1) 0,..1!'7.14) (1 .. .1 ..... ) 
c ... a--.a....((1K") 
"",1) (1,'. (lJJ) (l.J,I) 
""'" 
(l~) (f,7" (lJJ) (111.111,111) ~,I) fl17,.14.JJJ) 
J...p6. ... v ............. 
lLV.., (1~J5JI') (l1l,lli,l,lS) (lJJ) (lJJ) (lJJ) 
,....., 
",7,1) (lIT.LIIJ") !U,I) (I""',Iil) ( .. 7.., 
.... _1.) 
...... ) ,....., P""""") (JIl,lil.D (lJJ) 
""'" 
a,.,......, (LtI.,lfI'.1 .... !U,I) !U,I) (1.9,.1 .... ..., 
..... .,"" ...... (1)W) (1JI,J""'" (1,UJ 
""" 
IL'f.IJ'.IM) (IIO,lJ',lJ2) (lJJ) 
-""., (lM.VI,In) (l.'t,VS,1I4) (1,>,<) , ...... 
..... ~(Pl.,) (1JI,J""") (VI',ll5,lAC) (JlI,1n~ ....... ..., (4U'J 
""'" 
(lJJ) <,,'1,1) !U,I) (l ...... ~) (lJ.J) 
--""' 
... ' .. 
...' ... 
0"',1) 
.... " , .. ' .. ) 
(1.1.<) 0,,117.111) U.l,l) (I,l.l) 0..." 0.1,1) 
_ ............ 
(11tJJ5,W) (lJI,l"',14) I~'AI (IH,J.""'" (I~.vn 
-
(lJ4"l1lJ12) 11 .... ) (lJJ) ''-'.1J I""" 
Pwt·· ........ t..·'NM 
..... .., (lMr"ln,lIt) ""~ (L9J~"') ......, (114.lJ5,l1Z) "",,/I,Iil) ""'" (ltJ.ll1.I) (117 • .,.,,,,,, (1J.1J , ...... 
~ ... n..-,YIr_ 
"""-(ACME) (lII.In,lJl) (1,0,0) ""'1J (J~."" fl4f,ll>,l"l .. ~ (lIU'SJAt, (1,1.1) (W"",114) (l"'JI!,l~) (1,1,1) 
Amax = 12.19 CI=O.l19 RI=1.53 CR=O.078 < 0.1 
From Table II.6, synthesis values in respect to main goal are calculated as per Equation 
4.11 shown in Section 1 of the extent analysis and are depicted as follows: 
SI==(3 1.750, 37.952, 44.334) ® (1/352.248, 11301.01, 11248.86) = (0.090,0.126,0.178), 
82::::(19.764,23.865,28.061) ® (11352.248, 11301.01, 11248.86) = (0.056,0.079,0.l13), 
S3:::::(32.468, 37.560, 41.700) ® (11352.248, 11301.01, 1/248.86) = (0.092,0.l52,0.167), 
S4==(21.685, 26.843,32.117) ® (11352.248, 11301.01, 11248.86) = (0.062,0.089,0.129), 
S5==(13.936, 19.204,24.875) ® (11352.248, 11301.01, 11248.86) = (0.039,0.064,0.100), 
S6:::::(18.209, 22.542, 27.167) ® (11352.248, 11301.01, 1/248.86) = (0.052,0.075,0.109), 
S7::::(16.751, 20.886, 25.084) ® (11352.248, 1/301.01, 11248.86) = (0.047,0.069,0.101), 
S8:::::(30,125, 36.143,42.167) ® (11352.248, 11301.01, 11248.86) = (0.085,0.120,0.169), 
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S9=(22.042, 26.342,30.917) ® (1/352.248, 1/301.01, 1/248.86) = (0.062,0.087,0.124), 
SI0=(l8.212, 22.587, 27.492)® (I1352.248, 1/301.01, 1I248.86) = (0.052,0.075,0.1 10), 
SI1==(23.918, 27.086, 28.334)® (I1352.248, 1I301.01, 1I248.86) = (0.068,0.090,0.1 14). 
These fuzzy synthesis values are compared with each other by using Equation 4.l7 
shown in Section 2 of the extent analysis and new values are obtained as follows: 
V(SI~S2)=1, V(SI~S3)=1, V(SI~S4)=I, V(SI~S5)=1, V(SI~S6)=1, V(Sl~S7)=1, 
V(Sl~S81=1, V(Sl~S9)=1, V(Sl~SlO)=l, V(Sl~Sl1)=l; 
V(S2~Sl)=O.328, V(S2~S3)=O.313, V(S21~S4)=O.836, V(S2~S5)=1, V(S2:::S6)=1, 
V(S2~S7)=1, V(S2~S8)=O.406, V(S2~S9)=0.864, V(S2~SlO)=1, V(S2~Sll)=O.804; 
V(S3~Sl)=O.987, V(S3~S2)=1, V(S3~S4)=1, V(S3~S5)=I, V(S3~S6)=1, V(S3~S7)=1, 
V(S3~S8)=1, V(S3~S9)=1, V(S3~SIO)=I, V(S3~Sll)=1; 
V(S4~SI)=O.513, V(S4~S2)=1, V(S4~S3)=0.507, V(S~S5)=1, V(S~S6)=1, 
V(S4~S7)=1, V(S~S8)=O.587, V(S~S9)=I, V(S4~SlO)=1, V(S~Sll):::l; 
V(S5~S 1)=0.139, 
V(S5~S6)=O.814, 
V(S5?S2)=0.746, 
V(S5~S7)=O.914, 
V(S5~S10)=O.813, V(S5~Sll)=O.552; 
V(S5~S3)=O.l16, 
V(S5~S8)=0.211 , 
V(S5~S4)=O.603, 
V(S5~S9)=O.623, 
V(S6~Sl)=O.271, V(S6~S2)=O.930, V(S6~S3)=O.254, V(S~S4)=0.770, V(S6~S5)=1, 
V(S6~S7)=1, V(S6~S8)=O.348, V(S6~S9)=0.797, V(S6~S10)=1, V(S6?Sll)=O.732; 
V(S7~Sl)=O.162, V(S7:::S2)=0.818, V(S7:::S3)=O.138, V(S7~S4)=0.661, V(S7~S5)=I, 
V(S7~S6)=O.891, V(S7~S8)=O.239, V(S7?S9)=O.684, V(S7~SlO)=O.891, 
V(S7~S11)=O.611; 
V(S8~Sl)=O.929, V(S8~S2):::1, V(S8~S3)=O.939, V(S8~S4)=1, V(S8~S5)=I, 
V(S8~S6)=I, V(S8~S7)=I, V(S8?S9)=1, V(S8?SI0)=I, V(S8~SI1)=1; 
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V(S9~SI)=O.466. V(S9~S2)==I, V(S9~S3)=O.457, V(S9~S4)=O.969, V(S9~S5)=1, 
V(S9~S6)=1, V(S9~S7)=I, V(S9~S8)=I, V(S9~SlO)=1. V(S9~Sll)=1; 
V(SlO~SI)=O.282, V(SlO~S2)==0.931, V(SlO~S3)==0.265, V(SlO~S4)=O.774, 
V(SlO~S5)=I, V(SlO~S6)=1, V(SlO~S7)=1, V(SlO~S8)=O.357, V(SI~S9)=O.800, 
V(S lO~Sl1 )=0. 737; 
V(Sll~Sl)=O.4, V(Sll~S2)=1, V(SI1~S3)=0.386, V(Sll~S4)=1, V(Sll~S5)=I, 
V(SII~S6)=I, V(SI1~S7)=I, V(SII~S8)=0.491, V(SI1~S9)=I, V(SII~SlO)=l. 
Then priority weights are calculated by using Equation 4.18 shown in Section 3 of the 
extent analysis as follow: 
d'(el)= min (l,I,I,I,I),I,I,I,I) == 1, 
d'(C2)= min (0.328,0.313,0.836, 1, 1, 1,0.406,0.864, 1,0.804) == 0.313, 
d'(C3)== min (0.987, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1) == 0.987, 
d'(C4)= min (0.513, 1,0.507,1, 1, 1,0.587, 1, 1, 1) = 0.507, 
d'(C5)=min(0.139, 0.746, 0.116, 0.603, 0.814, 0.914, 0.211,0.623,0.813,0.552)=0.116, 
d'(C6)= min (0.271,0.930,0.254,0.770, 1, 1,0.348,0.797, 1,0.732) = 0:254, 
d'(C7)= min (0.162,0.818,0.138,0.661, 1,0.891,0.239,0.684,0.891,0.611) = 0.138, 
d'(C8)=min(0.929, 1,0.939, I, 1, 1, 1,1,1,1)=0.929, 
d'(C9)= min (0.466, 1,0.457,0.969, 1,1,1,0.542,1,1) = 0.457, 
d'(C 1 0)== min (0.282, 0.931,0.265, 0.774, 1, 1,1,0.357,0.8,0.737) == 0.265, 
d'(Cll)= nUn (OA, 1,0.386, 1, 1, I, 1,0.491, 1) = 0.386. 
W' == (1 ,0.313,0.987,0.507,0.116,0.254,0.138,0.929,0.457 ,0.265,0.386) 
Collected priority weights are shown in vector W'. Finally after normalisation of these 
values as per Equation 4.20 shown in Section 4 of the extent analysis, priority weights 
in respect to the main goal will be calculated as follows for each criterion in Table II.6: 
W = (0.186,0.061,0.184,0.095,0.022,0.047,0.026,0.173,0.085,0.049,0.072) 
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Table 11.7: Local weights and pair-wise comparison matrix of Competition Factors 
IDdu.try Challge 
Fluctuation in Shipping Industry (PSI) 
Consolidation Among Ocean Carriers (CAOC) 
(FSI) 
(1,1,1) 
(113,112,1) 
Potential for Global Substitutes for Port Users (pGSPU) (2,3,4) 
it max = 2.038 Cl = 0.019 RI=0.58 CR=0.033 < O.l 
(CAOC) 
(1,2,3) 
(1,1,1) 
(1,2,3) 
(pGSPtJ) Local Weights 
(1/4,1/3,1/2) 0.312 
(1/3,112,1) 0.140 
(1,1,1) 0.M8 
From Table 11. 7, synthesis values in respect to main goal are calculated as per Equation 
4.11 shown in Section 1 of the extent analysis and are depicted as follows: 
SI = =(2.25, 3.333, 4.5) ® (Il15.5, 1111.333, 117.916) = (0.145,0.294,0.568), 
S2= =(1.666,2,3) ® (1/15.5, 1111.333, 117.916) = (0.107,0.176,0.379), 
S3= =(4,6,8) ®(1I15.5, 1111.333, 117.916) = (0.258,0.529,1.010). 
These fuzzy synthesis values are compared with each other by using Equation 4.17 
shown in Section 2 of the extent analysis and new values are obtained as follows: 
V(SI~S2)=1, V(Sl~S3)=O.569; 
V(S2~S 1 )=0.665, V(S22::S3)=O.255; 
V(S3~S 1)= 1, V(S32::S2)= 1. 
Then priority weights are calculated by using Equation 4.18 shown in Section 3 of the 
extent analysis as follow: 
d'(el) = min (1, 0.569) = 0.569, 
d'(C2) = min (0.665, 0.255) = 0.255, 
d'(C3) = min (l, 1) = 1. 
W' = (0.569,0.255, 1) 
Collected priority weights are shown in vector W~ Finally after normalisation of these 
values as per Equation 4.20 shown in Section 4 of the extent analysis, priority weights 
in respect to the main goal will be calculated as follows for each criterion in Table n.7: 
w = (0.312, 0.140, 0.548). 
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Tables R8, 11.9, RIO, IU 1 and 11.12 are used to show the pair-wise comparision and 
local weighfs calculations for risk factors associated with organisational risks within 
sea ports and offshore terminals. 
Table 11.8: Local weights and pair-wise comparison matrix for Organisational Structure 
Organisational Structure (LSTRD) (LACD) Local Weights 
Lack of Subdividing Tasks & Responsibilities amOllg Departments (LSTRD) (1,1,1) (1/3,1/2,1) 0.307 
Lack of Achieving Co-ordination between Departments (LAeD) (1,2,3) (1,1,1) 0.693 
As RI for matrix 2x2 is equal to zero then CR= ° < 0.1 
From Table 11.8, synthesis values in respect to main goal are calculated as per Equation 
4.11 shown in Section 1 of the extent analysis and are depicted as follows: 
S 1=(1.333, 1.5,2) ® (116, 114.5, 113.333) = (0.222,0.333,0.600), 
S2=(2, 3,4) ® (116, 114.5, 113.333) = (0.333,0.667,1.200). 
These fuzzy synthesis values are compared with each other by using Equation 4.17 
shown in Section 2 of the extent analysis and new values are obtained as follows: 
V(Sl~S2)==().444; V(S2~Sl)=1. 
Then priority weights are calculated by using Equation 4.18 shown in Section 3 of the 
extent analysis as follow: 
d'(CI) = min (0.444) = 0.444, 
d'(C2) = min (I) = L 
W'= (0.444,1) 
Collected priority weights are shown in vector W'. Finally after normalisation of these 
values as per Equation 4.20 shown in Section 4 of the extent analysis, priority weights 
in respect to the main goal will be calculated as follows for each criterion in Table 11.8: 
w = (0.307,0.693) 
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Table 11.9: Local weights and pair-wise comparison matrix for Management 
Management (LDAERA) (QRJSM) (LAUK) (LCSMP) Local Weights 
Lack of Direct Authority to Effeet Rancdial Action (lDAERA) (1,1,1) (I/4,lf3,lf2) (1,2,3) 
Quality RequiRd by the Job for Senior Managers (QRJSM) (2,3,4) (1,1,1) (2,3,4) 
Lack of Adequacy in Upgrading Knowledge (LAUK) (113,112,1) (1/4,1/3,112) (1,1,1) 
(1,2,3) 
(1,2,3) 
(1,2,3) 
0.286 
0.437 
0.189 
Lack of Continuity in Senior Managers Position's (LCSMP) (1/3,112,1) (1/3,112,1) (lf3,1I2,l) (1,1,1) 0.088 
A. max = 4.105 Cl = 0.035 RI=O.90 CR=O.039 < 0.1 
From Table II.9, synthesis values in respect to main goal are calculated as per Equation 
4.11 shown in Section 1 of the extent analysis and are depicted as follows: 
SI==(3.25, 5.333,7.5) ®(1I29, 1120.666,1113.832) = (0.112,0.258,0.542), 
S2==(6, 9, 12) 0(1/29, 1120.666, 1113.832) = (0.207,0.435,0.867), 
S3=(2.583, 3.833, 5.5) ®(1129, 1120.666, 1/13.832) = (0.089,0.185,0.398), 
S4==(1.999, 2.5, 4) ® (1/29, 1120.666, 1/13.832) = (0.069,0.11 0,0.289). 
These fuzzy synthesis values are compared with each other by using Equation 4.17 
shown in-Section 2 of the extent analysis and new values are obtained as follows: 
V(Sl~S2)=O.654, V(Sl~S3)=1, V(Sl~S4)=I; 
V(S2~SI)=I, V(S~S3)=I, V(S2~S4)=1; 
V(S3~Sl)=O.797, V(S3~S2)=O.433, V(S3~S4)=1; 
V(S~SI)=O.545, V(S~S2)=O.201, V(S4~S3)=O.727. 
Then priority weights are calculated by using Equation 4.18 shown in Section 3 of the 
extent analysis as follow: 
d'(el) = min (0.654, I, 1) = 0.654, 
d'(C2) = min (1, 1, 1, 1) == 1, 
d'(C3) = min (0.797, 0.433, I) = 0.433, 
d'(C4) = min (0.545, 0.201, 0.727) = 0.201. 
W'= (0.654, 1,0.433,0.201) 
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Collected priority weights are shown in vector W'. Finally after nonnalisation of these 
values as per Equation 4.20 shown in Section 4 of the extent analysis, priority weights 
in respect to the main goal will be calculated as follows for each criterion in Table n.9: 
W = (0.286,0.437,0.189,0.088) 
Table 11.10: Local weights and pair-wise comparison matrix for Quality Process 
Quality Process (LPMDR) (LPSI) (LPIIC) (LCRPC) Local Weights 
Lack of Proccdutes, Manuals, Documents and Records (LPMDR) (1,1,1) (1,2,3) (2,3,4) (2,3,4) 0.445 
Lack of Processes e.g. Ship inspection, ctc (LPSI) (1/3,112,1) (1,1,1) (1,2,3) (1,2,3) 0.306 
Lack of Process c.g. Internal Inspection and Control (LPIIC) (114,113,1/2) (113,112,1) (1,1,1) (1,2,3) 0.193 
Lack: of Custom a- Related Processes (Complaints) (LCRPC) (114,113,112) (113,112,1) (1/3,112,1) (1,1,1) 0.056 
A max = 4.175 Cl = 0.058 Rl=0.90 CR=O.065 < 0.1 
From Table n.1 0, synthesis values in respect to main goal are calculated as per Equation 
4.11 shown in section I of the extent. analysis and are depicted as follows: 
SI=(6, 9, 12) ®(1I29, 1/3.833, 115.5) = (0.207,0.435,0.867), 
S2=(3.333, 5.5, 8) ®(1129, 113.833,115.5) = (0.115,0.266,0.578), 
S3=(2.583, 3.833, 5.5) ®(l/29, 1/3.833, 1/5.5) = (0.089,0.185,0.397), 
S4=(1.916, 2.333, 3.5) ® (1/29, 1/3.833, 115.5) = (0.066,0.113,0.253). 
These fuzzy synthesis values are compared with each other by using Equation 4.17 
shown in section 2 of the extent analysis and new values are obtained as follows: 
V(SI~S2)=I, V(SI~S3)=I, V(Sl~S4)=1; 
V(S2~SI)=O.687, V(S2~S3)=1, V(S2~S4)=1; 
V(S3~SI)=O.432, V(S3~S2)=O.777, V(S3~S4)=I; 
V(S~SI)=O.125, V(S4~S2)=O.474, V(S4~S3)=O.695. 
Then priority weights are calculated by using Equation 4.18 shown in section 3 of the 
extent analysis as follow: 
d'(el) = min (1, 1, 1) = I, 
d'(C2) = min (0.687, I, 1) = 0.687, 
d'(e3) = min (0.432, 0.777, I) = 0.432, 
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d'(C4) = min (0.125, 0.474, 0.695) = 0.125. 
W'= (1,0.687,0.432,0.125) 
Collected priority weights are shown in vector W'. Finally after nonnalisation of these 
values as per Equation 4.20 shown in section 4 of the extent analysis, priority weights in 
respect to the main goal will be calculated as follows for each criterion in Table n.lO: 
W = (0.445,0.306,0.193,0.056) 
Table 11.11: Local weights and pair-wise comparison matrix for Human Resources 
(lDM) (LQ) (/E) (Ll) 
Laclt of Decision ~ (lDM) (1.1,1) (1/4,113,112) (114,113,112) (1/4.113.112) 
Lock ofQualiljcatioo (LQ) (2,3,4) (1.1,1) (1,2.3) (2,3.4) 
Lock of Experience (LE) (2,3.4) (113.112.1) (1,1.1) (1,2.3) 
Laclt ofT niWug (LT) (2,3.4) (1/4,113,112) (113,112,1) (1,1.1) 
Lock ofJad_ (U) (113,112,1) (1/4,1/3,11l) (1/4,113,112) (114,113.112) 
Laclt oCSaiOty Culture .ad ... (LSCHA) (1,2.3) (114,1/3,112) (114,113,112) (1/4,113,112) 
Pooc CommuWcation (PC) (1.2,3) (114.113,112) (1/4.1/3,11Z) (J/4.113,11Z) 
Lock ofSkJ1k (LS) (1,2.3) (J/4,113.II2) (114,113,112) (113,1/2.1) 
(lJ) (LSCHA) (PC) (LS) Local w.;p.t. 
(1,2,3) (J13,II2.I) 
(2.3,4) (2.3,4) 
(2,3.4) (2,3,4) 
(2,3,4) (2.3,4) 
(1,1,1) (1/3,112,1) 
(1,2,3) (1,1,1) 
(1,2,3) (113,112.1) 
(1.2,3) (1/3.112,1) 
(J!3,112,1) (113,112.1) 
(2,3,4) (2,M) 
(2,3,4) (2.3,4) 
(2,3,4) (1.2,3) 
(113,1/2,1) (113.112,1) 
(1.2,3) (1,2,3) 
(1,1,1) (1,2,3) 
(113.112,1) (1,1.1) 
0.039 
0.23S 
0.219 
0.195 
0.002 
0.126 
0.101 
0.080 
it max = 8.779 Cl = 0.1 11 RI=1.41 CR=0.079 < 0.1 
From Table n.ll, synthesis values in respect to main goal are calculated as per Equation 
4,11 shown in Section 1 of the extent analysis and are depicted as follows: 
SI =(3. 749, 5.499, 8.5) ® (11127.5, 1190.495, 1159.079) = (0.029,0.061,0.144), 
S2=(14, 21,28) ®(1I127.5, 1/90.495, 1/59.079) = (0.109,0.232,0.474), 
S3=(12.333, 18.5,25) ®(I/127.5, 1/90.495, 1159.079) = (0.097,0.204,0.423), 
S4=(1O.583, 15.833,21.5) ®(1I127.5, 1190.495, 1159.079) = (0.083,0.175,0,363), 
S5=(3.082, 3.999, 6.5) ®(1I127.5, 1190.495, 1159.079) = (0.024,0.044,0.110), 
S6=(5.75,9.999, 14.5) ®(l/127,5, 1/90.495, I159.079) = (0,045,0.110,0.245), 
S7=(5.083, 8.499,12.5) ®(l/127.5, 1190.495, 1159.079) = (0.040,0.094,0.211), 
S8=(4.499, 7.166,11) ®(I/127.5, l/90.495, 1/59.079)= (0.035,0.079,0.186). 
These fuzzy synthesis values are compared with each other by using Equation 4.17 
shown in Section 2 of the extent analysis and new values are obtained as follows: 
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V(Sl~S2)=O.166, V(Sl~S3)=O.247, V(Sl~S4)=0.348, V(Sl~S5)=I, V(Sl~S6)=O.669, 
V(Sl~S7)=O. 759, V(S 1~S8)=O.858; 
V(S2~SI)=I, V(S2~S3)=1, V(S21~S4)=1, V(S2~S5)=1, V(S2~S6)=1, V(S2~S7)=1, 
V(S2~S8)=1; 
V(S3~SI)=I, V(S3~S2)=O.918, V(S3~S4)=1, V(S3~S5)=1, V(S3~S6)=1, V(S3~S7)=I, 
V(S3~S8)=I; 
V(S4~Sl)=1, V(S4~S2)=0.816, V(S~S3)=0.902, V(S~S5)=1, V(S~S6)=I, 
V(S4~S7)=1, V(S~S8)=1; 
V(S5~S 1 )=0.826, V(S5~S2)=O.005, V(S5~S3)=0.075, V(S5~S4)=0.170, 
V(S5~S6)=O.496, V(S5~S7)=O.583, V(S5~S8)=O.682; 
V(S6~Sl)=1, V(S~S2)=0.527, V(S6~S3)=O.611, V(S6~S4)=O.714, V(S6~S5)=1, 
V(S~S7)=1, V(S~S8)=I; 
V(S7~SI)=I, V(S7~S2)=0.425, V(S7~S3)=O.509, V(S72:S4)=0.612, V(S7~S5)=1, 
V(S7~S6)=O.912, V(S7~S8)= 1; 
V(S8~Sl)=1, V(S82:S2)=0.335, V(S8~S3)=O.416, V(S82:S4)=0.517, V(S82:S5)=I, 
V(S8~S6)=O.819, V(S82:S7)=O.907. 
Then priority weights are calculated by using Equation 4.18 shown in Section 3 of the 
extent analysis as follow: 
d'(Cl) = min (0.166,0.247,0.348, 1,0.669,0.759,0.858) = 0.166, 
d'(C2) = min (1, I, I, I, I, I, I) = I, 
d'(C3) = min (1, 0.918, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1) = 0.918, 
d'(C4) = min (1, 0.816, 0.902, 1, 1, 1, 1) = 0.816, 
d'(C5)=min(0.826, 0.005, 0.075, 0.170,0.496,0.583,0.682)=0.005, 
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d'(C6) = min (1, 0.527, 0.611, 0.714, 1, 1, 1) = 0.527, 
d'(C7) = min (1,0.425,0.509,0.612, 1,0.912, 1) = 0.425, 
d'(C8) = min (1, 0.335, 0.416, 0.517, 1,0.819,0.907) = 0.335. 
W'= (0.166, I ,0.918,0.816,0.005,0.527,0.425,0.335) 
Collected priority weights are shown in vector W'. Finally after normalisation of these 
values as per Equation 4.20 shown in Section 4 of the extent analysis, priority weights 
in respect to the main goal will be calculated as follows for-each criterion in Table n.lI: 
W:::: (0.039,0.238,0.219,0.195,0.002,0.126,0.101,0.080) 
Table 11.12: Local weights and pair-wise comparison matrix for Port Performance 
Indicators. 
P.P.! (POPI) (PFPI) (PQPI) Local Weigh19 
Port Operational Performance indicators (POPI) (1,1,1) (2,3,4) (1,2,3) 0.548 
Port Financial Performance indicators (PFPI) (114,1/3,1/2) (1,1,1) (l,2,3) 03J2 
Port Quality Performance indicators (PQPI) (1/3,112,1) (1/3,112,1) (1,1,1) 0.140 
Amax =3.053 Cl::::: 0.026 RI=0.58 CR=0.046 < 0.1 
From Table 11.12, synthesis values in respect to main goal are calculated as per Equation 
4.11 shown in Section I of the extent analysis and are depicted as follows: 
SI==(4, 6, 8) ®(1I15.5, 1111.333, 117.916)=(0.258,0.529,1.011), 
82==(2.25,3.333,4.5) ® (1115.5, 1111.333, 117.916) = (0.145,0.294,0.568), 
S3=(1.666, 2, 3) ®(1/15.5, 1111.333, 117.916) = (0.107,0.176,0.379). 
These fuzzy synthesis values are compared with each other by using Equation 4.17 
shown in section 2 of the extent analysis and new values are obtained as follows: 
V(SI~82)==1, V(SI~S3)=I; 
V(S2~SI)==O.569, V(S2~S3)=1; 
V(S3~S 1 )==0.255, V(S3~S2)=O.665. 
Then priority weights are calculated by using Equation 4.18 shown in section 3 of the 
extent analysis as follow: 
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d'(Cl) = min (1,1) = 1, 
d'(C2) = min (0.569, 1) = 0.569, 
d'(C3) = min (0.255,0.665, 1) = 0.255. 
W'= (1,0.569,0.255) 
Collected priority weights are shown in vector W'. Finally after normalisation of these 
values as per Equation 4.20 shown in Section 4 of the extent analysis, priority weights 
in respect to the main goal will be calculated as follows for each criterion in Table n.12: 
W = (0.548,0.312,0.140) 
Tables lLB, n.14, 11.15, 11.16, n.17 and n.18 are used to show the palr-WISe 
comparision and local weight's calculations for risk factors associated with operational 
risks within sea ports and offshore terminals. 
Table 11.13: Safety Related Risk Factors (R41) based on Harrald and Merrick (2000) 
Le\",!3 Operational Risks 
Composition of Calling Fleet (CCF) 
Traffic Conditions (TC) 
Weather CoDditions (WC) 
Waterway Configunllion (WWC) 
(CCF) (TC) (WC) (WWC) (PCDGT) (PNTM) Local Weights 
(1,1,1) (1,2,3)(1/4,1/3,112) (114,1/3,1/2) (1,2,3) (1,2,3) 
(1/3,112,1) (1,1,1) (1/6,115,1/4) (1/3.112,1) (I,2,3) 0,2,3) 
(2,3,4) (4,5,6) (1,1,1) (114,1/3,112) (1,2,3) (1,2,3) 
(2,3.4) (1,2,3) (4,5,6) (1,1,1) (1,2,3) (1,2,3) 
0.048 
0.34{) 
0.099 
0.398 
Potential Consequences ofDG Transportation (PCDGT)(I,1 ,1)(1/8,lfl,1/6) (113,112,1) (1/4,1/3,112)(1,1,1)(1,2,3) 0.027 
PolentialImpacls afoot baying VIM (PIVTM) (1.2,3) (1,1,1) (113,1/2,1) (113,112,1)(113.112,1)(1,1,1) 0.088 
A max = 6.328 Cl = 0.065 RI= 1.24 CR=O.053 < 0.1 
From Table n.B, synthesis values in respect to main goal are calculated as per Equation 
4.11 shown in Section I of the extent analysis and are depicted as follows: 
81=(3.833,5.166, 7) 0(1168.083,1151.009, 1136.523) = (0.056,0.101,0.192), 
82=(4.833,6.2,8.25) ® (1/68.083, 1/51.009, 1/36.523) = (0.071,0.121,0.226), 
83=(9.2, 13.25, 17.333) 0(1168.083,1151.009, I136.523) = (0.135,0.260,0.475), 
84=(11, 16,21) ®(1/68.083, 1/51.009, 1/36.523)= (0.162,0.314,0.575), 
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S5=(3.658, 4.893,6.5) ® (1/68.083, 1/51.009, 1136.523) = (0.054,0.096,0.178), 
S6=(3.999, 5.5, 8) ® (1168.083, 1/51.009, 1136.523)= (0.059,0.108,0.220). 
These fuzzy synthesis values are compared with each other by using Equation 4.17 
shown in Section 2 of the extent analysis and new values are obtained as follows: 
V(SI~S2)=O.857, V(Sl~S3)==O.260, V(Sl~S4)=O.120, V(SI~S5)=1, V(Sl~S6)=O.949; 
V(S2~Sl)=1, V(S2~S3)=0.396, V(S21~S4)=O.250, V(S2~S5)=1, V(S2~S6)=1; 
V(S3~Sl)=1, V(S3~S2)=I, V(S3~S4)=0.853, V(S3~S5)=1, V(S3~S6)=1; 
V(S~Sl)=l, V(S£S2)=1, V(S~S3)=1, V(S~S5)=1, V(S~S6)=1; 
V(S5~Sl)=O.960,V(S5~S2)==O.811,V(S5~S3)=0.208,V(S5~S4)=0.068,V(S5~S6)=0.908; 
V(S6~S 1)= 1, V(S~S2)=0.920, V(S~S3)=O.358, V(S6~S4)=O.220, V(S6~S5)= 1. 
Then priority weights are calculated by using Equation 4.18 shown in Section 3 of the 
extent analysis as follow: 
d'(Cl) = min (0.857, 0.260, 0.120, 1,0.949) = 0.120, 
d'(C2) = min (1, 1,0.853, 1, 1) = 0.853, 
d'(C3) = min (1, 0.396, 0.250, 1, I) = 0.250, 
d'(C4) = min (1, 1, 1, 1, 1) = 1, 
d'(C5)=rnin(0.960, 0.811, 0.208, 0.068,0.908)=0.068, 
d'(C6) = min (I, 0.920, 0.358, 0.220, I) = 0.220. 
W' = (0.120,1,0.853,0.250,1,0.068,0.220) 
Collected priority weights are shown in vector W'. Finally after normalisation of these 
values as per Equation 4.20 shown in Section 4 of the extent analysis, priority weights 
in respect to the main goal will be calculated as follows for each criterion in Table H.l3: 
W = (0.048,0.340,0.099,0.394,0.027,0.088) 
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Table 11.14: Local weights and pair-wise comparison matrix for Security Related Risk 
Factors 
Pollution Related Risk Factors (PS) (PA) (PP) Local Weight s 
People's Safety (PS) (1,1,1) (1,3,4) (2,3,4) 0.670 
Port Asset (p A) (1/4,1/3,112) (1,1,1) (1.2,3) 0.274 
Port Profit (PP) (1/4,1/3,112) (1/3,112,1) (1,1,1) 0.056 
il max = 3.054 Cl = 0.027 RI=0.58 CR==0.047 < 0.1 
From Table II.14, synthesis values in respect to main goal are calculated as per Equation 
4.11 shown in Section 1 of the extent analysis and are depicted as follows: 
SI=(5, 7, 9) ®(1I16.5, 1112.33, 1/8.833) == (0.303,0.568,l.019), 
S2=(2.25, 3.33, 4.5) ®(1I16.5, 1112.33, 118.833) = (0.136,0.270,0.509), 
S3==(1.583, 2, 3) ®(1I16.5, 1112.33, 118.833) == (0.096,0.162,0.340). 
These fuzzy synthesis values are compared with each other by using Equation 4.17 
shown in Section 2 of the extent analysis and new values are obtained as follows: 
V(S I~S2)=1, VeS l~S3)==I; 
V(S2~Sl)=O.408, V(S2~S3)==I; 
V(S3~S 1)=0.083, V(S3~S2)==0.654. 
Then priority weights are calculated by using Equation 4.18 shown in Section 3 of the 
extent analysis as follow: 
d'(Cl) == min (1, 1) == 1, 
d'(C2) = min (0.408, 1) == 0.408, 
d'(e3) = min (0.083, 0.654) == 0.083. 
W' = (1,0.408,0.083) 
Collected priority weights are shown in vector W'. Finally after normalisation of these 
values as per Equation 4.20 shown in Section 4 of the extent analysis, priority weights 
in respect to the main goal will be calculated as follows for each criterion in Table n.14: 
W == (0.670,0.374,0.056) 
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Table 11.15: Local weights and pair-wise comparison matrix for Pollution Related Risk 
Factors 
Pollution Related Risk Factors (SRP) (CRP) (pRP) (CRP) Local Weights 
Ship Related Pollutions (SRP) (1,1,1) (1,2,3) (2,3,4) (3,4,5) 0.496 
Cargo Related PoIlutions (CRP) (1/3,1/2,1) (1,1,1) (1,2,3) (l/3,l/2,1) 0.178 
Port Related Pollutions (PRP) (114,1/3,1/2) (1/3,112,1) (I,I,I) (2,3,4) 0.220 
City Related PolIutions (CRP) (1/5,1/4,1/3) (1,2,3) (1/4,113,112) (1,1,1) 0.166 
A max == 4.186 Cl == 0.062 RI=0.90 CR=0.069 < 0.1 
From Table II.15, synthesis values in respect to main goal are calculated as per Equation 
4.11 shown in Section 1 of the extent analysis and are depicted as follows: 
SI=(7,10, 13) ®(l/30.333, 1122.416,1115.699)= (0.231,0.446,0.828), 
S2=(2.666, 4,6) ®(1/30.333, 1122.416, 1115.699)= (0.088,0.178,0.382), 
S3=(3.583, 4.833, 6.5) ®(1/30.333, 1122.416, 1115.699) = (0.118,0.216,0.414), 
S4=(2.45, 3.583, 4.833) ®(1/30.333, 1122.416, 1/15.699) == (0.081,0.160,0.308). 
These fuzzy synthesis values are compared with each other by using Equation 4.17 
shown in Section 2 of the extent analysis and new values are obtained as follows: 
V(SI2:S2)=1, V(Sl~S3)=1, V(Sl~S4)=I; 
V(S22:S 1 )=0.360, V(S2~S3)=O.874, V(S22:S4)= 1; 
V(S32:S1)=O.443, V(S32:S2)=I, V(S3~S4)==1; 
V(S4~SI)=o.212, V(S~S2)=1, V(S4~S3)=O.772. 
Then priority weights are calculated by using Equation 4.18 shown in Section 3 of the 
extent analysis as follow: 
d'(Cl) == min (1, 1,1) = 1, 
d'(C2) = min (0.360,0.874, 1) = 0.360, 
d'(C3) = min (0.443, 1, 1) = 0.443, 
d'(C4) = min (0.212, 1,0.772) = 0.212. 
W' = 0,0.360,0.443,0.212) 
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Collected priority weights are shown in vector W'. Finally after nonnalisation of these 
values as per Equation 4.20 shown in Section 4 of the extent analysis, priority weights 
in respect to the main goal will be calculated as follows for each criterion in Table ll.15: 
W = (OA96,0. 1 78,0.220,0. 106) 
Table 11.16: Local weights and pair-wise comparison matrix for Legal Related Risk 
Factors 
Legal Related Risk Factors 
Regulatory Changes (RC) 
Fraud in Contracts (FC) 
(RC) 
(1,1,1) 
(1/3,112,1) 
As RI for matrix 2x2 is equal to zero then CR= ° < 0.1 
(FC) 
(1,2,3) 
(1,1,1) 
Local Weights 
0.693 
0.307 
From Table I1.16, synthesis values in respect to main goal are calculated as per Equatioll-
4.11 shown in Section 1 of the extent analysis and are depicted as follows: 
SI =(2, 3,4) ® (1/6, 114.5, 1/3.333) = (0.333,0.667,1.200), 
S2=(1.333, 1.5,2) ®(1/6, 114.5, 1/3.333) = (0.222,0.333,0.600). 
These fuzzy synthesis values are compared with each other by using Equation 4.17 
shown in Section 2 of the extent analysis and new values are obtained as follows: 
V(S 1~S2)= 1; V(S2~S 1 )=0.444. 
Then priority weights are calculated by using Equation 4.18 shown in Section 3 of the 
extent analysis as follow: 
d'(Cl) = min (1) = 1, 
d'(C2) = min (0.444) = 0.360. 
W' = (1,0.444) 
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Collected priority weights are shown in vector W'. Finally after nonnalisation of these 
values as per Equation 4.20 shown in Section 4 of the extent analysis, priority weights 
in respect to the main goal will be calculated as follows for each criterion in Table n.16: 
W = (0.693,0.307) 
Table D.17: Local weights and pair-wise comparison matrix for Human Error Risk 
Factors 
Human Error Risk Factors (PRE) (PPRE) (SPRE) (SRP) Local Weights 
Pilot Related Errors (PRE) (l,I,I) (2,3,4) (1,2,3) (3,4,5) 0.498 
Port Personnel Related Errors (PPRE) (1/4,1/3,1/2) (1,1,1) (1,2,3) (1/3,1/2,1) 0.161 
Ship's Personnel Related Errors (SPRE) (113,112,1) (1/3,1/2,1) (1,1,1) (l,2,3) 0.189 
Stevedore's Related Errors (SRP) (1/5,1/4,1/3) (1,2,3) (113,1/2,1) (1,1,1) 0.152 
it max = 4.18 Cl = 0.06 RI=0.90 CR=0.067 < 0.1 
From Table n.17, synthesis values in respect to main goal are calculated as per Equation 
4.11 shown in Section 1 of the extent analysis and are depicted as follows: 
SI=(7, 10, 13) ®(l/29.833, 1121.583, 1114.782) = (0.235,0.463,0:879), 
S2=(2.583, 3.833, 5.5) ®(1I29.833, 1121.583, 1I14.782) = (0.086,0.177,0.372), 
S3=(2.666, 4, 6) ®(1I29.833, 1121.583,1114.782) = (0.089,0.185,0.406), 
S4=(2.533, 3.75, 5.333) ®(1/29.833, 1121.583, 1114.782) = (0.085,0.174,0.361). 
These fuzzy synthesis values are compared with each other by using Equation 4.17 
shown in Section 2 of the extent analysis and new values are obtained as follows: 
V(SI2::S2)=1, VS 12::S3)=I, V(SI~S4)=1; 
V(S22::S1)=O.324, V(S22::S3)=O.972, V(S2~S4)=I; 
V(S32::SI)=O.381, V(S32::S2)=I, V(S32::S4)=1; 
V(S42::SI)=O.304, V(S42::S2)=O.989, V(S42::S3)=O.961. 
Then priority weights are calculated by using Equation 4.18 shown in Section 3 of the 
extent analysis as follow: 
d'(el) = min (1, 1, 1) = I, 
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d'(C2) = min (0.324,0.972, 1) = 0.324, 
d'(C3) = min (0.381, 1, 1) = 0.381, 
d'(C4) =min (0.304, 0.989, 0.961):::: 0.304. 
W' = (1,0.324,0.381,0.304) 
Collected priority weights are shown in vector W'. Finally after normalisation of these 
values as per Equation 4.20 shown in Section 4 of the extent analysis, priority weights 
in respect to the main goal will be calculated as follows for each criterion in Table RI7: 
W = (0.498,0.161,0.189,0.152) 
Table 11.18: Local weights and pair-wise comparison matrix for Technical Related Risk 
Factors 
Technical Related Risk Factors (LEM) (UTI) (CRP) Local Weights 
Lack of Equipment Maintenance (LEM) 
Lack of IT Teclmology (UTI) 
(l,I,I) (114,1/3,1/2) (1/3,1/2,1) 
(2,3,4) (1,1,1) (1,2,3) 
0.078 
0.566 
Lack of Dredging and Navaids Maintenance (LDNM) (1,2,3) (113,112,1) (I,I,I) 0.356 
A max = 4.15 Cl = 0.051 RI=0.58 CR=0.089 < 0.1 
From Table IT. 18, synthesis values in respect to main goal are calculated as per Equation 
4.11 shown in Section 1 of the extent analysis and are depicted as follows: 
SI=(1.583, 1.833,2.5) ®(1I15.5, 1111.333, 117.916) = (0.102,0.162,0.316), 
S2=(4, 6, 8) ®(l/15.5, 1111.333, 117.916)= (0.258,0.529,1.011), 
S3=(2.333, 3.5, 5) ®(1I15.5, 1111.333, 117.916) = (0.150,0.309,0.632). 
These fuzzy synthesis values are compared with each other by using Equation 4.17 
shown in Section 2 of the extent analysis and new values are obtained as follows: 
V(S 12:S2)=O.136, V(S 12:S3 )=O.530~ 
V(S22:SI)=1, V(S22:S3)=1; 
V(S32:S1)=1, V(S32:S2)=0.629. 
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Then priority weights are calculated by using Equation 4.18 shown in Section 3 of the 
extent analysis as follow: 
d'(el) = min (0.136, 0.530) = 0.136, 
d'(C2) = min (1, 1) = 1, 
d'(C3) = min (1, 0.629) = 0.629. 
W = (0.136,1,0.629) 
CoUected priority weights are shown in vector W'. Finally after normalisation of these 
values as per Equation 4.20 shown in Section 4 of the extent analysis, priority weights 
in respect to the main goal will be calculated as follows for each criterion in Table IT.18: 
W == (0.078,0.566,0.356) 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
After pair-wise comparisions and global weights' calculations using Level 2 and Level 
3 risk factors the final results for the country, business and organisational risk factors 
are illustrated in Tables II.19, II.20 and II.21 respectively (results for operational risk 
factors were already illustrated in Chapter 4). In the following tables the final ranking of 
the risk factors are shown just after the global weights. Final ranking of the risk factors 
are based on their weight magnitute. 
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Table 11.19: Level 3 Country Risks - Global weights and rankings 
Level! Levei2 Risb Local Level 3 Risks Local Global Risk Weights Weights Weights Raokiogs 
Country Macro-ecunomic 0.312 Eoonomic invigoration 0.519 0.162 2 
Risks Practices 
Stability in interest and foreign 0.181 0.056 7 
exohange rates 
GDPgrowth 0.202 0.063 5 
Balancing of national saving 0.097 0.030 10 
anddept 
Political and Social 0.061 Political stability 0.477 0.029 11 
Systems 
Government efficiency and 0.357 0.022 14 
incorrupt ion 
Internationalisation 0.058 0.003 19 
Social stability 0.108 0.007 18 
Foreign Enterprise 0.052 Capital and remittance control 0.556 0.029 12 
Policy 
Tax incentives 0.260 0.014 16 
Trade restriction 0.184 0.010 17 
Port Development 0.204 Port organisation pattem 0.156 0.032 9 
Policy 
Liberalisation and 0.325 0.066 4 
internationalisation degree 
Industrial potential in 0.414 0.085 3 
neighbouring areas 
Positioning relative to ports 0.105 0.021 15 
within a nation 
Port Management 0.371 Private finanoing of port 0.073 0.027 13 
Policy infrastructure and equipments 
Portltetminal dues and charges 0.632 0.235 I 
Efficient port operation policy 0.155 0.057 6 
Custom practice 0.140 0.052 8 
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Table 11.20: Leve13 Business Risks - Global weights and rankings 
Lev"ll Levcl 2 Risks Local Loul Global Risk W!!ghb Levcl3 Risks Weights Wei2ht. Ranldal" 
Business Competition (0.566) Port (Terminal) Effioiency (PTE) (0.186) (0.1052) 3 
Risk Factors (CF) 
Landside Accessibility (LA) (0.061) (0.0345) 11 
Cargo Handling Charges (CHC) (0.184) (0.1040) 4 
Logistics and Value Added (0.095) (0.0532) 7 
Sen>ices (LV AS) 
Port/offShore terminal (0.022) (0.0124) 15 
Reliability (PR) 
Depth of Water (OW) (0.047) (0.0266) 13 
PortloffShOTe terminal (0.026) (0.0147) 14 
Location (PL) 
Shipping Frequenoy (SF) (0.173) (0.0970) 5 
Adequate Service (AS) (0.085) (0.0480) 9 
POTt's Response to User's Need (0.049) (0.0273) 12 
(PRUN) 
Ability to Changing Market (0.072) (0.0403) 10 
Environment (ACME) 
Industry Change (0.357) Fluctuation in Shipping Industry (0.312) (0.11 13) 2 
(IC) (FSI) 
ConliOlidation among Ocean (0.140) (0.0499) 8 
Carriers (CAOC) 
Potential for Global Substitutes for (0.548) (0.1956) 1 
Portl offshore terminal 
Users (pGSpu) 
Customer Change (0.080) Increase in Ship Size (lSS) (0.080) (0.0800) 6 (cq 
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Table 11.21: Level 3 Organisational Risks - Global weights and rankings 
Levell Risk Level 1 Risks Local Level 3 Risks Local Global -11 WeiGbts W~bts Wei2hta 
Organisational Organisational (0.161) Laclc: of Subdividing Tasks & (0.307) (0.0494) 8 
Risk Structure (OS) Responsibility among departments 
(LSTRD) 
Lack of Achic:ving Co-ordination (0.693) (O.I11S) 3 
between Dcpat1ments (LACD) 
Management (M) (0.122) Lack of Direct Authority to Effect (0.286) (0.0349) 9 
Remedial Action (LDAERA) 
Quality Required by the lob for Senior (0.437) (0.0539) 7 
Managers (QR1SM) 
LackofA~u~inUp~g (0.189) (0.0230) 13 
Knowledge (!AUK) 
Lack of Continuity in Senior Managers (0.088) (0.0107) 18 
Position'5 (LCSMP) 
Quality Process (QP) (0.353) Lack of Procedures, Manuals. (0.445) (0.1570) 1 
Documents and Records (LPMDR) 
Lack of Processes e.g. Ship inspection, (0.306) (0.1080) 4 
etc (LPSI) 
Lack of Process e.g. Internal Inspection (0.193) (0.0681) 6 
and Conlrol (LPIlC) 
Lack of Customer Related Processes (0.056) (0.0197) 15 
(Complaints) (LCRPC) 
Human Resource (HR) (0.118) Lack of Decision Making (LDM) (0.039) (0.0047) 20 
Lack of Qualification (LQ) (0.238) (0.0280) 11 
Lack ofExpc:rienQc (LE) (0.219) (0.0258) 12 
Lack of Training (1,1) (0.195) (0.0230) 14 
Lack of Judgment (U) (0.002) (0.0003) 21 
Lack of Safety Culture and ... (LSCHA) (0.126) (0.0148) 16 
Poor Communication (PC) (0.101) (0.0119) 17 
Lack of Skills (LS) (0.080) (0.0094) 19 
Key Performance (0.246) Port/terminal Operational Performance (0.548) (0.1348) 2 
Indicators (KPl) indicators (POP!) 
Port/terminal Financial Performance (0.312) (0.0767) 5 
indicators (PFPI) 
port/terminal Quality Performance (0.140) (0.0344) 10 
indicators (PQP!) 
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APPENDIX III 
Questionnaire used in Survey 2 for the purpose of 
Chapter 5 
320 
Liverpool John Moores University 
School of Engineering, Technology and Marine Operations 
LOOM Research Institute 
Byrom Street 
L33AF 
UK 
Phone: +44 (0) 151 231 2028-
Fax: +44 (0) 151 231 2453 
Email: k.mokhtari@2007.ljmu.ac.uk 
Date : 21.09.2010 
Dear Sir, 
As offshore terminals and marine ports are valuable assets, in today's uncertain and 
complex environment further refinements are needed to assess risk factors and prioritise 
protective measures for these critical logistics infrastructures. From other hand the 
problem facing port professionals, such as port risk managers and port auditors is lack 
of an appropriate methodology upon which to base their evaluation techniques to 
support the ports risk management strategies. 
A research project at Liverpool John Moores University is currently being carried out 
with regard to a generic risk assessment model which is based on a risk management 
framework of offshore terminals and marine ports. The proposed model is intended to 
be applied on real offshore terminal and marine port cases. Now the requirement for this 
investigation is to use experts' judgements who are working in the related fields and to 
rate the motioned risk factors on the nominated ports. Eventually outcome of this survey 
can help port professionals and port risk managers to audit and compare their ports. In 
latter stages this will lead to develop appropriate strategies to take preventive/corrective 
actions for mitigating risk factors toward a successful port and tenninal operations and 
management. 
Thus this survey sets out to provide an organized method for collecting views and 
information pertaining to the implementation of an appropriate risk management 
framework in offshore terminals and marine ports. I should be most grateful if I could 
ask you to spare some of your very valuable time to complete the accompanying 
questionnaire and to email or post it to myself at the address as shown above. Your vital 
feedback will greatly benefit and contribute in the formulation of an industry wide 
opinion. I can assure you that the confidentiality of your response will be honoured and 
respected. 
Best Regards 
Captain Kambiz Mokhtari 
PhD Student 
MSc, BSc, Master Mariner, MICS 
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SECTION 1: PERSONAL DETAILS 
- Please mark the appropriate answer for each question: 
1. Please mark your age range: 
A. Less than 30 years old 
B. Between 30 and 40 years old 
C. 40 years old or more 
2. Please mark your appropriate qualification: 
A. Postgraduate 
B. Undergraduate 
C. High School Diploma 
3. Please mark your work experiences: 
A. Work experience < 10 
B. 1 0 ~ Work experience ~ 20 
C. 20 < Work experience 
SECTION 2: MEASUREMENT SCALES 
Table Ill.I: Different Grades for rating of the Operational Risk Factors 
Occurrence Likelihood Consequence Severity 
(OL) Grade (CS) 
Very Low 1 Slight 
Low 2 Minor 
Medium 3 Moderate 
High 4 Critical 
Very High 5 Catastrophic 
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SECTION 3: EXPLANATIONS AND EXAMPLES 
Please study the operational risks model in Figure Ill. I. Subsequently fill the empty 
spaces of the evaluation sheet shown in Table III.2 by selecting the appropriate grades 
from Table III.l for the Ports of Bushehr, Shahid Rajaie and Chabahar. Empty spaces 
must be filled with respect to the 22 operational risk factors shown in Level 3 of the 
operational risks model in Figure IIU. As it is shown in Table 111.1 "Occurrence 
Likelihood" describes the frequency happening of the risk factors depicted in the model 
which may occur within the mentioned ports, whereas the "Consequence Severity" 
describes the magnitude of the possible losses if these risk factors happen in the selected 
ports. 
With respect to the mentioned operational risk factors during ports' and terminals' 
operations and management in Ports of Bushehr, Shahid Rajaie and Chabahar following 
question is an example which will help in filling the evaluation sheet shown in Table 
ITI.2. 
Question: What is the Occurrence Likelihood (OL) of the risk factor of "Pilots' related 
errors i.e. R52" in Port of Shahid Rajaie? How severe can be the Consequence Severity 
(CS) of any "Pilots' related errors" affect and cause loss or damage to the Port of 
Shahid Rajaie? 
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Levell Level 2 Level 3 
r-- Composition of Calling Aeet R11 
~ Traffic Conditions R12 
Safety Risk 
-
t-- Weather Conditions R13 
r-- Factors t-- Waterway Configuration R14 
R1 t-- Potential Consequences of DG transportation R15 
'-- Potential Impacts of not having VTM R16 
Security Risk r- People's Safety R21 
Factors 
t-- Port Asset R22 
R2 '-- Port Profit R23 
Ship's Related PoIlutions R31 r--
Pollution Risk 
Factors ~ Cargo Related PoIlutions (Handling, Storage) R32 
t-- t---
t-- PortJTerminal (Industrialisation, Development and Maintenance)R33 
Operational R3 City Related PoIlutions (Port- City Interface) R34 ~ '--Risks 
Legal 
Risk Factors f-L Regulatory Changes R41 t-- Fraud in contracts R42 
R4 
Human Error ..-- Pilots Related errors R51 
Risk Factors t--- PortITerminal Personnel Related errors R52 r--- r--
'--
R5 
Ships Personnel Related errors R53 
-
Stevedores Related errors R54 
Technical ~ Lack of Equipment Maintenance R61 
Risk Factors 
'-- Lack of IT Technology R62 
RS - Lack of Dredging and Navaids Maintenance R63 
Figure ITI.!: Operational risk model to be used during offshore terminals' and marine 
ports' operations and management 
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SECTION 4: RISK SCORING SHEET 
Table ID.2: Evaluation sheet. 
Busbebr Sbabid Rajaie Cbabbabar 
Risk Name of Risks 
OL CS OL CS OL CS 
R411 Composition of Calling Fleet 
R412 Traffic Conditions 
R413 Weatbn Conditions 
R414 Waterway Configuration 
R41S Potential Consequences of DG Transportation 
R416 Potential Impacts of not having V. T.M 
R421 Security of peoples in port 
R422 Security of port's Assets 
R423 Security of Port's Profit 
R431 Ship's Related Pollutions 
R432 Cargo Related PoUutions 
R433 Port Related PoUutions e.g. Port Development 
R434 City Related PoUutions (port and City interface) 
R441 Regulatory Cbanges 
R442 Fraud in contracts 
R4S1 Pilot's Related Errors 
R452 Port's Personnel Related Errors 
R453 Ship's Personnel Related Errors 
R454 Stevedore's Related Errors 
R461 Lack of Equipment Maintenance 
R462 Lack of IT Technology 
R463 Lack of Dredging and Navaids Maintenance 
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APPENDIX IV 
Questionnaire used in Survey 3 for the purpose of 
Chapter 6 
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Liverpool John Moores University 
School of Engineering, Technology and Marine Operations 
LOOM Research Institute 
Byrom Street 
L33AF 
UK 
Phone: +44 (0) 151 231 2028 
Fax: +44 (0) 151 231 2453 
Email: k.mokhtari@2007.ljmu.ac.uk 
Date: 14.1 1.2010 
Dear Sir, 
Ports and offshore terminals are critical infrastructure resources and play key roles in 
the transportation of goods and people. With more than eighty percent of international 
trade by volume being carried out by sea, ports and offshore terminals are vital for 
seaborne trade and international commerce. Furthermore in today's uncertain and 
complex environment there is a need-to analyse the participated risk factors in order to 
prioritise protective measures in these critically logistics infrastructures. 
A research project at Liverpool John Moores University is currently being carried out 
with regard to a generic risk assessment model which is based on a risk management 
framework to identify the critical hazards that can lead to catastrophic damages to 
offshore terminals and marine ports. After identifying the most significant hazards it has 
been decided to investigate each hazard individually to check occurrence likelihood of 
the nominated causes and consequences of each hazard. Now the requirement for this 
investigation is to use experts' judgements who are working in the related fields to rate 
the causes and consequences of each hazards in order to detect the most significance 
ones. Eventually this can help port professionals and port risk managers to develop 
appropriate strategies and take preventive/corrective actions for mitigating risks toward 
a successful offshore terminals' and marine ports' operations and management. 
Thus this survey sets out to provide an organized method for collecting views and 
information pertaining to the implementation of an appropriate risk management 
framework in offshore terminals and marine ports. I should be most grateful if I could 
ask you to spare some of your very valuable time to complete the accompanying 
questionnaire and to email or post it to myself at the address as shown above. Your vital 
feedback will greatly benefit and contribute in the formulation of an industry wide 
opinion. I can assure you that the confidentiality of your response will be honoured and 
respected. 
Best Regards 
Captain Kambiz Mokhtari 
PhD Student 
MSc, BSc, Master Mariner, MICS 
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SECTION 1: PERSONAL DETAILS 
- Please mark the appropriate answer for each question: 
1. Please mark your age range: 
A. Less than 30 years old 
B. Between 30 and 40 years old 
C. 40 years old or more 
2. Please mark your appropriate qualification: 
A. Postgraduate 
B. Undergraduate 
C. High School Diploma 
3. Please mark your work experiences: 
A. Work experience < 10 
B. 10 ~ Work experience ~ 20 
C. 20 < Work experience 
SECTION 2: MEASUREMENT SCALES 
Table IV.I: Different occurrence likelihood grades to be used for rating the causes and 
consequences of the risk factors 
Occurrence Likelihood (OL) 
Very Low 
Low 
Medium 
High 
Very High 
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Grade 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
SECTION 3: CASE STUDIES 
CASE STUDY 1 
Please read Table N.2.l which has listed the main causes for initiating a pilot's related 
errors which probably can lead to the accidents shown in Figure IV.I. 
Table IV.2.t: Main causes of the pilot's related errors. 
Main causes of pilot's related errors 
Inappropriate command from pilot 
Pilot unaware of ship's behaviour 
Pilot make an error 
Ship master make an error of judgement 
Over friendly relation-ship with pilot 
Inadequate passage plan 
Inappropriate or fail aids 
Command execution failure 
No Consequences 
Pilot Errors 
With Consequences 
Grounding 
Collision 
Loss of life 
Event No 
Event I 
Event 2 
Event 3 
Event 4 
Event 5 
Event 6 
Event 7 
Event 8 
Grounding 
Pollution 
Collision 
Pollution 
Figure lV.l: Event tree of consequences as a result of when a pilot makes an error 
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Now with using the occurrence likelihood grades illustrated in Table IV.I mark the 
evaluation sheets in Tables IV.2.2 and IV.2.3. 
Table IV.2.2: Evaluation Sheet. 
Main causes of pilot error Event No Occurrence 
Likelihood 
Inappropriate command from pilot Event 1 
Pilot Wlaware of ship's behaviour Event 2 
Pilot make an error Event 3 
Ship master make an error of judgement Event 4 
Over friendly relation-ship with pilot Event 5 
Inadequate passage plan Event 6 
Inappropriate or fail aids Event 7 
Command execution failure Event 8 
Table IV.2.3: Evaluation sheet. 
Possibility of consequences after initiation of the security risk Occurrence 
factors likelihood 
Possibility of pilot's error without consequence 
Possibility of pilot's error with consequence of groWlding 
Possibility of pilot's error with consequence of collision 
Possibility of pilot's error with consequence of loss of life 
Possibility ofpilot's error with consequence of grounding but without 
further consequence of pollution 
Possibility of pilot's error with consequence of collision but without 
further consequence of pollution 
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CASE STUDY 2 
Please read Table Iy'3.1 which has listed the main causes for damage to offshore 
terminals that eventually can lead into the consequences shown in Figure IV.2. 
Table IV.3.t: Main causes of the damages to offshore terminals in Caspian Sea. 
Basic Events (Hazards) 
Terrorism and Sabotage 
War and political perils 
Ice damage 
Storm damage 
Earthquake and Tsunami 
Damage to offshore tenninals 
P 1 
No Consequences 
iePt 
With Consequences 
Loss of Life 
P21 
Loss of Property 
Pzz 
Damage to Environment 
P23 
Loss of Repntation Ss 
Figure IV.2: Event tree of consequences as a result of damages to offshore terminals 
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Now in respect of the Caspian Sea while using the occurrence likelihood grades 
illustrated in Table IV. I mark the evaluation sheets shown in Tables IV.3.2 and IV.3.3. 
Table IV.3.2: Evaluation Sheet. 
Main causes for damage to offshore terminals Possibility 
Terrorism and Sabotage 
War and political perils 
Ice damage 
Storm damage 
Earthquake and Tsunami 
Table IV.3.3: Evaluation sheet. 
Consequences as a result of damages to offshore terminals Occurrence likelihood 
Possibility of damage to offshore terminal without consequence 
Loss of life 
Loss of property 
Damage to environment 
Loss of reputation 
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APPENDIX V 
Questionnaire used in Survey 4 for the purpose of 
Chapter 7 
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Liverpool John Moores University 
School of Engineering, Technology and Marine Operations 
LOOM Research Institute 
Byrom Street 
UK,L33AF 
Phone: +44 (0) 151 231 2028 
Fax: +44 (0) 151 231 2453 
Email: k.mokhtari@2007.ljmu.ac.uk 
Date: 16.02.2011 
Dear Sir, 
Security assurance across maritime trading systems is a critical factor for international 
transport and logistics and in the evolution of international trade generally. A security 
attack on a petrochemical port or an offshore terminal, especially if several of such 
attach occur simultaneously, can disrupt nations' economies. This in fact can result in 
severe impact on economy, health, safety of people and public, environmental pollution 
and damage as well as casualties. 
A research project at Liverpool John Moores University is currently being carried out 
with regard to a risk management framework to identify, assess and manage the critical 
hazards that can lead to catastrophic damages to offshore terminals and marine ports. 
After identifying and assessing the most significant hazards among them the foremost 
significant one revealed was security related risk factor. As a result due to importance of 
the mentioned risk factor it was decided to defme a separate strategy for managing of 
the security risk factor. Now the requirement for this investigation is to use an expert's 
judgement who is working in the related fields to score the security risk factors shown 
in the provided security risk factor table. After rating of all security risk factors the total 
score in later stage will be determined to present the security risk status for the selected 
site. Eventually this can help port professionals and port risk managers to develop 
appropriate strategies and take preventive/corrective actions for mitigating security 
threats toward a successful offshore terminals' and marine ports' operations and 
management. 
Thus this survey sets out to provide an organized method for collecting views and 
information pertaining to the implementation of an appropriate risk management 
framework in offshore terminals and marine ports. I should be most grateful if I could 
ask you to spare some of your very valuable time to complete the accompanying 
questionnaire and to email or post it to myself at the address as shown above. Your vital 
feedback will greatly benefit and contribute in the formulation of an industry wide 
opinion. I can assure you that the confidentiality of your response will be honoured and 
respected. 
Best Regards 
Captain Kambiz Mokhtari 
PhD Student 
MSc, BSc, Master Mariner, MICS 
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SECTION 1: PERSONAL DETAILS 
- Please mark the appropriate answer for each question: 
1. Please mark your age range: 
A. Less than 30 years old 
B. Between 30 and 40 years old 
C. 40 years old or more 
2. Please mark your appropriate qualification: 
A. Postgraduate 
B. Undergraduate 
c. High School Diploma 
3. Please mark your work experiences: 
A. Work experience < 10 
B. 105 Work experience 5 20 
C. 20 < Work experience 
SECTION 2: MEASUREMENT SCALES 
Table V.I: Linguistic scales used for rating of the security risk factors in Table V.2. 
Linguistic scales 
Low 
Medium 
High 
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SECTION 3: EXPLANATIONS AND EXAMPLES 
Please read the following case studies carefully to determine security risk status within 
the described petrochemical sea port and offshore terminal. To perform this task 
security risk factors for both sites will be rated by using Table V.3. After rating the all 
security risk factors using the mentioned linguistic scales in Table Y.3 in later stage 
total score will be obtained to determine security risk status for each site. Finally this 
will result to take appropriate security measures and to select the suitable advised 
recommendations based on a total score obtained from table for each site. Now with 
respect to the security risk- factors associated with petrochemical sea port and offshore 
terminal which are depicted in the following case studies fIrst read the below examples 
and then start rating the security risk factors shown in Table V.3. 
Example 1: In your opinion in Case Study 1 the illustrated petrochemical sea port of ( a) 
has located near to which areas? Answer: urban 
Example 2: In Case Study 2 what is your opinion regarding the existing security 
measures taken by the illustrated offshore terminal in respect of the access control from 
sea? Answer: High level 
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CASE STUDY 1: PETROCHEMICAL SEA PORT OF (Cl) 
•••••••••••••••• 
.. 0 
Zo_B 
I 
I 
I z..c 
I 
Figure V.l: Sketch for Petrochemical Sea Port of (a) 
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. _ . 
••••••••••••••• 
Table V.2: Area description for Petrochemical Sea Port of (a) 
ZODl' A ( RefiDery ) 
1 Atmospheric distillation unit 
2 Vacuum distillation uni t 
3 C.atalytic reforming unit 
4 Ca lcinations unit 
5 Cokerunit 
6 DSC Control room 
7 Ammonia Plant 
8 LPG bottling 
9 Naphtha Tank Farm 
10 Power Plant 
11 Control room 
12 Effiuent treatment plant 
13 Crude Oil Tank Farm 
14 Natural Gas Tank Farm 
IS Ammonia Tank Farm 
ZODl' B (Harbour aDd Terminals) 
16 Canteen 
17 Seaman Club 
18 Administrative Building for Oil Rcfmery 
19 Admioistrative Building for Fertilizer Plant 
20 Car and port's machinery parking 
21 Port Control 
22 Crude Oil Import Terminal 
23 LNG Import Terminal 
24 Naphtha Export T crminal 
25 Ammonia Export Tenninal 
26 Fertilizer Export Terminal 
32 Gate 
33 Guard room 
34 Administrative Block 
Js Fire Brigades 
ZoDl' C (Fertilizer Plaaf) 
27 Power Plant 
28 Coal storage 
29 Urea Plant 
30 Urea storage and Bagging plant 
31 AshPond 
Symbols and limits 
Coast Lines •••••••••• 
Railway _ • - • 
Export Pipelines 
Fences 
Zone Margins - - - -
Guard Towers .!J 
Sea Port (a) shown in Figure V.l is a petrochemical complex including different parts 
as explained in Table V.2 and as fotlows: 
• Zone A: a refmery with different petrochemical units for refming the imported 
crude oil and natural gas with the ability to produce naphtha, ammonia and other 
types of petrochemical products; 
• Zone B: including import terminals for receiving and storage of crude oil and 
LNG cargo by Crude Oil Carriers and LNG tanker ships as well as export 
terminals for exporting naphtha by product carriers, ammonia by LPG tankers 
and bagged fertilizer cargo i.e. urea by dry bulk cargo ships; 
• Zone C: a fertilizer plant with capability to produce urea. 
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Petrochemical port (a) is situated within I km distance from a very small city. The 
direction of the city from the port is shown in Figure V.I. As it is shown there is always 
a pennanent wind gusting only during daytime from sunrise to sunset in the fonn of 
land breeze from sea toward shore in the shown direction. Except some of the tall 
buildings in the petrochemical complex, port storage tanks, ships and other units 
situated within the harbour, refinery and fertilizer plant are not visible from outside the 
port. Vertical tall walls and existing break water around the port make all of them 
obscured and invisible. The port is under ownership of the government. Up to the time 
there have not been any reports for terrorist activities except some criminal actions that 
have happened outside the port area. There has not been any type of accident reported. 
Traffic conditions, types and volume of hazardous cargoes are traceable through port 
authorities by the involved bodies or persons. 
The port authority has been implementing the ISPS Code since July 2006. Ship to port 
security interface ISPS procedures and fonnalities are always maintained in very high 
intensity. Existing security measure types along with the other security risk factors 
which are considered as the most important contributing factors affecting the port are all 
listed in the Table V.3. 
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CASE STUDY 2: ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE OF AN OFFSHORE TERMINAL 
Figure V.2: Offshore Terminal of Venice under study 
Ha1crow Group Limited is owned by the Halcrow Trust and employee shareholders Ca 
UK based company). It was appointed by Venice Port Authority to carry out a 
feasibility study in November, 2010 for a new £1.1 billion offshore deep water terminal 
outside Venice Lagoon. As part of the encouraged plan, a new platform will be 
positioned about 14km, from the mainland where the depth of water is 20m. The Port of 
Venice is part of the new Northern Adriatic multiport system, created to play a greater 
role in handling extra Europe-Asia and Europe-Mediterranean cargo flows over the next 
ten years. The offshore terminal will provide a consolidated port base in the 
Mediterranean and absorb incoming vessels from the Suez Canal. The location of the 
Port of Venice (and that of other North Adriatic ports) is exceptionally suitable for 
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goods imported or exported both from markets in the Far East and those in the Southern 
Mediterranean. The port will also act as a "refuge berth" when the MOSE barriers 
(Venices' anti-flood system) are closed. 
The port will be equipped to receive oil tankers, container ships, feeder container ships 
as well as to provide space for future expansion into other categories of goods, such as 
solid bulk cargo coming in on Capesize vessels. 
The shown offshore terminal is divided into three separate zones of A, B and C shown 
in Figure V.3 and is explained as follows. 
The offshore terminal shown in Figure V.3 is equipped to receive crude oil tankers via 
T -jetties of Alpha and Bravo, (see Zone A). The two berth oil terminal site is designed 
to receive ships of over 150,000 tonnes, unloading directly into an underwater pipeline 
linked to the onshore refmeries. 
Additionally the mentioned offshore terminal has three container terminals namely 
Terminal 1, 2 and 3 (see- Zone B). They enable containers to be transferred to or from 
inland terminals where they can be processed and distributed by rail and road links to 
the main local inland routes, as well as to and from markets in central and Eastern 
Europe. The facility is able to handle three ships of capacity between 6,000 and 14,000 
TEU at the same time. Each container terminal has five gantry cranes and ten small 
semi locked jetties enabling smaller container feeder ships operating between onshore 
and offshore terminals to load and discharge containers constantly. 
Support services (see Zone C) including terminal's port control, master tug boats, pilot 
vessels, coast guard, HSE and security section, emergency heliport, medical centre, 
buildings for staff, canteens and offices all of which are supplied by undersea electrical 
cables supplemented with electricity derived from renewable sources. The outer 
breakwater will protect the terminal in all weather. 
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Figure V.3: Venice Offshore Terminal 
Venice offshore terminal is near eight nautical mi les from the Port of Venice situated in 
Northeast of Italy in Adriatic Sea. This offshore terminal apart from visiting ships and 
other official visitors coming from the mainland is designed to accommodate 105 staff 
working in the site involved with different operations. The facility is owned and 
handled by a private Italian company looking after a medium range of shipping traffic 
within the facility. Occasionally there are swells and wind gusts coming from open sea, 
the direction from which is shown in Figure V.2. In this context for the safety reasons 
the breakwater of the facility is designed in such a way to minimise the effect of winds 
and swells to provide a good shelter for visiting ships. The breakwater also helps to 
reduce the visibility of the berthed ships and the whole operations within the facility for 
the purpose of security. Although there are no storage tanks for the processed gases and 
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chemicals within the site but the terminal always handles lots of containers in the form 
of Dangerous Good (DG) Containers. These specially designed containers in fact carry 
different types of IMO classed DGs such as different hazardous processed gases and 
chemicals. As soon as the mentioned DG containers arrive to site, very quickly they will 
be transferred and loaded into the outgoing container or feeder ships but only will 
remain on the jetties in terminals 1, 2 and 3 for a very short period of time. The 
imported crude oil will be pumped out from the berthed crude oil tankers via pipelines 
to shore based refineries or other destinations. There is no history on security incidents 
or any sign for the presence of terrorist groups or similar activities in the regions. 
The Venice Port Authority and in fact this offshore facility have been implementing the 
ISPS Code since July 2006. Ship to port security interface ISPS procedures and 
formalities are always maintained in very high level and intensity. Existing security 
measure types along with the other security risk factors which are considered as the 
most important contributing factors affecting this offshore terminal are all listed in 
Table V.2. 
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TabJe V.3: Security Risk Factor Table (SRFT) for petrochemical sea ports and offshore 
terminals 
Seemity risk racton LlDgalsli£ Sc:ales for rating security risk ractors Security Auditor'. 
ratl!!lls 
Site'. Iocatloa Rural Urban High Density 
VlsibUity status of ships aDd storage IaDb NotVisibl. Less Visible Highly Visible 
Processed cas aad liquid chemicals storage Medium Large Very!.arge 
Imported crucle oU aad natural gas storage Medium Large Very Large 
Tawr ships trsllk Low Medium High 
Site's owaership Pri''3te PubliclPrivate Government 
Preseau of terrorist groups ID region Low quantity Medium quanlity Large quantity 
Worst Impact o ..... ite Low Moderate Severe 
Wonl impac:t off-slte Low Moderate Severe 
History of security hlddents in site Nil Few Frequent 
Meteorologkal coaditioDS Good Moderate Bad 
Target idenUf!catlon - chemical - by terrorists: 
CW (Chemical Weapoa) agents None Minimum Present 
Listed chemical. of cOllC.,ra None Minimum Present 
• CII.,mkals of extreme toxidty None Minimum Present 
Existing securIty measures: 
Access <08trol from lud High level Ordinary Poor/~ 
Auess coatro! from sea High level OrdiDary Poor/6lDiinary 
Perimeter protec:tlon High level Ordinary Poor/&dinary 
Mitigation potential Highleve! Ordinary Poor/&dinary 
Proper lighting (All over the port) High level Ordinary Poor/~ 
Use of metsl deteetorlX-rayl CCTV High level Ordinary Poor/&dinary (at entrllDce a .... at aD crltie8llocationl) 
Pre-amval security coalrol of ship. High level Ordinary Poor/'lDiinaIy 
Secnrlty bospec:don of .hips la terminal. High level Ordinary Poor/'lDiinaIy 
before cargo opendollS begbI 
Employees preparedness, aWareness aDd Wen prepared 
Average Poor 
tralnlDgs 
Poor ReJiabU\ty ud .tatns of readlDes_ of emergency WdJ Prepared Average 
units "_g. health, s.fety, emronmeat, securIty 
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Poor/none 
Poor/none 
Poor/none 
Poor/none 
Poor/none 
Poor/none 
Poor/none 
Poor/none 
APPENDIX VI 
Questionnaire used in Survey 5 for the purpose of 
Chapter 8 
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Liverpool John Moores University 
School of Engineering, Technology and Marine Operations 
LOOM Research Institute 
Byrom Street 
L33AF 
UK 
Phone: +44 (0) 151 231 2028 
Fax: +44 (0) 151231 2453 
Email: k.mokhtari@2007.ljmu.ac.uk 
Date: 11.05.2011 
Dear Sir, 
Ports and offshore terminals are critical infrastructure resources and play key roles in 
the transportation of goods and people. With more than eighty percent of international 
trade by volume being carried out by sea, ports and offshore terminals are vital for 
seaborne trade and international commerce. Furthermore in today's uncertain and 
complex environment there is a need to analyse the participated risk factors in order to 
prioritise protective measures in these critically logistics infrastructures. Protective 
measures must be identified and selected using appropriate tools and techniques. 
A research project at Liverpool John Moores University is currently being carried out 
with regard to a risk management framework to identify, assess and manage the critical 
hazards that can lead to catastrophic damages to offshore terminals and marine ports. 
After identifying and assessing the most significant hazards it has been decided to 
introduce and select the best strategies in order to mitigate the risk factors. Now the 
requirement for this investigation is to use experts' judgements who are working in the 
related fields to rate and select the best strategies for mitigating the identified risk 
factors. Eventually this can help port professionals and port risk managers to develop 
appropriate strategies and take preventive/corrective actions for mitigating risks toward 
a successful offshore terminals' and marine ports' operations and management. 
Thus this survey sets out to provide an organized method for collecting views and 
information pertaining to the implementation of an appropriate risk management 
framework in offshore terminals and marine ports. I should be most grateful if I could 
ask you to spare some of your very valuable time to complete the accompanying 
questionnaire and to email or post it to myself at the address as shown above. Your vital 
feedback will greatly benefit and contribute in the formulation of an industry wide 
opinion. I can assure you that the confidentiality of your response will be honoured and 
respected. 
Best Regards 
Captain Kambiz Mokhtari 
PhD Student 
MSc, BSc, Master Mariner, MICS 
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SECTION 1: PERSONAL DETAILS 
- Please mark the appropriate answer for each question: 
1. Please mark your age range: 
A. Less than 30 years old 
B. Between 30 and 40 years old 
C. 40 years old or more 
2. Please mark your appropriate qualification: 
A. Postgraduate 
B. Undergraduate 
C. High School Diploma 
3. Please mark your work experiences: 
A. Work experience < 10 
B. 10 ~ Work experience ~ 20 
C. 20 < Work experience 
SECTION 2: MEASUREMENT SCALES 
Table VI.l: Grades used for showing importance of the best strategy for mitigating the 
Level 2 risk factors shown in Figure VI. 1 
Effect of the mitigation or 
control options over the 
level 2 risk factors 
Very Low 
Low 
Medium 
High 
Very High 
347 
Grade 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
SECTION 3: EXPLANATIONS AND EXAMPLES 
First look at the general risk·based model used for the purpose of the offshore terminals' 
and marine ports' operations and management as shown in Figure VI.I. Subsequently 
fill the empty spaces of the evaluation sheet shown in Table VI.3 by selecting the 
appropriate grades from Table VI.I for the purpose of mitigation or controlling the 
Level 2 risk factors listed in the said evaluation sheet. The grades in Table VI. I show 
the effect or importance value of the ten mitigation or control options illustrated in 
Table VI.2 over the nineteen risk factors in Level 2. As a result empty spaces must be 
filled by selecting an appropriate importance value for each of the mitigation options 
against nineteen depicted Level 2 risk factors shown in Figure VI. I and listed in Table 
VI.3. Now read the following examples and then by using the appropriate tables fill the 
evaluation sheet in Table VI.3. 
Example I: What is the importance of a VTMS 01 esseI Traffic Management System) 
A8 (shown in Table VI.2) in order to mitigate the safety risk factor RII (shown in 
Figure VI. I ) during of offshore terminals' and marine ports' operations and 
management? Answer: Very High - Grade (5) 
Example 2: What is the importance of (Privatisation) A2 (shown in Table VI.2) of a sea 
port or an offshore terminal in order to mitigate the competition risk factor R21 (shown 
in Figure VI. I ) during the offshore terminals and marine ports? 
Answer: Very High - Grade (5) 
Example 3: What is the importance of (ISPS Code) A9 (shown in Table VI.2) in order 
to mitigate the quality process risk factor R33 (shown in Figure VI. 1 ) during the 
offshore terminals and marine ports operations and management? 
Answer: Very Low - Grade (I) 
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Main Goal Level 0 Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 
l ! ! ! --+ 
Macro-economic practices R11 
Counby Political and Social Systems R12 
~ Risks 
- Foreign Enterprises Policy R13 
R1 
Portltenninal Development Policy R14 
'- Portltenninal Management Policy R15 
.--
External I--Risk 
Factors 
Business K Competition Factors R21 Risks '-- Indusby Change R22 Major R2 Customer Change R23 
Souroes of 
Risks and 
Uncertainties 
in Offshore -
Tenninals Organisational Structure R31 
and Marine --
Ports 
Organisational Management R32 
Risks 
,..... 
-
Quality Process R33 
R3 Human Resources R34 
K.P.I R35 
Internal 
'-- Risk I--
Factors 
~ Safaty Risks Factors R41 
Operational 
~ Security Risks Factors R42 
Risks Pollution Risks Factors R43 
'-- I-
Legal Risks Factors R44 
R4 Human Error Risks Factors R45 
.... Technical Risks Factors R46 
Figure VI.I: A generic risk-based model in offshore terminals and marine ports 
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Table VI.2: Best alternatives for mitigating Level 2 risk factors shown in Figure VI. 1. 
Alternatives Names 
Al Internal Audits and Inspections 
A2 Privatisation 
A3 ISPS Code 
A4 ISO 20000 
A5 Port Risk Manager 
A6 Safety Cases and Safety Reports 
A7 IMS (ISO: 9000, 14000, 18000) 
A8 VTMS 
A9 Deregulation 
AI0 HSE-MS 
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Table VI.3: Evaluation sheet. 
Levell 
Risk Al A2 A3 A4 AS A6 A7 AS A9 AIO 
Facton 
RH 
R12 
R13 
R14 
RIS 
R21 
R22 
R23 
RlI 
Rl2 
R33 
Rl4 
Rl5 
R41 
R42. 
R43 
R44 
R45 
R46 
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APPENDIX VII 
First journal paper published as par-t of the thesis 
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